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1. Introduction
The year 2019 was dominated by debates over ecological crises, and the climate crisis in particular.
One day in September, millions of – mostly young – people took to the streets on all continents to
demand a sea change in political action against climate change, including in unlikely locations such
as Kabul. Irrespective of their varying degrees of rhetorical support for these concerns, political
elites – vested as they have been in the global regime of fossil capitalism – still appear nonplussed
in terms of comprehensive action plans. These mounting ecological crises eventually translate into a
double  crisis  for  capital:  In  the  face  of  tightening  ecological  constraints,  a  growth-dependent
economy that yields very uneven benefits to different social groups across the globe is becoming
more difficult to justify – a  crisis of legitimacy unfolds, as exemplified in the popular movement
slogan “system change not climate change.” In the longer run, a crisis of reproduction is pending:
Ecosystems  global  and  local,  as  well  as  “natural”  resources,  have  constituted  indispensable
background conditions of capital accumulation. These are rapidly eroding.
Attention to the climate crisis had previously peaked in the mid-2000s – shortly before the
2007–9 financial crisis hit, which added to the legitimation crisis and went on to shape the political
economy as well as the cultural parameters of the 2010s in myriad ways. In reaction both to these
multiple crises and to the failure of global climate diplomacy at the 2009 Copenhagen summit, as
well as in anticipation of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio
de Janeiro (the Rio+20 summit), a group of international institutions presented, within the span of
twelve  months,  a  set  of  reports  that  outlined  the  road  towards  a  revitalized  capitalist  Green
Economy (GE) driven by  green growth,  which promised to solve economic,  environmental  and
social problems all at one stroke (OECD, 2011b; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2012). While never
unchallenged,  the  model  developed  through  this  coordinated  effort  continues  to  exert  a  broad
influence on “green” policy debates – and policy design – in the era of mass youth climate strikes.
Against the background of capitalism’s historical lack of environmental sustainability and
the renewed sense of urgency that dominates current policy debates, this begs the first lead question
guiding  my  research: Could  the  strategies  pursued  in  major  international  institutions’  Green
Economy models enable “green” systemic capital accumulation in the 21st century?  My research
suggests that the GE approach instead aids the emergence of an Economy of Additionality that ulti-
mately fails to halt ecological crises, complementing the infrastructures of fossil capitalism rather
than supplanting them. But this finding is predicated upon the assembly of several building blocks.
The  GE’s  grand  promise  involves  a  win-win-win  situation in  which  environmental
degradation and resource depletion are halted and the biosphere stabilized (an environmental win)
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 2
while the accumulation of capital continues indefinitely, perhaps infinitely (an economic win) – and
the benefits are widely shared (“inclusive” growth, a social win). The GE, in emphasizing internali-
zation, promises to end capital’s historical reliance on the externalization of costs to “others” – to
paid and unpaid productive and reproductive workers, but also to communities and ecosystems.
Consequently, it must be held to this no-externalizations standard, which itself implies a more dra-
matic break with the history of capitalist development than the Green Economy institutions care to
admit. One major task of this dissertation is to investigate, How consistent is the Green Economy’s
promise to  reconcile  economic growth with environmental  sustainability  and social  equity  and,
effectively, to end capital’s systematic externalization of costs?  This is the second lead question,
which broadens the view compared to the necessarily capitalocentric – and mostly functional –
perspective of the first. The argument here is that “win-win-win” outcomes are not on the horizon.
Instead, the GE functions as a re-externalization regime in which the (partial) internalization of
ecological costs is compensated through new mechanisms of cost shifting to capital’s “others.”
The global perspective assumed here highlights the propensity for – and limitations to –
problem shifting within global capitalism, tracing attempts to re-externalize costs across borders that
may  sneak  off  the  canvas  in  smaller-scale  investigations.  It  is  therefore  an  indispensable
complement  to  more  fine-grained  local-  and  national-level  studies  of  “green”  transformation
attempts. The Green Economy, like “green” capitalism more generally, is thus treated here mostly as
a  macroeconomic concept:  The pivotal question is not whether it offers new profitable business
models at the microeconomic or sectoral level (it certainly does) or whether a cultural tendency
towards “greening” and sustainability efforts is detectable in many contexts (it certainly is), but
whether or not the grand win-win-win promise of the Green Economy can be realized at a global
scale. While it is impossible to present a gapless analysis of accumulation processes at this global
scale, and much relevant detail will inevitably be missed, this macro-perspective is important in
order to do justice to the global span of both capitalism and the biosphere it is embedded in. 
This is reflected in the third lead question, which transcends the particularities of the GE
model: How  can  we  conceptualize  the  conditions  and  constraints  for  “green”  systemic
accumulation – and accumulation under ecological constraints – more generally? Another central
objective  of  this  dissertation,  thus,  is  to  systematize  the  critical  analysis  of  “green”  capitalism
through  a  theoretical  focus  on  the  centrality,  conditions,  feasibility  and  by-effects  of  systemic
accumulation. The development of a conceptual vocabulary appropriate to this task, as outlined in
section 1.4 below, is perhaps the most important step in this direction undertaken here. 
The final question combines these building blocks and ties together the analyses throughout
this work with a view towards possible alternative incarnations of “green” capitalism: Beyond the
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Green  Economy  model,  what  are  the  prospective  limits  to  the  “greening”  of  capitalism?  A
definitive answer to the problem of “green” accumulation, with a precise quantification of potential
for  the  21st century,  is  of  course  inherently  impossible  to  formulate  due to  the  contingency of
political  and  technological  developments  as  well  as  the  residual  uncertainty  with  regard  to
ecological tipping points. But the systemic accumulation approach developed here hopes to offer an
improved understanding of the dynamics of, and constraints to, “green” accumulation and thus to
assist in a realistic assessment of the stakes – which is then attempted in bloc V. 
The remainder of this introduction discusses the motivation behind this study (section 1.1)
and explains its intended contribution to the debate over “green” capitalism (section 1.3). It then
provides a structural (section 1.2) and conceptual (section 1.4) overview and finally clarifies some
terminological issues (section 1.5).
1.1 Into political wilderness
As this  thesis  begins  to  trace  the  haphazard  and  piecemeal  implementation  of  green-capitalist
policies  throughout  the  decade  heralded  by the  initial  diffusion  of  the  Green  Economy  model,
readers might wonder whether this isn’t simply a set of quaint ideas thrown around by non-fiction
entrepreneurs and think tanks out of touch with political reality. What, then, motivates this study? 
The GE model is not just some abstract proposal; it has been relentlessly advocated by the
most resourceful and well-coordinated actors within “green” transformation debates, and (not least
because of this) it exhibits a close, reciprocal relationship to prevalent real-world “green” policy
approaches  in  an  era  of  “mature”  neoliberalism.  As  the  GE,  preferring  market-based solutions
wherever possible, generally seeks to reproduce not only capitalist but, more specifically, neoliberal
hegemony, it  has achieved a weak and partial  hegemony – but hegemony nonetheless – within
“green” policy debates (cf. chapter 9). This is why this thesis privileges the GE model – particularly
in the first  blocs – while always keeping an eye on the more general possibility of a systemic
“greening” of capitalism, which finally takes center stage in bloc V. Alternative green-capitalist
projects – proposed, for example, under the banner of a Green New Deal – may envision a deeper
transformation but ultimately face the same structural constraints (see sections 9.3 and 10.2).
The  late  Mark  Fisher  remarked  in  Capitalist  Realism that  “environmental  catastrophe
features in late capitalist culture only as a kind of simulacra, its real implications for capitalism too
traumatic to be assimilated into the system.” (2009, p. 18) The Green Economy, in many ways, is an
enactment of this drama. Its ontology of natural capital (section 2.6.1) seeks to assimilate “nature”
conceptually by means of translation into the language and logic of capital and, thus, to render the
effects less traumatic. This thesis traces the manifold confusions, false equivalences and – often
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violent – social and material restructurings resulting from this aggressive reductionism. Irrespective
of such implications, however, the GE approach is notable for its unrelenting optimism: “Green”
capitalism  is  not  just  portrayed  as  viable  despite  (hard,  constraining)  regulations  but  as  more
dynamic in the medium term than “gray” capitalism because of (soft, enabling) regulations.  
The  drama  of  “green”  capitalism  more  broadly  conceived  is  perhaps  best  approached
through another,  quite  well-worn quote:  “[I]t  is  easier to imagine the end of the world than to
imagine the end of capitalism.” (Jameson, 2003, p. 76) As the crises that the Green Economy seeks
to address continue to aggravate and effective responses are needed, both of these eschatological
visions gain in salience. Consciously or not, however,  any response to ecological crises that does
not explicitly envision a transformation beyond capitalist  relations boils down to  some form of
“green” capitalism. Within capitalism, green-capitalist policy approaches are the default option, and
most real-world policy debates revolve around the strategies introduced here in chapter 2. In this
sense, absent successful counter-projects of radical social transformation,  the future of humanity
absolutely hinges on the realization of “green” capitalism and its lofty promises.
But “green” capitalism, including the Green Economy as a particular neoliberal incarnation
that  carries  an  additional  burden  of  contradictions,  rests  on  curious  theoretical  and  empirical
foundations.  Theoretically,  as  first  addressed  in  chapter  4,  infinite  economic  expansion  and
appropriation of surplus value on a finite material basis remains a highly contradictory proposal.
Empirically, as we will see in chapters 3 and 6, the GE is not proven to bring the desired ecological
benefits. Politically, it tends to be stymied by its own non-confrontational logic (see chapter 8).
There is exactly one escape route, which again is littered with a number of theoretical and empirical
obstacles  discussed  in  chapter  5:  a  “green-tech  revolution”  which  thoroughly  and  permanently
dematerializes  the  global  economy.  Any  theoretical  argument  explaining  why  this  outcome  is
extremely unlikely could be belied by future events, and empirical evidence can only establish the
non-occurrence  of  such  miracle  after  the  fact.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  this  green-capitalist
strategy  is  given  a  label  that  paradoxically  evokes  faith  and  religion  along  with  science  and
technology: the gospel of eco-efficiency (section 2.6.2 and chapter 5).  
Consequently,  a  decision  –  explicit  or  implicit  –  in  favor  of  green-capitalist  responses
amounts to a wager with long odds and extremely high stakes: life on Earth as we know it, i.e., in
Holocene-like conditions. Even before we turn to the expectably disparate social consequences, the
wildly uneven distribution of losses and benefits, we may note, on mathematical grounds, that this
is not a gamble that many people would enter into in any other context.1 Thus, while policy debates
1 A decade ago, a group of climate scientists commented that “probabilities of averting damage that fall within the 
50%–90%-range—i.e., the range generally discussed in relation to the climate problem—would be considered 
completely unacceptable in everyday contexts (e.g., with respect to traffic safety, prevention of infectious diseases, 
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are usually dominated by a division between those who support green-capitalist interventions and
those who consider any environmental policy with any teeth too much to bear, it is worth calling
attention to the unfortunate circumstance that the green-capitalist path itself is extremely risky from
a social  and  an  ecological  perspective,  all  win-win-win  rhetoric  notwithstanding.  This  work  is
dedicated to a systematic exposition of these risks. 
One critic of green-capitalist policies already noted during the trough of the recession in
2009 that “the crisis has not led to a critique of market-based instruments, but rather to an ever more
desperate attempt to cling to them, in spite of all their weaknesses, for beyond them there seems to
be nothing but political wilderness.” (Brunnengräber, 2009b, p. 26) When the Green Economy took
the  stage  soon after,  it  validated  this  assessment.  This  particular  model,  although a  product  of
neoliberal hegemony and its incipient crisis, has arguably made limited headway against the “gray”
economy throughout the 2010s. Nevertheless, the GE’s policy arsenal remains the default response
on the part of those global policy elites wary of “political wilderness.” The Paris Agreement on
climate change (United Nations, 2015) – hailed as a milestone despite being non-binding and falling
far short  of the type of global deal originally envisioned to be sealed in Copenhagen six years
earlier – reflects this hegemony, suggesting market- and technology-centered paths out of the crisis
while remaining silent on “hard” regulations or measures to limit the extraction of fossil fuels. The
European  Commission’s  (2018) recently  published  long-term vision  of  a  clean  and prosperous
future equally demonstrates that the GE is still alive and kicking in the imaginary of technocrats. 
But in the real world, the surge of right-wing parties has opened up “wilderness” territory of
quite a different kind, in which environmental ambitions are openly renounced. The technocratic
road to a Green Economy remains rocky: While French President Macron ridiculed U.S. colleague
Trump for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, his own attempts to increase carbon taxes while
defending tax cuts for the rich sparked rebellions throughout France in late 2018 (section 7.4). In
the  light  of  both  the  more  recent  progressive  turn  of  the  debate  on  climate  change  and  other
ecological crises and the closing time frame for mitigation, critical engagement with the green-
capitalist imaginary remains an urgent task. A foray into a progressive political wilderness beyond
green-capitalist solutions may, after all, not seem quite as reckless as clinging to the latter.
1.2 Overview and structure
Four research questions were outlined above:
1. Could the strategies pursued in major international institutions’ Green Economy models
enable “green” systemic capital accumulation in the 21st century? (→ Bloc IV)
etc.)!” (Messner, Schellnhuber, Rahmstorf, & Klingenfeld, 2010, p. 5)
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2. How  consistent  is  the  Green  Economy’s  promise  to  reconcile  economic  growth  with
environmental sustainability  and social equity and, effectively, to end capital’s systematic
externalization of costs? (→ Bloc III)
3. How can we conceptualize the conditions and constraints for “green” systemic accumu-
lation – and accumulation under ecological constraints – more generally? (→ Bloc II)
4. Beyond the  Green Economy  model, what are the prospective limits to the “greening” of
capitalism? (→ Bloc V)
The first two questions pertain to the Green Economy model – the first from a more functional and
the  second  from  a  normative  perspective.  The  remaining  two  questions  approach  the  general
prospects of “green” capitalism – while question 3 helps to provide the foundations for the entire
analysis,  including  that  of  the  particular  Green  Economy  case  treated  through  the  first  two
questions, question 4 eventually builds on these foundations to offer a broader outlook. The main
body of this thesis, then, is structured into five blocs: an introductory bloc plus four more that each
privilege  one lead  question.  As indicated  above,  these questions  will  not  be addressed  in  their
original order of appearance but in a sequence that reflects their particular mutual interdependence:
First the conceptual framework (bloc II), then the GE’s externalizations record (bloc III), followed
by its  overall  prospects  qua  accumulation regime (bloc IV) and, finally,  the potential  of green-
capitalist alternatives to fare better (bloc V).
Bloc I introduces the  Green Economy  model and the institutions promoting it (chapter 2)
and reviews both the level of “green” ambition embodied in this model and the evidence of its
materialization in  “green” policy throughout  the 2010s point  (chapter  3).  Bloc II  then builds  a
theoretical framework  in response to the third lead question, focusing first on the logic of “green”
capital  accumulation in  view of basic  structural  contradictions between capital  and ecology (in
chapter  4)  and then  on the pivotal  role  of  green-technological  innovation  (chapter  5).  Bloc  III
addresses the second question regarding the GE’s normative promises, highlighting the – multi-
faceted but structurally limited – appropriation of Cheap Natures (chapter 6) and further patterns of
cost re-externalization in GE strategies that clearly violate the “win-win-win” pledge (chapter 7). 
Building on the cumulative insights of the previous blocs, bloc IV seeks to settle the first
question regarding the GE’s potential to realize “green” systemic accumulation: Political-economic
hesitancy decisively circumscribes the  Green Economy’s implementation record (chapter 8), and
following a systematic assessment according to the criteria developed in the theory bloc, it is argued
that  the  “actually  emerging”  GE is  better  characterized  as  an  Economy of  Additionality  whose
uneven selection of “green” systemic accumulation strategies leaves the fossil-fueled infrastructure
of global capitalism in place and develops little transformative power (chapter 9). The final bloc V
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then proceeds to ask, in line with the final research question,  whether alternative models could
realize a fully “green” capitalism – but these seem equally incapable of overcoming the capital—
ecology rift (chapter 10), and at the global scale,  additional political-economic and institutional
barriers appear insurmountable under capitalist conditions (chapter 11). The concluding chapter 12
summarizes the findings of this dissertation and, hazarding another foray into dystopian territory,
discusses the prospect of authoritarian responses in the wake of a failed “greening” of capitalism
before drawing a few strategic conclusions for progressive movements. 
1.3 Towards a systemic accumulation view of “green” capitalism
Critical  scholarship  has  provided  fruitful  analyses  of  the  incipient  Green  Economy  as  well  as
“green” capitalism more generally, its technological basis, its class basis, its ideological basis and its
preferred political/regulatory  instruments.  The contribution  of  this  work is  to  complement  such
perspectives  with  a  combined  approach  which  foregrounds  the  question  of  “green”  systemic
accumulation  in  the  “somewhat  longer  durée”  of  the  21st century  –  and  the  systematic  re-
externalizations this entails. This attempt reflects a wide range of theoretical influences and deploys
an  equally  wide  range  of  conceptual  tools:  from Marxian  economics  to  Gramscian  studies  of
hegemony  and  regulationist  political  economy,  from  eco-Marxist,  neo-Polanyian  and  political
ecology  analyses  of  capitalist  environmental  degradation  to  a  world-systems  perspective  on
capitalist history in the longue durée and a world-ecology understanding of capitalism as a way of
organizing nature. This section outlines the analytical lenses and focal points defining this approach
to  a  critique  of  the  Green  Economy  and  the  prospects  of  “green”  capitalism,  and  clarifies  its
particular contribution to – and engagement with – the existent body of literature. 
1.3.1 Systemic accumulation
Many objects of critical scholarly attention in the field of “green” capitalism, including emerging
micro-level  business  models  in  “green” growth sectors  (see the fascinating study of  “cleantech
entrepreneurialism”  in  Goldstein,  2018),  the  ideological  foundations  of  “green”  capitalism  (an
excellent  discourse-analytical  critique  is  offered  in  Kenis  &  Lievens,  2015) or  the
(consumer-)cultural mainstreaming of “green” discourses (Szasz, 2011), only play ancillary roles in
this  work.  As  reflected  in  the  lead  questions,  the  primary  concern  here  is  with  systemic
accumulation, the spiraling, global-scale process of capitalist reproduction-by-expansion as outlined
in chapter 4. Even eco-Marxist polemics against “green” capitalism tend to neglect this dimension
(R. Smith, 2016; Tanuro, 2013). Critiques of “green” capitalism in the tradition of regulation theory,
Gramscian political economy and historical-materialist theories of the state  (Brand, 2012, 2014;
Brand & Wissen, 2014; Kaufmann & Müller, 2009; Mahnkopf, 2016; Mueller & Passadakis, 2009;
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Rest, 2011; Sander, 2016; Wanner, 2015) provide us with a good historical grasp of how green-
capitalist  strategies  may  translate  into  selective  and  uneven  processes  of  transformation.  The
regulationist concept of a regime of accumulation points to the functional requirements of systemic
accumulation, particularly the need to balance patterns of production and consumption  (Aglietta,
2015a; Becker, 2013, pp. 36–41; Lipietz, 1985, pp. 119–120), which can be expanded by considera-
tion of ecological conditions of production. But world-systems perspectives are necessary here to
complement the national scale privileged by regulationist  conceptions  with a global view.2 Can
“green” capitalism work in functional terms? What side effects appear inevitable? These questions
are  central  to  the  prospects  for  capitalist  survival  under  tightening  ecological  constraints.  The
systemic accumulation focus here serves as the central hub that links most of the following items.
This focus extends to the complex organization of systemic accumulation at various scales
(see section 4.1). The world-ecology view pioneered by Jason W. Moore  (see following section)
here suggests an operationalization of the first two lead questions: Can “green” capitalism be a
feasible way of “organizing” nature? By what strategies does the  Green Economy seek to make
nature “work for” – or at least not “work against” – capital in the 21 st century? This obviously
relates to all three macro-strategies identified in section 2.6, and this framework is likewise applied
throughout  the analysis  of  Cheap Nature  potentials  in  chapter  6.  Political  ecologists  here offer
excellent insights into the particular mechanisms by which nature is theoretically constructed as,
and practically turned into, capital  (e.g. Corson, MacDonald, & Neimark, 2013; Heuwieser, 2015;
MacDonald, 2013; Moreno, Speich Chassé, & Fuhr, 2015; Robertson, 2006; Sullivan, 2009). This
work attempts to synthesize these insights into a more comprehensive theoretical framework. 
In addition, there is the question of political institutions that shape the particular form of
such organization.  These cannot  be reduced to  the market  but also involve “anti-markets” (see
sections  4.1  and  10.1).  International  institutions  that  evolved  in  the  20th century  now propose
particular,  contradictory  political  forms  for  green-capitalist  planetary  management in  the  21st
(chapter 11). While immediately relevant to the first two (GE-related) research questions, all of this
also feeds into the discussion of the broader prospects for 21st-century “green” systemic accumu-
lation throughout bloc V, and thus into the final question that reaches beyond the GE approach.
1.3.2 Longer historical view
Critiques of “green” capitalism rarely go beyond the time frame of regulation theory, in which the
life of accumulation regimes tends  to be measured in decades (cf.  section 4.1.2).  As suggested
above, I will apply Jason W. Moore’s world-ecology approach (Moore, 2010, 2015, 2016; Patel &
2 A rare exception, Victor and Jackson’s (2012) brief response to UNEP’s GE model perhaps remains the most 
intriguing systemic accumulation perspective on green-capitalist futures.
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Moore, 2018; Walker & Moore, 2019) to the problematique of “green” capitalism. World-ecology,
along  with  world-systems  analysis  more  broadly,  is  steeped  in  longue  durée  historiography,
highlighting both the cyclical development of the capitalist world economy since its emergence and
its  progressive  expansion  within  an  increasingly  “fuller”  world  (see  also  section  4.1.2).  This
perspective allows both to recognize green-capitalist strategies as reenactments of age-old strategies
of appropriation and externalization  and  to understand the progressive historical  aggravation of
ecological crises through systemic accumulation that approaches planetary limits, pointing in the
direction of a terminal crisis. In particular, analyzing “green” accumulation in terms of Arrighi’s
systemic cycles of accumulation (SCAs) or “long centuries” allows for a combined perspective on
technology, economic dynamics and territorial-political power constellations (see chapter 11).
1.3.3 Developing a conceptual vocabulary
Overviews  and  typologies  of  Green  Economy  models  and  various  associated  concepts  abound
(Bailey & Caprotti, 2014; Death, 2015; Georgeson, Maslin, & Poessinouw, 2017; Levidow, 2014;
Loiseau et al., 2016), but these do not offer a comprehensive conceptual framework to understand
the potential for – and limitations of – “green” accumulation. In response to the third lead question,
a four-component framework as outlined in section 1.4 below is developed. It includes two broad
types of constraints to green-capitalist development, three sets of criteria a green-capitalist regime
needs to fulfill, four theoretically available “green” accumulation strategies – and three empirically
observable macro-strategies that define the  Green Economy approach.  This conceptual landscape,
mapped in Appendix 1, is intended to enable a more systematic understanding of the potential and
limitations of the Green Economy, and of “green” capitalism more generally. 
1.3.4 Re-externalizations
This framework is attentive to the myriad ways in which green-capitalist reforms are exercises in
problem  shifting rather than problem  solving,  creating new externalizations while  attempting to
correct others – a way of providing an answer to the second and third questions.  Through the
analyses in bloc III, including the world-ecology-inspired typology of Cheap Natures in chapter 6,
it  attempts  to  do  so  more  systematically  than  previous  analyses.  The  field  work  of  countless
political  ecologists  who  have  critically  examined  the  uneven  impacts  of  Green  Economy
experiments  in  localities  across  the  global  South  and  beyond  again  provides  rich  empirical
foundations  for  this  theorization  (e.g.  Bakker,  2007;  Bergius,  Benjaminsen,  & Widgren,  2018;
Buseth, 2017; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; McAfee, 2016). Activist writings have further
pointed  out  the  inequities  of  emerging  green-capitalist  ideology  and  practice  (Thematic  Social
Forum, 2012; Unmüßig, Sachs, & Fatheuer, 2012; Kill, 2015). In combination, this allows for a
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sharpened immanent critique that measures the  Green Economy’s promise of an end to capital’s
externalizations against  evidence of  new and persistent  forms of  externalization.  Such complex
dialectics  of  externalizations—internalizations,  shaped  by  (and  shaping)  class  and  other  power
struggles, arguably have always been at the core of the historical development of capitalism. These
patterns, as analyzed with regard to the emergent  Green Economy  here, consequently provide an
important lens through which to understand the GE in a world-historical perspective.
1.3.5 The politics and specificity of the Green Economy
Only a small part of the critical literature on “green” capitalism pays specific attention to the set of
Green Economy reports that will be at the center of my analysis and the institutions behind them
(notable examples in journal-article length include Brockington, 2012; Goodman & Salleh, 2013;
Lander, 2011; Wanner, 2015; also Victor & Jackson, 2012). In some cases, various strands of green-
capitalist thought are conflated in the critical  literature.  Specifically, neo-Keynesian  Green New
Deal proposals are often treated as representative of “green” capitalism in general (Goldstein, 2018;
Kaufmann & Müller, 2009; Wainwright & Mann, 2018). In this perspective, the specific content
that neoliberal hegemony brings to the Green Economy agenda tends to be discounted in the face of
neoliberalism’s crisis, whereas the GE reveals not only the long shadow neoliberalism continues to
cast but also its particular approach to crisis management through shifting externalizations. My goal
in  this  respect  is  to  clarify  this  historical  specificity  and distinguish  the  Green  Economy  from
previous (and parallel) incarnations of green-capitalist thought.
As highlighted in the following section, political-economic constraints importantly curtail
the  development  of  the  Green  Economy  in  terms  of  policy  formulation,  adoption  and
implementation, relative to the “outer” limits drawn by purely functional constraints. This forms a
crucial part of any comprehensive answer to my first two research questions but is also relevant to
the others due to the close linkages between political-economic and structural-economic constraints.
Both  Gramsci’s  theory  of  hegemony  and  the  regulation  school’s  work  on  historical  modes  of
capitalist  regulation  provide  valuable  tools  to  understand  the  political-economic  struggles  that
condition the historical development of capitalism. Drawing on these concepts,  chapter 8 traces
these lines of conflict in an attempt to understand the relative strength of the green-capitalist project
relative to  the “gray” incumbent  regime.  The distribution of  costs  and benefits  associated with
“greening” measures, again, forms an important part of these conflict dynamics. Bloc V likewise
relates to this political dimension by exploring alternative green-capitalist futures as well as global
competitive dynamics and thus determining whether the Economy of Additionality is the inevitable
destination of green-capitalist tendencies. 
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1.4 Conceptual outline
This  section  will  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  conceptual  landscape  developed  in  this
dissertation.  The  broad  range  of  theoretical  tools  outlined  above  is  deployed  to  identify  basic
requirements and various sets of constraints for green-capitalist development as well as available
responses to these, and to assess the particular choice of strategies bundled in the Green Economy
model. One of the central objectives of this work is to develop, on the basis of this rich arsenal, a
conceptual vocabulary to make sense of the prospects for “green” capitalism and enable a more
systematic approach to its analysis. The approach outlined here is visualized in Appendix 1.
In the most  abstract  terms,  this  dissertation sets  out  to  analyze two distinct  but  closely
interrelated types of constraints and conditions for green-capitalist development. The first are what I
will call  structural-economic constraints; these express a more functional view of the process of
capital  accumulation.  Structural-economic  constraints  point  to  the  systemic  limits  to  capital:  If
systemic accumulation is not possible, if over a longer or even indefinite period of time the average
investor cannot find investment opportunities with a reasonable expectation of positive returns, we
cannot speak of a functioning capitalist economy (see section 4.5.1). Environmental degradation
and the exhaustion of resources and sinks could contribute to such an outcome, but – and this is the
crucial  dilemma  –  stringent  environmental  regulations  could  likewise  undermine  systemic
accumulation.  While  this  involves  consideration  of  the  technological  feasibility  of  “green”
capitalism, the question is not just about the purely technical feasibility of, say, replacing today’s
entire fossil energy infrastructure with renewable alternatives per se, but the feasibility of doing so
under  capitalist  conditions  (cf.  section  5.2),  without  undermining  systemic  accumulation
opportunities – and allowing for indefinite economic growth. Ultimately, of course, the limits to the
survival of capitalism are political, and social struggles will decide in the final instance – both class
and inter-capitalist struggle over differential accumulation opportunities. But in the medium term,
without  systemic  accumulation  opportunities  the  system  faces  untenable  crisis  symptoms,  and
structural-economic constraints will also make themselves felt in the shape of social resistance. 
Focusing on such potential for conflict, the second type will be called  political-economic
constraints: Not every constellation that is feasible from a functional standpoint (i.e., conceivable
without  halting  systemic  accumulation)  is  politically  realizable.  Where  structural-economic
constraints form the outer boundary of the green-capitalist possibility space, resistance from vested
interests and voter constituencies may further shrink this space. This, of course, is also where the
situated agency of the institutions behind the GE enters the picture, as discussed in chapters 2 and 8.
Geopolitical conflicts, and the realm of international politics more generally, create further obstacles
(see chapter 11). Thus, even “greening” measures that do not undermine systemic accumulation –
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but produce particular winners and losers – may be obstructed. The Green Economy, the primary
case treated here, does not even come close to the outer boundary of green-capitalist possibility. 
Generally, every technological or regulatory choice tends to produce winners and losers and
is thus inherently political. These limits are more relative and negotiable, but within the competitive
framework of capitalism, they may be just as impossible to overcome in practice. This second type
also  raises  the  possibility  of  a  contradiction  between  individual  (as  well  as  short-term)  and
collective  (or  longer-term)  capitalist  class  interests.3 While  these  two categories  of  constraints,
again, should never be understood in isolation,  their analytical distinction allows for a nuanced
consideration  of  both  the  more  objective/structural  and  the  more  subjective/political  aspects  of
overall  political-economic  developments.  Politically  speaking,  the  first  category  highlights  the
“general” capitalist class interest whereas the second privileges particular interests; in economic
terms, the former is more concerned with the general rate of profit and the latter, with realities of
differential accumulation – a tension to which we will return in the conclusion.    
This complex set of constraints not only applies to green-capitalist policy implementation
but, crucially, also to green-tech development – conceptualized as capital’s technological selectivity
in section 5.2. “Green” technologies obviously need to become competitive; if they are to form part
of  a  successful  green-capitalist  formation,  however,  they  not  only  have  to  be  profitable  for
individual  producers  but  also  create  systemic  accumulation  opportunities  (structural-economic
constraints).  Besides,  they  are  faced  with  incumbents’ resistance  as  well  as  with  the  cultural
predispositions of producers and consumers (political-economic constraints). Take the example of
car  sharing,  variously  discussed  in  chapter  10:  While  ecological  effects  here  depend on usage
patterns, macroeconomic consequences may be inversely correlated with the former. If fewer cars
are needed to provide the same level of service to consumers, resources are saved but business
suffers. Whether or not such practices can become dominant importantly depends on other factors,
including their ability to overcome the iconic function of car ownership in modern societies – which
car  makers  have every incentive to  reinforce while  fending off  this  challenge to  their  business
models politically, economically and culturally. Comparable dynamics play out in many branches.
The  distinction  between  structural-economic  and  political-economic  constraints  further
contains important insights for a proper understanding of the Green Economy’s role as a particular
conception of “green” capitalism. All green-capitalist models have to take into consideration both
types of constraints. The  Green Economy offers at least sketches – however inconsistent – of a
particular  regime  of  accumulation  in  response  to  structural-economic  constraints  (discussed
3 Uncertainty of course also plays a role, and certain “greening” measures may be rejected by political elites because 
it is feared that they might contribute to rendering systemic accumulation impossible. As previously emphasized, 
the two categories (structural-economic and political-economic constraints) are always intertwined.
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throughout and summarized in chapter 9), and it pursues a particular – and notably weak – strategy
of dealing with political-economic constraints (as investigated in chapter 8).
As  previously  noted,  the  challenge  for  “green”  capitalism  is  to  reconcile,  within  these
constraints, three different sets of functional and normative criteria: economic, environmental and
social sustainability. These are fleshed out in section 4.5. The environmental and social criteria not
only involve a stabilization of the biosphere and a functional warranty of social reproduction but
also an avoidance of cost (re-)externalizations, which so far often leave behind “sacrifice zones”
populated by marginalized communities. The economic dimension is primarily defined by ongoing
systemic  capital  accumulation  –  in  other  words,  functioning  “green”  capitalism  must  defy  all
structural-economic  constraints.  To  this  end,  four  potential  “green”  systemic  accumulation
strategies (GSASs) are available, which are identified deductively in section 4.6. These include (1)
absolute  decoupling of  economic  growth  from  resource  consumption  and  pollution  through
technological progress, (2) new Landnahmen or seizures of economic territory to compensate for
constraints  in older,  fossil-fueled sectors,  (3) politically enabled “green” creative destruction to
shift the balance of forces between “gray” and “green” sectors and restrict the “gray” economy, and
(4) the appropriation of new Cheap Natures as conceptualized in world-ecology theory. Chapter 8
attests to a very uneven combination of these strategies in the Green Economy framework. 
This unevenness becomes obvious when these potentially available strategies are contrasted
with those actually  formulated and pursued in  green-capitalist  theory and practice.  The GE, as
proposed in section 2.6 and extensively documented in blocs I through IV, pursues three  macro-
strategies,  which are here synthesized from empirical evidence. The first is the previously cited
ontology  of  natural  capital  –  an  attempt  to  come to  terms  with  the  ecological  foundations  of
capitalist development, and one that primarily functions as an accumulation strategy in a negative
sense (by reducing, ideally, the drag on systemic accumulation exerted by ecological pressures).
The second macro-strategy is the  gospel of eco-efficiency, the technology-focused approach that
corresponds  to  the  first  available  GSAS.  The  third,  unspoken  strategy  is  based  on  the  re-
externalization  of  costs:  As  capital  is  increasingly  forced  to  internalize  the  costs  of  ecological
degradation and resource exhaustion, it seeks out myriad ways of re-externalizing these costs to
various “others.” This is closely related to the fourth GSAS, the appropriation of Cheap Natures,
and it immediately collides with the ecological and social criteria for “green” capitalism. With the
macro-strategies as a final component, the stage is now set for the analysis of the GE’s prospects.
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1.5 A note on terminology
The specificity of the  Green Economy approach, as highlighted above, plays a significant role in
this work. Under this label, I primarily group the work of three institutions, which themselves have
alternated between the terms “green growth” and “Green Economy.” The World Bank and OECD
reports are titled “Inclusive Green Growth” and “Towards Green Growth,” respectively, whereas
UNEP’s is named “Towards a Green Economy.” The green growth label, according to one World
Bank  economist,  was  “explicitly  chosen  to  reach  out  into  the  world  of  hard-core  macro-
economists.”4 Both  the  Bank  and  UNEP added  a  subheading  declaring  their  reports  to  show
“pathway[s] to sustainable development,” establishing a further link between both labels. The close
coordination between the three organizations in this field is emphasized by both the World Bank
and the OECD in their original reports (OECD, 2011b, pp. 11, 15; World Bank, 2012, p. 24), as well
as by UNEP (n.d.) on its Green Economy web portal (see also section 2.5). A more comprehensive
map of the linkages between these organizations – and a few others holding stakes in the  Green
Economy – will be provided in Appendix 2.
The synonymous use of  green growth  and  Green Economy,  and the association with this
particular  triad  of  organizations  (OECD/World  Bank/UNEP),  is  widely  shared  in  the  literature
(Bergius et al., 2018; Buseth, 2017; Death, 2015; Heuwieser, 2015; Levidow, 2014; Loiseau et al.,
2016; Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2013). While the OECD (2013) at times insisted that green growth
was a narrower concept, it ultimately reiterated the same sweeping claims: “Green growth implies
transforming current modes of production and consumption across the entire economy at a global
scale.” (OECD, 2015a, p. 3) UNEP, meanwhile, declared its Guidance Manual for Green Economy
Policy Assessment equally applicable to “projects in the name of green economy (or green growth,
green  development,  low-carbon  development  and  the  like).”  (UNEP,  2014a,  p.  2) Citing  the
definitions provided by all three organizations, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI; 2017, p.
11) reaffirms the close association between the two concepts.5
As the two labels Green Economy and green growth have thus been used interchangeably in
most cases, which in its identification of “the economy” with “growth” is a tellingly capitalistic
rhetorical move, I will generally refer to these concepts as the  Green Economy  (GE). The term
“green” itself, meanwhile, will be put in quotation marks whenever it implies a specifically green-
capitalist definition of ecological sustainability (see also criteria in section 4.5.2).
4 Marianne Fay at the Green Growth and Sustainable Development conference, Paris, November 29, 2018.
5 By contrast, Georgeson et al. (2017, p. 4) propose a “hierarchy of green economy concepts” according to which a 
Green New Deal could be a catalyst for green growth, which contributes to a more broadly conceived Green 
Economy, which in turn is a means of achieving sustainable development. Even so, they agree that “UNEP, OECD, 
the World Bank and the GGGI are coalescing around a shared definition” of the Green Economy (ibid., p. 8).




This first bloc offers an extensive introduction to the Green Economy in order
to contextualize the analyses throughout this work. The GE is understood here
as  a  mature  or  late  neoliberal  approach  to  the  management  of  ecological
constraints and degradation and found to represent the dominant model in the
green-capitalist camp.
Chapter 2 outlines the present unsustainability of global capitalism and
introduces the response offered by the Green Economy model, its genesis, the
institutions supporting it and three macro-strategies that define this approach.
Chapter 3 reviews both the level of “green” ambition embodied in this model,
taking the example of greenhouse gas emissions, and available evidence of this
ambition’s  materialization  in  “green”  policy  throughout  the  2010s.  It  thus
provides  the  first  indications  concerning  the  GE’s  systemic  accumulation
potential  and its  ability  to  effectively  internalize  the  socio-ecological  costs
associated with capitalist development – the focus of the first two research
questions, which blocs III and IV will proceed to answer more systematically.
This more empirically oriented introduction is further intended to facilitate an
understanding of the theoretical considerations in bloc II.
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2.  Introducing the Green Economy
After sketching out global capitalism’s present lack of sustainability (section 2.1) and the history of
debates  over  appropriate  responses  (section  2.2),  this  chapter  introduces  the  Green  Economy
approach  to  the  “greening”  of  global  capitalism  (section  2.3)  and  appraises  its  historical  role
(section 2.4), followed by an introduction to the institutions behind this approach, with a focus on
their long-standing involvement in environmental policy advocacy (section 2.5). The chapter then
ends with a brief introduction of three  macro-strategies  underlying the GE model (section 2.6),
resuming the construction of a conceptual framework begun in the introduction. Chapter 2 thus
seeks to familiarize the reader with the state of green-capitalist thought in order to facilitate an
understanding of both the empirical (beginning in chapter 3) and the theoretical analyses (taken up
in bloc II) in this work. 
2.1 Contextualizing the Green Economy
This section outlines the challenge of “greening” on the basis of recent data on both the state of
global ecosystems and the global economy’s impact on the former. 
2.1.1 Part I: The state of global ecosystems
In this section, recent scientific literature concerning the stability of global ecosystems – or global
natural capital, in the language of the Green Economy – will be surveyed in order to illustrate the
ecological “baseline” from which the GE sets out on its quest for ecological sustainability. 
An international research group has been monitoring the health of the Earth system and its
subsystems with respect to a set of planetary boundaries, which “defines a safe operating space for
humanity  based  on  the  intrinsic  biophysical  processes  that  regulate  the  stability  of  the  Earth
System.”  (Steffen et al., 2015, p. 1) These “boundaries for anthropogenic perturbation of critical
Earth System processes” (ibid., p. 2) are based on the conviction that “human societies would be
unwise to drive the Earth System substantially away from a Holocene-like condition.” (Ibid., pp. 1–
2).  In this  framework, climate change, biosphere integrity,  ocean acidification and a number of
further parameters are monitored and compared to conservatively set boundaries for ecosystemic
integrity. Their framework is as of yet incomplete as either data or suitable measurable indicators
for some of the boundaries are missing. But the findings are alarming for several parameters: For
climate change and land-system change (the latter measured here by forest cover), the suggested
boundaries have been crossed and the system is well into the “zone of uncertainty,” in which, based
on current scientific understanding, there is already a risk of irreversible damage (but likely still a
chance  for  reversal).  For  biodiversity  and  the  selected  biogeochemical  flows  (nitrogen  and
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phosphorous),  the  indicators  by  now far  exceed  the  “zone  of  uncertainty”  –  here,  the  risk  of
planetary  instability  resulting  from  this  overshoot  is  considered  high.  (On  the  relevance  and
limitations of the planetary boundaries concept, see section 4.5.2.)
The  “core  boundaries”  identified  by  Steffen  et  al.,  foregrounded  as  “highly  integrated,
emergent system-level phenomena that are connected to all of the other PBs,” are climate change
and biosphere integrity, the latter serving as a two-component indicator of biodiversity (Steffen et
al.,  2015, pp.  6–7).6 As noted above,  with regard to both of these key indicators,  the world is
currently well outside its “safe operating space.” To make matters worse, certain instances of goal
conflicts and negative feedbacks notwithstanding, at the aggregate level biodiversity loss and cli-
mate change tend to reinforce each other, as, for example, damaged forest ecosystems bind less car-
bon from the atmosphere while increasing droughts and other climatic changes drive the extinction
of many species populations. Both crises, “highly interrelated” (Steffen et al., 2015, p. 6), therefore
currently feed on one another (cf. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2014).
Let us briefly turn to the issue of biodiversity, defined as “the variety of genes, species or
functional traits in an ecosystem”  (Cardinale et  al.,  2012, p.  60) and considered crucial  for the
stability of conditions for life on Earth, including human life.7 The dramatic loss in biodiversity
over the past decades8 has been described as a “sixth mass extinction event” in the planet’s history
(Hood, 2010; McBrien, 2016), and the first to be caused largely by a single species. While the
United  Nations  declared  the  2010s the  Decade on Biodiversity,  the  reports  issued since  by  its
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity  (2010, 2014, n.d.) note that internationally
6 Biosphere integrity in this framework is composed of genetic biodiversity as measured by Phylogenetic Species 
Variability – for which the alarms are already flashing as extinction rates are at least an order of magnitude greater 
than considered tolerable – and a measure of ecosystem degradation that takes account of the functional distribution
of species populations (Biodiversity Intactness Index, BII). The latter has not been measured globally, but in the 
African ecosystems already assessed, the safe boundary has been crossed as well. 
7 The loss of biodiversity “reduces the efficiency by which ecological communities capture biologically essential 
resources, produce biomass, decompose and recycle” as well as ecosystemic stability (Cardinale et al., 2012, p. 60),
and “[t]here is now sufficient evidence that biodiversity per se either directly influences (experimental evidence) or 
is strongly correlated with (observational evidence) certain provisioning and regulating services.” (Ibid., p. 62) 
Economic practices that seek to “optimize” ecosystems so as to extract particular services lead to their 
simplification – in other words, to a loss of diversity –, which can impede regulating functions (ibid.). An example 
of this would be agro-industrial monocultures, which maximize short-term gains in the growth of one species at the 
expense of ecosystemic balance. These constitute yet another case of the environmental problem-shifting and cost 
externalization so common under capitalism. The authors of the above-cited piece in Nature note rather abstractly 
that “many trade-offs among services occur at very different spatial and temporal scales.” (Ibid., p. 65) The impact 
of biodiversity loss on humans includes a wide range of threats including, but not limited to, sinking agricultural 
yields with the potential to disrupt food supplies, reduced availability of medicinal plants and material resources 
(timber is an example) and reduced biological pest control (Cardinale et al., 2012; Hood, 2010; Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). 
8 To cite just a few figures: By the end of the last decade, almost a quarter of plant species were considered to be at 
risk of extinction (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010, p. 9). Among several thousand 
monitored vertebrate species, average “population abundance declined by 58 per cent between 1970 and 2012.” 
(Oerlemans, Strand, Winkelhagen, Zwaal, & Klinge, 2016, p. 12) The overall species extinction rate has been 
estimated to exceed the “natural” background rate by a factor ranging from 100 to 10,000 (Hood, 2010).
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agreed targets for the preservation of biodiversity continually fail to be met, and with pressures on
biodiversity  still  increasing,  losses  are  projected  to  continue  throughout  the  century.  The UN’s
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019) agrees,
highlighting  that  the decline of  ecosystem functions  across  the  planet  could only be halted  by
“transformative” social change (ibid., p. 6).
Climate change, the aspect of ecological crisis that dominates current debates, will be more
systematically treated in this work. Each of the reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), widely accepted as the global benchmark of climate science, has voiced
progressively stronger warnings. (If its findings are to be faulted, it is for underestimating risks and
being overly  optimistic about potential solutions rather than the reverse.9) According to its latest
data, an average 1 °C of warming has now been reached, with further warming presently occurring
at a rate of around 0.2 °C  per decade.  (IPCC, 2018, p. 4). These patterns are regionally uneven:
Extreme temperature rises of 2-3 °C in permafrost regions within only a few decades have been
recorded  (IPCC,  2013,  p.  9),  which  may  lead  to  the  release  of  massive  amounts  of  methane
previously  bound in  the  soil  –  the  second most  relevant  greenhouse  gas  by  total  effect.  “The
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have increased to levels
unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years” (ibid., p. 11), and the prospects are getting direr:
Total anthropogenic radiative forcing – the share of the difference between solar energy influx and
energy radiated back into space that is caused by human activity –  is estimated to have increased by
a dramatic 43% in the six years between the fourth and fifth IPCC reports (ibid., p. 13). For the late
21st century, the IPCC predicts further atmospheric and oceanic warming, bigger and more frequent
heat waves, more extreme precipitation patterns, melting sea ice, glaciers and permafrost soils in the
9 IPCC reports are compiled from studies by thousands of natural scientists across the globe. This is not an apolitical 
enterprise: In what the IPCC itself calls a “unique partnership between the scientific community and the world’s 
governments” (IPCC, 2010, p. 2), contributing scientists are partly nominated by governments and the scoping 
process for each report involves consultations with policymakers “in order to identify the key policy-relevant 
issues.” (Ibid.) The summaries for policymakers, one of which will be cited here at length, even undergo a “line-by-
line” approval process involving “all participating governments” (ibid., p. 4). There have been accusations of 
governmental meddling in these summaries, with certain alarming passages toned down or deleted, particularly 
with regard to individual countries (and apparently more so in the more policy-oriented parts of the reports than in 
the more basic physical science section) (Howard, 2014; Monbiot, 2007; Stavins, 2014; Wible, 2014).
Perhaps because of (rather than in spite of) these close ties to state power, the IPCC reports – it is worth noting 
that only the summaries are subject to such censorship and can in each case be compared to the full reports – are 
generally recognized as the authoritative source of scientific information on climate change. Some of the authors 
involved even demand closer integration with policymakers in order to increase the reports’ political relevance (cf. 
Howard, 2014). Some leading contributors to the IPCC reports have furthermore argued that the reports, which 
cautiously synthesize climatological research findings from across the globe, have an inbuilt conservative bias, 
tending in its consensus-based, lowest-common-denominator approach to ignore the findings of more pessimistic 
studies and thus effectively underestimate risks (cf. Davis, 2010, pp. 31–32; Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2015, p. 6; 
Mooney, 2015; Scherer, 2012; Oreskes, Oppenheimer, & Jamieson, 2019). This has been noted especially with 
regard to potentially catastrophic feedback mechanisms (Ajl, 2018). The most contested parts of the IPCC report 
are those that construct future scenarios built on a range of explicit or implicit political-economic assumptions (the 
work of Working Group III); in this section, I will focus on the physical science part instead (Working Group I).
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Northern hemisphere and an accelerating sea level rise. These climatic changes will in turn exert a
positive  feedback effect  on  the  disruption  of  the  carbon cycle  as  less  carbon  can  be  naturally
sequestered (ibid., pp. 20–27). Recent research indicates that the IPCC reports have underestimated
the pace of climate change (see also note  9),  particularly with regard to  sea level  rise  and the
warming of the oceans (Oreskes, Oppenheimer, & Jamieson, 2019). A special IPCC report released
in 2018 indeed corrected risk assessments upward (IPCC, 2018), and modeling currently undertaken
for the sixth regular report suggests yet more dramatic warming effects (Voosen, 2019).
2.1.2 Part II: The global economy’s environmental consumption
This  section  seeks  to  briefly  outline  the  material  and  environmental  “footprint”  of  the  global
economy. While there is some thematic overlap with the previous section, the focus here shifts from
unfolding ecological effects to their anthropogenic causes, and to their economic foundations in
trade patterns and asset ownership in particular.
According to World Bank data10, in the period from 2000 to 2014, global GDP (in constant
2010 US$) grew from $50 trillion to $73.6 trillion, a 47% increase. Over the same period, some
relative decoupling of energy use from GDP took place globally, such that global energy intensity
fell: Per kg of oil equivalent, 7.9 instead of 6.5 dollars (constant 2011 US$) were generated. But
economic growth outweighed this 21.5% efficiency gain by a factor greater than two, and overall
energy consumption grew considerably. The carbon intensity  per unit of energy use  also slightly
increased during this period (by around 5%), thus exacerbating the global warming effect. So far,
the numbers suggest that the turn to unconventional sources of fossil fuel in what has been termed
the  Third  Carbon  Age  (after  those  dominated  by  coal  and  oil,  respectively;  Klare,  2013) has
effectively outweighed all efforts to shift to renewable energy – but this effect, in turn, is dwarfed
by the sheer impact of continuing economic growth on global emissions. 
Global greenhouse gas emissions grew by 37% between 2000 and 2016, with CO2 emissions
growth at almost 40%  (Olivier, Schure, & Peters, 2017).11 Regional patterns are important here.
Emissions accounting is commonly  production-based, meaning that emissions are imputed to the
country in which they are physically produced. According to the World Bank (n.d.), these emissions
fell slightly over this period in OECD countries, whereas those of “low-income countries” grew
10 All figures in this paragraph are taken from the World Bank database (World Bank, n.d.).
11 The former figure is measured in CO2-equivalent global warming potential and excludes the notoriously difficult-
to-measure LULUCF emissions (land use, land use change and forestry). As a compromise in international climate 
negotiations during the 1990s, the year 1990 has been used as a more common baseline year. This favors the then-
newly market-capitalist states classified as Economies in Transition, which experienced a period of rapid 
deindustrialization in the early 1990s (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015, pp. 58–59). But the year 2000 appears to be a
more suitable reference point for Green Economy analysis as it marks a point at which most governments had 
already formally recognized the need to reduce global emissions in an international treaty, the Kyoto protocol. 
Besides, the lion’s share of aggregate emissions growth since 1990 has taken place in the post-2000 period. 
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moderately (per-capita GHG emissions in these countries are still negligible). The bulk of emissions
growth comes from the third of four groups of countries classified by per-capita income, “upper-
middle income” (UMI), which includes, among others, all of the BRICS states12 with the exception
of India. Here, the statistics show an increase in overall CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions
of 70% (and, roughly, a doubling of carbon emissions) between 2000 and 2012. By 2012, the UMI
group accounted for 42% of all GHG emissions and 46% of CO2 emissions, clearly outweighing the
OECD area’s shares (35% and 30%, respectively). But these aggregates obscure patterns of  per-
capita CO2 emissions: While these have converged since 2000, they are still disparate, ranging in
2014 from a stagnant 0.3 metric tons in “low-income” countries to 6.6 in the UMI group and 9.5 in
the OECD area. Global per-capita CO2 emissions rose from 4 to 5 t over this period, while the ratio
between OECD and UMI figures imploded from 3.36 to 1.44. 
Consumption-based accounts,  meanwhile  serve  to  relativize  the  notion  of  convergence.
Here, emissions are imputed according to the place of final consumption. This reveals a global
pattern  of  “embodied  emissions”  obscured  by  official  emissions  statistics:  The  global  shift  in
energy-intensive  manufacturing  from  OECD  to  non-OECD  countries,  a  dividing  line  roughly
equated with the “global North” and “global South,” respectively,  implies  a concurrent  shift  of
production-based  GHG  emissions,  even  as  a  large  part  of  the  product  is  re-imported  for
consumption in the “old” industrial core countries. One estimate found 26% of the global carbon
footprint embodied in exports (in 2008; Peters, Minx, Weber, & Edenhofer, 2011), the growth rate
of these exported emissions over the previous two decades being more than twice that of overall
CO2 emissions.  In 2011, the latest  year in the OECD database,  net imports of fuel-related CO2
emissions (embodied in traded goods) by OECD countries from non-OECD countries added almost
13% to the former group’s conventional production-based emissions bill, down from a pre-crisis
peak of 15.7%. In 1995, this figure stood at a mere 7.7%, and in absolute terms, imported emissions
more than doubled over the decade before the crisis hit (calculated from database, OECD, 2016; cf.
Wiebe & Yamano, 2016).13 Peters et al. (2011) thus argue that between one-quarter and one-third of
the emissions growth in “developing” countries since 1990 should instead have been added to the
“developed” countries’ books.14 
12 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
13 A regional disaggregation within the OECD reveals that for the relatively “greener” EU states (EU-28), emissions 
imported from outside the OECD area were estimated at 19.4% of those produced in the EU, whereas for the U.S., 
they added “only” 9% to the already higher domestic emissions record.
The OECD datasets exclude CO2 emissions from land use-related activities and greenhouse gases other than 
CO2, as well as international aviation and shipping. Since the calculations are made on the basis of industry 
averages and nominal trade volumes, they involve possible sources of bias (Wiebe & Yamano, 2016, pp. 25–26). 
14 Countries are categorized here according to the Kyoto Protocol, with “developed” countries corresponding to the 
Protocol’s Annex B group, and “developing” countries to the non-Annex B group. These figures likewise exclude 
emissions from international travel, a fast-growing sector in which the global North partakes disproportionately.
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Working with consumption-based GHG emissions data, Chancel and Piketty  (2015) point
out  that  class  inequalities  within countries  have  become just  as  important  a  source  of  unequal
individual  emissions as inequalities  between  countries,  with the bottom 1% of emitters  in low-
emitting countries responsible for about one-fiftieth of global-average per-capita emissions, whereas
the top 1% individuals in a high-emitting country like the U.S. account for emissions 50 times as
high  as  the  global  average  (ibid.,  p.  29),  bringing  the  total  magnitude  of  “carbon  inequality”
between these extreme groups up to a factor of 2,500. 
After a period of slower growth in global carbon emissions from 2014 through 2016, the
surge has resumed  (Storrow, 2018; Tollefson, 2017; Vaughan, 2018).  After a quarter century of
international, national and subnational initiatives for climate change mitigation, only the  rate of
growth in emissions has declined, not the overall level of emissions. While the OECD (2013, pp. 3–
5) already spoke of successful “absolute decoupling” with reference to the stabilization of fossil-
fuel CO2 emissions in several (mostly OECD) countries despite ongoing economic growth during
the 2000s, this claim refers to a stabilization at unsustainably high levels, is restricted to one – albeit
important – type of emission in some regions, and does not account for the explosion of emissions
“embodied” in traded goods. When the IPCC first calculated remaining “carbon budgets” in 2014,
an analysis based on these figures found that at then-current consumption rates, the world’s entire
remaining budget for maintaining a fifty-fifty chance of limiting global warming to 1.5° – since
formalized in the 2015 Paris Agreement – would be used up by 2024. For a two-thirds chance to at
least stay within 2°, that point would be reached in 2035 (Carbon Brief, 2014). The IPCC recently
corrected the carbon budgets upwards (2018, p. 16), but at the same time, the estimated potential for
compensating emissions through carbon dioxide removal  (CDR, see sections 3.1.1 and 7.3) was
revised downwards, leading UNEP  (2018c, p.  4) to conclude that the “emissions gap” between
actual and desirable emissions trajectories had effectively widened. (In section 3.1.2, the emissions
scenarios from the Green Economy reports will be analyzed against this background.)
As the discussion of “embodied” emissions suggests,  global economic activity has been
increasingly reliant on trade and, thus, on large-scale, long-distance transportation infrastructures.
By 2017, internationally exported goods and services accounted for nearly 30% of global GDP, up
from below 20% in 1990 (most of this growth happened in the 1990s period of trade liberalization;
data from World Bank, 2019b). Likewise, a significant part of the global ecological footprint has
been “embodied” in exported goods, which is often associated with an externalization of costs: A
recent  estimate  finds  41% of  the  global  raw material  footprint  embodied  in  exports  (in  2008;
Wiedmann et al., 2015). Even UNEP’s International Resource Panel (2017, p. 34) recently stated
that global trade “adds to the growth dynamic of global resource use.”  In 2001, trade  itself was
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already estimated  to  be directly  responsible  for  around 5.5% of  global  emissions  (Hertwich  &
Peters, 2009).15 These fast-growing emissions from international transportation, including passenger
transport, are conveniently excluded from national accounts and from most figures cited in this sec-
tion (cf. discussion in section 3.2.3). Economic globalization and “free” trade, in other words, have
worked against the “greening” of economic activity across the globe, and analysis of concrete trade
patterns serves to put the relative “greening” achieved in European economies into perspective.
Of course, the global economy not only appropriates pollution sinks like the atmosphere; it
also  feeds  on resources.  Around the  year  2000,  humans  were  estimated  to  directly  appropriate
and/or  degrade between one-fifth  and one-third of global  net  primary production of land-based
biomass (for food, paper, fibre and wood production), although these figures come with a large
uncertainty range – and with dramatic regional disparities. “This is a remarkable level of co-option
for a species that represents roughly 0.5% of the total heterotroph biomass on Earth,” the authors of
one study wryly noted (Imhoff et al., 2004, p. 870).16 The overall global ecological “footprint” of
human economic activity – this concept is an attempt to aggregate a variety of measures into one
illustrative number – is currently calculated at 1.6 times Earth system capacity. The system has been
in “overshoot” since 1970, and  overshoot day, the day on which global regenerative capacity for
that year is “used up,” by 2019 had moved up to July 29 (Global Footprint Network, 2019). More
specifically, recent estimates found the land area effectively appropriated for human use as resource
and sink was 50% above biocapacity, and material consumption exceeded the sustainable level by
more than 30% (Hoekstra & Wiedmann, 2014). During the 2000s, the annual growth rate in global
raw material use – which had been at above 2% for the period 1970–2000 – accelerated to 3.5%,
with the global economic crisis dampening this trend only slightly; the environmental impacts from
resource extraction – global warming effects, biodiversity loss, acidification, water and air pollution
– have likewise skyrocketed since 2000 (International Resource Panel, 2017, pp. 28–33).
The economic  stakes  in  the  infrastructures  that  enable  these patterns  of  production  and
consumption are enormous. Environmentalist Bill McKibben pointed out in 2012 that fossil fuel
companies around the world had fossil reserves in their books that exceeded the carbon budget until
2050 for an 80% chance to reach even the “far too lenient” 2 °C target roughly by a factor of five
(McKibben, 2012; see discussion of climate targets in section 3.1). In 2015, Citigroup calculated
that the sales value of “unburnable” fossil reserves to stay within 2 °C is above US$ 100 trillion (G.
15 This mostly relates to transportation of goods and probably does not include trade-related business travel. 
16 According to the same source, in Western Europe and parts of Asia, the figure is two-thirds and higher, whereas in 
Africa and South America it was estimated at 12 and 6 per cent, respectively. While North America’s per-capita 
value exceeds all these regions by far, the continent is so rich in biomass (and relatively thinly populated) that it 
“only” consumes about 24% of annual net primary production. These figures do not include the impact of imports, 
which should raise the figures for Europe and North America.
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Parkinson, 2015), which exceeded the global GDP that year.17 According to another estimate, global
proven oil reserves alone (excluding unconventional sources) in 2014 amounted to $170 trillion, or
more than two years’ global GDP, most of which, of course, would also be redundant in a “green”
scenario (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015, pp. 147–148).18 Still, this figure only considers the direct
sales value of fossil fuels. By another estimate, around one-third of all global wealth is invested in
more broadly defined carbon-heavy assets  (Alperovitz, Guinan, & Hanna, 2017) – this would, for
example, include automobile and aviation industries.19 McKibben (2012, n.p.) emphasizes that the
fossil  reserve  stock  is  “already  economically  aboveground  –  it’s  figured  into  share  prices,
companies are borrowing money against it, nations are basing their budgets on the presumed returns
from their patrimony.” More recently, just the fossil fuel extraction sites already in operation were
found to exceed even the carbon budget for 2°  (McKibben, 2016), implying that the economic
assets to be devalued and destroyed here are no longer merely in the books but include much of the
physical infrastructure currently in place throughout these industries. 
These figures clarify the political-economic stakes, suggesting that the political opposition
to comprehensive “greening” is very concentrated and well equipped. Such greening, meanwhile,
would require a dramatic path reversal to be accomplished on a very tight schedule.
2.2 The Green Economy’s pre-history
Thesis 2.2: The Green Economy emerged historically in reaction to the multiple crises of the late
2000s, as a strategically selective, “mature” neoliberal specification of  sustainable development
and  ecological modernization,  framed now as a more emphatically positive and non-conflictual
“green” capitalism in which capital is never the problem but usually the solution.20
Around 1970, debates over environmental destruction, pollution and resource depletion began to
gain prominence in public discourse. The basic economic structure of growth-focused industrial
societies  was  quickly  identified  as  a  major  culprit  in  these  debates,  and thus  the  discipline  of
economics – along with the social sciences in general – was prompted to confront the ecological
constraints that had newly arrived on the policy agenda. Some elite circles began to take the specter
of  “limits  to  growth”  seriously  (Meadows,  1972);  others  dismissed  the  problem  out  of  hand
17 Depending on the market situation, some of these reserves may not be economically exploitable. Global GDP in 
2015 was $75 trillion according to World Bank (2019d) data.
18 Assuming an oil price of $100 per barrel. This is only slightly above the actual price level from 2011–2014, which 
dropped in 2015 and has been partially recovering since (MacroTrends, 2019). See discussion of oil price trends in 
section 6.3.
19 Similarly, Rest (2011, pp. 101–103) noted that fossil-based industries accounted for one-third of the total market 
capitalization of the world’s largest 500 companies – and this figure had grown during the 2000s.
20 The central findings of many sections of this dissertation will be summarized in such thesis statements, placed at 
the beginning of the respective section. All theses are visualized in Appendix 3, which thus provides an overview of
the entire argument.
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(Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972). In this context, more far-reaching attempts to reconcile economics and
ecology began to emerge. Some of these found the capitalist structure of industrial economies to lie
at  the root  of environmental  degradation and proposed eco-socialist  alternatives  (Benton,  1989;
Gorz,  1977;  Kovel,  2007;  J.  O’Connor,  1988;  Sarkar,  1999), while  others,  disillusioned by the
authoritarianism  and  equally  dismal  ecological  track  record  of  actually  existing  socialism,
advocated eco-anarchy (Bookchin, 1982).21
Still,  many  voices  sought  to  defend  the  basic  institutions  of  capitalism  and  developed
proposals  for “green” economies that  relied on private  property and market  exchange.  Herman
Daly’s  Steady-State  Economy  (1991) presents  an  intriguing  analytical  “borderline  case,”
envisioning  a  wildly  contradictory  post-growth  capitalism which  space  does  not  permit  me  to
discuss further here. Since the early 1990s, public intellectuals have presented spectacular visions of
market-driven green-technological abundance  (Fücks, 2013; Hawken, 1993; Hawken, Lovins, &
Lovins, 2000; Weizsäcker, Hargroves, Smith, Desha, & Stasinopoulos, 2010). In Economics depart-
ments, meanwhile, the subdiscipline of environmental economics had evolved since the 1970s.
In their attempt to situate the institutional Green Economy approach historically, Bailey and
Caprotti (2014, p. 6) argue that “[w]hilst the green economy first emerged as an identifiable concept
in  the  1980s and 1990s focusing  on the use  of  price mechanisms to  ameliorate  environmental
externalities (eg, Pearce et al, 1989), its latest incarnation aspires to create whole new orientations
for capitalism.” Indeed, the cited  Blueprint for a Green Economy (D. W. Pearce, Markandya, &
Barbier, 1989) laid out the classical mechanisms of neoclassical environmental economics in the
context  of  the  then-vibrant  sustainable  development  debate:  the  economic  valuation  of  the
environment,  “getting  the  prices  right”  and the  determination  of  appropriate  discount  rates  for
investments. In line with much sustainable development advocacy, it recognized trade-offs between
environmental and economic goals but made a case for the possible reconciliation of these goals,
arguing that  growth is  feasible  despite ecological  constraints  – and that  market-based measures
could play a positive role in this reconciliation. Along with the emergent ecological modernization
paradigm (cf. section 2.6.2), such voices established a more optimistic position relative to the Club
of Rome’s bleaker top-down planetary management agenda in the face of physical limits to growth
(Meadows, 1972) that had been so controversially debated in the 1970s.22 But in the early 1990s, the
21 Today, alternative ideas for degrowth or post-growth economies abound, with a broad range of authors proposing 
varying degrees of transformation within or beyond capitalism – or altogether evading the question of where their 
utopias are located relative to capitalism (D’Alisa, Demaria, & Kallis, 2015; Hamilton, 2003; T. Jackson, 2009; 
Latouche, 2009; Paech, 2012; Schneidewind & Zahrnt, 2014).
22 The Club of Rome itself was created as a renegade spin-out of the OECD bureaucracy. Its pessimistic stance on 
growth had a sobering influence on official OECD policy for a short period but never became dominant and was 
ultimately flushed out in the institution’s neoliberal turn (Schmelzer, 2016, Chapter 7). For a characterization of 
early ecological modernization theory as an optimistic rebuttal of 1970s pessimism, see Spaargaren (2000).
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Green  Economy  signifier  still  carried  content  different  from  today’s,  not  quite  absorbed  by
institutionalized neoliberalism, as demonstrated by Michael Jacobs’s (1991) monograph of this title,
in which a crucial concern was still to constrain the forces of capital rather than simply guide them
to unleash their creative power for a green-technological makeover.23
The 1990s saw a particular conjuncture.  The end of the Cold War marked not only the
victory of neoliberal capitalism, (in)famously heralded as the “end of history” by Francis Fukuyama
(1989), but also initiated the short reign of liberal multilateralism. This animated the “spirit of Rio”
surrounding the 1992 UN summit that elevated sustainable development into the status of a major
international political objective and invigorated the UN-mediated process of international climate
policy  negotiations  that  led  to  the  Kyoto  Protocol  in  1997  (Brunnengräber,  2009a,  Chapter  1;
Chaturvedi & Doyle,  2015, Chapter  6).  The Protocol  encapsulated the sustainable development
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – imposing a larger “burden” on those
countries whose economic development had been fossil-fueled and propelled by colonial conquests
– but also installed a set of carbon trading mechanisms that represented the neoclassical wisdom on
“efficient”  emissions  mitigation.  During  this  period,  the  somewhat  more  statist  ecological
modernization paradigm  of  the  1980s  was  increasingly  redirected  towards  market-based
governance. Whereas an influential early theorist had emphasized the strength of political-economic
resistance  to  macroeconomically  reasonable  “green”  modernization  efforts  and  the  need  to
strengthen state capacity vis-à-vis industry actors  (Jänicke, 1988), market instruments were now
hailed as easy win-win-win solutions. By the end of the decade, ecological modernization partisans
lamented that the concept had been watered down and captured by efficiency-fixated neoclassical
economists (Andersen & Massa, 2000). Notably, over the same period, corporate actors increasingly
opened up to (and co-developed) this rather non-threatening, “shallow” variant of green politics
(Sklair, 2001; see discussion in section 8.3.3).
In  the  early  2000s,  the  political  economy  of  “green”  development  began  to  be
complemented with a dark underside termed energy security. Following the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.,
23 In Jacobs’s work, the GE was already anticipated, for pragmatic reasons, as a reformed capitalism. But the tone was
more somber, and the deep social and environmental contradictions of capitalism were acknowledged. In his 
attempt to bring together radical green thought with mainstream environmental economics, strategies of monetary 
valuation and cost-benefit analysis were examined with regard to important limitations and assigned an auxiliary 
role, whereas Jacobs emphasized the centrality of qualitative and political decisions to deal with conflicting goals 
and interests, as well as the need to re-conceptualize quality of life in collective and non-monetary terms rather than
just individual economic welfare. The link to “deep green” utopias, still awkwardly envisioned for the longer-term 
future in the introduction, is practically severed in his study. Nevertheless, the basic coordinates of the intellectual 
terrain Jacobs occupies are far from the Green Economy discourse encountered two decades after. (Jacobs curiously
justified his choice of neoclassical over Marxist economic explanations with the former’s easier intelligibility (ibid.,
p. xvi, n. 6). Although stating that “[t]he liberal view of the benign state and the democratic process is not an 
adequate picture of the real world” (ibid., p. xix), he proceeded to make policy recommendations as if it were, 
assuming a position of “knowing naivete.” (Ibid., p. xx))
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intensified  geopolitical  conflict  increasingly  revolved around control  over  fossil  fuel  resources.
One observer went as far as declaring the Iraq War the “first war primarily conditioned by global
ecological  crisis.”  (Kovel,  2007, p.  18) These developments,  contributing to  a  steep rise  of  oil
prices,  sparked  a  greater  public  and  scholarly  interest  in  the  links  between  energy  systems,
economic prosperity and sustainability  (Di Muzio, 2015, p. 4). The energy security turn certainly
had  “green”  implications:  As  first  conceptualized  in  the  Carter  administration,  energy  security
became  an  increasingly  compelling  rationale  for  an  industrial  policy  that  fostered  domestic
development of renewable energy capacity. Schmitz (2015) argues that the limited degree of “green
transformation”  that  has  been  evident  so  far,  particularly  in  Europe  and  China,  was  crucially
enabled by state interventions that were motivated by energy security concerns. The problem, of
course, is that the  energy security  frame also leads right into the  Third Carbon Age  (see section
6.3.1). Renewable energy here is just one of several strategies to reduce each national economy’s
dependence on fossil fuel imports rather than fossil fuels per se. Consequently, ramped-up domestic
production of fossil fuels, which often implies reliance on “unconventional” sources, is another core
strategic element. This was perhaps most succinctly expressed in former U.S. President Obama’s
“all of the above” energy strategy (Furman & Stock, 2014), in which these two developments were
simultaneously  pushed.  Thus,  global  carbon  emissions  continued  to  grow  in  parallel  to  the
development  of  Green  Economy  policy  sets  and  the  significantly  increased  deployment  of
renewable energy infrastructure in the 21st century (see sections 2.1 and 3.1). 
As 1990s multilateralism gave way to a neo-mercantilist era of national and regional energy
security  strategies,  UN  climate  negotiations  became  completely  bogged  down  in  geopolitical
conflict. The latter development was crystallized in the grand failure of international climate diplo-
macy in Copenhagen in 2009, where no successor to the Kyoto Protocol could be agreed upon (see
Ciplet et al., 2015 for an extensive discussion). This historical moment was perhaps the clearest
expression of interrelated global economic, ecological and political crises, with all-around narrow
national  (and  capitalist)  self-interest  widely  perceived  to  threaten  the  future  of  humanity.  Sur-
prisingly little of this conflictual historical context is explicitly reflected in the GE reports, which
retain the “win-win” optimism of liberal institutionalism and add a third “win” for the environment.
In insisting on this optimism, however, the GE arguably was deployed as a push-back to the
gloomy Copenhagen world of zero-sum geopolitics, seeking to reaffirm that economic prosperity
and ecological sustainability were not mutually exclusive. Its perhaps most important precedent was
the so-called Stern Review – the report on the economics of climate change prepared by economist
Nicholas Stern for the UK government and released to much fanfare in 2006 (N. Stern, 2006). The
basic  message of what  perhaps  became the world’s most famous cost-benefit  analysis  was that
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“early” action to mitigate climate change would prevent disastrous costs in the long run. While this
simply  reiterates  environmental  wisdom  in  the  most  abstract  sense  (of  course  some  present
sacrifices are worthwhile if they prevent eventual doom), the additional claim that really made the
Stern Review so palatable to political elites was that the costs of this endeavor would only put a
tolerable dent into ongoing economic growth throughout the 21st century. Environmentalist critics
faulted both Stern’s underestimation of necessary emissions cuts and his uncritical assumption that
renewable  energy  infrastructures  could  easily  be  scaled  up  to  replace  today’s  entire  fossil
infrastructures in time (Trainer, 2008). Soon after, Stern publicly corrected himself with reference to
the latest IPCC data on climate change, admitting that his original calculations had underestimated
the magnitude of the challenge (Adam, 2008), but the genie was out of the bottle. Proceeding from
the Stern Review’s optimism, it only took a small rhetorical operation to declare, as UNEP did, that
a “green” capitalism would achieve faster economic growth than the “gray” economy (see section
2.3)  –  if  only  with  reference  to  a  hypothetical  “business  as  usual”  future  in  which  ecological
degradation and resource depletion become increasingly costly. The subtle difference between such
a claim to the GE’s greater dynamism relative to a “dirtier” future rather than to the  historical
“gray” economy disappears in the emphatic claim that greening can constitute a “new engine of
growth.” (Ibid., p. 16; see section 4.4 for a discussion of such claims) 
 But there is a final intervening historical moment to the story, namely the 2007-9 global
financial crisis that coincided historically with a spike in global food and oil prices and a period of
renewed public attention to the climate crisis. The financial crisis brought with it a brief moment of
Keynesian revival, in which public stimulus packages were hastily deployed in many countries.
Some of these included “green” measures (for an overview, see Barbier, 2010), even if their actual
ecological  merits  often  proved  to  be  quite  controversial.  Various  institutions  –  which  at  first
included UNEP itself – seized this opportunity to call for a Green New Deal that would tackle the
multiple  crises  at  once,  combining  strengthened  regulation  of  the  global  economy with  public
investments in “green” infrastructures and “green” jobs to re-ignite economic growth. With stimulus
packages being prepared by governments across the globe, UNEP made a pragmatic case for the
targeting of stimulus funding to “green” sectors, given that “there is a unique historical opportunity
now to create the basis of a new Green Economy.” (UNEP, 2009, p. 4; see discussion of UNEP’s
later shift  to the GE in section 8.2) The debate at  the time ranged from rather limited,  one-off
“green” stimulus proposals (Bowen, Fankhauser, Stern, & Zenghelis, 2009; Pollin, Garrett-Peltier,
Heintz,  &  Scharber,  2008) and  fairly  orthodox  neoliberal  visions  of  market-driven  “green”
prosperity (T. L. Friedman, 2007a, 2007b) to Edward Barbier’s (partly UNEP-sponsored) proposals
to combat global poverty with a Global Green New Deal (Barbier, 2009, 2010) and, finally, to the
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UK  Green  New  Deal  Group’s  (2008) ambitious  and  actively  oppositional  project  to  end  the
neoliberal reign by tackling the “triple crunch” of financial, climate and energy crises through heavy
financial re-regulation and redistributive mechanisms. But owing to the political relations of force at
the time, the Keynesian moment quickly passed (see section 8.2), and just like the financial crisis
was eventually managed primarily through austerity politics, not through a revitalization of social
democracy  on  neo-Keynesian  foundations  (Candeias,  2014) 24,  the  more  neoliberal  Green  Economy  model
emerged as the dominant response to ecological crises. 
2.3 The Green Economy agenda
What I call the hegemonic model of a Green Economy is exemplified in a set of studies published
over  a  remarkably  short  period  of  time  –  2011/12  –  by  notable  international  institutions:  the
Organisation  for  Economic Co-operation and Development  [OECD]  (2011b,  2015a),  the  World
Bank  [WB]  (2012) and  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  [UNEP]  (2011).25 While
UNEP prepared its report to frame the debate on sustainable development in the lead-up to the 2012
Rio+20 summit and the Bank’s vice president likewise linked the report’s release to the upcoming
summit  (World Bank, 2012, pp. xi–xii), the OECD study was commissioned through an explicit
request from government representatives – mostly cabinet members or deputy cabinet members – of
all  member  states  as  part  of  their  Declaration  on  Green  Growth in  mid-2009,  before  the
Copenhagen disaster (OECD, 2009). The resulting set of policy proposals is remarkably consistent
across these studies. In this section, I will summarize the policies suggested by these reports in
order  to  provide  an  outline  of  hegemonic  Green  Economy  thought  that  awaits  theoretical  and
empirical analysis in later sections.
A Green Economy is defined as leading to “improved human well-being and social equity,
while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 16)
Most importantly a  Green Economy  is conceptualized in these studies as one that delivers  green
growth,  which  “means fostering economic growth and development  while  ensuring that  natural
assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies”
(OECD, 2011b, p. 9), or, “growth that is efficient in its use of natural resources, clean in that it
minimizes pollution and environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards
24 Even the public investments made in the immediate post-breakdown phase constituted a twisted Keynesianism: 
Benefits almost exclusively accrued to capital rather than the working class(es) (Mirowski, 2013, pp. 16–18).
25 As we will see in chapter 8, this hegemonic position is weak and partial. It it tied to the hegemonic status and 
functions of the organizations proposing the model (cf. section 2.5) and rests on their attempts to co-opt the 
widespread normative acceptance of the need for “greening” within the broader neoliberal hegemony. These 
organizations are arguably more resourceful than any other participant in the debates over “green” transformations 
and enjoy direct access to political power structures. Their normative leadership, however, is frequently challenged 
from progressive civil society ranks as well as from the political Right, and their material-coercive capacity vis-à-
vis the “gray” economy is extremely limited. 
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and the role of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters. And
this  growth  needs  to  be  inclusive.”  (World  Bank,  2012,  p.  2) The  latter  point  is  emphasized
especially by the WB and UNEP, whose work is geared more towards “developing” countries.
The Green Economy sketches out a win-win-win scenario of economic growth that allows
for Northern prosperity while eliminating Southern poverty, all the while nurturing the ecosystems
on  which  all  of  these  economies  depend.  This,  as  UNEP  (2011,  p.  628) stresses  by  way  of
conclusion, requires  “a fundamental rethinking of our approach to the economy.” The OECD is
more ambiguous, stating, on the one hand, that “[g]reen growth implies transforming current modes
of production and consumption across the entire economy at a global scale” (OECD, 2015a, p. 3)
while maintaining elsewhere that “[g]reen growth should be conceived as a strategic complement to
existing  environmental  and  economic  policy  reform  priorities.”  (OECD,  2011b,  p.  125) This
abeyance in mid-air between an unwavering commitment to a “smooth” transition (ibid., p. 95) and
the insistence on the need for dramatic change is characteristic of the hegemonic GE discourse. 
The problem definition employed here, which crucially shapes the political and economic
agenda pursued in these studies, hinges on the notion of  market failures  with regard to  natural
capital (OECD, 2011b, p. 28; World Bank, 2012, p. 46). Ecosystems and their “services” – factored
into economic calculation as natural capital – have been undervalued (OECD, 2011b, p. 29) and,
consequently, “inefficiently managed”  (World Bank, 2012, p. 7), meaning: excessively depleted.
This neglect leads to a “gross misallocation of capital,” which UNEP (2011, p. 14) sees at the heart
of multiple current global crises. It is further acknowledged that other types of capital can only
substitute  for  lost  natural  capital to  a  limited  extent,  given  that  ecosystems  provide  both
indispensable  and  irreproducible  foundations  for  any  economic  activity  (OECD,  2011b,  p.  21;
UNEP,  2011,  pp.  17–18;  World  Bank,  2012,  pp.  35–36).  The  under-  or  non-valuation  of,  for
example, the effectively limited absorptive capacity of the atmosphere for greenhouse gases or other
pollutants allows producers to externalize a significant part of the costs of their economic activities,
thereby distorting market  exchange  (UNEP, 2011,  p.  604).  (This  ontology of  natural  capital  is
identified as one of three macro-strategies of the GE in section 2.6.)
Following from this  diagnosis,  the institutions  promise a  win-win-win situation for “the
economy,” “the environment” and even “the poor” through a more “efficient” use and maintenance
of  natural capital (e.g. OECD, 2011b, p. 22; World Bank, 2012, p. 11), which not only allows
economic activity to be extended into the future without major ecological disruption but also offers
economic opportunities in “new green markets”  (OECD, 2011b, p. 22) that will even embody “a
new engine of growth”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 16) for the ailing world economy. UNEP’s is the only
report  to  include  comprehensive  macroeconomic  projections  for  a  Green  Economy  until  2050.
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These  involve  a  comparison  of  “business  as  usual”  (BAU)  with  “green”  scenarios  in  which
additional investments of 1% (G1 scenario) and 2% (G2 scenario, the proposed path) of global
GDP, respectively, will be poured into the global economy in the form of “green” investment. The
“engine of growth” argument is supported by comparing these scenarios not only to the BAU case
but also to scenarios in which the same levels of additional investment are undertaken without a
“green”  focus  (BAU1 and BAU2).  By 2050,  the  G2 scenario  promises  global  per-capita  GDP
growth of  122% vis-à-vis 2011,  whereas  the BAU case projects  71% growth and BAU2, 95%
(growth rates calculated from absolute GDP figures in UNEP, 2011, p. 518). (While this may sound
impressive,  it  translates  into  annual  growth  rates  that  are  relatively  modest  by  20th-century
standards: between 1.38% and 2.07% p.a. per capita, or 2.02%–2.74% in absolute terms. Over the
equally  long  period  from  1960–1999,  the  absolute  global  GDP growth  rate  was  3.77%  p.a.
(calculated from World Bank, 2019c).) 
The most significant measure to warrant more efficient management of natural capital is to
compel economic actors to internalize, finally, the previously externalized full environmental costs
of economic activity by first establishing property rights and then putting a price on pollution. Clear
property rights for natural capital are considered essential to avoid overuse of natural resources and
thus, depletion of this form of capital (UNEP, 2011, p. 565; World Bank, 2012, pp. 30, 46, 107).26
Getting the prices right  is seen as the pivotal strategy to “fix” market failures since  “in order for
markets to efficiently allocate resources, prices need to accurately reflect the full social costs of
economic activity.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 558) The costs to be internalized importantly include those
generated by greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) as well as by local air and water pollutants. In
addition,  policies  to  “increase  cost  recovery”  are  recommended  for  water  provisioning,  waste
management and other ecologically relevant goods (OECD, 2015a, p. 33); free or subsidized public
water and waste disposal services are seen to encourage wasteful consumption habits. 
The two major policy approaches to achieve GHG cost internalization, discussed throughout
the relevant literature, are carbon taxes and carbon trading schemes (“cap and trade”). Both are
examples of market-based instruments, which are generally considered preferable to other policy
mechanisms for being  “friendlier to productivity growth.”  (OECD, 2015a, p. 59) Both also hold
evergreen status in the tradition of green-capitalist thought.27 In the former case, a price on carbon
26 This builds on Garrett Hardin’s classic essay describing the Tragedy of the Commons (1968), whose conclusion in 
favor of clear property rights significantly contributed to the emergence of environmental economics – and whose 
penchant for “bas[ing] many of his arguments on racist, pseudo-scientific assertions about immigrants’ fertility 
rates” has been largely forgotten (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d., n.p.).
27 For example, emission trading schemes as well as Pigouvian taxes on externalities (named after economist Arthur 
Pigou, who originally devised the concept as early as 1920), applied to carbon emissions, were already discussed as
necessary price-fixing mechanisms by Pearce, Markandya and Barbier (1989) and Hawken (1993). The general call 
for pricing as the crucial mechanism to internalize externalities and incorporate concern for future versus present 
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emissions  is  instituted as  a  surcharge  in  order  to  “correct”  the  relative valuation  of  goods and
services in the marketplace from an ecological standpoint – ideally, so the conventional wisdom
goes, applied closer to the source rather than at the end of the “pipe” in order to foster technological
innovation throughout the production chain (UNEP, 2011, p. 559). The tax has to be calibrated so as
to aim for the desired overall amount of emissions, following classical supply-and-demand theory
that assumes demand to respond more or less elastically to prices. Proponents argue that the tax is
administratively efficient and uniformly enforceable. A much-discussed question concerns the use
of  the  revenue,  with  hegemonic  models  generally  coming  down in  favor  of  “revenue-neutral”
solutions that allow for corresponding decreases in more “distortive” income taxes as part  of a
broader environmental fiscal reform that intended to shift taxation from “goods” towards “bads”
such as pollution (OECD, 2011b, pp. 32, 92, 97; UNEP, 2011, p. 559). 
Cap-and-trade,  by  contrast,  works  through  the  creation  of  a  new  market  by  directly
commodifying carbon emissions (or, viewed from a different angle, “chunks” of the atmosphere and
its absorptive capacity). Here, governments define a ceiling to permissible emissions and allocate,
usually on the basis of previous emissions records (“grandfathering”) but partly also via auctioning,
corresponding  amounts  of  tradeable  emission  permits  to  would-be  polluters.  The  economic
argument  undergirding  this  practice  is  that  this  system  ensures  compliance  with  a  politically
determined  emissions  target  in  the  most  economically  efficient  manner,  as  determined  in  the
marketplace. It assumes that emitters facing the lowest costs in emissions abatement will choose
this path while those with above-average costs will prefer to buy permits. An important add-on to
such  carbon  markets  is  the  possibility  of  trading  in  offsets:  Emissions-reducing  activities  that
happen outside the scope of the particular trading scheme can thus be credited and used to substitute
for  emissions  reductions  within  the  sectors  covered  by  the  scheme.  For  example,  rainforest
preservation activities in the Amazon region may be financed by a EU-based company producing
chemicals in order to avoid costly changes to production facilities, if this preservation can be proven
to be additional, i.e., contingent upon the funding obtained through the offset trading scheme. (For
carbon trading recommendations, see OECD, 2011b, p. 105; World Bank, 2012, pp. 47–48, 82.)
Besides such mechanisms to directly price emissions,  Green Economy models rely on a
number of further proposals to shift economic incentive structures in favor of more ecologically
benign technologies  and behaviors.  Crucially,  they demand the  phase-out  of  state  subsidies  for
fossil fuels, arguing that these do not only support ecologically damaging and backward energy
infrastructures – “acting as a negative price on carbon”  (OECD, 2015a, p. 15) – but also mainly
benefit  wealthy  demographics  while  being  routinely  publicly  defended  as  providing  access  to
consumption opportunities was already issued in the early 1970s (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972).
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energy for the poor. This redistributive effect, so the argument goes, could be achieved at much
lower cost  through targeted payments  to  low-income households  without  promoting overuse of
fossil fuels (OECD, 2011b, pp. 45, 100–101; World Bank, 2012, p. 15). 
Conversely,  “green”  technologies  in  sectors  such  as  renewable  energy  production,
transportation and construction are to  be encouraged through subsidies  and public  procurement
policies  (OECD,  2011b,  pp.  42–44;  UNEP,  2011,  pp.  550–555).  The  degree  to  which  this  is
advisable is subject to much detailed debate, however, with all institutions cautious not to intervene
unduly in market processes. In order to foster innovation – a crucial policy goal of Green Economy
advocates – it is considered most appropriate for public funding to concentrate on the early stages of
technological development (OECD, 2011b, p. 58), where private markets may provide insufficient
funding even for eventually profitable technologies. The protection of intellectual property rights –
meaning  patents  on  technological  developments  –  is  seen  as  another  crucial  foundation  for
innovation  (OECD, 2011b, p. 12; UNEP, 2011, pp. 567–568). Industrial policy may also include
direct regulation – setting rigid pollution standards for industrial emitters, for example – but this is
“typically  a  second-best  solution  to  market-based instruments.”  (OECD,  2011b,  p.  60;  cf.  also
World Bank, 2012, pp. 58–60) Where direct regulation is applied, a clear preference is expressed for
technology-neutral  policies that  avoid “picking winners” among competing technologies  (World
Bank, 2012, pp. 83–84) and, more generally, for “pro-competitive regulation.”  (OECD, 2011b, p.
47) Concerning ecosystem “production” more directly, positive financial incentives are proposed in
the form of  payments for ecosystem services  (PES) which remunerate land owners, farmers and
other economic actors for exercising stewardship over the ecosystems under their influence rather
than maximizing revenue by any means possible (UNEP, 2011, p. 550; World Bank, 2012, p. 23). A
notable example is the REDD+ program for reforestation activities (UNEP, 2011, pp. 597–599, see
also discussions in sections 3.2.4 and 7.4). This strategy, as part of the set of reforms summarized
here, should herald the “[e]mergence of green property as an asset class.” (Ibid., pp. 595–596)
Such terminology from the world of finance points to another important policy concern for
Green Economy models: How can access to finance be warranted for “green” development, given
that green projects have to compete with more conventional ones for funding? UNEP (2011, pp.
583–625) devotes a lengthy chapter to this question, although it also estimates that “only” about
10% of total global investment must be “green” in order to enable the  Green Economy transition
(ibid., p. 24). The organization seeks to combine green stimulus measures and functioning financial
markets with “[s]ound public policies and enabling regulatory frameworks” to “unlock the scale of
private finance needed.” (ibid.,  p. 622)  While the World Bank  (2012, pp. 21, 76–77) advocates
public-private partnerships in which public funding is privately controlled, and UNEP wants to take
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development finance institutions to task (2011, p. 617), attracting private investment by “improving
the investment environment”  (OECD, 2015a, p. 39) is generally given high priority. The OECD
(2011b, p. 53) here wants to rely on “clear and stable market signals” via pricing. Institutional
investors are targeted as potential sources of long-term financing (OECD, 2015a, pp. 38–39), as is
the “high net worth community” whose “[c]oncentrated pools of assets … will need to support the
green  economy  in  coming  decades.”  (UNEP,  2011,  p.  588) In  order  to  attract  the  latter,
“[g]overnments should involve the private sector in establishing clear, stable and coherent policy
and  regulatory  frameworks  to  facilitate  the  integration  of  ESG  [environmental,  social  and
governance] issues into financial and investment decisions” (ibid., p. 589); few details, however, are
specified.  Meanwhile,  in  unison, all  reports  caution against  trade protectionism and advocate a
global “free”-trade agenda, which we will return to in sections 5.2.2 and 7.4.3.
In  summary,  these  institutions  seek  to  expose  the  “myth”  (UNEP,  2011,  p.  16) of  a
fundamental trade-off between sustainability and “economic progress” and, instead, to highlight the
“synergies between economic growth and environmental protection.”  (World Bank, 2012, p. 85)
Potential trade-offs and tensions between these goals in some particular contexts are recognized but
typically relativized (OECD, 2011b, p. 130; UNEP, 2011, p. 508; World Bank, 2012, p. 105). 
2.4 The Green Economy as “mature” neoliberalism
The  Green  Economy  model  is  here  interpreted  as  a  “mature”  neoliberal  variant  of  “green”
capitalism. What specifically distinguishes this model, and what “maturity” is it credited with?
The institutional  Green Economy  and  green growth  models  emphasize the  link between
these new concepts and the established goal of sustainable development. The World Bank (2012, p.
2) sees the former as an attempt to operationalize the latter, while UNEP (2011) similarly declared,
in the subheading of its report, the GE to provide “pathways to sustainable development.” But in a
moment of crisis for capital, the social objectives associated with sustainable development had to be
carefully rephrased so as not to impose a further drag on capital accumulation. The OECD points
out the semantic shift when explaining that  “[g]reen growth is narrower in scope than the related
concept of sustainable development. It focuses more squarely on driving progress at the interface of
the economy and the environment by fostering innovation, investment and competition.” (2015a, p.
20) Accordingly,  critics  have  noted  that  sustainable  development was  more  insistent  on  social
justice, equality and bottom-up democratic participation, all of which have been watered down in
the green growth discourse (Dale, Mathai, & Puppim de Oliveira, 2016; cf. also Bluemling & Yun,
2016; Posthuma & Muçouçah, 2016). Here, “[t]he social dimension of addressing ecological issues
is  reduced  to  growth,  green  jobs  and  poverty  reduction,  rather  than  environmental  justice.”
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(Corporate Watch, 2016, p. 40) The hard choices between economic, social and environmental goals
that sustainable development faced tend to disappear in the rhetoric of win-win-win solutions (cf.
Wanner, 2015), but they continually reappear in practice (see chapter 9).
Some scholars still argue that the term Green Economy is open to contestation and could, in
principle,  be  reclaimed  from  different  angles,  perhaps  even  from  a  post-capitalist  standpoint
(Caprotti & Bailey, 2014; Corson et al., 2013). But throughout the 2010s, it has effectively become
identified with the market-oriented neoliberal agenda outlined in section 2.3. Not only does UNEP’s
usage of the term exclude the possibility of a “green” economy beyond capitalist relations; it has
also contributed to a rhetorical upgrade of the idea of “green” capitalism from a set of mechanisms
to fix environmental degradation under capitalism – a more or less costly stabilization effort – to a
new regime of  capitalist  accumulation  that  is  more dynamic  than the old “gray” economy (cf.
discussion in section 4.4). Along with the de-emphasis of the social pillar, this shift contributes to
making the concept far more attractive to the international business community (Buseth, 2017).
Here, it should be re-emphasized that to call the Green Economy “neoliberal” is not to say
that it is an expression of market purism or orthodox neoclassical economics. (For an introduction
to the more radical idea of  “free-market  environmentalism,” see T.  L.  Anderson & Leal,  2015,
Chapters 1–2.) The GE’s natural capital pricing strategies perhaps best pinpoint its functioning as
an ecologically reflexive neoliberalism: The removal of distorting factors from market exchange in
order to reach a true equilibrium is still paramount, but, to a larger degree than admitted in orthodox
neoclassical theory, this can only be achieved through government interventionism that involves
itself directly (in the case of carbon taxes) or indirectly (in the case of carbon trading schemes) in
the setting of prices for certain, now ubiquitous (and fictitious) commodities. 
Building on experience from decades of neoliberal environmental “governance,” the GE
reflects many of the contradictory processes of uneven neoliberalization and their contestation that
characterize what has been dubbed “actually existing neoliberalism.” (Brenner & Theodore, 2007)
This involves a panoply of state interventions, but those are not to be seen as constricting the forces
of capital – it  enables  them, all the while nudging them into the desired direction. “The private
sector needs an enabling environment,” the World Bank (2012, p. 13) admonishes, and governments
can deliver this – the primary criterion for adequate environmental policies here is that they do not
interfere with a broader framework of “good growth policies” (ibid.), i.e., those that enable markets
to function smoothly.  This  carries  a  certain appeal  for  centrist  forces  in  that  no shift  in  power
relations appears necessary. Applying this neoliberal inflection of state power as an  enabler  and
partner of capital more than a counterweight, which will be discussed more extensively in section
8.3, the GE does not simply seek  deregulation but various  reregulations with a general tendency
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towards increasing commodification (but not necessarily a straightforward pursuit of the latter).28
The concrete choice of enabling mechanisms, market-based or otherwise, is context-specific and
often handled as a pragmatic question under “actually existing” neoliberalism. 
In this sense, the Green Economy is a “mature” expression of neoliberal strategy, one of the
many complex and contradictory – and, in the details, frequently quite pragmatic – articulations of
neoliberal purism with other ideological influences, the “messy hybrids” that “reflect the radical
non-achievability of such purity” during the “protracted phase of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism.”  (Peck,
2010, pp. 23–24)29 The role of the state in the Green Economy,  and in green-capitalist formations
more generally, will be subject to more intense scrutiny in chapters 10 and 11.
2.5 Meet the players: The Green Economy institutions
This  section will  outline the history of  the three institutions  behind the major  Green Economy
studies with respect to their engagement in environmental-economic policy. This contextualization
highlights the embeddedness of these studies in loci of institutional power and serves to clarify why
the  political  program formulated  in  these  reports  deserves  particular  attention  even if  it  is  not
comprehensively implemented. Moreover, the hegemonic status I ascribe to the  Green Economy
agenda within environmental debates derives to a large extent from the hegemonic function of these
institutions themselves.30 This critical history outlines the latter function and begins to approach the
green-capitalist  hegemonic  project’s  paradoxical  agenda,  in  which  the  capital-friendly  form of
problem solving is prioritized over any substantive “green”  outcome. A graphic overview of the
linkages between these organizations and a number of further important players in what I call the
Green Economy network will be provided in Appendix 2.
2.5.1 OECD  
The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD),  located  in  Paris  and
employing a staff of 2,500  (OECD, 2018c, p. 2), is perhaps the world’s most famous think tank.
Formed after World War II and originally named Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC),  the  OECD’s  membership  is  closely  correlated  with  the  list  of  the  world’s  wealthiest
28 In the words of Brenner and Theodore (2007, p. 154), neoliberalism “generates a complex reconstitution of 
state/economy relations in which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote market-based regulatory 
arrangements and to extend the process of commodification.”  
29 For a concurring assessment, see Brockington’s review of UNEP’s Green Economy report: “This is a report which 
tries to keep as true to the neoliberal zeitgeist as possible, while making more explicit than most the levels of re-
regulation ... required to bring neoliberalism into being.” (Brockington, 2012, p. 414)
30 In a much-noted essay building on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (see chapter 8), Robert W. Cox (1983, p. 172) 
outlined the characteristics of hegemonic international organizations as follows: “(1) they embody the rules which 
facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves product of the hegemonic world order; 
(3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries 
and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.” It should become apparent from the further exposition here that all 
of these points apply to the institutions in question; Cox, in fact, noted the OECD as an example.
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countries, earning it the designation “Club of the Rich.”31 It has been tasked with monitoring its
members’ economic  policies  and  promoting  policy  harmonization  –  in  its  own  words,  with
“providing a forum in which governments work together … to promote better policies for better
lives.” (Ibid.) It thus effectively functions as a platform for  “negotiating inter-capitalist economic
tensions” (Schmelzer, 2016, p. 29) and a “warden of liberal capitalism.” (Ibid., p. 354) 
In  The Hegemony of Growth,  economic historian Matthias Schmelzer  (2016) follows the
institution’s history with a focus on its pivotal role in establishing the policy paradigm of economic
growth in  the post-war decades.  In  the 1950s,  “public  acceptance  of  economic expansion as  a
political goal … had to be actively produced” (ibid., p. 127) through a “politics of productivity
aimed at depoliticizing social and economic issues” (p. 118) and legitimizing the post-war social
order. The OECD was at the forefront of this development, declaring the 1960s the “Decade of
Growth.” While intra-OECD growth was also legitimized as a prerequisite to allow other countries
to prosper, and the organization dedicated some resources to development aid (contributing to the
equation of “development” with “growth”), “an essential function of the OECD growth target lay in
… providing identity and purpose … to the imagined community of ‘the West.’” (P. 185) 
Schmelzer  highlights  the  continuous  self-reinvention  of  the  OECD’s  agenda,  which,
however, mainly reflects so many reincarnations of the growth paradigm. Not only mirroring but
often actively shaping the overall societal climate, the organization transitioned from predominantly
Keynesian  to  strictly  neoliberal  policy  advocacy  over  the  1970s.  Interestingly,  the  interregnum
between these eras was characterized by an increasing reflection of ecological concerns within the
OECD  (ibid.,  Chapters  7-8).  Again,  this  development  not  only  followed  the  broader  societal
preoccupation with environmental issues during the time but actively contributed to it: The Club of
Rome,  whose  1972  Limits  to  Growth report  (Meadows,  1972) was  arguably  the  single  most
important contribution to the mainstreaming of environmental concern, was essentially a maverick
spin-off from within the OECD nomenclature and reflected back upon the organization’s agenda for
a brief period, leading it to shift towards advocacy for “qualitative” growth. Thus seeking to contain
environmentalism within their terms of engagement, in 1970, shortly before UNEP was founded
(see below),  “the [member states’] ministers decided that the OECD should become the primary
international organization for the rich countries’ environmental policies.” (Schmelzer, 2016, p. 279)
While  the  more  critical  tones  within  its  ranks  were  quickly  superseded  during  the  neoliberal
ascendancy,  the  OECD continued  to  work  on  the  econometric  quantification  of  environmental
31 Meanwhile, all of the large so-called “emerging economies” often lumped together under acronyms like BRIICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa) are listed as “OECD Key Partners” (cf. OECD, 2018c, p. 2) 
– with the notable exception of Russia.
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monitoring  and  contributed  to  the  increasing  dominance  of  (neo-)liberal,  market-  and  growth-
oriented environmental-economic thought (ibid., Chapter 9). 
Through this lens, it is easy to see that the OECD’s main GE study, titled Towards Green
Growth  (OECD, 2011b),  is  firmly rooted in  a long tradition of  growth advocacy that  arguably
constitutes  the  organization’s  DNA. The environmental  redefinition  of  growth – along with its
inverse, the economically oriented redefinition of environmental protection – was developed by the
organization over four decades prior to the study’s release.
This  is  largely  confirmed  by  a  more  sympathetic  study  of  the  OECD’s  Environment
Directorate, conducted as part of the larger MANUS research project on international environmental
bureaucracies  (Busch, 2009).32 As the first international organization to feature an environmental
unit (since 1971), the OECD’s focus was always on economic instruments and the integration of
environmental with economic, trade and energy policies. Busch laments the lack of executive power
– the OECD’s Environment Directorate has no sanctioning power over member countries and no
financial  resources  to  create  incentives,  which  allows  member  states  to  continuously  resist
implementing  unpopular  policy recommendations  such as  the  phase-out  of  fossil  fuel  subsidies
(which happens to be demanded again and again in the Green Growth study): “Its obvious weakness
is its poor record in ‘turning talk into action.’” (Ibid., p. 84) At the same time, Busch emphasizes the
considerable  cognitive  and  normative  influence exerted by the OECD in environmental matters.33
While it has little influence on whether states implement policies, it has greatly influenced how they
are  conceptualized  and  implemented.  Through  its  close  connections  to  “stakeholders,”  unique
organizational expertise including vast data collections, extensive activity in hosting workshops and
other  knowledge dissemination events  and its  relentlessly practical  policy focus  the OECD has
gained a reputation as an authoritative source of knowledge. This way, the Environment Directorate
has  been highly influential  in  defining concepts  such as  the “polluter  pays” principle  for  anti-
pollution policies, an influence that even resonates in the scientific community.34 The Directorate
has been particularly central in its agenda-setting and problem-framing endeavors, always pointing
in the direction of growth-friendly environmental policies (ibid., pp. 77-81). Drawing on interviews
with OECD officials, Busch also notes that the depoliticization of environmental policies – their
32 Conveniently for our present purposes, the project also includes studies on the World Bank and UNEP, cited below.
33 The MANUS studies cited in this chapter systematically distinguish between each institution’s executive, normative
and cognitive influence. The executive dimension covers the institution’s influence on countries’ implementation of 
international agreements, albeit at the level of executive capacity building rather than top-down enforcement. The 
normative dimension refers to its influence in shaping international cooperation and agreements. The cognitive 
dimension, perhaps not neatly separable from the normative, consists of the knowledge-producing as well as the 
awareness-raising and agenda-setting functions of these institutions.
34 Proposed by the OECD in the 1970s, the “polluter pays” principle – essentially, the idea that environmental policy 
should aim to impose internalization of environmental costs on producers – has been a central concept in 
environmental economics ever since (cf. e.g. Jacobs, 1991, Chapter 12).
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reduction to technical questions – has been used strategically in order to convince member states of
implementing stronger policies (ibid., p. 92). 
Since the publication of its  Green Growth  report,  the OECD has continued to publish a
broad range of policy recommendations and monitoring studies with regard to the GE  (see e.g.
OECD, 2013, 2015a, 2015b, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2018e, n.d.; DRC & OECD, 2017); it has further
hosted  regular  conferences  for  scholars  and  policymakers  and  offered  policy  consulting  to
governments across the globe (for an extensive overview, see OECD, 2018c). The OECD’s reaction
to political-economic obstacles to GE policy implementation will be treated in section 8.3.5.
Thus, while lacking direct executive influence, the OECD functions as a highly effective
think  tank  with  privileged  access  to  decision-makers  throughout  the  “rich  world.”  Across  its
member  countries  it  has  effectively  promoted a  particular  variant  of  environmental  policy  –  a
neoliberal  interpretation of  ecological  modernization,  cf.  sections  2.2 and 2.6.2  –  for decades,
helping this variant to attain the (admittedly weak) hegemonic status it presently enjoys. It is within
this framework that its contribution to the Green Economy discourse should be understood. 
2.5.2 World Bank
Like  the  OECD,  the  World  Bank  began  as  a  rather  modest  building  block  of  the  emerging
institutional  order  in  the  post-World  War  II  period.  But  not  only  is  its  ostensible  constituency
universal – the Bank also began with very material practices of project lending before integrating its
banking function with an increasingly important role as a knowledge-producing think tank. In his
excellent  Imperial Nature,  Michael Goldman  (2005) traces the ascent of the World Bank to the
position of “the world’s most powerful international institution” (ibid., p. xi), capable of defining
global problems and offering particular solutions,  both conceptually and through its  investment
practices, thus maintaining ideological and material hegemony over the global South. He leaves no
doubt that the World Bank’s primary objective, from the outset, was to facilitate Northern capital
accumulation – in its early period after World War II, this proceeded through reconstruction loans to
war-torn areas, and from the late 1960s on, through shifting its focus on poverty and the global
poor. The Bank thus heavily contributed to the debt crises of the early 1980s before moving on to
debt management and imposing the now-notorious structural adjustment policies on governments
across  the  globe,  which  significantly  expanded  the  institution’s  power.  Inside  the  institution,
Goldman reports strict mechanisms of social control and hierarchy and a “dominant culture where
neoclassical economics is the sole language of communication and rationality.” (Ibid., p. 136) 
Finally, in reaction to mounting social movement pressures on the institution following the
disastrous  social  and  environmental  impacts  of  its  lending  practices  and  the  dismal  record  of
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structural  adjustment  policies  in  particular,  the  World  Bank  developed  a  new  hegemonic
development paradigm from the 1990s on, which Goldman terms green neoliberalism. This model,
in  Goldman’s formula,  combined neocolonial  conservation practices  with a  neoliberal  focus on
natural capital (ibid., p. 184). The very local visibility of the World Bank’s often destructive green-
neoliberal projects has sparked even more widespread resistance than its less transparent structural
adjustment policies, leading Goldman to opine that the Bank’s hegemony is at least vulnerable. The
WB’s 2012 GE report clearly reflects the experience of this policy paradigm’s first two decades. 
It is worthwhile contrasting this critical perspective with an insider view. In the perspective
provided by a former high-ranking official (Ravallion, 2016), the World Bank is honestly dedicated
to poverty reduction, but its internal mechanisms and incentive structures are not always optimal for
accomplishing this task, and Bank projects often suffer from insufficient monitoring and inadequate
cost-benefit analyses. The country-based lending practice is not ideal for addressing global public
“bads” such as climate change. But since private capital flows are “selective” (ibid., p. 80) and
bilateral aid often reflects donors’ political and economic interests, the Bank is still needed. (With
Goldman, one may ask how its practices are any different on these counts.) Major responsibility for
the failure of poverty reduction for him still lies with poor countries: “[U]nderdevelopment … has
deeper causes in poor policy-making and governance in developing countries.” (Ibid., p. 80) While
arguing  that  “critics  were  not  always  well-informed,”  he  concedes  that  early  SAPs  were  not
poverty-sensitive enough and the “Washington Consensus was too formulaic” (ibid., p. 87) – but,
fortunately,  these  shortcomings  have  been  addressed  from the  late  1980s  on,  yielding  a  more
socially attentive Bank. This would be Goldman’s highly ambivalent era of green neoliberalism.
The same narrative of a more-or-less idealistic Bank and its frustration with the reluctance
of “developing” countries to embrace the benefits of “green” development appears in the MANUS
study dedicated to the Bank  (Marschinski & Behrle, 2009). While the authors praise the Bank’s
“innovative green projects” (p. 118), they admit to a methodical choice that “convey[s] an overly
green vision of the World Bank” (ibid., p. 103) and acknowledge the uneasy “coexistence of both
highly innovative 'green' and environmentally controversial projects” (p. 122), the former of which,
generously counting,  only amount  to  5-10% of  the Bank’s  budget  (p.  104).  They attribute  this
contradiction  to  the  Bank’s  “loosely  defined mandate”  with  conflicting  goals  (p.  131).  (Unlike
Goldman, they do not critically interrogate these “green” projects and do not consider that the two
approaches they find to exist in conflict with one another may often in fact coincide in the same
projects.) Marschinski and Behrle emphasize both the World Bank’s cognitive influence through its
extensive publications for a relatively large audience and its normative influence in operationalizing
the Kyoto Protocol by working out the mechanisms that constituted the first global carbon markets
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 40
and offset schemes. It has thus been an effective lobbyist for and designer of market-based solutions
to ecological problems for decades. But, they argue, these dimensions of power are dwarfed by the
vast executive influence the Bank can wield through its financial power. Not only does the Bank
directly  fund many projects  suitable  to  its  agenda,  it  is  also,  as  detailed  by Goldman,  heavily
invested  in  state  capacity  building  and  makes  use  of  its  additional  leverage  through  the
conditionalities attached to its loans to national governments (pp. 111-115, 119).35 
Likewise,  the  World  Bank  used  its  considerable  financial  power  to  jump-start  carbon
markets in the 2000s. In 2007, it was considered “the world’s largest buyer of [carbon] credits”
(Labatt & White, 2007, p. 19), and it was importantly involved in establishing and governing the
Kyoto Protocol’s  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, cf. Bumpus & Liverman, 2008), further
discussed in sections 3.2.3 and 7.4. In the 2010s, the Bank ran a “Partnership for Market Readiness”
initiative  to  support  (largely  Southern)  countries  with  “knowledge  and  financial  support”  in
establishing carbon trading systems (World Bank, 2013).
This directly extends to the implementation of other international policy mechanisms such
as the  Green Climate Fund established at the 2010 climate summit in Cancún, suggested as the
main vehicle to raise $100 billion annually by 2020 to finance adaptation and technology transfer
for poorer countries. The World Bank’s designation as the (interim) trustee for the fund led one
African observer  to  remark snidely that  even if  the funds were successfully  raised from richer
countries – which appeared unlikely at the time – their dispensation “would be so ring-fenced with
‘conditionalities’ that it would auction away the sovereignty of African nations at the altar of ‘Green
Capitalism’ or  ‘Good Governance.’”  (Tandon, 2011, p.  141) Civil  society critics noted that  the
World Bank had aggressively lobbied for this job during the summit negotiations and worried that
the strategies pursued in  the Bank’s  other  climate funds – to  push for  loans  and private-sector
leveraging over grants to poor countries, thereby increasing debt distress and benefiting Northern
corporate interests more than either the poor or the climate – would be applied to this larger fund as
well (Honkaniemi, 2011). Indeed, the policy conditionalities attached to the Bank’s previous climate
finance mechanisms were explicitly devised to enforce market-based solutions in recipient countries
(ibid., pp. 16–17). This leaves the World Bank in the fascinatingly powerful position to implement
its  market-oriented  Green Economy  agenda  even through the “complementary” mechanisms  for
technology “transfers” which it has been advocating as the social justice component – the beyond-
the-market aspect – of its GE framework. 
35 This ability to effectively enforce, through the power of the purse, compliance not just with international 
agreements but with World Bank standards and policy goals arguably exceeds the notion of executive influence as 
laid out in note 33.
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Thus, beyond producing GE-related knowledge, frequently in cooperation with other – often
private  –  institutions  (e.g.  ClimateWorks  Foundation  & World  Bank  Group,  2014;  High-Level
Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017; infoDev & World Bank Group, 2017; World Bank, 2013,
2017, n.d.; World Bank & Ecofys, 2018), the Bank has continued to engage in the implementation
of its  Green Growth vision since its 2012 report. Most recently, emphasis has begun to shift from
climate change mitigation to adaptation, as in the Bank’s 2018 promise to mobilize $200 billion for
climate action over five years (World Bank, 2018; World Bank Group, 2018a, 2018b). This might
signal an admission that the Green Economy’s lack of success in to halting global warming warrants
greater attention to dealing with the emerging consequences of warming, but at the same time, it
reproduces the GE’s preferences – as outlined in the following section – for “soft” optimization of
administrative  and  investment  practices  over  “hard”  regulation,  and  for  “mobilizing”  and
“leveraging”  private investment by “creating markets for climate business”  (World Bank Group,
2018a, n.p.): Not only mitigation but also adaptation activities are, to a large extent, subjected to the
profitability criterion. 
We may thus summarize that in the context of Green Economy advocacy, the World Bank,
through the active construction of “environmental states,” does for the global South what the OECD
does for the North:  setting the agenda and effectively foreclosing the emergence of  alternative
perspectives on environmental policy at the decision-making level. But unlike the OECD, it has the
additional  power  of  the  purse,  or  “executive  influence,”  which  allows  it  both  to  quasi-legally
enforce  implementation  (by  making  loans  conditional  on  particular  social  and  environmental
policies) as well as to provide positive incentives (by privileging the financing of projects that suit
its  sustainable  development  agenda)  –  both  often  in  contexts  where  financially  dependent
governments in the global South cannot afford to forgo such deals.
2.5.3 UNEP
The  United  Nations  Environment  Programme,  finally,  is  the  youngest  of  the  three  institutions,
founded at the Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, in the wake of the
rise of modern environmentalism – in the same historical moment that spawned the Club of Rome. 
One sympathetic observer noted that, along with environmental questions in general, UNEP
was marginalized from the outset within the UN system – for example through a bureaucratic move
that  preempted  any  consideration  of  trade  issues  at  the  Stockholm  conference,  through  weak
funding and inadequate staffing and its remote location in Nairobi, all of which meant that it was
faced from the beginning with an “impossible assignment.” (von Moltke, 1996, p. 57; for a largely
concurring perspective, see Najam, 2003) Ivanova  (2007) offers an account of UNEP’s inception
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which emphasizes how environmental issues were, from the very moment they emerged on the
global  political  agenda,  entangled  in  complicated  North-South  relations.  (Her  account  largely
reproduces  a  narrative  of  Northern  enlightened  cosmopolitanism  frustrated  by  Southern  self-
interested  politicking,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  decision  to  locate  UNEP in  Nairobi.)  An
authoritative  global  environmental  organization  was  not  politically  feasible  at  the  time,  and  a
specialized  UN  agency  on  the  model  of  the  World  Health  Organization  was  considered
inappropriate for a cross-cutting issue that affected the domains of all other agencies, leading to the
subordinate status of a subsidiary UN Programme.  It was further weakened by voluntary funding
mechanisms which give particular donor countries much leeway to influence UNEP’s activities,
leading  Ivanova’s  largely  affirmative  account  to  the  conclusion  that  UNEP  has  “not  been
tremendously successful” (ibid., p. 339) and to note that its political clout was much smaller than
the World Trade Organization’s (which, of course, has a sanctioning power that UNEP is lacking).
Its status has further suffered from the World Bank’s increasing encroachment, backed by actual
financial power, upon the environmental policy domain (ibid., p. 352). Ivanova explains that UNEP
was  conceived  as  a  “brain”  to  coordinate  between  other  agencies’ efforts,  collect  knowledge,
conduct  environmental  quality  management  and  engage  in  environmental  capacity  building  –
playing a catalytic and normative but explicitly not an operational role. 
Echoing most of these assessments, the MANUS study on UNEP (Bauer, 2009) still finds a
considerable cognitive and normative influence through its role as a “hub of global environmental
information” (ibid., p. 185) and its very active role in brokering international treaties and initiating
relevant organizational steps such as the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC; p. 173).  Bauer concludes: “In many ways, the secretariat of UNEP is the hub of
international  environmental  governance  ....  Nonetheless,  it  is  merely  a  small,  underfunded,  and
formally low-ranking player within [the UN] system.” (Ibid., p. 190) 
Considering such limitations, von Moltke (1996, p. 58) concluded that “[g]iven its mandate,
resources, and its authority, UNEP has been a remarkable success” because of its role in fostering
international  environmental  agreements,  and  that  it  is  currently  the  world’s  best  hope  for  an
institution entrusted with international environmental management – if its mandate and resources
were expanded. But a 2007 initiative to upgrade UNEP to the status of an independent agency
named the UN Environmental Organization (Doyle, 2007) went nowhere. Indeed, as Najam (2003),
similarly  lauding  UNEP’s  role  in  raising  environmental  awareness  among  UN  and  national
government structures as well as its success in brokering international treaties despite its chronic
lack of resources, argues, the problem of its relative weakness is not simply organizational – absent
adequate political will among member states, a new organization would face the same problems.
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In  the  wake  of  the  2012  UN  Conference  on  Sustainable  Development (the  “Rio+20
summit”), for which UNEP’s Green Economy study had been prepared, significant changes to the
organization’s structure were made for the first time since its inception: The Governing Council was
expanded to  include  all  UN members.  At  the  same time,  the  General  Assembly  called  on  the
Secretary-General to ensure that UNEP “receive secure, stable and increased financial resources
from the regular budget of the UN.” (UNEP, 2012) These decisions implemented the UNEP-related
provisions  in  the  Rio+20  outcome  document,  The  Future  We  Want  (United  Nations  General
Assembly, 2012), which officially elevated the GE strategy to UN-sanctioned policy doctrine. In the
lofty declaration, the UN committed itself to “strengthening” UNEP’s role as “the leading global
environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda.” (Ibid., p. 17) But still, in 2016,
the regular UN budget only accounted for 7% of UNEP funding, while earmarked contributions
from public and private sources alone made up 40% of the budget – rising, during the first ten
months of 2017, to 54% (UNEP, 2017).36 This budget composition calls into question the agency’s
political independence and “neutrality.” 
UNEP appears to exemplify the problems of “global environmental governance”: A brain
without  a  body,  caught  up  in  global  power  politics  and  thus  confined  to  an  ideological  and
coordinating role without any executive power. Its main function in our present context, one may
think, is to lend the United Nations’ greater legitimacy, compared to the more obviously Western-
dominated OECD and World Bank, to the political agenda of the  Green Economy. This involves
close ties with influential business actors, for example through UNEP’s Finance Initiative (UNEP
FI), an extraordinarily thinly veiled lobbying platform for the financial industry, to which it awards
accolades for minuscule “green” achievements.37 Further sub-initiatives include the UN Sustainable
36 The regular budget’s share did increase after the 2012 resolution, but at that point it had reached a historical low of 
2.8% after four decades of continuous (relative) decreases. 
37 Membership includes a long list of financial institutions such as HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, UniCredit, 
AXA, Barclays, BNP Paribas and Citigroup; the initiative is also supported by the World Wildlife Fund (UNEP 
Finance Initiative, n.d.). UNEP FI’s “Statement of Commitment” identifies the best way to sustainable development
as “allowing markets to work within an appropriate framework of cost efficient regulations and economic 
instruments.” In their “pursuit of good corporate citizenship,” members claim to “support a precautionary approach 
to environmental and social issues.” (UNEP Finance Initiative, 2011, n.p.) Whereas UNEP’s Global Green New 
Deal (UNEP, 2009) still acknowledged the necessity of reforms to the global financial system in principle, UNEP 
FI prefers to speak of value commitments, reviewing and dialoguing. In seeking to engage financial institutions to 
“integrate sustainability as a value creation driver,” its main strategies according to its 2018–19 work plan are 
“sharing knowledge and best practices” and “amplify[ing] the collective voice from the finance sector in policy 
debate.” (UNEP Finance Initiative, 2018, n.p.) Adding UNEP’s legitimacy as a “neutral” institution to this chorus 
appears to be the initiative’s central selling point: “As a unique partnership between the UN and the finance sector, 
one of UNEP FI’s offerings is its ability to convene a wide range of stakeholders under a neutral platform.” (Ibid., 
n.p.) “Stakeholders” from civil society thus are to be involved – but subordinated to corporate members.
UNEP FI’s activities are clearly biased towards the global South, where most of its “priority countries” for 
“market intelligence” are located (ibid.). Regarding its corporate membership, UNEP FI’s goals are extraordinarily 
lenient: Its declared goal is to turn 15% of its members into “sustainability leaders” and have 60% “working 
towards sustainability.” This is currently measured by proxies – for the former status, participation in some of its 
activities (public commitments, project participation or simply “CEO participation in UNEP FI activities”) suffices;
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Stock  Exchanges  Initiative,  whose  main  effort  is  to  encourage  stock  exchanges  to  have  listed
companies disclose their carbon emissions through a “voluntary action plan.”  (Sustainable Stock
Exchanges Initiative, 2017, 2018) Here, UNEP backs another set of institutions whose main raison
d’être arguably is  to  disseminate the message that  capital  is  never  the problem but  always the
solution, in need of nudging and encouragement but not tough regulation. The central problem,
meanwhile,  which Northern corporations help to rectify through these initiatives,  is  the South’s
insufficient integration into global capital circuits.
The Green Economy report’s publication was well-timed in the run-up to the 2012 Rio+20
conference, during which UNEP “pressed all participants to focus on the green economy, thus pre-
empting  alternative  choices  and  marginalising  NGO  dissent.”  (Levidow,  2014,  p.  8) Much  –
although by far not all – of its agenda was consequently translated into the conference’s outcome
document,  The Future We Want (United Nations General Assembly, 2012), testifying to UNEP’s
vast normative influence on global green-capitalist representation. (For a critical response from civil
society  groups,  see  Thematic  Social  Forum,  2012;  the  conflictual  preparatory  process  for  the
conference is detailed in Goodman & Salleh, 2013. See section 7.4.5 for UNEP’s attempt to co-opt
oppositional Southern governments.) As Najam (2003, p. 376) puts it, unlike the WB and the WTO,
UNEP “does not have to place barriers or bring out riot police at its annual meetings,” due to the
public legitimacy it enjoys and its relatively well-developed ties to civil society organizations. 
But this view neglects the material practices UNEP is involved in, often in cooperation with
the World Bank. It may not have the power to interfere with Northern practices of environmental
degradation,  but  it  is  clearly  involved  in  very  material  re-orderings  of  global  socio-ecological
relations such as the notorious REDD+ forestry program (see sections 3.2.4 and 7.4).  UNEP also
provides  Green  Economy  policy  consulting  for  “developing”  countries,  offering  a  fairly
standardized set of policy recommendations in line with the “green-neoliberal” program applied by
the World Bank for decades.38 These instances of “normative” influence have real effects, even
though the effective protection of the biosphere is unlikely to be among them.
2.5.4 The institutional division of labor
From this comparison of the three institutions, a relatively coherent picture emerges: Each covers
slightly different (but overlapping) segments of the political terrain on which the Green Economy is
for the latter, even participation in one UNEP FI event or its membership survey warrants inclusion (ibid.). In other 
words, the initiative is content with having 40% of its members not even attending to the most superficial 
appearance of any “green” activity. 
38 The assessment report published for the organization’s host country Kenya (UNEP, 2014b), for example, an 
emphasis on integrated top-level policy plans and systematic knowledge production, environmental fiscal reform, 
investments in agriculture and energy and public-private partnerships, as well as participation in international 
schemes such as REDD+.
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 45
constructed. The OECD advises powerful states in the global North but can do little to enforce its
agenda. The World Bank unleashes a disparately greater force upon less powerful states of the
South and is deeply engaged in many of the socially problematic on-the-ground practices of an
emerging  Green Economy,  without  necessarily  bringing the  world  any closer  to  environmental
sustainability. UNEP similarly focuses its attention on the South and is involved in designing some
of the same policy mechanisms, but its crucial contribution appears to reside in the moral authority
of United Nations “one worldism” it uses to link the respective strategies devised for the North and
the South. The institutions have continued to pursue this path since the publication of the GE reports
(cf. also section 8.3.5). In assuming these varying but overlapping roles, all three organizations and
their staff represent what has been conceptualized as the “transnational capitalist class,” which over
the past thirty years has actively sought to absorb environmental critiques and co-opt large segments
of environmental movements into a more capital-friendly “sustainable development historical bloc.”
(Sklair, 2001, 2016, see discussions here in chapter 8) 
Finally, the close cooperation between the three institutions, as indicated in the introduction,
is worth noting. In 2012, UNEP, the World Bank and the OECD joined forces with the  Global
Green  Growth  Institute  (GGGI)39 in  order  to  launch  the  Green  Growth  Knowledge  Platform
(GGKP),  which  collects  research  and  advocacy  stemming  from the  various  initiatives  of  these
institutions and their “knowledge partners.” (Green Growth Knowledge Platform, 2013) Targeting
policymakers and “experts” in particular, the GGKP arguably exemplifies the  Green Economy’s
technocratic bent. Its work is part of the broader efforts of the GGGI’s somewhat Orwellian- (and
certainly Gramscian-)sounding Office of Thought Leadership to “mak[e] the business case for green
growth more systematic, measurable, and predictable.” (Global Green Growth Institute, 2017, p. 30)
Besides constant cross-references in their publications, the big three institutions have also issued
joint publications, for example on climate finance (OECD, World Bank, & UNEP, 2018).
2.6 Macro-strategies of the Green Economy
This  chapter  closes  with the  brief  exposition of  three “macro-strategies”  that  define the  Green
Economy approach. The first is dubbed the ontology of natural capital, relating to the valuation of
ecosystems and their conceptual assimilation into capitalist logic, and the second, the gospel of eco-
efficiency,  which  refers  to  technology-centered  strategies  to  decouple  economic  growth  from
39 The GGGI is a primary vehicle for Green Economy policy consulting for the global South. Founded in 2010 as a 
Korean think tank, it was upgraded to the status of an international organization on the occasion of the Rio+20 
summit in 2012 (Global Green Growth Institute, 2017, p. 17). In 2015, the GGGI launched a cooperation with the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to “work together on activities aimed at addressing green growth 
issues in developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2015b, n.p.), thus drawing official international climate diplomacy 
under the Green Economy umbrella.
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resource consumption and environmental damages. These two openly acknowledged strategies are
then  contrasted  with  a  third,  more  hidden  strategy  of  problem  shifting through  capital’s  re-
externalization of the costs associated with “greening.”
2.6.1 Macro-strategy I: The ontology of natural capital
The moniker chosen for this first strategy is borrowed from Corson, Macdonald and Neimark (2013,
p. 3). This ontology involves a “reconceptualization of ‘nature’ as an entity that can pay for its own
reproduction” (ibid.), and it provides the foundations for the Green Economy’s problem framing of
ecological crises as market failures, as expressed in the “getting the prices right” mantra. In this
worldview, nature consists of stocks of natural capital (i.e., functioning ecosystems and resources)
that yield flows of  ecological services (such as edible species, pollination, absorption of GHGs or
water drainage) (e.g. OECD, 2011b, Chapter 1; World Bank, 2012, Chapter 5). As a macro-strategy,
it enables the translation and incorporation of ecosystems as natural capital into economic theory
and practice in order to employ their services more sustainably by allowing for the internalization
of externalities generated through the economic exploitation of such stocks and flows. 
The World Bank (2012, p. 7) very explicitly promotes this ontology: “The environment can
be thought of as natural capital that is often inefficiently managed, with many precious resources
wasted.”  Unsurprisingly,  the  economic  vocabulary  is  directly  tied  to  a  primarily  economic
perspective on nature. The Bank (ibid., p. 25) concludes that “neglecting natural capital … is simply
bad management, bad economics, and bad for growth.” The OECD (2011b, p. 29) argues that it is
the undervaluation of natural capital that poses a risk for future economic growth and claims that
“[t]he central feature of a green growth framework ... is recognition of natural capital as a factor of
production  and  its  role  in  enhancing  well-being.”  (Ibid.,  p.  20)  In  UNEP’s  (2011,  p.  14)
interpretation, the neglect of  natural capital reflects a “gross misallocation of capital” – in other
words, a regrettable and macroeconomically unwise business decision. This framework then guides
sectoral analyses: “Well-managed forests are the cornerstone of ecological infrastructure; as such,
they need to be recognised as an ‘asset class’ to be optimised for its returns.” (Ibid., p. 157) In the
run-up to the 2012 Rio+20 summit, this view was explicitly endorsed by a coalition of financial
institutions coordinated by UNEP in a Natural Capital Declaration, which noted that the term “has
been borrowed from the financial sector” and went on to conceptualize nature after the model of the
financial industry (UNEP Finance Initiative & Global Canopy Programme, 2012, p. 1).
The Green Economy’s ontology of natural capital is perhaps best expressed in the UNEP-
sponsored  TEEB (The  Economics  of  Ecosystems & Biodiversity)  study,  prepared  in  the  years
leading up to the publication of the GE studies and the Rio+20 summit (UNEP, 2010b). Endorsed in
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the Natural Capital Declaration, it has been referred to as the “main systemic concept” of the GE
(Corporate  Watch,  2016,  p.  40).  Working  within  the  same  ontological  framework  that
conceptualizes ecosystems as stocks of capital yielding ecosystem services, TEEB’s aim was to
“recognize, demonstrate and, where appropriate, capture the values of ecosystems and biodiversity”
(ibid., p. 3) and thus to create a methodological frame of reference for the implementation of GE
policies across the planet. Strategically, its goal is in “creating a common language” – the basic
work of establishing the ontology, in other words, to allow for the incorporation of nature into the
economy – and in “revealing the opportunities to work with nature” (ibid., p. 24), recognizing that
often ecological “infrastructures” are superior to human-made alternatives (ibid., p. 28).40 
The capitalist incorporation of nature through quantification, homogenization and valuation
enables,  at  least  in  theory,  its  management  according  to  capitalist-managerial  practices.  These
notably  involve  the  application  of  efficiency  strategies  in  the  tradition  of  the  ecological
modernization  paradigm:  the  second  macro-strategy  of  the  Green  Economy.  The  ontology,
meanwhile, will be problematized first on the level of theory in chapter 4 and then in terms of its
real-world repercussions throughout this work (notably in section 7.1).
2.6.2 Macro-strategy II: The gospel of eco-efficiency
The  gospel  of  eco-efficiency  is  the  rather  poetic  name  given  to  the  ecological  modernization
paradigm in Joan Martinez-Alier’s (2002) classification of currents of environmentalism. Ecological
modernization  as  a  political  project  refers  to  a  broader  development  in  which  environmental
critiques of capitalism have been taken up – and/or deflected – by liberal institutions with the aim of
further  “modernizing”  industrial-capitalist  societies  towards  a  reconciliation  with  environmental
stewardship  (for a historical account, see Spaargaren, 2000). It has thus been characterized as an
enlightened,  more  reflexive  variant  of  the  human  domination  of  nature,  one  that  has  attained
hegemonic status within environmental debates (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, Chapter 2; Görg, 2003,
pp. 134–158; Krüger, 2014). The  Green Economy, in turn, has been identified as the most recent
manifestation of this paradigm (Brand & Wissen, 2014), as a “popularized version” (McAfee, 2016,
p. 334) and even as the “pinnacle of ecological modernization.” (MacDonald, 2013, p. 55) 
While ecological modernization as such represents a broader political project, much of it
founded on the ontology of natural capital, and one of its “founding fathers” indeed acknowledged
the  long-term need  to  complement  technical  with  structural  change  (Jänicke,  1988),  Martinez-
Alier’s  pointed  phrase  highlights  the  relentless  prioritization  of  problem  solving  through
40 The prime example of this, frequently cited in the literature (in this case: UNEP, 2010b, p. 20), is New York City’s 
water utility that implemented a scheme paying farmers in upstate New York to protect watersheds, which proved to
be significantly cheaper than water purification plants to restore water quality later in the “commodity chain.” See 
section 6.4.3 for a closer look at this case.
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 48
technological  innovation over  structural  social  change  that  characterizes  the  ecological
modernization  outlook  in  general  and  the  Green  Economy  perspective  in  particular.41
“[T]echnological  change is  exactly what ecological modernization is  about,” as two proponents
argued (Andersen & Massa, 2000, p. 340). Whereas the ontology of natural capital emphasizes the
non-substitutability  of  this  form  of  capital  in  line  with  “strong”  sustainability  concepts,  these
technology-driven approaches seek to exhaust the potential for substituting built capital for natural,
as emphasized by the tradition of “weak” sustainability strategies (cf. Loiseau et al., 2016; see also
Döring, 2004 on competing notions of sustainability).42 As a capitalist macro-strategy, the gospel of
eco-efficiency envisions the absolute decoupling of production and economic growth from resource
consumption and ecological degradation by means of vastly accelerated technological innovation. 
The general outlook of the GE reports clearly reflects this gospel. The OECD makes this
explicit  at  the outset,  citing “productivity” and “innovation” as  the first  two “sources  of green
growth,” followed by “new markets” and “investor confidence” to guarantee both initial funding
and final demand for these innovations  (OECD, 2011b, p.  9). Innovation is seen as “crucial  in
enabling green and growth to go hand in hand” (ibid., p. 50) as it “can help to decouple growth from
natural  capital  depletion.”  (Ibid.,  p.  10)  The  World  Bank  (2012,  pp.  36–39) seeks  to  tailor
environmental policies to promote growth through increased capital inputs, efficiency, stimulus and
innovation  effects.  Arguing  that  the  idea  of  a  trade-off  between  ecological  sustainability  and
economic progress is a “myth” (UNEP, 2011, p. 16), UNEP frames its advocacy for market-based
incentives  in  terms  of  their  function  as  “powerful  tools  to  promote  green  investment  and
innovation” (ibid., p. 550) while admonishing that markets by themselves cannot be relied on to
deliver these and public interventions to foster innovation are also required (ibid., p. 22). The World
Bank-sponsored High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices  (2017, p. 53) extends the argument to
the wider potential of “greening”-induced intensified innovation activity across the entire economy,
expecting “positive spillovers on technological change in the form of a ‘Schumpeterian’ innovation
wave.” (On the ambivalent impacts of “Schumpeterian” innovation on capital, see section 4.6.3.)
41 This is particularly prominent in the ultra-Promethean Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015), a 
collaborative statement arguing, for example, that “[m]eaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a 
technological challenge” (p. 21), and calling for a “radical decoupling of humans from nature” (pp. 23–24). The 
manifesto holds that modern technology is per se more ecologically sensitive (because, according to crude 
measurements, less land-intensive per capita) than pre-modern technology and makes an emphatic case for nuclear 
energy as the central solution to humanity’s energy problems while dismissing most forms of renewable energy. The
text is also an explicit celebration of an alleged global historical development towards universal liberal values and 
polities. While European eco-modernists, often associated with Green parties, tend to be more moderate and most 
of them would disagree with the manifesto’s stance on energy, the document captures rather nicely the spirit that is 
dominant within the Anglo-Saxon contexts from which most of its authors originate.
42 This suggests a latent tension between the two macro-strategies. Loiseau et al. eventually argue, plausibly, that 
“weak” sustainability strategies dominate the Green Economy agenda. But the two moments – and, hence, the two 
macro-strategies identified here – are not incommensurable as neither is based on a totalizing claim (i.e., the Green 
Economy reports neither argue that “natural capital” is fully substitutable nor that it can never be substituted for).
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One plausible reading of the  gospel of eco-efficiency  is to view it as a  reaction  to various
“natures” becoming more expensive – to the same tendencies that gave rise to the  ontology of
natural capital. As raw materials and energy are increasingly costly production inputs, economizing
on these tends to become a necessity even beyond any consideration of the externalizations that
their cheap appropriation has historically entailed. But the Green Economy, it will be argued here,
does  not simply  accept  the  notion  of  “Expensive  Nature”  and  restrict  itself  to  adjustments  in
reaction; instead, it seeks ways to appropriate nature more cheaply once again, as manifested in the
third macro-strategy introduced below. The potential for, and limitation to, technological solutions
to capitalism’s historical unsustainability, meanwhile, will be analyzed in chapter 5.
2.6.3 Macro-strategy III: Re-externalizations/problem shifting
Here, we are moving beyond the “official”  Green Economy  agenda, addressing its more implicit
strategies. I would argue that the multiple, interwoven patterns of cost externalization hidden in the
Green Economy  effectively constitute the GE’s most important macro-strategy. If the expansion of
production faces resource constraints, the redistribution of all sorts of goods and property becomes
more central to systemic accumulation (see section 4.5.1). If little Cheap Nature is available on the
surface,  new externalizations  are  needed.  The macro-strategy of  re-externalizations,  or  problem
shifting,  is  characterized  by discursive  and  material  rearrangements  that  facilitate  capital
accumulation in the face of increasing ecological constraints by means of new and transformed cost
externalizations across ecosystemic, class, geopolitical and generational divides.
Shiny enclaves  of  an emerging  Green Economy  coexist  with  quite  substantial  “sacrifice
zones,” as documented in the discussion of “green” consumer products and the large-scale, toxic
mining activities they require (section 6.4). In the case of electric vehicles, Northern (and urban)
“zones of consumption” are freed of pollution, which instead takes place in mostly Southern (and
rural) “zones of extraction.”  (Kalt, 2019) These are embodiments of the green-capitalist tendency
towards problem  shifting rather than problem  solving; in other words, towards the restructuring
rather than the elimination of externalizations. Despite  the central  green-capitalist  concern with
avoiding  certain  forms  of  externalization  so  vividly  emphasized  in  getting  the  prices  right
strategies,  the  GE still  fundamentally  rests  on patterns  of  social  and ecological  externalization.
While the ecological externalizations are inherent in capital’s necessarily reductive subsumption of
nature under its own premises (see section 4.2), the social (often geographical) externalizations are
rooted in asymmetrical political-economic power relations, with the appropriation of all kinds of
Cheap Nature generally following the path of least resistance. These patterns of re-externalization
will be discussed in Bloc III.
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3. Taking stock: The Green Economy so far
This  chapter  seeks  to  provide  an  assessment  of  the  Green  Economy  in  terms  of  both  its
environmental promises “on paper” (section 3.1) and the track record of the “actually emerging”
Green Economy in  practice (section 3.2).  This empirical survey aids  the analytical work in the
following blocs and, through its overview of real-world developments, is intended to render more
accessible the theorization of “green” accumulation opportunities in the following chapter.
3.1 On ambition: The GE’s projections of future trajectories
Thesis 3.1: The widely accepted 2 °C benchmark for global warming is insufficient to stabilize the
global climate before extensive damages occur. The  Green Economy models nevertheless pay lip
service to this target – but in fact do not even promise to meet it.
With regard to  perhaps  the  most  decisive marker  of  “greening,”  the stabilization of  the  global
climate, the  Green Economy reports rely on references to widely noted greenhouse gas emissions
scenarios provided by the IPCC and the International Energy Agency (IEA). They more or less
explicitly endorse the commonplace goal of limiting global warming to 2 °C above pre-industrial
levels. This section will probe into the consistency of the GE models’ adherence to these 2 °C
scenarios in order to contextualize the level of “green” ambition embodied in these models. But
first, a few caveats are required. (For biodiversity, no such benchmark figures are provided, so that
this exemplary reconstruction must be restricted to the climate case.)
3.1.1 Going for 2 °C? On targets and scenarios
First of all, emissions scenarios are not politically neutral; they cannot be simply derived from the
“objective” findings of climate science but are necessarily based on specific assumptions about
political-economic developments – the IPCC (2014, p. 5) indeed emphasizes this. The institutions
behind the most frequently cited scenarios in fact are closely linked to those institutions that issued
the  Green  Economy  reports.  The  IEA,  contrary  to  what  one  may  assume,  is  not  a  global
intergovernmental body but an OECD spin-off that functions as “an autonomous body within the
OECD framework” and provides, among other things, a high-level lobbying platform for the coal
industry  (IEA,  2018a) as  well  as  for  nuclear  energy  (see  IEA,  2019).43 It  was  conceived  as  a
counterweight  to  OPEC,  the  Organization  of  the  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries,  in  order  to
represent Western countries which are mostly oil  importers  (Di Muzio,  2015, p.  2).  The IPCC,
43 This particular connection is reflected in its publications and projections of future trajectories – “according to the 
IEA, coal continues to have a bright future.” (Di Muzio, 2015, p. 33) The IEA has been accused of systematically 
downplaying the potential of renewable energy: In the past 20 years, year by year its forecasts have vastly 
underestimated the actual growth in renewables (Drum, 2017; Murray, 2009).
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meanwhile, is an institution working within the UN framework, co-established and to a large extent
funded by UNEP (cf. IPCC, 2010, pp. 1–2). As argued in section 2.1.1, its scenarios tend to be
based on a conservative, optimistic take on climatological findings (see note  9). These problems
with what the reports call the physical science basis  are compounded when it comes to modeling
exercises that involve political,  social,  economic and technical assumptions. For example, IPCC
scenarios  have  been  criticized  for  relying  too  heavily  on  not-yet-available  negative  emissions
technologies (NETs, see below), leading to conveniently lower estimates in terms of required reduc-
tions of industrial and household emissions (K. Anderson, 2015, cf. also section 5.5.4). Even a voice
as conservative as the  Economist  complained about  these models’ lack of plausibility  and their
tendency to understate the problem (“What they don’t tell you,” 2017). As with the IEA, while the
IPCC’s close links to political power and to the GE institutions call into question its  “objectivity,”
they  also  establish  the  perfect  grounds  for  an  immanent  critique  of  capitalist  Green  Economy
models, which can thus be subjected to a reality check provided by “their own” numbers.44
The problems begin with the envisioned benchmark for climate stability. The 2 °C goal,
widely established in international policy circles, has been frequently contested as an arbitrarily
politically  constructed (rather  than scientifically  “given”)  target  (Leach,  2015, pp.  28–30;  Rest,
2011, pp. 45–50). Capacities to adapt to warming depend on socio-economic circumstances, and
warming occurs unevenly across geographical regions. Critics argue that the 2 °C mark draws the
line for “acceptable” damage so as to restrict negative warming effects largely to the world’s poor
(Kaufmann & Müller, 2009, pp. 43–44). Environmentalist Bill McKibben calls it “a ‘suicide pact’
for  drought-stricken Africa.”  (McKibben,  2012,  n.p.) Many Southern  states,  small  island states
threatened by rising sea levels in particular, therefore pushed for a more ambitious target, leading to
the compromise wording in the Paris Agreement to the effect that the signatory countries aim to
“hold[]  the  increase  in  the  global  average  temperature  to  well  below 2°C above  pre-industrial
levels” while “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.” (United Nations, 2015,
p. 3, emphasis added) The political relevance of this formula is questionable, however, given that
about 1 °C of warming has already occurred and some further warming is already “locked in” due
to delayed feedback effects – it would gradually be realized over the course of the century even if
carbon emissions ceased altogether overnight. In its latest assessment report, the IPCC (2014, p. 16)
noted that few models actually bothered to even include scenarios with a 1.5 °C target. Following a
provision in the adoption of the Paris agreement, however, it prepared a “special report” to assess
1.5 °C scenarios, affirming that 1.5 °C would lower risks to humans and ecosystems significantly
44 While this shorthand certainly simplifies the power relations involved in these complex institutional webs and 
somewhat black-boxes the latter, the case for a suitable consistency check remains.
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compared to 2 °C of warming, particularly in already socially disadvantaged regions, and that in the
case of marine ice sheets, a tipping point could lie in between these two outcomes (IPCC, 2018).
Even a temporary overshoot beyond 1.5 °C during the 21st century could carry significant risks.
According  to  the  special  report,  the  commitment  to  further  warming  from  past  emissions,
previously estimated at a half-degree or more, is likely to be smaller – so that there is still some
space  for  action  to  stay  within  the  1.5  °C range  (ibid.,  p.  4). The  report  outlines  “pathways”
consistent with 1.5 °C warming that largely avoid reliance on not-yet-existent NETs (but heavily
rely on controversial technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (CCS) as well
as nuclear energy). These would require very steep emissions reduction paths beginning around
2020, with net CO2 emissions reaching zero shortly after 2050 (for an overview, cf. ibid., p. 19). 
But let us return to the 2 °C goal envisioned in the Green Economy reports. At the time of
publication of the GE reports, the latest IPCC estimates were that CO2 emissions alone had to be cut
by between 50 and 85% – depending on the various trajectories chosen in the models – relative to
2000 levels until 2050 in order to  come close to  achieving the 2 °C goal (the estimated range of
outcomes  being 2.0–2.4  °C warming),  with  emissions  peaking by 2015 at  the  latest  (!)  and a
stabilization horizon that saw long-term GHG concentrations in the range of 350–400 ppm of CO2
and  445–490  ppm  of  CO2-equivalent  gases,  respectively,  suggesting  a  need  for  net  negative
emissions  after  2050  (see  below).45 The  IPCC  noted  that  these  reduction  figures  “might  be
underestimated”  and  excluded  emissions  from land-use  change  (IPCC,  2007,  pp.  20–21).  This
suggests that accurate targets should be found near the upper end of the 50–85% range.46 It should
be noted that for the  planetary boundaries  research group, these benchmarks already strain such
boundaries: While not specifying a temperature target, they stipulate 350 ppm CO2 as the safety
threshold,  with  the  “zone  of  uncertainty”  (the  yellow  zone  in  their  traffic-light  visualization)
ranging to 450 ppm (Steffen et al., 2015, p. 3); this, however, relates to carbon emissions only.
Since the publication of the GE reports, the IPCC has released its Fifth Assessment Report,
which  includes  an  estimate  for  necessary  reductions  by  2050  for  aggregate greenhouse  gas
emissions in order to reach 450 ppm CO2e by 2100: about 25–65% relative to 2000 levels; in this
case, compliance with the 2 °C goal is at least considered “likely” (>66%) (IPCC, 2014, p. 10).47
45 All reduction figures converted to a 2000 baseline for better comparability (the original reduction figures in the 
reports are based on varying reference years).
46 Shortly after publication of the fourth IPCC report, a synthesis study of emissions reduction scenarios noted that the
IPCC modeling was conducted in the early 2000s, before the dramatic rise of global emissions during that decade 
became apparent (den Elzen & Höhne, 2008)(den Elzen & Höhne, 2008); the IPCC data thus underestimated 
cumulative global emissions until 2020, and therefore the reductions needed in order to remain within the 450 ppm 
range. 
47 Reference data to calculate the correct baseline is again taken from Olivier et al. (2017), excluding land-use 
emissions. It is unclear whether the figures provided in the fifth IPCC report still exclude these as well, but when 
calculating relative emissions cuts, this uncertainty does not distort the percentage figures for reductions much.  
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The lower figure has to do with the inclusion of non-carbon emissions with different time spans of
persistence in the atmosphere, but also, as the report itself notes and Kevin Anderson and others
have  criticized,  with  the  fact  that  most  models,  particularly  those  at  the  lower  bound,  rely
significantly on as-yet-unavailable CDR technologies.48 Most of them are  overshoot scenarios in
which GHG concentrations first exceed the given target and are then brought back to the desired
level  through negative emissions  technologies  (NETs) like CDR which the  modelers  hope will
become available at scale in the meantime. The IPCC drily notes that  “[o]vershoot increases the
probability of exceeding any given temperature goal.” (IPCC, 2014, p. 10, n. 15) We can therefore
reasonably assume that the estimates towards the higher end of the provided range are more suitable
benchmarks for safely reaching the 2 °C goal, as their efficacy is independent of uncertain and risk-
laden technological breakthroughs (cf. discussion in section 7.3).
Thus,  given  the  contentious  nature  of  the  2  °C  goal  itself,  even  credible  scenarios  for
achieving it hardly provide pathways to a “green” future in a more inclusive sense at all. With the
Paris Agreement’s flirtation with the more stringent 1.5 °C benchmark, this long-standing figure has
been corrected even in the highest echelons of climate diplomacy. Likewise,  to the degree that
emission reduction goals for 2050 are “cheapened” through their coupling with speculative science-
fiction trajectories for the post—2050 period in the pursuit of the longer-term 2 °C goal, we should
be  wary  of  accepting  the  2050  benchmarks  provided  in  these  scenarios;  they  are  likely  to  be
underestimations. It should be noted, finally, that the relationship between atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations and warming outcomes is laden with significant scientific uncertainty, which is
why the IPCC operates with relatively large ranges and probabilistic estimates as well as stipulating
confidence levels for each claim (cf. e.g. IPCC, 2013, p. 20, 2014, p. 4). The precautionary principle
would suggest that scenarios with the greatest likelihood of achieving the desired goal and emission
targets at the lower end of the predicted range for each respective warming outcome be chosen – for
CO2, this would suggest  at least  a global 85% cut from 2000 to 2050. With this in mind, in the
following subsection I will scrutinize the Green Economy’s climate credentials on a more modest
level of inquiry: Are the GE models at least consistent in their conformity, according to their own
calculations (however optimistic these may be), to the benchmarks they endorse?
3.1.2 Evidence from the Green Economy reports
We will now walk through the projections and targets formulated in the three institutions’ studies in
turn. The OECD report is internally inconsistent in its climate projections. First, it envisions global
48 Nuclear power also plays a significant role in most of these “decarbonization” scenarios (ibid., p. 12). In the 
recently published 1.5 °C scenarios that aim for near-total decarbonization by 2050, nuclear power generation is 
expanded by between 100 and 500% relative to 2010 levels (IPCC, 2018, p. 19). Resource constraints may render 
such scenarios unfeasible regardless of safety considerations. 
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greenhouse  gas  emissions  to  clock  in  at  66% of  2005  levels  by  2050;  the  diagram provided,
however, does not highlight this figure – instead, it emphasizes the large deviation (-63%) from the
projected “business as usual” scenario, which involves an explosion of global emissions to almost
twice the 2005 level (OECD, 2011b, p. 19). The goal of 2050 emissions at 66% of 2005 levels is
equivalent to a 25% per cent decrease from 2000 levels.49 Later in the report, a mitigation trajectory
based on an IEA 450 ppm scenario is presented that envisions 2050 CO2 (!) emissions to be reduced
to half the level of yet another baseline: 2010 (OECD, 2011b, p. 64). Given that emissions grew
significantly throughout the 2000s, this amounts to a decrease of slightly less than 35% from 2000
levels, which would be significantly more ambitious than the earlier figure for all GHGs but still
falls even below the lower end of the IPCC range for CO2 reductions.50 Finally, the report bases its
employment projections on yet another set of calculations, which indicate regionally differentiated
targets  that  are  explicitly  described  as  “purely  illustrative  and  not  intended  as  a  policy
recommendation.” (Ibid.,  pp. 93, 108, note 5) In this scenario, OECD countries are expected to
reduce  their  emissions  by  50% from 1990 levels,  whereas  the  “rest”  would  contribute  a  25%
reduction relative to “business as usual” –  in other words,  a lesser  increase in emissions than
otherwise  expected.  Given  that  OECD countries  only  accounted  for  about  one-third  of  global
emissions at that point (cf. section 2.1.2), the overall outcome of this scenario, depending on the
BAU assumptions involved, would probably be global emissions growth.
The World Bank report provides surprisingly little in the way of statistical projections. Only
when comparing cost projections for energy infrastructure investments does it reference various
estimates based on 450 ppm and 550 ppm CO2e scenarios from the IEA and other sources, defining
450 ppm as “the level needed to maintain a 50 percent chance of not exceeding global warming of
2°C  above  preindustrial  temperatures.”  (World  Bank,  2012,  p.  8) Thus,  according  to  its  own
assessment, the more ambitious scenario discussed by the Bank only comes with a fifty-fifty chance
of  achieving  the  2  °C  target.  From  a  precautionary  principle  perspective,  this  is  obviously
unsatisfactory.  Slight  relief  is  provided  here  by  the  IPCC,  which  more  recently  estimated,  as
previously cited, that the chances under this scenario would be at least two-to-one.
Finally, UNEP refers to IPCC and IEA data in arguing that achieving the 2 °C goal would
require atmospheric GHG concentration to be limited to 450 ppm CO2e by 2050. “This translates to
a peak of global emissions in 2015 and at least a 50 per cent cut in global emissions by 2050,
compared with 2005.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 206) (Converted to a 2000 baseline, this is a 43% cut, and
ostensibly an overshoot scenario.) In the modeling section of the report, however, it is claimed that
49 Based on data by Olivier et al. (2017), who put 2000 emissions at 36 Gt CO2-equivalent, with an increase to 41 Gt 
by 2005, once more excluding land use changes.
50 Again based on Olivier et al. (2017), who indicate global CO2 emissions of 33.6 Gt in 2010 and 25.6 Gt in 2000.
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the G2 scenario – the “greenest” scenario discussed by UNEP – is based on the target of a 450 ppm
concentration in CO2, rather than, as previously argued, CO2-equivalent greenhouse gases (ibid., p.
506). This difference may eventually become very significant: While non-CO2 positive and negative
forcings in the recent past largely canceled each other out, the IPCC’s more optimistic stabilization
horizons factor in a divergence of about 100 ppm, meaning that stabilization at 450 ppm CO2e
would  require  CO2 levels  around 350 ppm  (IPCC,  2007,  p.  20) and  making UNEP’s  scenario
altogether inadequate. Finally, a footnote later in the chapter mentions that even this scaled-back
goal is only achievable “when accounting for the  potential carbon sequestration of organic and
conservation agriculture” (ibid., p. 521, n. 18, emphasis added) while adding that this potential is
speculative. More recent evidence indeed suggests that counting on this potential to make such a
drastic difference to atmospheric GHG levels is nothing other than wishful thinking.51 Without it,
“we project a concentration in the range of 500–600 ppm [of CO2] in the green scenarios. This
indicates a moderate to unlikely probability that global warming will be limited to 2 ° C.” (Ibid.) 
This is not simply a matter of oversight. In a previous chapter, it is frankly admitted that the
G2 scenario “does not fully achieve the emissions reductions projected by IEA as necessary for
limiting atmospheric concentrations to 450 ppm” (ibid., pp. 224-225) unless the soil sequestration
joker works as desired. Here, UNEP even provides reasons for this shortfall, including the rebound
effect of economic growth on emissions and the modest degree of reliance on nuclear power and
CCS  in  its  “greenest”  scenario.  “Thus,  the  G2  investment  scenario  constitutes  a  relatively
conservative  emissions  reductions  path,  but  one  which  is  more  feasible  than  more  ambitious
projections.” (Ibid., p. 225) Further, while overall GHG emissions figures for the G2 scenario are
not presented, fossil fuel CO2 emissions are only supposed to begin sinking around 2030 and clock
in at 65% of 2011 levels by 2050 – that is roughly equivalent to a mere 15% reduction relative to
2000. In other words, in a few passages and tables buried in the 600+ pages of its report UNEP
concludes  that  the  scenario  it  relentlessly  promotes  for  its  capacity  to  achieve  the  convenient
greening  of  the  global  economy  with  only  modest  amounts  of  investment  is,  due  to  entirely
foreseeable economic dynamics, not expected even to come close to achieving these goals. In a
reiteration of the familiar dilemma, the best hope identified by UNEP to avoid this outcome is
increased reliance on technologies that are only “green” in a very distorted sense (nuclear power) or
simply unproven to work in large-scale application (CCS and soil sequestration; see section 7.3). 
51 Based on a review of the more recent research literature, Dooley and Stabinsky (2018, p. 24) reaffirmed that the 
potential for (permanent) soil carbon sequestration is very uncertain and consequently refused to quantify it. 
UNEP’s claim that it could make a difference of 50–150 ppm CO2e to atmospheric GHG concentrations – in other 
words, roughly between 10 and 30% of the entire stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere – therefore seems 
particularly adventurous.
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By way of a quick summary, even when assuming – despite significant reasons for doubt –
both that the IPCC/IEA 450 ppm scenarios are plausible roads to climatic stability and that the
trajectories envisioned in the GE reports will actually materialize in practice, in each of the three
reports we find a refutation of the claim that these trajectories could reliably meet the 2 °C goal.
Somewhat obscured by the varying baselines and emissions scenarios referenced in these reports, in
the fine print the Green Economy itself does not really promise a “green” future of relative climatic
stability. Taking into account the overly lenient choice of the 2 °C target itself as outlined in section
3.1.1, the picture darkens even further.
3.2 On achievement: The “actually emerging” Green Economy
Thesis 3.2: While green-capitalist developments are on an upward trajectory, they still have not
penetrated the “gray” economy much during the 2010s: The majority of carbon emissions remain
unpriced,  “green”  investments  remain  marginal  except  in  the  electricity  sector,  international
climate diplomacy has neither achieved a binding agreement nor realized the promised funding for
“greening” in the global South, and market-based forest conservation has been a failure.
The numbers presented at the outset (section 2.1) suggest that a measurable “green” turnaround has
not taken place yet. But, it may be objected, policy initiatives take time to come to fruition. The
success  of  the  Green  Economy  agenda  up  to  this  point  cannot  be  read  off  global  ecological
indicators – much of the available environmental and economic data is only published with some
delay, and another few years’ delay from policy decision to measurable environmental effect must
be permitted. While a systematic multi-scalar analysis of  Green Economy  policy implementation
across the globe is far beyond the scope of this work, this section will attempt to assess relevant
large-scale policies and investment patterns with potential global effects. Many of the details of the
Green  Economy  agenda  need  to  be  worked  out  at  local  and  national  levels,  but  attention  to
overarching  policies  such  as  binding  emissions  limits,  trading  schemes  and  taxes  with  wide
coverage and to “green” investment levels provides a clearer picture of systemic progress for the
purposes of this work. The four areas covered here, selected to provide a panoramic view of core
GE policies, include (1) emissions pricing – the idea of “getting the prices right” –, (2) investment
patterns  that  indicate  whether  a  “greening”  of  economic  infrastructures  is  taking  place,  (3)
international climate politics and the progress towards an international framework for GE policies
and (4) the REDD+ mechanism for global forest preservation as a salient example of both natural
capital strategies and policy implementation in the global South.
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3.2.1 “Getting the prices right”
Emissions pricing via trading schemes and taxes is one of the central policy strategies associated
with the  Green Economy. Recent developments will be briefly assessed in this section, offering
evidence for some of the political-economic arguments presented in the following chapters. This
section focuses on greenhouse gas emissions (and carbon pricing in particular). Lest the picture of
slow progress portrayed here appears too selective, it  should be noted that environmental fiscal
reform more broadly understood seems to be moving backward: OECD researchers recently pointed
out that since 2005, “[e]nvironmentally related taxation has decreased as a percentage of total tax
revenue and as a percentage of GDP … on average in the OECD.” (Capozza & Samson, 2019, p.
16, emphasis added; cf. DRC & OECD, 2017, p. 19)
The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), whose original incarnation preceded the Green
Economy reports by a few years, has been framed as a “cornerstone” of EU climate policy and a
“pioneer” for carbon markets more generally  (cf. Marcu et al., 2018, p. 1). The scheme by now
covers about half of the EU’s carbon emissions and 40% of its overall GHG emissions but still
notably excludes emissions from buildings and most modes of transportation.52 For the first eight
years of its existence, emissions certificates in excess of actual emissions were freely allocated to
polluters. This did not preclude many firms, electricity utilities in particular, to pass their fictitious
costs on to consumers, thus generating windfall profits  (Rest,  2011, pp. 64–67). In 2014, when
certificates  began to  be  auctioned to  a  larger  degree,  verified  emissions  immediately  exceeded
allocated certificates; by 2017, the gap had almost closed, but actual emissions still exceeded the
cap by 40 million tons CO2e. For aviation emissions, which have been included since 2013 and are
accounted for separately, a yawning gap of more than 66% was reported. The banking of emissions
from the  years  of  over-allocation allowed for  this  outcome.  The generous (over-)allocation of
certificates led to prices that presented little incentive to reduce emissions: At the beginning of the
ETS’s second phase in 2008 – after the first few years of testing – the carbon price was around EUR
25 per ton. After an initial dramatic drop as the financial crisis unfolded, the price continued to fall
and remained in the single digits from 2011 on, briefly dropping below EUR 3 in 2013, and only
recovered past the EUR 10 mark during 2018. It spiked past EUR 20 late that year and, as of late
2019,  has  remained  in  the  mid-20s  (Sandbag,  2019).  After  the  price  collapse,  the  Economist
(“Breathing difficulties,” 2012) opined that the scheme was “failing wretchedly” to encourage clean
energy investments. The dramatic rise during 2018 indeed was due to regulatory improvements
intended to remove the “glut” of certificates through a Market Stability Reserve mechanism over the
next few years, prompting a “significant influx of speculative capital.” (Vitelli, 2018)
52 ETS figures taken from European Environment Agency (EEA, 2018a); total emissions from Olivier et al. (2017).
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A recent report intended to “ensure that the EU ETS is ‘fit for purpose’” (Marcu et al., 2018,
p. 3) found that while the carbon market as such functioned relatively well and the EU’s short-term
emissions target for 2020 (–21% vis-à-vis 2005 in ETS sectors) would be reached, the currently
established caps and price levels were insufficient to achieve the more ambitious longer-term goal
for 2050 (–90% vis-à-vis 2005 in ETS sectors). Only 14% of surveyed “players & stakeholders”
involved in the ETS believed otherwise (ibid., pp. 7–8). While the study, with some computational
artistry,  argued  that  in  purely  mathematical  terms,  a  slight  additional  increase  in  the  annual
tightening of the cap would suffice to achieve these cuts, the greater problem was that the price
level  was  insufficient  to  trigger  the  actual  long-term  transformation  of  European  electricity
infrastructures. While renewables were estimated to become more competitive at a carbon price
around 30 EUR/t, more than 40 EUR/t were expected to be required to achieve this transformation
(ibid., pp. 18–20). Even with the recent explosion of the market price, the scheme is operating far
from a sustained price level in this range. Compliance with the Paris Agreement would require even
faster decarbonization, posing an even steeper challenge. An expert commission associated with the
World Bank recently estimated that emissions need to be priced in the range of at least US$ 40–80
per ton of CO2-equivalent by 2020 in order to achieve the Paris goals, with further increases by
2030 – and this assumes that nuclear energy and not-yet-available carbon capture and storage (CCS)
facilities each play an important role (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017). This is a
global average, with required prices in wealthier economies higher than in poorer. 
These figures indicate – and the commission agrees – that the market alone is not able to
trigger  a  technological  transformation:  Even  where  the  caps  are  supposed  to  approximate  the
mathematically required reductions relatively closely (see section 3.1.1, however, for a critique of
such interpretations), prices are far from the levels that optimists think could sustain  actual  deep
transformation processes. More importantly, once we move beyond the electricity market with its
uniform product logic, such transformation becomes rather impossible to achieve through pricing
(see also section  6.3).  This  suggests  that  more active,  targeted  industrial  policy is  required,  as
argued here in section 10.1. (For a critical perspective on such cost calculations in general, see
section 7.2.2; see section 7.3 for a critique of the GE’s reliance on science-fiction scenarios.) 
The use of offsets was initially considerable in the ETS, equaling 10% of the amount of
emission  allowances  allocated  by  the  EU.53 These  were  implemented  through  the  Kyoto
mechanisms,  CDM  and  Joint  Implementation  (the  latter  being  a  mechanism  for  projects  in
industrialized countries, mostly the newly capitalist states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia). In
53 According to the European Commission (2016b), slightly more than 1 billion “international credits” were used in 
the scheme’s second phase from 2008-12. The EU issued a little more than 2 billion allowances annually during this
five-year period (EEA, 2018a).
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response to criticisms and scandals around the abuse of CDM (see sections 3.2.3 and 7.4.4), the EU
adopted relatively stringent standards that excluded nuclear power, forestry initiatives and projects
“involving the destruction of industrial gases,” many of which had involved massive fraud. Since
2012,  only  new  projects  from  “least  developed”  countries  have  been  accepted,  presumably  a
response  to  the  fact  that  the  vast  majority  of  CDM  projects  has  been  located  in  “emerging”
economies, reducing the “developmental” effect ascribed to them. From 2020 on, the use of offsets
is  scheduled to be discontinued, although it  is noted that Paris Agreement implementation may
involve new mechanisms to this effect (cf. European Commission, 2016b). Therefore, while the EU
ETS may not “deliver” a green industrial transformation, steps have been taken to limit negative
externalities  to  vulnerable  groups  by  ruling  out  the  most  egregious  projects  and  increasingly
focusing on actual domestic emissions reductions.
The EU ETS is not the only cap-and-trade system in place. It is set to be succeeded as the
world’s biggest scheme by the Chinese system scheduled for operation in 2020, which builds on a
number of experimental schemes implemented throughout the 2010s. It will begin with the power
sector – enough to dwarf the EU system in terms of emissions covered – and gradually include
other  industries.  This  increases  the  global  share  of  GHG emissions  covered  by carbon trading
schemes to about 15%. Further notable carbon trading schemes exist at the subnational level in
North  America,  in  California  (linked  with  initiatives  in  a  number  of  Western  U.S.  states  and
Canadian provinces under the umbrella of the  Western Climate Initiative,  WCI) and a number of
U.S. East Coast states united in the  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative  (RGGI). Unlike the EU
ETS, the RGGI does not provide any of its allowances for free, but the price is even lower (US$
3.76 in 2017). Only 20% of the involved states’ emissions are covered. The cap is set to decline by a
relatively ambitious 3% annually until 2030, with a modest floor price of US$ 6 taking effect in
2021, scheduled to rise by 7% each year. The Californian system, recently extended until 2030, is
more ambitious: Covering 85% of the state’s overall GHG emissions, it targets an annual decline of
4% throughout the 2020s, with limited opportunities to rely on offsets. However, a price ceiling is
to be announced: Polluters in California will be able to exceed the emissions cap simply by paying
the specified price. (This paragraph relies on information provided by the international association
of jurisdictions involved in carbon trading, ICAP, 2018.) While quite limited in scope and ambition,
it is remarkable that these schemes have weathered the particularly regressive tendencies of the
2010s in the United States and were even expanded over the past few years. 
A similar case can be made for carbon taxes, the other main instrument for carbon pricing.
According to World Bank data (World Bank & Ecofys, 2018), taxes and trading schemes together –
including the forthcoming Chinese scheme – cover 20% of global GHG emissions, which suggests
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 60
that  about  5% of  global  emissions  are  currently being taxed,  spread over 26 jurisdictions.  The
highest  taxes  are  in  countries  with  highly  specialized  service  economies,  such  as  Sweden,
Liechtenstein and Switzerland, which all charge more than US$ 100 per ton (cf. ibid., p. 11). The
Bank noted that, just as emissions trading is becoming more widespread in Asia, carbon taxes have
been making inroads in Latin America. While carbon taxes tend to surpass the market prices of
carbon  trading  schemes  (cf.  ibid.),  few  have  reached  the  price  range  the  Bank’s  conservative
estimates consider necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement goals.
An  aggregate  measure  of  carbon  pricing  has  been  developed  by  the  OECD:  “effective
carbon rates” that include sector-specific fuel taxes in addition to explicit carbon pricing (OECD,
2018a; Van Dender, 2017). This more comprehensive measure reveals only slightly higher prices,
however. 60% of emissions across OECD and G20 countries were unpriced in 2016, and 78% of
those priced were cheaper than €10 per ton – fully 93% failed to reach the €40 threshold  (Van
Dender, 2017). For 2018, aggregate actual prices amounted to less than a quarter of a “low-end”
€30 threshold, whereas a “midpoint estimate” of €60 was cited for an appropriate 2020 cost level,
meaning that actual prices were below one-eighth of this benchmark (OECD, 2018a). 
Another notable outlier in terms of carbon taxes is France, listed in 2018 at US$ 55/tCO2e
(World Bank & Ecofys, 2018, p. 11), which is remarkable for a more populous country with a
mixed economic base: France is the only large economy with a carbon tax in the range demanded
by GE experts. But this tax proves to be enormously controversial. Further massive tax hikes were
announced for the following years, which – partly because the policy decision coincided with rising
oil prices – led to an outburst of mass actions of civil disobedience on the part of enraged motorists
across the country in November 2018, which soon spiraled into the largest wave of riots the country
had seen in a long time,  provoking something of a state crisis.  The government was forced to
promise  compensation  measures  in  return,  including  rebates  for  the  purchase  of  hybrid  cars
(Marlowe,  2018;  Matamoros,  2018;  McAuley,  2018;  see  also  section  8.4). The  French  case
illustrates how a policy of market-based cost  internalization that individualizes these costs can in
fact be perceived as an externalization on the part of those who are made to pay even as they lack
appropriate alternatives, which depend on public investment decisions. It bears pointing out that, as
in  Canada  (Doelle,  2018) and  in  Germany,  energy-intensive  industries  have  been  generously
exempted from the French carbon tax  (OECD, 2018e, p. 13), whose expansion was furthermore
preceded by income tax breaks for high earners – two more elements of re-externalization that
accompanied this particular internalization policy.
Finally, negative carbon pricing in the form of subsidies features prominently on the green-
capitalist agenda. The OECD (2015b, 2018e) carefully tracks progress on the elimination of fossil
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fuel subsidies. The latest report sees a flattening in OECD countries and a substantial downward
trend in non-OECD countries. As 80% of all listed subsidies are consumer-side programs, the fall in
oil  prices turned out to be the largest factor in reducing subsidy volumes,  but “policy reforms,
although on the aggregate to a lesser extent, also contributed to this trend.” (OECD, 2018e, p. 12)
Most of the portrayed non-OECD policy measures involved drastic cuts to consumer subsidies in
“emerging economies” including Mexico, Indonesia and India as well as some South American
countries. The “best practice” generally accepted within the GE framework here involves targeted
cash compensation for the poor to avoid regressive distributional impacts.54 In some of these cases,
compensatory  measures  were  indeed  implemented  (Capozza  &  Samson,  2019,  pp.  21–22;
Rentschler  &  Bazilian,  2017,  p.  901).  Nevertheless,  the  particularly  drastic  Indonesian  policy
changes – and, more ambiguously, their Mexican counterparts – are explicitly referred to as “fiscal
consolidation efforts.” (OECD, 2018e, p. 14) It has been argued more generally that “[i]n practice,
the  key  rationale  for  implementing  subsidy  reform  has  typically  been  fiscal  rather  than
environmental” and many reform projects have faltered over intense social protests; consequently,
many  governments  seized  the  opportunity  to  push  through  reforms  when  oil  prices  began
plummeting in 2014 (Rentschler & Bazilian, 2017, pp. 892, 901 and passim).
By contrast, the newly introduced subsidies mentioned in the latest OECD (2018e) report are
all  targeted  at  producers.  These  are  more  common  in  wealthier  countries,  and  even  friendly
observers lament that attention to (and practice of) fossil fuel subsidy reforms has been lopsided,
focusing on Southern consumer subsidies  while  generally  ignoring generous Northern producer
subsidies  (Rentschler  & Bazilian,  2017).  All  of  this  suggests  that  there  is  a  fine  line  between
advocacy for environmentally sensible subsidy reform and the “greenwashing” of simple austerity
measures (see also the discussion of environmental-to-social re-externalizations in section 7.2).
3.2.2 Investment patterns
Capital  flows are arguably crucial  for an assessment  of green-capitalist  success:  What types of
infrastructures are attracting investments? Are “green” technologies displacing “gray”? Investment
figures also serve as a proxy for green-tech development. While substantial “green” innovation as
such is difficult  to quantify – available indicators such as numbers of registered patents do not
54 According to the standard GE argument (Coady, Parry, Sears, & Shang, 2017; Mackie & Haščič, 2018; Rentschler 
& Bazilian, 2017; World Bank, 2012, pp. 49–50), such consumer subsidies are often regressive in the sense that 
most of the financial benefit – by volume – goes to wealthier households with higher consumption levels. But this 
obscures the fact that poorer households often critically depend on such subsidies to make ends meet. This 
recognition, in turn, prompted the proposal for targeted cash reimbursements to the poor – an element of “best 
practice” that policy makers apparently overlook in many cases. How fiscally progressive the removal of subsidies 
really is, of course, also depends on the alternative use of the freed-up revenue in each case.
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differentiate between marginal and “breakthrough” innovations – relative investment volumes for
“green” and “gray” technologies attest to the former’s practical success in a capitalist economy.
In  the  electricity  sector,  the  “green”  transition  has  arguably  progressed  most.  Here,
investment in renewables has fluctuated but not consistently increased above the levels recorded at
the beginning of the decade when the Green Economy reports were released. Nevertheless, due to
falling costs – a study co-commissioned by UNEP records a drop of 72% in installation costs for
photovoltaic  energy  and  27%  for  wind  since  2009  –,  in  terms  of  newly  installed  capacity,
renewables surpassed fossil-fueled power generation by more than two-to-one in 2017 (Frankfurt
School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2018, pp. 11–12, 17). It should be noted, however, that actual power
generation of solar photovoltaics and wind installations – and these two make up the bulk of new
capacity  –  is  generally  far  below  theoretical  capacity,  given  natural  fluctuations  in  wind  and
sunshine.55 Renewables – excluding environmentally dubious large hydropower installations – now
account  for  12.1%  of  global  electricity  production  (ibid.,  p.  11),  and  they  are  increasingly
competitive  with  fossil  alternatives  (ibid.,  p.  17).  From  a  geopolitical  and  world-systemic
perspective, regional patterns are intriguing: China alone accounted for 45% of new investments in
2017, whereas investment levels declined in the U.S., Japan and, more drastically, Europe, where
investment fell  by 36% – mostly because of downward spikes in the UK and Germany, where
subsidy schemes were phased out (ibid., p. 11). The international trend towards sinking levels of
subsidies was noted as a future concern, coupled with the impression that the post-crisis era of
cheap capital is coming to an end (ibid., p. 17).56 In a development ascribed to increasing market
maturity,  venture  capital  and  private  equity  investments  have  been  rapidly  disappearing;
government and corporate R&D spending remained relatively constant throughout the 2010s (ibid.,
pp. 11–14). (Similar numbers are provided in IRENA & Climate Policy Initiative, 2018.)
While this demonstrates that renewable sources of electricity have developed into a serious
alternative from the point of view of cost-effectiveness, there are hints that – partly due to a lack of
political support – the trajectory of technological progress here may approach a plateau (“maturity”)
rather than heralding the kind of further explosions of innovation on which the  Green Economy
agenda  –  and  the  need  for  accumulation  under  ecological  constraints  more  generally  –  is  so
dependent. This may be problematic particularly with regard to the limited ability of renewable
energy  installations  with  naturally  wildly  fluctuating  operating  levels  to  feed  the  centralized
industrial  infrastructures and enable the further  electrification of energy use (see below),  all  of
55 Different sources provide utilization rates of up to 25% for solar PV (see note 204). 
56 In this sense, the crisis did present an opportunity for the “greening” of energy infrastructures. As the authors argue,
“[f]or technologies such as wind and solar, where almost all the cost is upfront capital expenditure, cheap capital 
makes a big difference to competitiveness.” (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2018, p. 17)
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which  would  be  essential  for  an  actual  systemic  transformation  to  renewables.  A focus  on
“competitive” prices for energy generation alone may obscure these problems (see section 6.3).
In terms of overall energy investment patterns, fossil industries still exceed renewables and
other  “green”  development  by  far  –  but  with  a  downward  trend.  Fossil  supply  infrastructures
accounted for nearly 60% of all energy investments in 2017, but at slightly below US$ 800 billion
only reached two-thirds of 2014 investment levels  (all figures in this paragraph taken from IEA,
2018b,  and  2018d). While  subordinated  in  the  power  sector  to  renewables  investment  (which
amounts to about US$ 300 billion alone), fossil fuels are riding on the strength of their continued
dominance in the buildings and mobility sectors. Investments in renewable solutions here amount to
a comparatively meager US$ 20 billion, while energy efficiency measures across the board attracted
US$ 236 billion (IEA, 2018d, p. 2). Electric vehicles (including plug-in hybrid vehicles) only just
exceeded a market share of 1% among new vehicle sales. Sales of heat pumps, important for the
“greening” of heating infrastructure,  went up by 30% but still  only amount to 2.5% of heating
equipment  sales  (IEA,  2018b,  p.  2).  These  developments,  as  the  IEA wrily  notes,  have  “no
discernable impact on the allocation of capital to oil and gas supply projects.” (Ibid., p. 2) Indeed,
although the coal industry is ailing, fossil capital as a whole is not: The oil and gas industry is seen
to stand on “more solid financial footing” now, and the “largest 20 institutional equity holders in the
oil and gas majors are continuing to expand[] their stakes.” (Ibid., p. 5) At the same time, R&D
spending is increasingly “greened,” with the automotive sector in particular investing in R&D into
“EVs and new forms of mobility” (ibid., p. 7), but the sums at stake here are much smaller. 
A final  interesting  pattern  may  be  noted  with  regard  to  ownership:  Private  investment
dominates  in  renewables  and  energy  efficiency,  whereas  state-owned  enterprises  increasingly
control fossil fuel supplies (ibid., p. 6). Complex geopolitical factors contribute to this outcome,
whose implications for “green” capitalism may be variously read in terms of a promising sign of
potential for market-driven “greening” (although much of this investment depends on a favorable
regulatory framework) or as an indicator of the problematic linkages – even identity – between
fossil capital and state power in particular regions (see note 294 in section 9.1.3).
3.2.3 International climate politics
In section 2.2, it  was argued that the  Green Economy  model was importantly motivated by the
stalemate in international climate negotiations, crystallized in the 2009 Copenhagen summit, which
yielded no substantive follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. The GE sought a way out by
convincing the negotiating parties that “green” growth was achievable and, thus, ambitious climate
policy could be a positive-sum game. Did this vision help the international process?
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That the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015) was celebrated as a milestone at all is only
explicable in the context of the total failure of climate diplomacy in the previous decade. Six years
after the Copenhagen summit, national delegations were finally able to agree upon a new deal that
fixated the goal of remaining below 2 °C of global warming – and preferably below 1.5 °C – in an
international treaty. It is not surprising that the institutions backing the GE cast the deal in a positive
light, trying to claim their share of the credit: OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, who said that
his organization was “pleased to have played a positive role in the road that paved [sic] the way to
Paris,”  argued  that  the  deal  “differs  fundamentally  from previous  climate  accords  in  terms  of
ambition, reach and commitment.” (Gurría, 2017, p. 14) The organization continues to speak of the
Paris Agreement as a “success.” (OECD, 2018b, p. 2) But the Agreement is entirely non-binding,
with signatory countries only required to submit voluntary Nationally Determined Contributions to
the overall emissions reductions needed. According to UNEP’s most recent assessment, even if all
countries  were  to  comply  with  their  announced  targets  in  the  absence  of  any  enforcement
mechanism, the cumulative result pointed in the direction of  at least 3 °C of global warming by
2100 (UNEP, 2018c, p. 10) – which, of course, implies a lock-in to some further warming in the
following century.  With a voluntary agreement that only takes effect in 2020, and from which the
U.S. as the world’s second-largest emitter has withdrawn to much medial fanfare (Shear, 2017), the
2010s should be understood as another wasted decade for international climate politics, given that
the opportunity window for mitigation is rapidly narrowing.  Even the  Economist  noted that the
commotion around the U.S. withdrawal served to cover the Paris deal’s substantive weaknesses
(“What they don’t tell you,” 2017). 
The Green Economy’s endemic optimism was thus ultimately overpowered by global power
politics and reactionary tendencies (see chapter 8). Only from a global governance perspective that
is  averse  to  “hard”  policy  solutions  to  begin  with  can  the  Paris  Agreement  be  considered
progressive (on the GE’s  paradoxical  approach to  planetary management,  see chapter  11).  The
remainder  of  this  section  will  discuss  the  inadequacy of  “soft”  international  policy  approaches
currently taken in two sectors: transportation and “green” North—South technology transfers.
Rampant growth sectors
This is perhaps best exemplified in the governance mechanisms under development for relevant
growth sectors that are effectively wholly excluded from the Nationally Determined Contributions
approach taken in the Paris Agreement. One of these is international shipping, a sector for which
emissions  growth  of  50-250%  by  2050  is  projected.  Here,  the  UN  International  Maritime
Organization began working on an emissions reduction strategy instead, to be “revised” until 2023
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(Merk, 2017). The same is true for international aviation, with projected emissions growth between
300 and 700% for the period 2020-2050, which may soon turn the industry into one of the biggest
contributors to climate change globally.57 In this case, the equivalent International Civil Aviation
Organization agreed on an offsetting scheme intended to “neutralize” the largest part of post-2020
emissions through carbon trading (European Commission, 2016a). 
Aviation is a salient case in point for the reluctance of the  Green Economy community to
support  transformative  change  that  could  interfere  with  global  capitalist  infrastructures.  In  the
OECD’s  quarterly  magazine,  an  employee  of  the  International  Transport  Forum –  an  OECD
daughter organization – recently explained that while incremental efficiency gains in the aviation
sector surpassed those in the automotive industry, alternative technologies faced “many constraints”
(biofuels)  and “many uncertainties”  (electric  planes)  (Benezech,  2017,  p.  25).  Strikingly,  while
lauding the new offset policy, the author argued explicitly against the conclusion that “incentives to
fly less” were necessary to address the mismatch between rapid demand growth and incremental
efficiency gains.  “It  actually  wouldn’t  really  be feasible  or  equitable  to  do so” – after  all,  the
tourism sector  and “the poorest  travellers” would be negatively affected (ibid.,  p.  25).  This,  of
course, suggests that he assumes the offset policy will not significantly influence prices and change
incentive structures, despite the fact that massive amounts of carbon credits are needed to offset
each  flight.  This,  in  turn,  presupposes  that  carbon  prices  remain  at  the  low levels  considered
insufficient – by the OECD and World Bank – to change incentive structures to a sufficient degree,
in other words, that the GE fails to take off (or, less plausibly, that out of the blue a green-tech
miracle emerges in other sectors to unleash a flood of cheap credits for airlines to buy up).
The equity argument is particularly striking given that the author emphasizes that “less than
5% of the world population flies in a given year.” (Ibid.) It is estimated that more than 80% of
humans have never boarded a plane (Götze, 2019). In other words, “incentives to fly less” would
not affect the status quo for the vast majority of the world population – arguably roughly identical
with the poorest four-fifths58 – who have always been excluded from air travel. The equity argument
in favor of unrestricted aviation, meanwhile, is made with reference to the new consumer classes of
“emerging economies.” While it is often argued that these groups’ one-on-one adoption of Northern
lifestyles  is  an  ecological  impossibility,  in  this  case,  the  fact  that  these  new consumer  classes
57 Heuwieser (2017) provides impressive numbers: In 2005, aviation’s total contribution to anthropogenic climate 
change was estimated at 5%; from 1990-2010, the industry’s CO2 emissions growth rate was almost three times that
of the overall global economy; the industry expects an overall annual growth rate of 4.3%, so by 2050, emissions 
may increase four- to eightfold and then amount to 22% of total global emissions (while most of its climate effect is
not through CO2 but through ozone, cloud production, making the impact even bigger). In the same study, 
Heuwieser also provides a trenchant critique of recent industry attempts at presenting a “green growth” strategy.
58 Air travel is so closely associated with wealth that Chancel and Piketty (2015) considered a levy on flight tickets as 
a convenient alternative to a global progressive carbon tax.
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constitute global capital’s fresh lifeblood – in the sense of representing the major growth markets
for consumer goods – apparently outweighs any sobering environmental concerns. Furthermore,
such policies would affect the cost of conducting business in a globalized economy. 
This prospect is apparently ruled out as altogether unacceptable. Shipping and aviation, as
basic infrastructures of globalized capital, are not to be interfered with, even though re-regionalized
economic circuits would be more ecologically sustainable. The strategy of offsetting their rampant
emissions growth in future decades through emissions credits will be less and less feasible if Green
Economy policies are implemented and, consequently, emissions caps are drastically lowered over
the next few decades. In the medium run, carbon credit supply should no longer be able to satisfy
growing demand from the global transportation sector – unless negative emissions technologies
become applicable at scale (which is a rather remote hope; see section 7.3).
The demise of the Clean Development Mechanism
The 2010s have also witnessed the demise of the central market-based mechanism for North—
South cooperation towards a  Green Economy. Within the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the first of two primary vehicles
to support green-tech diffusion in “developing” countries (the other being the Green Climate Fund
reviewed  below),  allowing  Northern  countries  to  fulfill  a  part  of  their  emissions  reduction
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol through offsets that finance supposedly equivalent emissions
reductions in the global South instead. 
The CDM has been heavily criticized for its role in delaying technological transformation in
the North,  for the fact that most  investments go to “emerging” economies  rather than enabling
“sustainable  development”  in  the  poorest  countries,  for  many  projects’ negative  social  effects
including the displacement of local communities (“green grabbing”) and for the highly questionable
actual emissions savings achieved by CDM projects  (Bracking, 2015; Brunnengräber, 2009b, pp.
30–31; Bumpus & Liverman, 2008, 2011; FDCL & Lateinamerika Nachrichten, 2015; Heuwieser,
2017; Kenis & Lievens, 2015, pp. 88–95; Rest, 2011, pp. 71–82). These charges will be taken up
again in section 7.4.
In its early years, quite some money flowed into the market. Quickly, however, the scheme
was mired by endemic fraud and corruption  (Brunnengräber, 2009b; Lohmann, 2009b). Much of
this corruption has been attributed to the inherent difficulty of establishing the additionality of the
emissions reductions thus effected,  which opens the door to  all  manner of manipulation.59 In a
59 The additionality criterion is central to emission offsetting schemes. In short, in order to obtain credits, project 
developers have to prove that the project in question (along with the emissions savings it promises) would not be 
realized without the offset funding, which also means it has to happen in excess of mere compliance with legal 
standards. In this sense, the emissions savings created through the project are supposed to be both environmentally 
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particularly spectacular case,  billions of carbon certificates – 35% of all CDM credits in 2012 –
were produced for the cheap elimination of one extremely effective greenhouse gas (HFC-23), a by-
product of a widely used refrigerant; many refrigerant factories never would have been built in the
absence of the massive offset incentive (Kenis & Lievens, 2015, pp. 88–91; Rest, 2011, pp. 71–82;
Tanuro, 2013, pp. 80–83). In other words, billions of tons of additional CO2 could be emitted in
exchange for abatement of a different gas which, for one thing, was mostly produced specifically
for this purpose and, for another, whose elimination involved simple technical interventions that
direct  regulation  could  easily  have  mandated  –  and  which  contributed  nothing  to  a  systemic
technological  transition  to  a  “low-carbon  economy.”  This  is  not  the  only  problematic  project
category: A study for the European Commission found additionality “highly unlikely” for more than
80% of CDM projects; it was “highly likely” only for 2% (cited in Heuwieser, 2017, pp. 9–10).
Regulatory improvements have since contained the most egregious practices.  But as the
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period expired in 2012 directly after the deep global recession
had already reduced demand for credits, the CDM market collapsed. Despite prices below US$1 for
a ton of carbon equivalent – which would make for an economically very attractive option to offset
emissions –, buyers could no longer be found.60 Since states were no longer required to offset their
emissions under Kyoto and only a few trading schemes at smaller scales were linked to the CDM,
demand was so insignificant that supply plummeted as well. Only 93 million credits were issued
from October  2017 through August  2018,  down from more than 264 million in  2011–12;  new
project registrations almost entirely ceased, from four-digit numbers until 2013 down to a mere 31
in  2017–18.  Three  quarters  of  all  credits  produced  through  the  system  hail  from  the  Kyoto
commitment period that expired in 2012, and most of them were indeed used for Kyoto target
compliance. The CDM now offers the opportunity for the public to pay for voluntary cancellation of
credits as a form of private ecological redemption; the average price of a ton of carbon-equivalent
from 2015–2018 was $1.1861, and one prominent “customer” was FIFA, offsetting much of the 2018
and economically “additional.” (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008, pp. 135–136) This produces the perverse incentive for 
governments to relax regulatory standards so that more emissions-saving measures qualify as “additional.” Since 
non-enforcement is sometimes built into baseline scenarios for “developing” countries, governments may also be 
incentivized to leave laws in place but refrain from enforcement (Lohmann, 2009b, pp. 182–183). Additionality 
may also be given if projects are simply less polluting – producing fewer additional emissions, which are counted 
as “savings” – than they would have been if built according to assumed industry standards. As the concept generally
relies on counterfactual scenarios that are unprovable and subject to non-computable political dynamics, Lohmann 
(ibid., p. 180) concludes that “[s]cientifically speaking, there is no such thing as ‘additionality’ or ‘non-
additionality.’”
60 CDM credits (Certified Emission Reductions) are traded on futures markets. Since 2013, prices have hardly 
exceeded the $1 mark (cf. EEX, 2018). From December 2016 through December 2018, the highest recorded price 
was €0.35; even the recovery of the EU emissions trading system in 2018 (see section on carbon trading above) did 
not help much (cf. Intercontinental Exchange, 2018).
61 Voluntary cancellation tends to realize higher prices relative to anonymous market transactions, given that buyers 
longing for redemption can pick particular offset projects from an internet platform and may pay more for those 
they find particularly appealing (cf. Andreassen, 2018). 
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Football World Cup’s footprint (all figures taken from Executive Board of the Clean Development
Mechanism,  2018). It  sounds  like  resignation  when  the  CDM’s  Executive  Board,  listing  the
mechanism’s achievements, notes that the “rules, standards and governance structure created under
the CDM – designed to ensure that  [credits]  represent  true emission reductions compared with
‘business as usual’ – are a valuable international public good.” (Ibid., p. 4) 
In other words, twenty years after its inauguration in the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM has at
best offered some lessons for fighting fraud and corruption in green-capitalist policy schemes. It has
certainly not led a transition from climate destruction to “sustainable development,” and since the
binding framework of the Kyoto Protocol fell away, it has crumbled to the point of irrelevance. The
last major hope expressed by the Board is that the international aviation offsetting scheme could
finally revitalize the CDM in the 2020s (cf. Andreassen, 2018). 
Green Climate Fund
As outlined in section 2.5.2, the World Bank administers the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the other
central mechanism of international climate diplomacy intended to facilitate technology transfer and
support  adaptation  and  mitigation  activities  in  “developing”  countries.  There  is  widespread
disagreement over the proper definition and calculation of climate finance flows, particularly with
regard  to  private  for-profit  investments  (cf.  F.  Harvey,  2018;  Roberts  &  Weikmans,  2015;
UNFCCC, 2015c). The declared goal was to raise US$100 billion  annually by 2020, and due to
hazy vocabulary, it is unclear how much of this share was supposed to be provided directly through
the state-funded GCF.62
By June 2018, the World Bank noted total contributions of just over US$7 billion, with total
cash transfers of below $350 million – half of which was spent for the administration of the fund
itself.  By  May  2019,  cumulative  cash  transfers  had  risen  upwards  of  $850  million  and
administrative  costs  and fees  were  reduced to  about  37% of  this  amount.63 Despite  the  recent
increase in payments, the GCF as the UNFCCC’s crucial finance mechanism has thus not become a
relevant source of support for transformative investments within the first decade of its existence.
Having supplied, one year before its self-chosen 2020 benchmark, only about 0.5% of the promised
annual funding flow in cumulative funds, the GCF should be understood as a failure.
62 A former U.S. representative on the board of the Global Climate Fund, defending the fund against Trump’s attacks, 
insisted that the $100 billion figure was to include major amounts of private finance and the “Green Climate Fund 
is only one of many potential sources.” He emphasized that “[w]e vigorously advocated for a fund that served the 
interests of the United States.” (Kotchen, 2017)
63 Figures taken from World Bank (2019h) (2018 figures retrieved on June 1, 2018; 2019 figures on May 17, 2019). 
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3.2.4 REDD+
The initiative for  Reducing Emissions  from Deforestation  and Forest  Degradation  (REDD+) is
included here both as another proxy, in addition to carbon pricing mechanisms, for the valuation of
natural capital – which, as previously argued, is difficult to measure comprehensively – and as an
example highlighting the impact of  Green Economy policies on communities in the global South.
REDD+ and similar  payments for ecosystem services  (PES) schemes have been characterized as
“quintessential applications of current green-economy logic” (McAfee, 2016, p. 335), captured here
in the ontology of natural capital. 
The REDD+ program, in which both the World Bank and UNEP are significantly involved
(Heuwieser,  2015,  pp.  15–17;  Kill,  2015),  is  a  voluntary  mechanism  within  the  UNFCCC
framework (UN-REDD Programme, 2016).  Initially, great hopes were placed in the scheme, with
some arguing that in the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen summit, it was widely seen as the key
policy development to enable a binding post-Kyoto climate agreement (Seymour & Angelsen, 2012,
p. 319). While this seems exaggerated, both the World Bank’s  (2012) and UNEP’s  (2011) Green
Economy  reports  repeatedly  referred  to  REDD+  as  an  exemplary  solution.  Although  UNEP
acknowledged  some  problems,  it  highlighted  the  message  that  REDD+  “may  be  the  best
opportunity to protect forests and ensure their contribution to a green economy.” (Ibid., p. 156)
REDD+ conceptualizes – and values – forests in terms of the ecosystem “services” they
provide, their ability to sequester carbon from the atmosphere in particular, and seeks to remunerate
“developing” countries for forest preservation activities that sustain these “services” into the future.
The  scheme  involves  “results-based  payments  for  verified  emissions  reductions.”  (UN-REDD
Programme, 2016, p. 2) While it promises “meaningful stakeholder engagement” at the community
level (ibid., p. 4), participation and payments take place on a national basis, with the money often
going directly to national governments. 
This setup has reinforced adverse effects on local communities, who have faced frequent
evictions and access restrictions (to be discussed in greater detail  in section 7.4), with national
governments incentivized to shift the pressure to the poorest communities while keeping most of the
compensation. In fact, stringent and well-enforced national forest protection laws act as an obstacle
to participation in the project as they make it harder to claim additionality for any emissions savings
(cf. note  59). This equally holds at the community level, where a positive track record of forest
stewardship precludes communities  from obtaining payments for  the “ecosystem services” they
have been providing so reliably for free: Conservation projects can only claim to deliver certifiable
emissions benefits additional to the status quo if the area in question is considered at risk in the first
place. The degree of social cost externalization in the REDD+ scheme appears enormous.
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Critics have further noted that the program is largely failing as a market-based mechanism,
with only 10% of funding stemming from voluntary carbon markets,  whereas most came from
institutional donors: “[T]he mechanism’s original promise to generate a global market in carbon
credits is already effectively finished.”  (Fletcher, Dressler, Büscher, & Anderson, 2016, pp. 673–
674) Caught between insufficient funds and local resistance, many projects have faltered (ibid.). A
global carbon market, of course, cannot simply be willed into existence from the supply side. While
the program was explicitly acknowledged in the Paris Agreement, in the absence of a binding post-
Kyoto agreement at the international level an obligatory carbon market that could provide reliable
demand for REDD+ credits remains out of sight. Thus, the “aid-ification” (Seymour & Angelsen,
2012) of  REDD+  was  necessary  to  enable  the  program’s  survival,  even  though  some  of  the
program’s  proponents  (ibid.)  lamented  that  this  involved  an  increasing  shift  of  focus  towards
biodiversity,  development-related and other  goals associated with forest  conservation,  while  the
UNFCCC’s climate-focused role in administering the program was diminished – all of which they
understood  to  be  watering  down  the  scheme’s  originally  more  straightforward  PES  approach
(money  paid  out  for  successful  carbon storage  in  forests).  The  complexity  of  ecosystems here
appears to overwhelm the market’s preference for one-on-one exchange.
Fletcher  et  al.  (2016) point  out  another  fundamental  problem inherent  in  market-based
conservation: In the absence of strict regulation that forces extractive industries to internalize the
costs  of their  activities,  conservation projects  based on cost  internalization always compete for
potential “suppliers” with these industries and their superior revenues. In other words, those who
wish to cut down the forest for profitable activities are usually able to pay more than those who
make voluntary contributions to the preservation of “ecosystem services.” Kill  (2015, pp. 50–51)
confirms this for REDD+, noting that the national pilot projects set up by the World Bank, which
pay $5 per ton of successfully mitigated carbon emissions, fail to match the opportunity costs for
any type of commercial forest usage and, thus, to avoid large-scale deforestation. The only users
unable to compete with this price are (forest-dependent) subsistence farmers, which helps to explain
why it is mostly their forests that are incorporated into REDD+ schemes. 
Comprehensive official statistics for REDD+ are lacking. The official Info Hub created for
this purpose contained only fragmented information on three countries as of late 2018; the only
information  that  can possibly be  derived from the data  set  is  that  verified emission reductions
through the program for Brazil steadily declined after 2011 (UNFCCC, n.d.). Since a 2008 forest
conservation deal over $1 billion with the Norwegian government was concluded, Brazil has been
considered a model country for REDD+ implementation; however, while deforestation rates had
been lowered through domestic political efforts in the years before REDD+, they remained stable in
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the years after the deal  (REDD-Monitor, 2018). More recently, rain forest deforestation in Brazil
has  taken  up  pace  again,  with  observers  blaming  illegal  logging,  demand  for  agricultural
commodities and the lack of state oversight (Teixeira, 2018; Watts, 2019). The REDD+ model state
of Acre saw particularly rapid increases in deforestation (REDD-Monitor, 2018). In the first months
of the Bolsonaro regime, deforestation was accelerated even further (see section 8.4.1). 
Overall global forest loss, particularly in tropical regions, has retained a rapid pace (Dooley
& Stabinsky, 2018, p. 11). Still, a 2015 study projected that during 2015–2025, with “status quo
demand,” a  “chronic oversupply” of forest carbon credits was to be expected, such that “prices
subject  to  market  forces  will  remain  depressed.”  (Linacre,  O’Sullivan,  Ross,  Durschinger,  &
Deshmukh, 2015, p. viii) Most of the anticipated policy changes which, according to the study,
could have prompted renewed demand for REDD+ credits have since turned out to disappoint such
expectations.64 Furthermore, as the authors argued at the time, “[i]f REDD+ markets are to work,
REDD+ credits need to be incorporated in a future UNFCCC agreement.” (ibid., p. xi) The non-
binding  Paris  Agreement  concluded  shortly  after  arguably  squashed  these  hopes,  even  as  it
“encouraged” support and implementation of REDD+-like programs (United Nations, 2015, p. 6).
This means that, as with the Clean Development Mechanism, the last hopes for REDD+ now rest
with market revitalization through aviation offsets in the 2020s.
To conclude, REDD+ as perhaps the most widely recognized market-based mechanism for
the protection of  natural capital has had a questionable impact on actual forest conservation and
emissions  reductions  while  failing,  partly  due  to  the  general  failure  of  international  climate
negotiations, to function as a market-based program. Meanwhile, the social costs of these efforts
have been externalized to forest-dependent communities across the global South.
From this sobering journey across various fields of green-capitalist policy implementation, we now
move on to the theorization of “green” capitalism – in search of explanations for the slow, partial
and contradictory developments outlined in this chapter.
64 First, the Obama-era Clean Power Plan in the U.S. was mired in litigation for years before being terminated by the 
Trump administration in 2017 (L. Friedman & Plumer, 2017). Second, in the Californian carbon trading scheme, the
use of international offsets for compliance was effectively restricted to 2-3% of emissions for the 2020s (ICAP, 
2018, p. 11). The other two cases mentioned are global aviation offsets (as described in the previous section) and 
Australian federal policy, which needed a replacement for the cap-and-trade system that was scrapped in 2014 
shortly after beginning its operation. Two REDD-related (sub)programs indeed are among the dozens of climate 
initiatives listed by the Australian government (Department of the Environment and Energy, n.d.), one of which 
focuses on capacity building for forest conservation rather than offset purchases. Given the modesty of Australia’s 
overall climate policy targets, its quantitative impact on global forest credit markets is likely to be limited.
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BLOC II:
THEORIZING “GREEN” CAPITALISM
Against the background of the first bloc’s empirical overview, bloc II goes on
to  theorize  the  challenges  associated  with  a  “greening”  of  capitalism  and
develops a conceptual vocabulary to engage with these challenges. This bloc
thus seeks to answer the third lead question posed at the outset: How can we
conceptualize the conditions and constraints for “green” systemic accumu-
lation – and accumulation under ecological constraints – more generally?  
Chapter 4 works out a comprehensive definition of capitalism and the
complex  conditions  of  its  reproduction  and  proceeds  to  outline  the
fundamental contradictions between capitalist and ecological “logic.” The final
sections propose a set of functional and normative criteria for an immanent
critique of “green” capitalism based on its declared ambitions, followed by a
set of potential “green” systemic accumulation strategies (GSASs) that could
enable accumulation under ecological constraints. Chapter 5 then focuses on
the  particularly  crucial  capacity  of  “green”  technological  innovation  to
decouple economic growth – and thus capital accumulation – from resource
use,  pollution and ecosystem degradation.  The frequently evoked power of
“the  market”  to  drive  forward  innovation  notwithstanding,  specifically
capitalist conditions are shown to  impede the development and diffusion of
such technologies.
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4. “Green” accumulation: A theoretical framework
The previous chapter highlighted the patchy track record of the nascent Green Economy. In order to
facilitate,  contextualize  and  structure  the  deeper  analysis  in  the  following  blocs,  this  chapter
approaches the challenge of “greening” capitalism at the level of theory. It begins with an extensive
definition of capitalism in the first section, which combines various angles suggested in the critical
literature. The following two sections then delve more deeply into debates over the contradictions
between the logic of capital and the functioning of ecosystems, followed by a value-theoretical
analysis of the implications of “greening” measures for capital accumulation in section 4.4. The
penultimate section proceeds to sketch out the functional and normative requirements of a green-
capitalist formation in order to enable an immanent critique, while the final section conceptualizes a
set of four available “green” systemic accumulation strategies (GSASs). This chapter thus stakes
out the overall possibility space of green-capitalist development. 
The question of “green” capitalism will be approached here from a broadly critical realist
perspective.  Critical  realism  accommodates postmodern  critiques  of  positivist  and  empiricist
reasoning while emphasizing the possibility of meaningful truth claims and asserting the existence –
albeit in itself “meaningless” – of reality independent of the observer, as well as of social structure,
in line with historical-materialist reasoning.65 While capitalism’s materiality has evolved in complex
articulations with corresponding discourses and belief systems, it ultimately forms a social structure
that immediately and forcibly conditions individual and collective behavior.66 Thus, critical realists
seek to avoid the pitfalls of relativism and retain the possibility of an effective social critique.
4.1 Defining capitalism
Lexical  definitions  of  capitalism commonly  begin  with  a  set  of  institutions  and  their  systemic
character as a social formation.67 Choosing this finished picture as a starting point, however, is an
65 For an overview of the “essentials” and varieties of critical realism, see López and Potter (2001). For a discussion 
of the role and “nature” of social structure, see also John Scott’s (2001) contribution to the same volume, as well as 
the instructive debate between Rom Harré and Roy Bhaskar (2001).
66 Roy Bhaskar, the “founding father” of critical realism, rightly emphasizes that at its extremes, social structure 
effectively constrains human behavior regardless of individual dispositions and discursive structures (cf. Bhaskar &
Harré, 2001). Capitalist social structure does so in particular ways. By forcing market actors to pursue individual 
utility maximization or else be eliminated by their competitors, capitalism imposes structural limits on social 
behavior in the economic sphere. Thus, a relatively stable and predictable pattern of economic and political 
behavior emerges in capitalist societies, allowing for a reasonably valid characterization of recurring constellations 
of social conflict that can readily be applied to environmental matters. None of this is to deny that subjective and 
collective consent play a major role in the evolution of any workable mode of regulation, as emphasized by 
Gramscians and regulationists (see section 4.1.2 and chapter 8), and therefore contribute importantly to the 
maintenance of the political conditions of capital’s reproduction.
67 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: “An economic system in which the means of production 
and distribution are privately or corporately owned and development is proportionate to the accumulation and 
reinvestment of profits gained in a free market”; Random House Kernerman Webster’s College Dictionary: “an 
economic system in which investment in and ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange of 
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unfortunate  strategy:  As  a  synchronic  “snapshot,”  such  empiricist  accounting  tends  to  be  both
ahistorical  and  analytically  superficial.  Essential  capitalist  institutions  do  not  form a  relatively
stable assemblage simply by fortuitous combination but logically build upon one another, while
their  specific  forms  vary  according  to  historical  and  cultural  circumstances.  An  appropriate
definition  of  capitalism  should  thus  recognize  both the  variety  (and  variability)  of  capitalist
formations  and their  essential  common  characteristics.  Others  have  conceptualized  this  as  the
distinction  between  (universal)  capital and  (particular)  capitalisms (Cavanagh  & Benjaminsen,
2017, p. 206). Both are eminently relevant for our current purpose, as they point to both the range of
possibilities and the inevitable constraints for a potential “green” capitalism. 
I will structure this definitional attempt along the lines of a “front-stage” versus a “back-
stage”  perspective.  While  the  “front  stage”  is  occupied  by  the  abstract  (and  nonetheless  very
material) economic process of capital accumulation, the “back stage” is populated not only by a
variety of  concrete  capitalist  formations but  also by the extra-economic conditions  of  capitalist
(re)production.  This  structure  of  argument,  which  follows  to  a  certain  degree  the
essence/contingency  (or  abstract  theory/concrete  history)  distinction,  should  lead  to  a  clearer
conceptual  understanding  of  the  complex  interactions  of  constant  and  contingent  aspects  in
capitalist history. All these definitional aspects are interrogated with a view to their implications for
the  “greening”  of  capitalism.  Whereas  the  front-stage  perspective  reveals  structural-economic
constraints to green-capitalist development,  the back-stage perspective envisions both structural-
and political-economic constraints as conceptualized in section 1.4.
4.1.1 The force field of capital: The front-stage story
We will begin with the front-stage story of capitalism as a mode of production and accumulation.68
In principle,  social relations are at the core of any critical consideration of the economic process;
the “front stage” is thus closely intertwined with the “back stage” to be discussed in the following
section.  Consequently,  previous analyses  of  capitalism  have  taken  relations  of  exchange  and
production, respectively, as their starting points.69
wealth is made and maintained chiefly by private individuals or corporations.” (“Capitalism,” 2015)
68 By “front stage” I do not mean a purely affirmative standpoint as assumed in neoclassical economists’ sanitized 
(re)presentation of capitalism. Instead, the term refers to the immediate and formal economic process, the capitalist 
organization of production and exchange. This abstracts from the broader conditions of possibility discussed in the 
following section. Fraser (2014) refers to the two dimensions as the “front-story” and “back-story,” respectively.
69 As Robert Boyer argues, “the capitalist mode is characterized by the very specific form taken by the relations of 
exchange and production.” (1990, p. 33) Marx (1968) began his economic analysis in Volume I of Capital with the 
commodity form and the dialectic between a commodity’s use value and its exchange value. Aglietta (2015a) 
instead took a more directly politically oriented approach and therefore chose the wage relation, thus beginning 
with the separation of capitalist societies into classes distinguished by their ownership of means of production (or 
lack thereof). The two approaches illustrate Boyer’s schema, with Marx bringing forward the relations of exchange 
and Aglietta those of production. Each strategy, therefore, begins with the basic dialectical contradiction on one side
of the economic process and proceeds to explain the totality of capitalist institutions from there. 
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For the purposes of this work, I will take a slightly different, although by no means opposed,
angle and foreground the  processual,  that  is,  define capitalism first  of all  by the movement of
capital.70 Witness David Harvey: “By capitalism I mean any social formation in which processes of
capital  circulation and accumulation are hegemonic and dominant in providing and shaping the
material, social and intellectual bases for social life.” (D. Harvey, 2015, p. 7) Capital, in Harvey’s
(2013, p. 37) formulation, directly derived from Marx, is value in motion.71 The process of capital
valorization  and  accumulation  works  through  the  circulation  of  commodities:  Summarized  in
Marx’s famous M-C-M’ formula, money capital (M) is invested in the production of commodities
(C) just to flow back to its owner, augmented by a surplus (M’), in a never-ending circular motion
(Marx, 1968, pp. 161–170). Money only functions as capital while it is implicated in this circular
process. Capital, meanwhile, continues to move through a circuit in which it alternately assumes the
form of money, means of production and finished commodities (Marx, 1979). 
This process is at the heart of any capitalist formation.72 While it is perfectly reasonable to
argue that the commodity form and the wage relation logically and historically precede capitalism,
the basic capitalist  institutions summarized below are logically  connected through the nexus of
capital circulation; they must, at least, be compatible with the process at any time. What’s more, the
accumulation process, guided only by quantitative measures, is, in principle, infinite (Marx, 1968,
pp.  166–167). “Paradoxically,”  Endnotes  (2010,  n.p.,  emphasis  in  original) argues,  “the
accumulation of capital is thus a teleology  without end.”73 Monetary growth – which, as we will
come to see, remains commonly based on processes of physical growth – is thus an indispensable
characteristic of any functioning capitalist economy.
The  centrality  of  infinite  accumulation,  reinforced  by  the  competitive  dynamics  of  the
(world)  market,  is  highlighted  in  world-systems  analysis (W-SA),  which  forms  an  important
cornerstone of the theoretical foundations of this work.74 In fact, accumulation becomes so crucial
here  that  from  a  longue  durée perspective,  capitalism  is  primarily  understood  as  a  mode  of
70 Of course, this is by no means an original idea. Marx turns to this in the second section of the first volume of 
Capital, after the discussion of the commodity and the value form. His purpose, however, was somewhat different, 
as he sought to explain the commodity fetish and the exploitation of surplus value in the process of production, that 
is, major blind spots of established political economy at the time. Taking these insights largely for granted (see, 
however, the discussions in section 4.4), a contemporary ecological perspective on capitalism can center on the 
problem of accumulation.
71 Marx (1968, p. 170) originally defined capital as “prozessierender Wert.” 
72 It should be noted here that possible sources of accumulation may also be encountered outside of capitalist 
production and circulation in the narrower sense. As Marx (1968, pp. 741-761/775-82) has pointed out, “primitive 
accumulation” in the form of land enclosures and colonial exploitation, among other practices, was even a 
prerequisite to the development of capitalist production. Harvey (2004) emphasizes how central countless forms of 
“accumulation by dispossession” still are to the functioning of real-world capitalism. This notion also relates to the 
back-stage story in the second part of this section and is central to world-ecology theory (see also note 75).
73 Endnotes then goes on to argue that “[i]t is a perpetuum mobile.” This, of course, reveals the ecological fallacy of 
many orthodox Marxists who betray their historical materialism by neglecting the very material basis of the 
accumulation process. The best corrective is provided by approaches based on thermodynamics (see section 4.2.2).
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accumulation, and as such is found to have historically preceded capitalism as a mode of production
by several centuries (Arrighi, 1994, p. 221). In other words, the logic of capital accumulation was
operative  long  before  production  came  to  be  organized  primarily  as  large-scale  commodity
production performed by wage laborers. Capital itself is understood here as flexible and eclectic,
moving from production to finance and back as it sees fit (Arrighi & Silver, 2001). But in the long
run, the accumulation process is dependent upon the expansion of capitalist production, and over
the past two centuries, in order to support this process global capitalism had to become, irrevocably,
a  mode  of  production.75 Meanwhile,  foregrounding  the  accumulation  process  is  crucial  to  any
consideration of “green” capitalism: Any such formation would have to guarantee the system-level
functioning of the accumulation process; otherwise, it is either dysfunctional or misnamed. This is
conceptualized throughout this work as systemic accumulation (see also section 4.5.1). 
The  accumulation  process  has  historically  hinged  on  the  exploitation  of  labor  power,
famously described by Marx as the only commodity capable of creating value in excess of itself, so-
called  surplus  value  (Marx,  1968,  p.  181).  Surplus  value  is  the  part  of  the  economic  product
extracted by the owners of capital and potentially available for investment in expanded reproduction
(or, alternatively, for their personal consumption); the extent of its extraction therefore determines
the  outer  limit  to  the  pace  of  accumulation.  Today,  the  generation  of  surplus  value  –  whether
directly or indirectly – still generally depends on the exploitation of human labor at some point in
the  value  chain.  This  points  to  the  always-at-least-latent  class  conflict  at  the  root  of  capitalist
history,  to  be  addressed  in  the  following subsection.  Value  theory,  meanwhile,  contains  crucial
insights for the theorization of green-capitalist possibilities and will therefore be introduced more
extensively in section 4.4.
The basic institutions of capitalist social formations under “modern” capitalism (as a mode
of production), then, include the predominantly profit-oriented organization of the social production
74 Following Fernand Braudel’s (2012) call for a longue durée historiography of capitalism, world-systems analysis 
has been concerned with the historical co-evolution of the interstate system and the capitalist world-economy 
beginning around the 15th century, the hyphen in each case emphasizing that each of these historical systems has not
necessarily covered the whole planet but effectively operated as a world unto itself (Wallerstein, 2004, Chapter 1; 
see also Lee, 2012 for another brief historical contextualization). World-systems have been various defined as a 
“multicultural territorial division of labor,” as “all of the economic, political, social, and cultural relations among 
the people of the earth” and as “intersocietal networks in which the interactions … are important for the 
reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units.” (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, pp. 389, 391) Like 
previous systems, the modern world-system is generally understood by world-systems analysts to be internally 
stratified and centrally characterized by uneven development between a dominant core and a subaltern, dependent 
periphery, complemented by an intermediate stratum of semi-peripheral states (which, it has been argued, is 
growing in relative importance; see Grell-Brisk, 2017). See also chapter 11.
75 As to be discussed in section 4.5.1, capital accumulation can, in principle, proceed through appropriation and 
dispossession (i.e., the redistribution of some form of wealth) as well as through expanded reproduction (i.e., the 
production of additional wealth). But in the absence of rationalized production organized by capitalist imperatives, 
overall economic wealth has historically grown relatively sluggishly. If the pie available for distribution fails to 
grow, accumulation strategies based on (more or less violent) redistribution obviously face hard limits.  
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of goods (in the form of commodities) under private ownership, wage labor, competitive exchange
via markets and a state-guaranteed monetary system.76 This list of institutions points to the general
prevalence  of  the  commodity  form in  capitalist  social  relations:  Not  only  goods  and means  of
production, but also labor, money and land are commodified to a certain extent – although never
fully  so.  The  complete  commodification  of  these  fictitious  commodities has  been  described  as
impossible by Polanyi since they are not originally produced for the market and retain certain non-
commodity characteristics (Polanyi, 1965, pp. 68–76, cf. also the following section).77 While there
is no exact threshold for the degree of commodification that licenses the signifier “capitalism” as a
mode of production, it is clear the basic capitalist institutions all must be sufficiently generalized for
each to function properly.78 Ellen Meiksins Wood (2017) forcefully argued that it was generalized
dependence on reproduction through the market that uniquely characterized capitalism: “Capitalism
is a system in which goods and services, down to the most basic necessities of life, are produced for
profitable exchange, where even human labour-power is a commodity for sale in the market, and
where all economic actors are dependent on the market.” (Ibid., p. 2; emphasis added)79
Due to the ever-increasing amounts of capital in need of profitable outlets, capitalism is
generally an expansive system, spreading not only into new geographical territory but also pushing
into any social territory that yields (politically) to its pressure. Capital thus creates an ever stronger
“force  field”  (Kovel,  2007,  p.  153) that  conditions  and heavily  constrains  social  development.
Consequently,  a  general  tendency  towards  increased  commodification  of  all  goods (material  or
immaterial) and social relations is inherent in capitalism and becomes manifest as the process of
accumulation  unfolds,  even  as  counter-tendencies  persist  and  stand  in  the  way  of  complete
commodification (see section 4.1.2 below). If it  is to turn “green,” capital needs to keep up its
infinitely  expansive  momentum  while  respecting  the  finite  material  basis  of  its  planetary
environment (cf. section 4.5.1). This, again, demonstrates how crucial a processual understanding of
76 Of course, all of these institutions crucially depend on legal protection guaranteed by the state, as emphasized in the
following section. 
77 Labor is incidentally embodied in human beings, the reproduction of “useful” land is contingent on biological 
processes and money is a state-controlled social institution devised to fulfill a range of different and partially 
contradictory functions. Fraser (2012, pp. 7–8) argues that Polanyi’s “essentialist” critique of fictitious commodities
should be abandoned in favor of a structural one. Without reference to her remark, Gómez-Baggethun (2015) offers 
such an explanation based on insurmountable biophysical, institutional and social limits to commodification.
78 For example, production of commodities for market-based exchange depends on households to be significantly 
proletarianized – that is, they must depend on wage labor for their subsistence, which not only means that they have
to enter into the wage relation and make their labor power available for the production process (the “supply side”) 
but also that they necessarily become consumers of commodities exchanged through the market (the “demand 
side”). Were most of them able to subsist without recourse to (labor and consumer goods) markets, capitalist 
production could only take place on the margins, as arguably was the case in the early centuries of its development. 
79 Meiksins Wood, who locates the emergence of capitalism in rural England prior to industrialization, consequently 
rejects the world-systems position that capitalism has an even longer, more global history. In W-SA, however, as 
noted above, capitalism is conceptualized as a mode of accumulation rather than “only” of production, which partly 
accounts for this dissonance (see also note 78 above).
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capital(ism) is in order to recognize the system’s full dynamic force, particularly with regard to its
fragile  ecosystemic  foundations.  But  the  tendency  towards  commodification  is  by  no  means  a
simple and straightforward affair in the real world, and other forces interfere with the pull of the
force field, as the next section demonstrates.
4.1.2 The anti-market: The back-stage stories
As emphasized by Polanyi, “pure” market capitalism – as if the interplay of the institutions listed
above were all  there was to  the story – remains  a  utopian  concept.  Dörre  (2015b,  pp.  12–22)
correctly  points  out  that  such  liberal  market-orthodox  conceptions  of  “harmonious”  capitalism
(efficiency through markets, perfect competition and freedom of contract), abstracting from tensions
and  contradictions  as  well  as  their  necessary  management  within  “really  existing”  capitalist
formations, paint an overly simplistic, unrealistic and incomplete picture of capitalism. The class
antagonism in  the  relations  of  production  between  capital  and  labor,  of  course,  is  an  obvious
contradiction foundational to capitalism. But critical perspectives that stop here, at the level of the
formalized economic process, without considering the various back-stage processes that enable and
give  shape  to  historical  capitalist  formations  by managing conflicts  and ensuring  reproduction,
reproduce many of the fallacies and lacunae of liberal theory.
Conflict management
An understanding of capitalism as a social rather than just an economic system, as a (hierarchical)
mode of social organization built upon antagonistic social relations – in Nancy Fraser’s  (2014, p.
66) words,  as  an  “institutionalized  social  order”  –  draws  both  the  historical  and  geographical
contingency and variability of capitalisms and their background conditions of possibility into the
spotlight. Where the “force field” represents the deterritorialized mo(ve)ment of capital, real-world
capitalism necessarily operates through all manner of reterritorializations (for these concepts in their
relation to capitalism, see Deleuze & Guattari,  1993).  These provide grounding, but  also cause
friction. Based on such a broader understanding, “green” capitalism, if it is to be sustained over any
significant period of time, must also be minimally functional as a mode of social organization, a
green capitalist society, in order to avoid overly disruptive effects on the accumulation process.
This is notably reflected in several of the theoretical traditions taken up in this work. The
regulation “school” of political economy, originating in France, holds that capitalist economies are
not centrally characterized by equilibrium and harmony but by social conflict, recurring crises and
ongoing  structural  transformation  (Aglietta,  2015a;  Becker,  2013;  Boyer,  1990;  Lipietz,  1985,
1992).  Regulation theorists,  understanding patterns of social  reproduction to be always “partial,
temporary and unstable”  (Jessop & Sum, 2006, p.  18) and subject to ongoing class struggle in
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capitalist contexts, thus go beyond universal aspects of capitalism “per se” and focus on contingent
aspects of specific capitalist formations. These formations  embody different combinations of, and
limiting  devices  to,  the  essential  institutions  listed  above,  and  they  importantly  involve  the
(national) state as a mediator. As regulation theory “regards continued accumulation as improbable”
(Jessop & Sum, 2006, p. 14), what is to be explained from its vantage point is not so much the
occasional  occurrence  of  crises  (after  which,  in  the  neo-classical  understanding,  the  economy
returns to an equilibrium state) but both the periods of relative stability and the inevitable processes
of  change  (cf.  Aglietta,  2015a,  introductory  chapter).  Regulation  theory  faces  the  problem  of
reproduction and stability by identifying particular historical formations (development models, each
built around a particular regime of accumulation) that provided such stability for a few decades until
they were rendered obsolete by historical developments. These are stabilized by a corresponding
mode  of  regulation,  “a  set  of  mediations  which  ensure  that  the  distortions  created  by  the
accumulation of capital are kept within limits which are compatible with social cohesion within
each nation” (Aglietta, 2015b, p. 391), without ever resolving these contradictions.80 
The  regulationist  perspective  raises  the  bar  for  “green”  capitalism even  further:  Can  it
actually develop as a full-fledged accumulation regime, accompanied by an appropriate mode of
regulation that mediates social conflicts so as to sustain the regime for a number of decades, or
even,  as  implicitly  suggested  by  its  proponents,  permanently?  Can  it  manage  the  “moving
contradiction” that is capital (Marx, 2014, p. 63; see also Endnotes, 2010) so as to ensure sufficient
effective demand for its greened range of products and avoid not only the economic complications
but also the potential social unrest associated with massive unemployment? Indeed, regulationists
have not only traced back the main substance of the Green Economy agenda as outlined here to the
early 1990s (Brand & Wissen, 2011, pp. 21–23), they have also explicitly treated the subject matter
of “green” capitalism (Brand,  2012, 2014; Brand & Wissen, 2014; Kaufmann & Müller,  2009;
Mahnkopf,  2016).  The  regulationist  lens  casts  doubt  on  state  capacities  to  implement  Green
Economy blueprints in a coherent manner. Green-tech developments and regulatory forms here are
expected to emerge selectively, in articulation with significant remnants of the “gray” economy as
well as Fordist infrastructural patterns and consumption norms. These “green” developments would
also take on highly spatially  uneven forms conditioned by successful  strategies,  on the part  of
economically powerful actors and regions, of spatio-temporal externalization and problem shifting. 
80 These mediations include social, political and economic institutions such as collective bargaining, financial 
regulation and other legislation, welfare mechanisms etc., but also widely shared and internalized values and 
behavioral norms, all of which regulate the wage relation and relations of competition as well as monetary 
exchange more broadly. Where neoclassical theory assumes equilibrium to emerge spontaneously from individual 
self-interested action, regulation theory holds that a complex combination of these mechanisms is required to 
provide some semblance of social order and harmonization; but even this regulation will always be imperfect and 
impermanent.
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Intra-class conflict further complicates the overall terrain of struggles: From their  longue
durée vantage point, world-systems analysts have emphasized how not only the social, but also the
more immediately economic viability of capitalism depends on its capacity to function as an “anti-
market,”  assuming  that  profits  in  perfectly  competitive  markets  would  tend  towards  zero
(Wallerstein, 2004, Chapters 1–2). Even as the world-systems notion of capitalism as a mode of
accumulation is consonant with the idea of an irresistible “force field,” for world-systems analysts,
successful accumulation always hinges on the ability of economic actors to effectively  suspend
competition and achieve at least temporary and partial (quasi-)monopolies. This argument is closely
related to Schumpeter’s non-equilibrium understanding of capitalist markets, as crystallized in his
famous  notion  of  creative  destruction.  For  Schumpeter  (2009,  Chapters  3–4),  monopolistic
practices are necessary both as an enabling and a stabilizing factor of capitalist development. In a
similar  vein,  Meiksins Wood  (2017, Chapter 7) – here in agreement  with the W-SA position –
highlights that capital,  in the violent process of its global expansion, has always been forced to
avoid the  types  of  universalization  that  its  logic  of  “free”  market  exchange  is,  at  the  surface,
predicated upon: A truly level playing field across the world-system is an unacceptable prospect. In
summary,  “anti-market”  practices  are  needed  to  condition  the  “force  field”  so  that  (not-quite-
universal) capital can accumulate in (historical) capitalisms.
“Green” capitalism, from a world-systems perspective, would have to function effectively as
an “anti-market” while  also solving the problem of how to further expand its reach on a “full”
planet,  as  suggested  in  the  previous  section.  International  conflict  management  and  systemic
stabilization  is  essential  here.  World-systems  analyst  Giovanni  Arrighi  (1994,  2008) helpfully
breaks down the longue durée of capitalist history into systemic cycles of accumulation (SCAs), so-
called “long centuries.”81 Each historical  long century has been enabled by an institutional setup
vastly more complicated than any schematic outline of basic capitalist institutions would suggest.
Arrighi establishes an ongoing dialectic between the logic of capital and a territorial logic of state
power; each SCA emerged from a particular articulation of the two, and each expanded the frontiers
of the world-economy through an innovative mode of governance that involved new combinations
of cost internalization and externalization so as to give the particular (hegemonic) state formation at
the center of the cycle a competitive edge. So, where would territorial power reside in a global
green-capitalist  formation? Rather than being simply steered by the anonymous “force field” of
81 For Arrighi, the four proper SCAs were – each named after the hegemonic force – the Genoese, the Dutch, the 
British and the American (see section 11.3). Other world-systems scholars have proposed slightly different 
hegemonic sequences, but the Dutch, British and American cycles are generally uncontroversial (cf. discussion in 
Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, pp. 411–414).  
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 81
capital, world-systems analysis urges us to understand capitalist development as shaped by specific,
situated agency and political power.
In this context, emphasizing the role of the state is important in order to denaturalize the
functioning of capitalist markets and enable a  political  economy perspective such as that of the
regulation approach or of W-SA, which illustrates that capitalism’s viability always depends on the
more or less fragile negotiation of historically  specific boundaries of commodification.  Equally
importantly,  the element  of extra-economic power is  indispensable to understand the history of
capitalist seizures of social territory – Landnahmen in Rosa Luxemburg’s formulation – required to
enable the ongoing accumulation of capital  (cf. Dörre, 2015b; see extensive treatment in section
4.6.2). This both includes the historical enclosures of the commons that separated workers from the
land,  variously  conceptualized  as  “primitive  accumulation”  by  Marx  (1968,  pp.  741–787) or  a
“great  transformation”  by  Polanyi  (1965),  and  the  various  contemporary  mechanisms  of
“accumulation  by  dispossession”  analyzed  by  Harvey  (2004) and  Federici  (2004).  The  world-
ecology perspective taken in this work,  as the broader W-SA tradition in which it  is rooted,  is
centrally concerned with this political, tendentially violent dimension of capitalist development and
with the ongoing externalizations it creates. But the state not only matters for capital as an engine of
frontier appropriation; it  also assumes broader functions as an enabler,  shaper and developer of
capitalist markets in general, as well as of specific markets  (Vormann & Lammert, 2019, pp. 18–
22). Chapters 10 and 11 explore the implications of various governance paradigms and political-
institutional forms for green-capitalist regulation.
This  political  dimension  necessarily  reflects  back  upon  our  understanding  of  systemic
accumulation,  and  more  specifically  of  its  heretofore  assumed  universality.  The  perspective
proposed in section 4.1.1 rests on the notion of a tendential, although quite imperfect, equalization
of profit rates across the economy enabled by the mobility of capital under competitive conditions,
as developed in Volume III of Capital (Marx, 1981, Chapters 9–12).82 While this systemic accumu-
lation concept  privileges  absolute  accumulation as  the telos  of  capital,  a  dissenting perspective
based on an understanding of capital as purely a mode of power highlights the factual importance of
differential – i.e., relative – accumulation, determined in inter-capitalist power struggles (Nitzan &
82 This equalization is driven by competition and the credit system, with liquid capital flowing towards high-profit 
sectors until the latter become crowded and a reverse movement sets in. Instead of selling goods at their (labor-
based) values, capitalists in equilibrium markets are here understood to add a profit that roughly corresponds to the 
perceived average rate of profit to their cost price. This allows for the co-existence of sectors with different organic 
compositions of capital, meaning different value ratios of fixed capital and raw materials to labor inputs. If, within 
the labor theory of value, all goods traded at their values, this would result in drastically unequal profit rates that 
would make investment in capital-intensive sectors all but impossible. (Of course, different types of investment may
yield different returns, for example because of different risk levels involved.) On the empirical validity of the 
equalization assumption, see note 140 in section 4.5.1.
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Bichler,  2006).83 My conception  retains  the  centrality  of  absolute  capital  accumulation  through
market processes, which signifies structural-economic constraints with regard to the “greening” of
capitalism. A conception that altogether dissolves the economic process in power struggles not only
downplays the materiality of “real” accumulation – not only labor, but also ecology and technology
are largely irrelevant in this account, and distributional questions are privileged while the substance
to be distributed is declared largely virtual – but also relegates the market as such to the margins, to
a  greater  degree  than  warranted  by  the  “anti-market”  theorem.84 The  differential  accumulation
argument nevertheless is a relevant corrective that foregrounds the political-economic dimension of
capitalist development and highlights the resulting unevenness of systemic accumulation.
Reproduction troubles
Capitalist  reproduction  has  also  been  problematized  from  various  angles  that  reach  beyond
economic  and  class  relations  to  other  social  (and  extra-social)  hierarchies,  thereby  exploring
capitalism’s entanglement with racism, heteropatriarchy and speciesism. Noting that instead of a
unidirectional  trend  towards  ever-intensified  commodification,  capitalism  always  relies  on  a
coexistence of marketized and non-marketized forms of (re)production, Nancy Fraser enumerates
three areas of particular concern in her plea for an epistemic shift towards recognition of indispens-
able back-stage processes – a “move to history.” (Fraser, 2014, p. 61) These processes include the
role of social reproduction, capital’s appropriation of nature and the “life support” provided by the
state. While the latter has been covered above, the first two deserve more detailed attention. 
83 Nitzan and Bichler’s account is based on a rejection of the labor theory of value (and, consequently, of almost all 
Marxist economic theory); for them, power as expressed through capitalization replaces Marx’s abstract social 
labor (and neoclassical utility) as the central measure of capital. Unfortunately, Marxist theory here is reduced to a 
caricature in order to make the argument that it is blind to considerations of power or only understands it as purely 
“external” to the accumulation process (Nitzan & Bichler, 2006, pp. 13–21), Marx’s own definition of value (and, 
hence, capital) as a social relation notwithstanding (treated at length, for example, in Marx, 1981, Chapter 48). The 
complex interweaving of capital and state, in their theory, simply amounts to a fusion of the two (Nitzan & Bichler, 
2006, pp. 35–41), with “dominant capital” (those firms that manage to accumulate faster than the average) as the 
central locus of power (ibid., pp. 42–49). The link between (differential) accumulation and economic growth is 
almost completely severed in this understanding; most of the time, they argue, growth signals a diffusion of power 
and thus is feared by dominant capital (ibid., pp. 50–1, 58). I would argue that they are overstating their case by 
positing accumulation as a purely relative matter (where capitalist simply seek to gain more capital/power than 
others, regardless of absolute profit), whereas long-term capital accumulation – as argued before – ultimately 
depends on expanded reproduction. Nevertheless, the notion itself is a helpful corrective: It insists on the uneven 
distribution of gains among capitals and offers an explanation for why state policy may not always be geared to 
maximize economic growth. For a critique of Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of power, see also Bradford (2012).
84 There is a contradiction in the capital-as-power understanding: Capital is seen as a purely financial entity (Nitzan &
Bichler, 2006, p. 82), but the mobility and flexibility associated with liquid capital – those forces that work towards 
an equilibrium as expressed in the notion of the average rate of profit – appears to be entirely negated. The world-
systems perspective here seems to find a better balance between market and anti-market. Nitzan and Bichler (ibid., 
pp. 34–35), unsurprisingly, complain that Arrighi does not go far enough in his articulation of the state—capital 
nexus, as he retains a distinction between the two. In Arrighi’s dialectic of alternate phases of material and financial
expansion, both the materiality and the deterritorialized moment of capital are brought to bear. Notably, unlike the 
idea of purely differential accumulation, his conception of systemic accumulation allows for unevenness without 
negating the overall directionality of the (expansive) process.
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As regards social reproduction, Fraser, in addressing the “crisis of care” under neoliberal
capitalism, elsewhere argues that
“every  form  of  capitalist  society  harbours  a  deep-seated  social-reproductive  ‘crisis  tendency’  or
contradiction:  on the one hand,  social  reproduction is a  condition of  possibility for  sustained capital
accumulation; on the other, capitalism’s orientation to unlimited accumulation tends to destabilize the
very processes of social reproduction on which it relies.” (Fraser, 2016, p. 100)
This  feminist  critique  highlights  that  for  its  reproduction,  capitalism  has  historically  always
depended  on  labor  that  takes  place  outside  the  market,  mostly  unpaid  and  to  a  large  extent
performed  by  women  (Federici,  2004;  Mies,  1986).  These  reproductive  processes,  while  not
operating according to capitalist principles, are therefore integral to capitalism’s functioning. Fraser
emphasizes  that  these  arrangements  have  grown  increasingly  fragile  under  the  marketization
pressures of financialized capitalism.  Any capitalist  formation must  find viable solutions to the
problem of care work, and a potential  “green” capitalism would inherit the specific form of care
crisis produced by the present regime. 
What about the ecological conditions of capitalism’s possibility? James O’Connor’s second
contradiction thesis, discussed in section 4.3 below, holds that capitalism undermines its own non-
valorized conditions of existence. This incorporates the feminist critique to some extent, but mostly
relates to ecological concerns: Environmental degradation inflicted by capitalist industrialization
requires increasing amounts of capital to be spent on “unproductive” restoration measures while
also sparking social resistance, thus complicating accumulation in different ways. A crucial question
for “green” capitalism, therefore, concerns the degree to which its “greening” strategies necessarily
exert a drag on accumulation,  a slowdown that is unavoidable in order to warrant the system’s
survival,  or,  much  worse  from a  capitalist  standpoint,  that  could  perhaps  even  force  systemic
accumulation to grind to  a halt.  Or could “greening” really  boost accumulation,  as  claimed by
Green Economy advocates? This will be addressed in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Building on world-systems analysis and the second contradiction thesis, as well as feminist
and decolonial critiques of capitalism, Jason W. Moore’s world-ecology approach suggests a related
question, namely whether green-capitalist models are capable of making nature work  for capital.
“Capitalism,” argues Moore, “is a way of organizing nature,” and it should be considered a “world-
ecology, joining the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the co-production of nature
in dialectical unity.” (2015, pp. 2, 3; italics in original) 85 In Moore’s framework, the capitalist appro-
priation of  Cheap Nature, most notably the “four cheaps” energy, labor, food and raw materials,
85 Following the W-SA tradition, Moore locates the origins of capitalism in the “long 16th century”: Whereas 
capitalism may not have fully functioned as a social formation at that point, capitalist dynamics were involved in 
major rearrangements of ecosystems in many regions and thus already shaped a world-ecology in his sense.
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takes center stage. Unlike  capitalization,  which directly draws work or energy into the sphere of
commodity exchange and therefore is a more costly way of extending capital’s reach, appropriation
here  refers  to  processes  which  allow  capital  to  access  such  resources  at  below-market  costs
precisely because they are not properly commodified, such as workers raised outside the sphere of
capitalist reproduction or forests and fossil fuel stocks that have not been “produced” by capital but
can be cheaply accessed depending on politico-economic circumstances. This perspective prompts
us to investigate the patterns of appropriation occurring in the nascent  Green Economy and their
impact on social and ecological reproduction (see chapter 6).
The  world-ecology  view  further  suggests  that  systemic  capital  accumulation  crucially
depends on such “cheap” appropriations – and, consequently, that the ubiquitous externalization of
costs  to  capital’s  “others”  is  vital  to  the  system’s  survival.  Fully  capitalized  inputs  are  always
capital’s second choice, and the system cannot always content itself with second-choice options.
“To call for capital to pay its own way is to call for the abolition of capitalism,” Moore (ibid., p.
145) consequently writes with a view to debates on the “internalization” of ecological costs  of
production, a tenet already anticipated in the W-SA tradition.86 For Moore, as for world-systems
scholars like Arrighi  (for whom geopolitical and geoeconomic limits stand in the way of another
SCA; 2010) or Wallerstein (who privileges social contradictions; 2013), capitalism’s terminal crisis
is already on the horizon. Can the Green Economy’s strategies transcend this contradiction?
The point of this two-part exposition is not to substitute the back-stage for the front-stage
story or to reduce the front-stage story to the status of a myth. Rather, critical engagement with
capitalism, “green” or otherwise, requires us to take into consideration both the anonymous “force
field”  of  capital  and its  infinite  accumulation  and  the  historical,  socio-political  and  ecological
specificity of capitalist formations. The former effectively constrains the development of the latter:
The front-stage story always matters, but without consideration of capitalism’s back-stage activities,
it is incomplete.
4.2 Ontological rifts: Capital and ecology
Thesis 4.2: In the most abstract terms, “green” capitalism faces steep challenges rooted in the
contradictions between the respective logics of capital and ecosystems: Capital, as a process, takes
the form of a spiral of growth, whereas ecosystems only grow to the point of maturity; capitalist
expansion accelerates the rise of entropy, the degradation of both energy and matter available to
human use. Capital’s control over abstract social nature is, to a considerable degree, illusionary.
86 According to Wallerstein, the essential tendency among capitalists “not to pay their bills” constituted “the ‘dirty 
secret’ of capitalism” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 4) as their profits depended on systematic cost externalizations, whereas
serious environmental protection measures “could well serve as the coup de grâce to the viability of the capitalist 
world-economy.” (Ibid., p. 6)
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This section considers the divergent basic principles and dynamics that complicate any attempt to
reconcile capitalism with its ecological foundations even though many of the same metaphors are
commonly used to describe both. This complicates the project of assimilation introduced here under
the moniker ontology of natural capital.
4.2.1 Patterns of growth
Both capitalist economies and ecosystems can be conceptualized in terms of  circular as well as
linear logics.  Simple  flow charts  explaining  economic  reproduction  show the  circular  flow of
capital – in various forms, as both money and goods – between production and consumption, firms
and households (see e.g. Jacobs, 1991, p. 13). But the peculiar capitalist means—ends constellation
transcends a simple circular motion: The goal of production is not material wealth or use values but
monetary accumulation through the creation of surplus value. Money here is used not simply as a
means of exchange, but, as outlined above, invested as capital in search of valorization. Perhaps the
most appropriate and intuitive visualization of this process is a  spiral,  combining circularity with
continuous expansion (cf. Altvater, 1992, p. 265; Walker & Moore, 2019, p. 61).  
Many ecosystemic processes can likewise be characterized by circular flow charts.87 This
applies to seasonal successions of growth and decline, but also to material flows. The Earth system
is centrally characterized by biogeochemical cycles (Lenton, 2016, Chapter 2). Nutrients and water,
nitrogen and carbon and countless other substances circulate through the bodies of various species
as well as by means of inorganic processes like evaporation and precipitation. Changes to these
processes are constantly underway: usually slow, but rarely linear – due not least to the enormous
complexity  of  ecosystems,  which  also  undermines  any  hope  for  reversibility  of  such  changes
(Charlson, Orians, & Wolfe, 2000; M. C. Jacobson, Charlson, & Rodhe, 2000; Neugebauer, 2006).
Ecosystems  as  such  undergo  quantitative  growth  until  they  reach  systemic  constraints  in,  for
example, the amount of available low-entropy inputs such as solar radiation, at which point they
transition  to  a  “mature”  state  characterized  by  qualitative growth  in  biological  complexity  and
thermodynamic efficiency (Fath, Jørgensen, Patten, & Straškraba, 2004). This does not enable them
to live forever: At some point in the life of a mature ecosystem, a period of “creative destruction”
sets in. This may entail survival through transformation to a different state (ibid.), but generally, the
lifespan of ecosystems is limited (Costanza & Mageau, 1999). 
Nevertheless,  the  difference  remains  striking:  The  lifespan  of  an  ecosystem in  view of
thermodynamic  constraints  is  considerably  extended  through  the  relatively  “steady”  stage  of
maturity,  in  which  qualitative  growth  processes  replace  quantitative.  The  accumulation  and
87 These flows essentially make up any given ecosystem, defined as “a system involving the interactions between a 
community of living organisms in a particular area and its nonliving environment.” (“Ecosystem,” 2014)
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circulation of capital obviously involves continuous and often dramatic qualitative change in the
structure of the economy as well. But, by marked contrast, this only serves the unceasing process of
quantitative expansion – regardless of any talk of “qualitative growth” as a new paradigm that could
succeed  “quantitative.”  Unlike  ecosystems,  capitalist  economies  can  only  maintain  a  state  of
equilibrium while continuing to grow. This discrepancy sets the stage for what John Bellamy Foster
and colleagues, referring to passing remarks in the works of Marx, have termed the metabolic rift
that progressively widens between capitalist  economies  and their  ecology  (Foster,  1999; Foster,
Clark, & York, 2010a).88 In a contemporary context, the concept has been applied to the carbon
cycle, emphasizing the rift between the timescales of fossil fuel accumulation over millions of years
and their  extraction within a few centuries,  and the multiple disruptions this  is now causing in
different ecosystems including the atmosphere, oceans and forests (Clark & York, 2005). 
4.2.2 Thermodynamics
This leads us into the field of thermodynamics, which forms the theoretical point of departure for
the subdiscipline of  ecological economics, the rebellious brother of (neoclassical) environmental
economics.  According  to  the  second  law of  thermodynamics,  over  time  (i.e.,  in  the  course  of
economic activity) the share of total energy and matter within the Earth system that is unavailable
to human use  increases.89 This entropy law is not reflected in (neo)classical economic theory, as
Herman Daly  (1991) and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1975, 1976, 1986) spent decades pointing
out.90 It is worth unraveling, however. As Lenton (2016, pp. 107–110) argues, the “secrets” to the
sustainability  and productivity  of  the  Earth  system are  its  combination  of  a  sustainable  (solar)
88 The concept originally referred to the disruption of the nutrient cycle through urbanization processes that were 
propelled by the proletarianization resulting from the enclosures of agricultural lands (Foster, 1999). Through these,
the metabolic exchange between nature and society was disrupted: Instead of returning to the soil, spread relatively 
evenly across the land, valuable nutrients accumulated in concentrations of urban waste, thus threatening the soil 
fertility of agricultural areas and, consequently, their ability to provide for urban populations. 
89 The first law of thermodynamics holds that matter and energy exist in constant amounts, and none of it is ever 
created or destroyed but merely rearranged. The second law – the entropy law – adds that all movements of matter 
and energy within a closed system irreversibly lead to higher spatial homogeneity (entropy) of the respective entity. 
For human purposes, this generally means that economic activity feeds on low-entropy inputs (useful 
concentrations of matter and energy) and turns these into high-entropy outputs (waste). The Earth is effectively a 
closed system with regard to matter and an open system with regard to energy, as it receives a continuous influx of 
solar energy and radiates warmth back into space. In the long run, this means that terrestrial sources of low-entropy 
matter and energy are limited and diminishing, and while for matter there is no replacement, energy needs might 
still be satisfied through solar influx. Moreover, high-entropy sink capacity is also limited, meaning that pollution 
becomes increasingly problematic. 
90 They also argued that this shortcoming was simply carried over into Marxist economics via the labor theory of 
value. Ecological Marxists have responded that the distinction between (monetary) exchange value and (material) 
use value does recognize the ultimate dependence of economic value on ecosystemic integrity and natural 
resources; while the labor theory of value – ascribing value only to abstract social labor – is an analytical reflection 
of the capitalist process, both labor and “nature” are seen to contribute to material wealth as reflected in the concept
of use value (Burkett, 2001, 2004; Foster, Clark, & York, 2010b). Consequently, thermodynamics has been 
employed by many writers with Marxist backgrounds to highlight the logical contradictions between ecosystems 
and capitalist economies (Altvater, 1994, 1998; Karathanassis, 2015; M. Koch, 2011; Kovel, 2007; M. O’Connor, 
1994a). See also the value-theoretical debate in section 4.4.
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energy influx and perpetual material recycling as well as the resilience created through negative
feedback mechanisms that provide for stable self-regulation. In this sense, in so far as it operates at
geological time scales, the Earth system is not subject to the second law of thermodynamics (nor to
the fourth law introduced below), which is essentially an anthropocentric concept. 
With the emergence of human economic activity at a significant scale, however, the rise of
entropy  was  imposed on the  planetary  ecosystem:  an  important  linear  thermodynamic  process,
irreversible on human time scales. Industrial  economic activity in particular feeds on “syntropy
islands”  (Karathanassis,  2015,  p.  20):  relatively  easily  accessible  stocks  of  highly  concentrated
matter and energy, which exist as the result of sedimentation processes on geological time scales.
While energy and matter, according to the laws of thermodynamics, never disappear, they surely
tend to dissipate in the course of economic activity and thus become useless for (time-constrained)
human purposes. The difference between thermodynamics and capital dynamics, again, is also one
of quality versus quantity: While capital accumulation, narrowly viewed, is generally a quantitative
matter, the corresponding “accumulation” of entropy signifies a qualitative transformation of energy
and matter from a human perspective – from useful to useless – while total systemic energy-matter
is held constant (Altvater, 1992, 1994, p. 86; cf. also Karathanassis, 2015, p. 125). This linearity of
biophysical  processes  obviously  comes  into  conflict  with  simplistic  models  of  circular  (and
spiraling) commodity exchange, which cannot conceptualize a steady shrinking of its material base.
In the case of fossil energy reserves, the rise of entropy is not necessarily dramatic, as the
Earth is an open system with regard to energy: There is still the option to subsist on the “solar
income,” the tiniest part of which has so far been directly utilized for human economic activity
(Daly,  1991).  But  systematic  reliance on widely diffused and relatively weak solar  radiation is
certainly a challenging prospect for a global economy built on the utilization of massive syntropy
islands, which allows for centralized deployment of energy at enormous scales. The compatibility of
a solar economy with capitalism, which has historically co-evolved with and depended on fossil-
fuel industries, cannot be taken for granted. 
To make things worse, with regard to matter, most notably mineral resources, the terrestrial
ecosystem is virtually closed. This was the source of greatest concern for Georgescu-Roegen (1975,
1976, 1981), and has often been downplayed or ignored in subsequent discussions  (cf.  Burkett,
2005). Georgescu-Roegen  (1981, pp. 59–61) posited a “fourth law of thermodynamics,” namely
that recycling of matter is always incomplete.91 Friction always means losses, and therefore the total
amount of available matter is continuously reduced. This argument also reflects the effective limits
91 Alternative formulations of this law offered by Georgescu-Roegen (1981, p. 60) are as follows: “A closed system 
cannot perform work indefinitely at a constant rate,” and: “In a closed system, available matter continuously and 
irreversibly dissipates, thus becoming unavailable.” 
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on recycling placed by the increasingly prohibitive amount of energy required as one approaches
complete recycling. It should also be noted that limited terrestrial mineral resources are, conversely,
placing effective constraints on the technological infrastructure needed to make concentrated use of
solar energy for recycling or other purposes. Georgescu-Roegen insisted that the additional friction
created  in  the  process  would  at  some  point  outweigh  the  material  gains  from  recycling.  The
dependence of “green” technologies on minerals and other very material resources will be discussed
in sections 5.1 and 6.4.
All  of  this  is  to  reiterate  the  original  point  of  the  application  of  thermodynamics  in
ecological economics, namely that economic systems are not closed in the dematerialized sense that
market theory suggests. They are embedded in a natural environment, with all manner of metabolic
interaction involving flows of matter and energy as well as “waste” flows of heat, various other
emissions and solid waste. In the world-ecology view, taking the argument even further, capital and
nature are fused in mutual co-production. For this to work, source and sink capacities of ecosystems
must  match  the  demands  of  the  economy.  With  the  former  either  relatively  stable  or,  worse,
declining through degradation and the latter  constantly growing,  there is  an obvious,  mounting
contradiction.92 As the well-worn but largely accurate environmentalist  credo goes, “there is no
infinite growth on a finite planet.”93 At least, that is, no infinite physical growth, and this is where
the  green growth debate, revolving around the idea of an absolute decoupling of economic from
physical growth, sets in. The success of the Green Economy as proposed by UNEP, the World Bank
and the OECD – two of the three reports carry  green growth in their respective titles – hinges
precisely on such absolute decoupling.
4.2.3 Abstract social nature
Ecosystems, furthermore, do not lend themselves to the level of systemic control afforded by semi-
automated factories. Green-capitalist policies tend to be deeply complicated by the fact that “unruly
ecologies” do not always behave orderly and predictably (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 254). Capitalist
practices depend on measurability and calculability, which are not even warranted for relatively
simple ecosystem properties such as species populations. Due to this  “impossibility of a perfect
articulation  between scientific,  legal,  and capital  logics,” in  practice,  “ad-hog logics”  are  often
substituted for rigorous measurement techniques  (Robertson, 2006, pp. 380, 377). No agreement
exists on the proper macro-scale measurement of natural capital either, as frankly pointed out by a
leading UNEP economist (Kumar, 2017). The calculation of payments for ecosystem services is thus
92 Whether one conceptualizes the nature—economy relation in terms of a metabolism (as most eco-Marxists do), a 
capitalist “production of nature” which simultaneously produces barriers to capital’s reproduction (N. Smith, 2008) 
or the mutual co-production of capital and nature (Moore, 2015, 2016), the mismatch remains.
93 This phrase is so ubiquitous that I did not attempt to track down the original source, suspecting there is none.
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no  straightforward  matter,  which  has  hampered  the  effectiveness  of  market-based  conservation
schemes (cf. McAfee, 2016).94 There is no natural Taylorism, at least not yet. 
The illusion of control frequently entertained here is particularly dangerous with regard to
climate change,  where  calculative exercises  such as  emissions  budgets suggest  a  simple,  linear
trade-off between economic costs and ecosystem impacts, allowing governments to determine and
then steer the economy precisely towards the “sweet spot” of economic-environmental compromise
(see also section 7.1). Systemic  tipping points are assumed to exist, however, at which dramatic
non-linear and irreversible changes would be triggered and either regional subsystems or, in the
most extreme cases, the Earth system would switch to an alternative stable state, which may or may
not allow human life to continue. (On tipping points and projection, see Lenton, 2016, Chapter 6.)
The  enormous  diversity  and  heterogeneity  of  species  that  interact  to  form  complex,
interdependent ecosystems is here confronted with the homogenizing effect of the capitalist value
form. In a particularly compelling enactment of the use-value-versus-exchange-value drama, the
qualitative variety of nature here assumes the role of use values, which are made to disappear from
the capitalist view that, in principle, only recognizes the metric of exchange value with its purely
quantitative differentiation,  even as the material process of capitalist production fully depends on
quite particular use value qualities.95 The holism of ecology is submerged by the methodological
individualism of  an  orthodox economics  which  can  only envision  a  homogenized nature  to  be
chopped  up,  sold,  traded  and  its  fragments  counted  against  one  another  according  to  human
preferences – practically treating nature, in Moore’s formulation, as abstract social nature: “[T]he
substance of abstract social nature is the production of ‘real abstractions’ – of time (linear), space
(flat), and Nature (external).” (Moore, 2015, p. 194) Different interventions in these systems that are
assigned the same amount of value – and thus are “the same” from an economic standpoint – each
may have very different physical impacts. 
As suggested by Moore, this rift has a temporal dimension. Whereas capital relentlessly
seeks to increase its turnover time (“time is money”), natural reproduction cycles are more difficult
to accelerate. Attempts by capital to prod nature into action, as with industrial agricultural practices,
generally serve to widen the metabolic rift and increase entropy. They are not necessarily impotent
and hopeless but certainly subject to limitations and rife with unintended negative consequences, by
tendency undermining longer-term yields  (see section 6.2).  This  discrepancy has  been noted in
94 “[E]stimates of net environmental losses or gains from PES or REDD projects necessarily rely on best-guess 
approximations, counterfactual scenarios, unsupported assumptions about future human decisions, and debatable 
claims about the commensurability and fungibility of ecosystems functions.” (McAfee, 2016, p. 340)
95 The accounting framework provided by the Natural Capital Protocol (Natural Capital Coalition, 2016), for 
example, while claiming in principle that natural capital accounting also involves “qualitative” forms of valuation 
(ibid., p. 3), is all about standardization that enables measurement and comparability in order to facilitate business 
decision-making.
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various contexts by ecological Marxists  (Altvater, 1992, 1994; Clark & York, 2005; Foster, 1999;
Moore, 2010) and also criticized from a feminist-biopolitical perspective (Charkiewicz, 2009).
I will leave it to Paul Burkett (2005, p. 144) to provide a succinct summary of the capital—
ecology rift: “In sum, money and capital values are homogenous, divisible, mobile, reversible and
quantitatively unlimited, by contrast with the qualitative variety, indivisibility, locational unique-
ness, irreversibility and quantitative limits of low-entropy matter-energy.” Based on this evidence,
Burkett  concludes  that  “production  driven  and  shaped  by  capitalist  valuation  is  fundamentally
antagonistic towards the natural conditions of human production and human development.” (Ibid.)
The challenge this  poses for  any conception of “green” capitalism is  obvious:  The antagonism
would have to be attenuated by proper “management” to ensure functionality – as has been the case
with so many other historical and logical contradictions within the capitalist mode of production.
4.3 The second contradiction debate
Such contradictions have long become the core of eco-Marxist theory, with important implications
for the plausibility of “green” capitalism. James O’Connor proposed that in abstracting from its
ecological  foundations,  capitalism  had  a  tendency  to  undermine  its  own  conditions  of
(re)production,  including ecosystemic  integrity  but  also human health.  This,  for  him,  famously
constituted  the  second  contradiction  of  capitalism (J.  O’Connor,  1998c).  Whereas  the  first
contradiction of capitalism, rooted in the class antagonism between capital and labor, tends to lead
to  overaccumulation and thus to periodic crises of realization (as capital is structurally driven to
overexploit labor in the production process, which carries the risk of generating insufficient demand
for  its  products),  the  second  contradiction  becomes  manifest  in  a  crisis  of  underproduction:
Capital’s ecological and social conditions of production (including factors such as relatively intact
ecosystems, plentiful natural resources and the reproduction of a healthy workforce; for a detailed
elaboration of this concept, see J. O’Connor, 1998b) are eroding as capital is structurally driven to
externalize  any losses  in  this  field – to  free-ride on undervalued “services”  including those of
ecosystems and reproductive workers. Thus, the state has to intervene in an attempt to guarantee
their reproduction, which is more immediately politicized than the ordinary production process. The
reasons O’Connor provides for capital’s tendency to undermine its conditions of (re)production96
include the lack of ownership of conditions of production on the part of producing firms (which
gives way to all manner of cost externalization, including to other capitals), capital’s dynamic of
96 In the following, depending on the context, I will frequently refer either to capital’s conditions of reproduction or 
the conditions of (systemic) accumulation to highlight that it is not just particular production processes in the 
narrow sense that are at stake but capitalism’s survival (as a necessarily expansive system) as such. O’Connor’s 
concept certainly implies such a broader perspective, and I merely chose to adapt the terminology accordingly.
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self-expansion and its universalizing tendencies as expressed in what is here called the ontology of
natural capital (J. O’Connor, 1998c, p. 165).97
The second contradiction thesis has sparked a substantial debate among ecological Marxists
with regards to crisis theory and the existence of “natural” limits to capital. John Bellamy Foster
(2002) and Paul Burkett (1999) have criticized O’Connor’s perspective for being too sanguine about
the prospects for resolving capital’s  destructive effects.  O’Connor assumed that the rising costs
associated with degradation – rising costs of raw material extraction as well as social and ecological
reparation  costs  of  various  types  –  could  constitute  a  profit  squeeze  heavy  enough  to  trigger
economic crises and effectively undermine systemic capital accumulation (J. O’Connor, 1998a).98 
By contrast, Burkett (2004, p. 466) claims that
“capital’s basic requirements (exploitable labor power and conditions under which wage-labor can be
objectified in vendible commodities) are, materially speaking, fulfillable under any degradation of natural
conditions short of human extinction. This helps explain why the most prominent type of environmental
crisis in Capital is not materials supply disturbances to accumulation, but rather the crisis in the natural
conditions of human development produced by capitalist industrialization. (…) Unlike materials-supply
disturbances, this environmental crisis tendency need not involve a crisis of capital accumulation.”
In addition, O’Connor viewed postmodern social movements including the environmental move-
ment  as well  as  (second-wave) feminism as  a reaction triggered by the underproduction crisis,
suggesting that these movements could pose a counterweight to capital’s (self-)destructive tendency
in the sense of a Polanyian double movement, a “social barrier” potentially acting as an effective
“natural” limit  (J. O’Connor, 1988, 1998a, 1998c).99 By contrast,  Foster and Burkett insist that
there  are  no  such  effective  negative  feedbacks:  Capital  is  in  principle  able  to  undermine  the
conditions of its reproduction until the point of collapse, long before the ecological costs it is forced
to internalize would cause it to change course (cf. Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2002). For them, the “first
97 The last of these points is connected to an understanding of the conditions of accumulation as fictitious 
commodities in the Polanyian sense – they are neither originally produced in or for the market, nor is their 
“production” really fully controllable in the same sense that the manufacturing of “classical” commodities is (J. 
O’Connor, 1994, pp. 162–166; cf. also M. O’Connor, 1994c). This immediately relates to the nature-as-capital 
debate and highlights its political-economic significance: In this view, any understanding of nature as a form of 
capital necessarily veils nature’s apriori status, preceding and encompassing all of capital. For James O’Connor 
(1994, pp. 156–158), there is a clear disconnect between green and capitalist perspectives: Should capital be made 
to conform to nature or vice versa? Whose primacy is assumed?
98 In fact, O’Connor also acknowledged that economic crises, in turn, tend to aggravate ecological crises (J. 
O’Connor, 1998a). But he generally held that both types of crises tendentially force capitalism to morph into “more 
social forms” that undermine commodification and competition with an eventual view towards socialism (J. 
O’Connor, 1998c), which flies in the face of all experience with neoliberal crisis responses – both in social and 
ecological terms, as market-oriented Green Economy models demonstrate. In this regard, Foster and Burkett’s 
skepticism is reasonable.
99 Foster and Burkett tend to exaggerate O’Connor’s position here, making it appear as if the double movement 
suggested by the second contradiction thesis represented an equilibrium model in which capital’s excesses are 
automatically reined in by social resistance. Instead, O’Connor makes it clear that history is open (cf. e.g. J. 
O’Connor, 1988, p. 28); his insistence on the force of the double movement was apparently motivated by his 
political intention to bring Marxists to recognize the importance of the often-dismissed “new” social movements.
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contradiction”  of  capital,  signifying  its  power  over  labor  and  nature,  is  still  paramount,  and
O’Connor’s separation of the two is misleading.
The  second  contradiction  debate  directly  relates  to  at  least  two  important  points  of
discussion with regard to the GE and the potential “greening” of capitalism: First, the question of
whether capital can withstand the effects of ecological degradation and the associated rising costs of
(re)production in the longer run, and second, the question of the extent to which “green” policies
can unlock additional systemic accumulation potential so as to enable “green growth.” 
As Foster  emphasizes capital’s ability to accumulate until the “point of no return”  (2002,
n.p.), unhindered by such “external” barriers as identified by O’Connor, his definition places much
of  the  biosphere  as  outside  of  capital’s  conditions  of  production  proper.  Foster  objects  to  the
treatment  of  the  Amazonian  rain  forest,  the  ozone  layer  and  other  elements  of  the  global
environment “as if it were a simply a precondition of the economy and not a precondition of life as
we  know it.”  (Ibid.,  n.p.)  Likewise,  readers  of  Jason  W.  Moore  –  who  effectively  sides  with
O’Connor – may immediately note Burkett’s above-cited dualistic treatment of “materials supply”
and the “natural conditions of human development,” as if the two were not intertwined. As detailed
in sections 6.3 and 6.4, increasingly extreme forms of extractivism have raised  both the cost of
energy  and the  level  of  environmental  harm inflicted.  The associated  public  health  toll,  again,
interferes  with  the provision  of  cheap labor  – a  crucial  supply  for  capital  accumulation  –  and
impedes  “human  development”  in  a  qualitative  sense.  Highlighting  the  “double  internality”  of
capital  and  nature,  Moore  (2015,  p.  1) would  take  exception  to  Foster’s  premise  of  (natural)
conditions  of  production as  barriers  “external”  to  the  (social)  process  of  capital.  In  the  world-
ecology definition, more or less the entire biosphere is relevant to capital accumulation in some
important sense. In the case of the rain forest, while Foster talks about timber, the forest’s more
systemically important functions are arguably as a source and locus of biodiversity and a sink for
carbon emissions (or even as an indispensable station in several biogeochemical cycles within the
Earth system),  all  of which are intimately linked to the reproduction of capital.  The distinction
between “a precondition of the economy” and “a precondition of life,” while made with under-
standable political intent, is analytically moot if one understands the former as a subset of the latter.
However, as eventually all sides agree, there is no reason to believe in a quasi-automatic
stabilization through negative feedbacks,  and permanent (social)  crisis  may become, or remain,
capital’s modus operandi in the 21st century (cf. Comité Invisible, 2015, pp. 17–20; Shaviro, 2015,
Chapter 2). Ultimately, Foster and Burkett’s conclusion is valid particularly with regard to climate
change: Given the considerable time lags between emissions and climatic effects, climatic stability
is  extremely  likely  to  be  upended  before  the  socio-ecological  repercussions  of  climate  change
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seriously begin to undermine everyday processes of capital accumulation.100 Nevertheless, on this
point the anti-second contradictionists seem to underestimate the potential of crises of social and
ecological  reproduction  to  affect  capital  through  social  unrest  and  accruing  degradation  of  the
conditions  of  production.  After  all,  the  publicly  declared  point  of  no  return,  climate-wise,  has
already been passed more than once and continually postponed out of desperation – but scientists
now seem unwilling to push it back any further.101 Even by the most lenient calculations, this point
will  be reached much sooner than common reference points for the future systemic stability of
capitalism,  such as  2050 or  –  in  the context  of  this  work – 2100.  Crises  of  reproduction with
considerable negative effects on systemic accumulation may well occur during this extended period:
after the “point of no return,” but long before an eventual point of collapse is reached – certainly
before human extinction. “Natural” limits are obviously social and relational and not simply fixed
(cf.  Dietz  & Wissen, 2009),  but  they are not  wholly absent  either.102 The  second contradiction
argument, in other words, does matter.
In  its  GE  report,  the  World  Bank  (2012,  p.  12) estimated  the  costs  of  environmental
degradation to amount to a cross-country average of 8% of GDP (which, of course, does not state
who has historically paid for these costs). Companies have begun to analyze systematically the
exposure of their supply chains to “natural capital risks”; these risks of course involve the specter of
politically  enforced cost  internalization,  but also include more immediate  and inevitable  factors
such as price volatility and supply disruptions caused by increasingly severe droughts  (Trucost,
2013; Natural Capital Coalition, 2018). Besides water scarcity and other climate change effects,
Moore (2015, Chapter 10) cites the case of “superweeds” – resistant to the repertoire of chemicals
deployed  in  industrial  agriculture  –  as  an  example  of  the  production  of  “negative-value,”  the
100 Andreas Malm emphasizes this point when defending the Foster side in the debate – “the balance of evidence 
suggests that capital can thrive by ravaging the earth – not forever, of course, but under the crucial time span when 
crises such as climate change can still potentially be mitigated.” (Malm, 2018, p. 191, emphasis in original) But, as 
I will argue below, this time span is so short that the qualification tends to undermine the argument for capital’s 
health amidst degradation.
101 Reviewing publications from around the time the GE emerged is a depressing experience: In 2010, climate 
scientists held that emissions needed to peak that year in order to maintain a realistic chance of reaching the 2 °C 
goal they themselves considered inefficient; political realism led them to demand a peak between 2015 and 2020 
instead (Messner et al., 2010). The carbon budgets calculated in that study for the entire period 2010–2050 are, at 
least as far as “developed” countries are concerned, just about used up by now. The IPCC held in the late 2000s that
a peak by 2015 was necessary (IPCC, 2007, pp. 19–20). This threshold having been passed, one of the authors of 
the 2010 study more recently stated that the peak had to be reached by 2020 (Rahmstorf & Levermann, 2017), 
which is also what UNEP (2018c, p. 7) currently claims while further envisioning the gap between actual and 
desirable emissions trajectories to be closed by 2030. 
102 The notion of a sudden collapse itself, of course, suggests an impermeable limit – like a fully translucent wall 
which only makes itself felt in the moment of impact. While there are precedents of major ruptures in capitalist 
history – witness the iconicity of certain dates on which stock exchanges collapsed and precipitated extensive 
depressions – these were usually not entirely unforeseeable. In most cases, mounting ecological or social crises, in 
their interaction with an economic structure, will take a trajectory other than sudden-doom-out-of-the-blue. See also
the discussion in the concluding chapter.
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“accumulation  of  limits  to  capital”  (ibid.,  p.  277)  through  ecological  degradation.103 As
demonstrated  in  chapter  6,  the  potential  for  future  appropriation  of  Cheap  Natures  is  limited,
particularly if it is to occur in line with Green Economy ambitions. 
The assumption of the anti-second contradictionists, of course, is not “green” capitalism but
an  increasingly  brutal  gray-capitalist  regime  that  maximizes  externalizations.  The  allegedly
profitable  measures  they  refer  to  are  not  intended  for  ecological  stabilization  but  only  for  a
provisional clean-up of the most immediate  adverse effects  of pollution  on capital.  The “gray”
regime, however, remains threatened by the rising costs of “extreme energy,” the social backlash
engendered  by  its  “cheap”  extractivism  and  ongoing  massive  cost  externalizations  –  and  the
looming impacts of  dramatic climate change (the “end of cheap sinks”). While avoiding mitigation
costs, in such scenarios the unmitigated impacts of ecological degradation will prove even costlier.
This is the hardly debatable kernel of truth in the GE argument. But here it is Foster (2002) who is
taken in by the easy-going outlook of institutions that predict the medium-term costs of degradation
– including climate change – to be easily manageable for capital either way (see UNEP’s “business
as usual” baseline projection discussed in section 2.3). 
The second contradiction framework and, by extension, the world-ecology approach appear
much more fruitful than the doom-or-revolution binary for the analysis of drawn-out processes in
which the particular trajectories taken – a “greener” or a “grayer” regime – may play out differently,
without implying that either variant is necessarily able to reverse ecological crisis tendencies or
sustain capitalism in the long run. This approach also encourages greater attention to the patterns of,
and potential for, re-externalizations that keep capital’s practices viable despite the costs incurred. 
Again, this is not to deny that the detractors’ more pointed formula is politically useful and
contains an important truth about the short- and medium-term opposition between capital interests
and those of the simplified entities “nature” and “humanity,”  as well  as about  the fundamental
asymmetry between these: While capital positively depends on human labor and natural resources
and sinks, the reverse is, in principle, not the case. Human and non-human nature only negatively
depend on capital, given the latter’s ability to destroy them.
4.4 “Green” accumulation from a value-theoretical perspective
Thesis 4.4: Many “green” policies, including emissions trading, are unproductive of surplus value.
Instead of constituting a positive “engine of growth,” they could at best maintain the conditions of
systemic accumulation by rationalizing the costs of dealing with ecological degradation and sink
103 While the highly toxic counter-measures to these “superweeds” developed by the agro-industrial complex certainly 
raise the costs of production directly, Moore highlights the enormous public health costs associated with their 
deployment. These, arguably, remain externalized to a large degree, depending on political circumstances. 
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exhaustion. Capital may therefore benefit from “greening” relative to disastrous future “business
as usual” – but not relative to a past in which effective cost externalizations were still feasible.
A careful  review  of  recent  scholarly  debates  over  “green”  capital  accumulation  suggests  that
divergent  assessments  of  “green”  capitalism’s  viability  are  frequently  rooted  in  competing
understandings of the category of  value.  Given that the accumulation process, in Marxist terms,
feeds on the production and extraction of surplus value, this is not altogether surprising. 
What may be more surprising is the remarkable degree of controversy over the labor theory
of value among contemporary scholars with a Marxist background. This includes questions of value
creation through non-commodified “creative” or “affective” activity as well as through digital tech-
nology (for a few examples, see Böhm, Land, & Beverungen, 2012; Daum, 2017; Hardt & Negri,
2004; D. Harvey, 2010; Mason, 2015; Morini & Fumagalli, 2010) but also conflicting understand-
ings of the role of nature – and, consequently, of “greening” strategies – in capital accumulation, as
the following discussion demonstrates. While frequently arcane and perhaps seemingly purely scho-
lastic, these debates are immensely relevant to the theorization of “green” capitalism’s prospects. 
4.4.1 Nature as an accumulation strategy, greening as an engine of growth?
The second contradiction debate can be traced onto the territory of “green” capitalism, where the
question  arises  as  to  whether  or  not  policies  for  ecological  protection  can  reinvigorate  capital
accumulation. According to UNEP, “the greening of economies has the potential to be a new engine
of  growth.”  (2011,  p.  16) As  the  detailed  numbers  presented  to  support  this  claim  show,  the
argument itself  should in fact be presented in more modest terms, given that the GE is merely
projected  to  attenuate  the  declining  growth  rates in  the  global  economy  (see  section  2.3).
Nevertheless, the “engine of growth” argument is a recurring motif in both GE and GND debates,
and the connotation is generally positive: “In [the green growth] concept, ‘greening’ is perceived as
a driver for growth.”  (von Hagen & Willems, 2012) 104 In this context, scholars have warned of a
“tension between defining the green economy as part of the whole (a ‘weak’ approach that considers
the green economy a ‘lever’ for economic growth) versus ‘greening’ (or transforming) the whole
economy by addressing underlying structural issues.”  (Georgeson et  al.,  2017, p.  14) Indeed, if
sectoral  green  growth is  viewed  in  isolation,  this  easily  leads  to  the  fallacy  of  mistaking  the
emergence of an Economy of Additionality  (cf. section 9.3) for an actual “green” transformation
while ignoring the central  importance of a “green” creative destruction  component (see section
4.6.3) to any such transformation. Instead, the economic boost would have to emanate from – or at
104 The World Bank’s promise, expressed in the vice president’s foreword to Bank’s GE report, strictly speaking only 
involves growth rates equal to today’s, arguing that “there is substantial scope for growing cleaner without growing 
slower.” (World Bank, 2012, p. xi)
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least  take place in concurrence with – the  “greening” of the entire economy.  This section will
discuss such “underlying structural issues” from a value-theoretical, systemic perspective.
Some  critics  of  capitalism,  meanwhile,  have  echoed  the  “engine  of  growth”  argument.
Burkett  (1999) claimed that clean-up activities themselves – the costs  incurred from social  and
ecological degradation, for example through additional health care and waste management expendi-
tures – constituted such vast opportunities for new accumulation that it benefited capital as a whole,
rather than just the pertinent economic sectors. Likewise, Foster (2002, n.p.) admonished that “[w]e
should  not  underestimate  capitalism’s  capacity  to  accumulate  in  the  midst  of  the  most  blatant
ecological destruction, to profit from environmental degradation (for example through the growth of
the waste management industry).”105 In making a similar case with his colleagues, he even referred
to climate change as a “blessing” for capital (Foster, Clark, & York, 2010b, p. 71). They were joined
by geographer Neil  Smith,  who extended his thesis of the capitalist  “production of nature”  (N.
Smith, 1996, 2008) into the claim that “nature as an accumulation strategy … promises to provide
the nervous system of a new phase of capitalist accumulation,” whereas “so-called conservatives
[who oppose  ‘greening’]  simply  have  not  yet  caught  up  to  the  opportunities  of  environmental
capitalism.” (N. Smith, 2007, p. 33)  106 Before picking up on these debates with regard to the pivotal
case of carbon trading, it is time for a more systematic introduction to value theory, with a view to
the question of which “green” policies may directly or indirectly benefit capital – and which cannot.
4.4.2 Value theory and “productive” versus “unproductive” expenses
UNEP complained in its main GE report that in many “developing” countries, “financial regulatory
systems classify environmental investments as non-productive assets” although “[g]reen investment
must be seen as value-adding.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 440) UNEP thus equates the general social need for
“environmental investments” with the latter’s positive contribution to  capitalist value production.
The two, however, are clearly distinct, as Marxian value theory aptly demonstrates.
The capitalist value form as outlined throughout Capital (Marx, 1968, 1979, 1981) revolves
around the notion of  socially necessary labor time  (hence the ambiguous designation of Marx’s
theory as the “labor theory of value,” as if everything besides labor was irrelevant to the theory –
105 While Foster and Burkett’s comments in this respect do not directly relate to visions of a comprehensively “green” 
capitalism but to more restricted clean-up and restorative measures, their position here indeed suggests that 
“greening” itself was an engine of accumulation, and it directly touches upon the sort of green-capitalist policies 
emerging from the ontology of natural capital. 
106 In this essay, Smith unfortunately conflated various aspects of this subsumption of nature, from bio-prospecting and
genetic engineering to carbon markets, all of which are portrayed as new domains of accumulation. He thus 
introduced a double confusion: He first subsumed biotechnological practices that may further capital accumulation 
(see, however, critique in section 11.6) but have little to do with “greening” under the banner of “environmental 
capitalism” – and then bestowed the same optimistic assessment of economic potential on proper “greening” 
policies that, as will be argued in the following, are not in themselves economically productive. 
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which it is not, as we will see below).  The value of an ordinary commodity is determined by the
(wage) labor input necessary to the commodity’s production at the appropriate scale and by the
methods common at that point of time in the respective industry (the market here plays an obvious
disciplinary role  in  enforcing this  outcome).  The actual  price,  or  exchange value,  of that same
commodity may be co-determined by a range of other factors such as rents or temporary or local
scarcity, but value is typically an important determinant of average price.107 Surplus value, the to-be-
monetized  “raw  material”  of  capital  accumulation,  is  extracted  from labor,  which  is  a  unique
commodity in that it is capable of producing value in excess of itself.108
The theoretical integration of “nature” into value theory has been achieved most eloquently
by  world-ecology  theorists.  Richard  Walker  (2017) here  speaks  of  unified  labor-nature  time,
arguing that “nature’s value is already reckoned in the calculus of labour value because the average
labour time includes the socially necessary amounts of unpaid work, performed by humans and the
rest of nature.” (Walker & Moore, 2019, p. 50; emphasis in original) This approach highlights the
negative  effect  of  rising  costs  of  “natural”  inputs  and  ecological  degradation  on  systemic
accumulation, which affects both the Marxian categories of fixed and variable capital.109 And unlike
many accounts discussed in the following, it does so without contorting the edifice of value theory,
recognizing that a conception of value based on necessary labor time (which itself is co-determined
by easily  overlooked  “natural”  factors)  represents  the  actual  logic  of  capital,  regardless  of  the
“noise” introduced by rent relations and periodical shifts in dominant accumulation strategies. 
Leading back to the subject matter of “green” capitalism, the debate over its vitality may
benefit from closer attention to the categories of “productive” and “unproductive” labor as outlined
by Marx, building on earlier work by Adam Smith  (Marx, 1863, 1965, 1979, Chapter 6). These
frequently misunderstood categories are inextricably linked to the value form: At the individual
level, (waged) work is here understood as “productive” to the degree that it produces surplus value
107 In the first volumes of Capital, Marx assumes that commodities are generally traded at their values (distorted 
mainly through temporary or local factors such as scarcity). It is only in Volume III that important additional 
categories are introduced, including land rent (Marx, 1981, Chapters 37–48) and the notion of the equalization of 
profit rates across industries (ibid., Chapters 9–12). The equalization theorem suggests that instead of being traded 
at their values, the average commodity is traded at its cost of production plus the average rate of profit. Initially, in 
this model, profit rates in labor-intensive industries would be much higher than elsewhere, attracting so much 
capital that profit rates were bound to go down and investment would escape into other sectors. Equalization thus 
importantly takes place through financial markets. 
108 This is due to the fact that in the ordinary wage relation, capitalists do not pay for labor but for use of the worker’s 
labor power. If a worker can reproduce the value of their own labor power (i.e., the wage, sufficient to ensure the 
worker’s reproduction and, depending on the historical circumstances, perhaps that of dependent relatives) in two-
thirds of their working day, the remaining one-third is surplus product whose value, once successfully monetized, is
appropriated by capital as profit. 
109 Concerning fixed capital, it is first and foremost the circulating part that becomes problematic, as when prices of 
necessary raw material inputs go up. As for variable capital, wages must eventually rise if workers’ social 
reproduction becomes more and more expensive – be it because workers can no longer complement their income 
with “free” subsistence labor or because the costs of health care are exploding due to air pollution effects.
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for the employer  (and thus pays for itself, too); whenever this is not the case, labor is considered
“unproductive” and has to be paid out of revenue. Productiveness, in this sense, strictly refers to the
capacity to produce (surplus) value  for capital; it has nothing to do with the  social utility  or  use
value of the work in question.110 Generally, within the circuit of capital, value-producing tasks are
confined to the realm of production, whereas all expenses related to the realization of value in the
marketplace are, consequently, “unproductive.” This generally includes the costs of circulation, for
example, the entire retail sector. Likewise, financial activities are indispensable for the circulation
of capital, but do not, in themselves, generate value. In some cases, the  same tasks may take the
form of “productive” or “unproductive” labor depending on the economic relations in which they
are embedded.111 The problem with capitalist economic relations, from this angle, is that they essen-
tially disallow the valuation of the socio-ecological conditions of production in O’Connor’s sense,
whose degradation only becomes palpable in obscure forms: as shifts in Walker’s combined labor-
nature time. These are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle. Maintenance of these
conditions, although functionally indispensable, is not immediately productive of surplus value.
Marx, and this  is  pivotal  for the present discussion,  made it  clear  that  the productive—
unproductive distinction also holds at the macroeconomic level. Generally, all “unproductive” work
– be it in retail, finance or elsewhere – has to be paid out of the surplus produced by “productive”
workers  (Marx,  1965,  pp.  206–207).  Even  services  that  may  be  profitable  for  the  individual
capitalist,  however,  may be  “unproductive”  for  capital  as  a  whole  if  their  entire  revenue only
derives from the  redistribution  of parts of the surplus  (Marx, 1979, Chapter 6). This, again, may
110 Alas, the term has never been entirely divested from such normative connotations in the productivist legacy of 
Marxism (in the most teleological interpretations, after all, the accumulation of capital is seen to serve a historical 
mission). As Marx’s extensive discussion of bourgeois economic debates from Smith – whose assessment of 
“productive” versus “unproductive” labor clearly was normative – onward shows, meanwhile, there was much 
outrage among economists and other scholars whose professions were thus declared “unproductive” along with all 
public offices and the financial sector; in other words, with every upper-class vocation other than that of the 
industrial capitalist (cf. Marx, 1965). 
Within Marxism, the residual normativity attached to the concept has provoked, amidst others, feminist 
critiques pointing out that in the gendered division of labor under patriarchal-capitalist relations, feminized tasks are
usually stamped with the “unproductive” label and, consequently, morally and economically devalued. Maria Mies 
(1986) took Marx to task for effectively reproducing the capitalist hierarchy of valuation and pointed out that 
surplus-producing wage labor is only possible on the basis of the “superexploitation” of non-wage laborers, notably
women and peasants, engaged in “the production of life, or subsistence production.” (Ibid., p. 48; see also Federici, 
2004) In order to rectify such shortcomings, Ursula Huws (2014, Chapter 7) suggested to apply a distinction 
between productive and reproductive labor instead and to extend this to a two-by-two matrix with the further axis of
paid versus unpaid labor. While this signifies an immense political and analytical advance, it does not change the 
standpoint of capital vis-à-vis activities that do not produce surplus value and therefore cannot contribute much to 
clarifying the accumulation potential of “green” measures for capital. The exact boundaries between “productive” 
and “unproductive” labor have been subject to endless debates in Marxist theory; as David Harvey (2013, p. 92) 
remarked, “we are here in the midst of an accounting nightmare.” 
111 Among the various examples cited by Marx are a personal tailor, whose clients pay out of their revenue (no surplus 
value being created), versus an employee in a textile factory (whose work produces surplus value for the employer).
Likewise, a singer hired as a personal entertainer produces no surplus value whereas one employed in a commercial
musical theater does (Marx, 1863, 1965). 
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include expenses that are necessary to maintain the economic process; “unproductive” does not
equal “useless” or “superfluous.” Thus, even as “green” activities such as eco-auditing, conserva-
tion  management,  carbon trading analysis  or  speculative  carbon trading itself  may function  as
business models in a Green Economy, and political-economic developments may be shaped by such
individual profit opportunities,  this does not mean that they positively reinforce macroeconomic
capital accumulation.  They do not, in fact, if they only, enabled by state regulation, appropriate a
share of the surplus of “gray” capitals in the name of sustainability, without enhancing that surplus.
4.4.3 Carbon trading: Accumulation by what?
Around the time the Green Economy model emerged, however, various critical scholars considered
the rise of carbon trading in particular to be a development that invalidated the second contradiction
hypothesis:  Capital  indeed appeared  to  thrive  on  the  climate  crisis  by  developing “innovative”
responses that enabled what has been variously termed “green accumulation” (Böhm, Misoczky, &
Moog, 2012), “accumulation by decarbonization” (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008), “accumulation by
conservation”  (Büscher  &  Fletcher,  2014) or  “capitalizing  on  chaos.”  (Fletcher,  2012) To
understand  the  implications  for  systemic  accumulation,  however,  it  is  important  to  distinguish
between the various dynamics at play, which tend to become blurred in this literature. Is carbon
trading really just another field for new capital accumulation, with dubious ecological effects but
indubitable gains for capital?
Parts of this literature contain explicit value-theoretical claims. It is particularly confounding
to hear Marxists suggest that carbon trading produces  value, given that a central tenet of Marx’s
theory, as described above, is that (surplus) value never originates in trade but always in production,
even if merchants frequently manage to enrich themselves at the expense of their trading partners
(as abundantly seen in carbon markets). It is worth taking some time to unravel the various layers of
confusion in this debate to develop a clearer understanding of this quintessential  Green Economy
policy’s effects on systemic accumulation – particularly since the confusion does not appear to have
been diminished over the past decade. As outlined in sections 2.3 and 3.2.1, so-called cap-and-trade
schemes limit the overall amount of permissible carbon emissions and require emitters to acquire,
on a carbon market, emissions certificates for each ton of carbon emitted; these certificates are
initially  either  allotted  to  emitters  for  free  (according  to  historical  emissions  records;  i.e.,  a
grandfathering scheme) or auctioned. As tradable commodities, of course, these certificates have
become subject to all manner of speculative practices, much like other financialized assets.
Much confusion arises now, first of all, based on the perception that a theory of value that
considers the financial sector to be “unproductive” in value terms must somehow be inadequate in
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 100
an era of financialization and, therefore,  alternative approaches are sought in which “finance is
construed as value-generative.”  (Christophers, 2018, p. 334) Even as Christophers begins with an
accurate account of Marx’s value theory, his attempts to rehabilitate finance by “putting risk into
value theory” rely on a number of non-sequiturs. He repeatedly describes processes of securitization
(the abstractions involved in  pooling,  for example,  individual risk insurance policies) as value-
generating simply because they create a tradable commodity that enables financial gains for asset
holders.112 As for carbon markets, he holds that uncertainty itself generates value, and surplus value
is extracted by companies who refuse to pass on de-facto subsidies in the form of freely allocated
credits to consumers, and others who somehow manage to buy offset credits at prices below the
offset project developer’s cost of production (ibid., pp. 342–343). All of this confuses the categories
of profit (or surplus value) and rent as well as production and circulation.113 His “sources” of surplus
value are always acts of exchange and value redistribution, in which one actor’s gain is the other’s
loss  (see  below  for  the  accumulation  by  dispossession  effects  this  may  entail).  Despite
Christophers’s insistence to the contrary, the securitization of risk – while entailing varying conse-
quences for the distribution of (surplus) value – does not magically “generate” value out of nothing.
As this discussion suggests, a recurring problem is the distinction between microeconomic
(individual) profit opportunities and macroeconomic (systemic) capital accumulation. This has led
various scholars to propose that value is being produced through carbon trading practices that are
obviously redistributive,  claims that  are  often packaged in ostentatious  language – with carbon
112 The fact that insurance companies yield positive returns while pooling risk for capitalists, as Marx (1979, p. 139) 
explicitly noted in a side comment when discussing the ancillary costs of circulation, does not change the fact that 
the losses absorbed thusly remain real losses to capital as a whole. In Christophers’s account, insurees (e.g. those 
taking out insurance against environmental disasters) are being exploited in that they receive less remuneration for 
the risk that they are working to produce than the securitized risk is worth to the financial actors dealing in it. This 
creative conceptualization arguably not only gets value theory but also the insurance business model backwards. 
If I purchase a car that embodies value, there is a certain risk that this value may be destroyed or damaged due 
to factors within or beyond my control. I can take out insurance to mitigate this risk for myself, and by pooling risk 
and charging premia above the calculated average risk, the insurer can obviously earn returns on their capital. But 
this is not due to my “production” of value-as-risk (as if by buying a car potentially subject to destruction I would 
add some positive value to the world that hovers in mid-air until seized by my insurance company upon signing an 
insurance policy); it is simply because the insurer diverts part of my income, which I otherwise could have spent 
elsewhere, on some other good, thereby realizing a fraction of surplus value for another company. The fact that no 
value is generated in such transactions has nothing to do with resentment against “parasitical” financial institutions. 
No conceptual trickery can reverse the obvious truth that the macroeconomic effect of increasing disaster risks 
is negative, even if insurance industries may prosper under such conditions (which in itself is uncertain, given that 
these risks are increasingly hard to calculate in the face of ongoing climatic shifts). If floods destroy more property 
each year, this may be a boon to construction and car industries as well, but their gains are redistributive, too: All of
this cuts into the macroeconomic surplus. If the cost of insurance to businesses rises, this acts as a squeeze on 
reinvestable surplus, thereby slowing down accumulation. Likewise, if ancillary costs of this sort incurred by 
households rise too much, employers may at some point be forced to raise wages, thereby cutting directly into the 
production of surplus value. 
113 Surplus value, in the Marxian understanding, is always a share of the overall value produced – precisely the share 
that exceeds the costs of replacing constant and variable capital. The very fact that Christophers needs to go 
looking, in several passages of his paper, for distinct “sources” of surplus value after having mysteriously identified
the source of value in the “generation of risk,” points to the futility of his narrative of value-generating finance. 
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allegedly turned into “metacapital” (Bryant, 2018) 114 or the “performativity of value” allowing for
real  accumulation  to  proceed  in  a  purely  virtual  dimension  (Bracking,  2015).115 Not  quite  as
esoteric,  Fletcher  (2012) builds on Naomi Klein’s  (2008) concept of  disaster capitalism  to argue
that “in the short term, paradoxically, the ecological degradation caused by capitalist production can
itself  be harnessed as  a  further  source of  profit,”  although this  “remains the minority  response
among capitalists.” (Fletcher, 2012, pp. 101, 102, emphasis added) While Fletcher doubts whether
these strategies are “capable of contributing to an effective resolution of the impending crisis rather
than merely stimulating capitalist expansion,” he holds that “both the climate crisis and uncertainty
concerning the  same  become distinct  sources  of  value,  a  double  reversal  of  James  O’Connor’s
(1994) prediction.” (Ibid., pp. 109, 107, emphases added) Fletcher cites the enormous growth in
carbon markets during the preceding years as evidence for the dynamism of these markets. As with
the other authors cited here, his perspective appears to conflate the micro- and the macroeconomic:
From the fact that carbon markets engender a business opportunity for many players involved (i.e.,
individual accumulation), it is concluded that carbon constitutes a “distinct source of value” and
thus suggested that its trading  per se  enhances  systemic  accumulation, glossing over the fact that
these markets exist largely because other businesses are made to pay for emissions that used to be
free of charge.116 This, again, is redistribution among capitalists, not additional value creation.
114 Bryant (2018) holds that carbon markets could offer substantial accumulation opportunities if only they were more 
stable; his evidence is that carbon credits can be used by polluting companies for all sorts of potentially lucrative 
financial trading. His argument ignores that these credits must, in the very first instance, represent someone’s costs 
in order to be valuable (see below); in his view, a contradiction between fossil-fueled accumulation and carbon 
trading gains could only arise at some point in the future when prices rise too high. In the meantime, “carbon could 
emerge as metacapital—a systemic socioecological relation of self-expanding value—by combining the 
appropriation and capitalization of carbon within a singular accumulation strategy” that somehow connects carbon 
“to value and, thus, to labor.” (Ibid., p. 615) The vaguely dialectical jargon cannot conceal that there is no 
convincing argument as to how the particular sublation of this contradiction is supposed to take place at the 
macroeconomic level, and even the microeconomic case remains frail.
Of course, as in the early phases of the EU trading scheme, credits may be allocated for free to companies 
based on their historical emissions records, which amounts to a considerable public subsidy (i.e., another 
redistribution of value). But even then, systematic financial gains for those trading in credits that they later need for
compliance – assuming, as Bryant apparently does, that these companies do not mitigate emissions and thus cannot 
sell excess credits – should be marginal and, once more, redistributive. To the degree that polluters are able to 
exploit cheap mitigation opportunities and sell excess credits at a net gain, again, these sales equal pure losses for 
those polluters forced to buy credits for compliance purposes.
115 Bracking (2015) discusses the “performativity of value” with regard to the Green Economy and its financialized 
policy mechanisms, arguing that since “a classification of ‘greenness’ can increase the value of a material asset,” it 
is obvious that “the real and the virtual are co-produced through evaluation practice” or “the material and discursive
comingle and co-produce value,” while taking “traditional Marxism” to task for failing to realize that “the 
relationship between a fixed asset and a derivative income stream from it can be stretched to the point of non-
association.” (Ibid., pp. 2351, 2347, 2350, 2338) Here, again, the fact that value can be appropriated as rent through
“green” branding and speculative trading in “green” derivatives is, wrongly, taken to mean that (additional) value is 
thus produced by such practices. Hence Bracking’s conclusion that the Green Economy thrives as an almost purely 
virtual capitalist enterprise without affecting the “real” economy; the redistributive (rather than productive) 
character of such “virtual” gains fades from her view.
116 According to Fletcher’s numbers, the EU ETS scheme alone accounted for about six-sevenths of the global carbon 
trading volume at that point; voluntary payments – which of course are equally drawn from economic surpluses, 
often draining the purses of conscionable consumers – made up a negligible share.
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These closely related fallacies – that of “productive” finance and the conflation of rent and
profit or surplus value – tend to go hand in hand. Böhm et al.  (2012) note accumulation oppor-
tunities in the form of “profits made through carbon trading” (ibid., p. 1630) while explicitly stating
that carbon markets “create new goods to be traded” (ibid., p. 1632) and thus enhance systemic
accumulation opportunities. In this analysis, the line between real and fictitious commodities gets
blurred,  along with  their  respective roles  in  surplus  value production.  The same holds  true  for
Bumpus and Liverman (2008). Yet other scholars of “green” valuation mechanisms recognize that
value is derived from production but either do not develop the argument into the direction pursued
here (Robertson & Wainwright, 2013) or go on to introduce new confusion  (M. Huber, 2018).117
Few contributions to the debate fully grasp the implications of value theory for capital’s
potential  to  accumulate  by  means  of  placing  environmentally  motivated  constraints  on
accumulation.  Felli  (2014) does  so  by  explaining  that  emission  rights  are  not  value-bearing
commodities but simply a legally imposed additional condition of production. Those who come to
control access to this condition of production (e.g. through the free allocation of carbon credits) are
placed in  a position to extract  a  “climate rent,”  but  this  is  not  a  macroeconomic accumulation
strategy; instead, such regulation installs a  barrier  to accumulation by stipulating the scarcity of
access to this condition of production. Andreucci et al.  (2017), building on Felli,  emphasize the
importance of intra-class conflict over the distribution of surplus value for questions of political
ecology. This is clearly applicable to the “greening” of capitalism. If the accumulation opportunities
deriving from “greening” policies are simply rents that redistribute parts of the surplus while, as I
argue here, many of these policies constitute real macroeconomic costs that reduce overall surplus
value, capitalist resistance against such policies will obviously remain strong.
These perspectives finally point towards a proper conceptualization of the impact of carbon
trading on systemic capital  accumulation.  First  of  all,  of  course,  a  cap on carbon emissions  is
required to safeguard atmospheric stability as a basic condition of (more or less all) production.118
Next,  certainly,  much money is  to  be made by firms specializing in  services  related to carbon
trading (and adding to the schemes’ overhead costs), and, depending on the construction of the
117 Huber (2018, p. 156) admonishes that “a value analysis of the financialization of nature needs to better theorize 
financial forms of profit-making in relation to value and surplus value creation in the realm of production,” but 
even he, amidst a more solid value-theoretical argument, misleadingly suggests in an all-too-literal application of 
the labor theory of value that “calculative practices of measurement … perhaps … can be understood as the 
‘socially necessary labor-time’ it takes to create commodities out of ecosystem services.” (Ibid., p. 151, emphasis in
original) Such bookkeeping practices, traditionally, are more or less unavoidable “unproductive” expenses, but they 
are not constitutive of the value of the commodity such administered. Many of these “ecosystem services” do not 
possess value in the Marxian sense; in some cases, it may be argued that the socially necessary labor time to restore 
these services is a determinant of their price (as with a number of carbon offset projects).
118 In Felli’s account, the legal provisions limiting access to the atmosphere themselves, in the form of carbon 
certificates, constitute this condition. But the underlying ecological condition of production, arguably, is 
atmospheric stability, regardless of the form and extent of its legal recognition.
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scheme,  windfall  profits  may accrue to  whole industries,  as in  the case of  the EU’s emissions
trading system in its early years (Boyd, Boykoff, & Newell, 2011; Brunnengräber, 2009a, Chapter
22; Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Labatt & White, 2007). This may be a primary rationale for certain
interested actors to promote these particular policy approaches, and the basis of the argument that
the financial industry could be an ally to green-capitalist interests (cf. section 8.3.3). 
But  such  arguments  often  seem to  conflate  financial  services  with  finance  capital and
confuse  the  emergence  of  new  individual business  models  with  a  positive  effect  on  systemic
accumulation. None of this, after all, refutes the argument that from a macroeconomic perspective,
we are first and foremost dealing with exercises in cost shifting. Excessive carbon emissions have
various negative long-term implications and thus incur all manner of costs if unabated. Abatement
changes the extent and character of these costs: If the cap is lower than initial carbon emissions, it
signals  not  only  an  opportunity  cost  (restricting  further  expansion  of  emissions-intensive
production) but also more immediate compliance costs. If the scheme worked as intended, costs
would be forcibly internalized by those who had previously externalized them onto other social
groups or onto ecosystems, in line with the polluter pays principle, and this internalization would be
accomplished  as  cost-effectively  as  possible  since  mitigation  would  occur  wherever  it  comes
cheapest.  This  theoretical  argument  for  cost-effectiveness  is  the  basis  of  the  green-capitalist
preference for this type of market-based solution. Still, the rise in costs gets greater the better the
internalization mechanism works. Whether or not one will go as far as Moore  (2015, p. 145) in
arguing that capital could not possibly “pay its own way,” this cost is certainly a burden from the
standpoint of capital as a whole (see e.g. figures in section 9.1.4). Carbon credit outlays remain
immediately “unproductive” in the Marxist sense of the term as any gains made here by individual
actors – or public coffers – simply figure as rising input costs to productive industries instead of
contributing to overall capital accumulation.
While such interventions may at times play a stabilizing role as a forcible outlet for surplus
capital (see section 10.2.1), “cost-effectiveness” does not imply that costs are magically turned into
net benefits. To the degree that environmental accounting and consulting firms, private accreditation
agencies for offset projects and other new “green” businesses flourish – and constitute an important
part  of  the  green-capitalist  coalition  at  the  political  level  –,  the  prospect  of  a  “greening”  of
capitalism tends to become more unattractive for “gray” firms, given that they are threatened with
having to share their surplus with these “green” service providers which do nothing to increase –
merely, at best, to maintain – the former’s output. 
In  this  sense,  from  a  green-capitalist  standpoint,  carbon  trading  may  be  an  important
regulatory  mechanism  with  varying  redistributive  implications  and  varying  degrees  of  cost-
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effectiveness, but any claim that it is an engine of economic growth itself reproduces the by-now-
familiar ambiguity: An ideally functioning carbon trading system would not have an overall positive
impact  on  accumulation  compared  to  an  alternative  world  without  climate  change,  but  merely
reduce  the  costs  of  dealing  with  climate  change  compared  to  less  capital-friendly  forms  of
regulation.  Only  indirectly,  by reinforcing  mechanisms of  accumulation  by dispossession  or by
spurring  dramatic  innovation  that  increases  overall  productivity,  could  carbon  trading  schemes
“create” value. The former, discussed in the following section, is of course at odds with the GE’s
normative foundations, and the latter possibility remains dubious (see section 10.1.1). 
Of course, the degree to which carbon pricing, whether through tradable certificates or taxes,
implies a net economic cost ultimately depends on the use of the revenue. Orthodox economists
prefer  revenue-neutral  solutions, in which the revenue from “green” taxation is used to substitute
for other tax revenues or directly  kicked back to taxpayers (this  is  also reflected in the  Green
Economy  reports,  see  section  2.3).  In  this  scheme,  carbon  pricing  becomes  a  redistributional
mechanism  between  greater  and  smaller  polluters;  depending  on  policy  design,  it  could  have
varying  distributional  consequences  between,  broadly  speaking,  capital  and  labor.  While  this
suggests a relatively economically neutral solution, it likely dampens the environmental effect as a
disincentive scheme.119 In order to amplify the transformative and environmental effect, by contrast,
it  would  make  sense  to  use  the  revenue  for  subsidies  and  other  measures  that  promote  more
structural environmental improvements. This, of course, means to abandon the principle of revenue
neutrality, unless one is to cut other public expenditures in return.120 Following this reinvestment
strategy, the macroeconomic effect depends on whether the measures thus funded are restorative (as
in the case of ecosystem conservation or pollution filters) or at least potentially productive (as in the
promotion of  “clean” technologies  that  simultaneously increase productivity,  see below).  In the
latter case, part of the cost could be recouped, and in extreme cases, the productivity gain could
outweigh the macroeconomic costs  (see section 5.2.3).  A carbon price designed to be revenue-
neutral (and therefore presumably macroeconomically neutral), meanwhile, is only likely to work
smoothly at a modest level of taxation and emissions savings – in other words, as an incremental
mechanism (cf. section 10.1.1). If ratcheted up towards the goal of meeting the requirement of full
119 The elasticity of economic activities to carbon pricing is an empirical question, and the literature is entirely 
inconclusive (for a brief review, see Gechert, Rietzler, Schreiber, & Stein, 2019, pp. 64–65). A carbon tax with a 
kick-back mechanism still provides an incentive for every individual firm or consumer to reduce their emissions, 
but it also reassures every individual that as long as the others are not drastically changing their behavior, the 
economic consequences of not changing one’s own will be manageable. The macroeconomic consequences of such 
a mechanism, meanwhile, are not necessarily null, as the redistributional effect may cause changes in overall 
spending and investment patterns. At high price levels, the consequences are difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
through conventional modeling (see below).
120 A recent joint publication by the three GE institutions actually proposes that part of the revenue could be used to 
support clean-tech development – and even a “just transition.” (OECD, World Bank, & UNEP, 2018, pp. 11–12)
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cost  internalization  as  a  means  of  effecting  a  fast,  dramatic  reduction  in  emissions, marginal
abatement costs will increase, with uncertain economic and ecological results. Conventional models
used to determine economically optimal tax levels can hardly capture the implications of a tax
intended to effect a transformation of the entire economy.121  
4.4.4 “Green” accumulation by dispossession
But this is not the full story. Looking only at the formal economic logic of inter-firm carbon trading
yields  a  “sanitized”  view.  Offset  mechanisms  and  related  market-based  conservation  schemes
complicate the picture, allowing for – as some commentators have pointed out – accumulation by
dispossession in David Harvey’s (2004) sense, in that they facilitate land grabs in the global South
and  allow  (Northern)  capital  to  appropriate  cheaply  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  newly
commodified atmosphere.  Indeed, a careful reading reveals that the substance of claims regarding
the beneficial effects of carbon trading on capital accumulation, where such claims are not based on
adventurous ideas about finance’s magic powers, frequently rests on accumulation by dispossession
effects, even as these are occasionally presented with imprecise value-theoretical wordings.122
Disaster rhetoric – here, Fletcher’s broader argument is quite insightful – legitimizes such
dispossessions in the form of “green grabbing” (Fairhead et al., 2012), biopiracy etc., some of which
is linked to carbon offsetting schemes.123 Macroeconomically speaking, these re-externalizations
allow for a displacement of climate-related costs for capital, a short-term strategy which tends to
undermine the conditions of (re)production even further in the medium term. Not all dispossession,
it is worth noting, implies a net gain for capital: While it is true that unequal exchange is involved in
the cheap appropriation of atmospheric pollution rights on the part of Northern corporations, the
commodity in question remains “unproductive”: a sink and not a resource, previously available for
free and now commodified due to scarcity concerns and unevenly appropriated at low cost. This
differs fundamentally from  dispossessions that allow capital to extract  additional  surplus value
121 I have not been able to find any studies working with models for sudden “extreme” carbon pricing. Researchers 
working for UNEP’s International Resource Panel have presented models with a global carbon price that, 
beginning at US$5 per ton in 2021, would increase gradually to $573 by 2050 without causing any economic havoc 
(whether these figures are nominal or inflation-adjusted is not entirely clear; Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2017; 
International Resource Panel, 2017). But this is just a side aspect in a study focused on resource efficiency, and the 
carbon emissions trajectory projected to result from this is not quite consistent even with the 2° target.
122 See previous section. Böhm et al. (2012) even explicitly highlight the crucial role of dispossession strategies.
123 On the margins of the global economy, further mechanisms by which ecological degradation, and climate change in 
particular, enables accumulation by dispossession have been detected: Anna Plowman (2016) points to the 
displacement of rural dwellers, particularly women, in Bangladesh through the effects of climate change. Floods, 
droughts, soil erosion and other disastrous events and processes have been driving millions of Bangladeshis into the
cities, where they add to the pool of ultra-exploited workers, mostly in the garment industry. Here, one effect of 
climate change is to drive down wages in these urban industries and thus increase surplus value extraction. Of 
course, in order to understand the overall balance sheet for capital, other effects of the same environmental events 
need to be factored in. But as many of the immediate costs will be borne by local communities, which may largely 
subsist outside the circuits of global capital, this may be an instance of successful medium-term externalization.
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from workers, as when previously publicly owned natural resources are privatized (although even
these cases are not straightforwardly beneficial for capital as a whole, for example when rents are
involved – see below).
Other forms of “green” dispossession, such as land grabs, may offer productive potential and
lend  support  to  the  anti-second  contradiction  argument.  But  even  here, forestry  conservation
projects remain the archetypal carbon offset ventures based on land grabbing, and these commonly
rest  on  the  financialization  of  the  non-use  (or  at  least  restricted  use)  of  forests  for  productive
purposes (Büscher & Fletcher, 2014). While dispossessing local populations of access to these lands
for  subsistence  purposes,  these  projects  are  generally  funded  by  Northern  capital,  and  one
capitalist’s gain in this game remains another’s loss (see also section 4.4.5). 
 Finally, water privatizations – environmentally justified in the Green Economy agenda and
in  this  sense  perhaps  another  form  of  “green  grabbing”  –  present  another  thorny  case  (cf.
discussions below and in sections 7.2.1 and 10.1.2). The activities of water utilities relate to various
environmental  problems as  typologized  in  the  following  section.  If  privatization  leads  to  price
increases,  as  empirical  evidence  suggests  is  generally  the  case  (Bakker,  2007;  Deckard,  2016;
Goldman,  2005,  Chapter  6),  it  raises  production  costs  across  the  economy.  Profits  of  water
companies and potential reductions in public spending must be weighed against cost increases for
everyone  else,  and  the  net  macroeconomic  effect  should  depend  first  on  the  actual  operative
efficiency gains – if any – realized following privatization, and second on the degree to which the
water  companies’ gains are  simply based on rent appropriation.  Other than that,  the success of
privatization  as an accumulation strategy depends, once more, on the degree to which costs are
successfully  externalized  – to  households,  for  example,  directly  or  indirectly.  This  is  a  limited
strategy of accumulation by dispossession in that it diverts purchasing power and, in the long run,
reinforces pressures for wage increases. Ultimately, while these strategies can have considerable
effects on the communities affected, they appear to be rather marginal in their positive contribution
to global accumulation and capital’s “survival.” Their “productive” aspect, in other words, is limited
in both form and extent.124 The same holds for waste management. 
124 Deckard (2016, p. 166) argues that “[t]he privatization and commercialization of water services in the Global North 
and Global South has been a key dynamic of neoliberal accumulation.” But this evokes the argument about the 
specificity of neoliberal accumulation strategies as “taking” rather than “making” (see sections 4.5.1 and 10.1.2): 
There is much money to be made in the water business, and capital has been drawn to these gratifying outlets. But 
much of the value accumulated here is in fact redistributed – from the broader public, whose purchasing power is 
thus negatively affected, as well as from other capitals – rather than originally created in the water business. 
Arguably, the water business is so attractive precisely because it allows the extraction of monopoly rents rather than 
“just” profits, and thereby raises the costs of production across the economy. This difference matters for the impact 
on effective demand, profit rates, productive reinvestment and, thus, macro-level accumulation (on the distinct 
characteristics of rent as opposed to profit, see e.g. Vercellone, 2010). This finding, of course, runs counter to the 
“greater efficiency” case commonly made for utility privatization.
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For capital, the associated increase in reproduction costs is more likely to be attenuated than
actually  reversed  by  these  dispossessions.  Carbon  certificates  are  cheapened,  not  turned  into
bonuses. Since  the  macroeconomic  profitability  of  land grabs,  to  return to  this  particular  case,
importantly depends on the potential for productive use rather than conservation of the areas in
question, the “greenness” of the “green grab” strategy tends to stand in an inverse relationship to its
success  qua  accumulation strategy. The privatization case likewise functions through social cost
shifting. The net accumulation potential of each of these three mechanisms is not in their “greening”
effect, but, quite the contrary, in their potential to reinforce social-ecological disasters through cost
re-externalizations. Each of these strategies, therefore, is only likely to serve systemic accumulation
in the short run – attractive enough to be pursued by rational capitalists, but not contributing to
capitalism’s longer-term viability.
4.4.5 A typology of ecological problems from a value perspective
To  conclude  the  value-theoretical  discussion  of  the  challenge  of  “greening”  capitalism,  the
“greening” responses to four distinct although somewhat overlapping types of ecological problems
will here be considered in turn, focusing on their respective implications for systemic accumulation.
a) Resource depletion
The depletion of resource stocks has several problematic  implications  for capital  accumulation.
Scarcity leads to rising resource rents appropriated by those who can monopolize access to scarce
resources.  While  these rentiers  accumulate,  the repercussions across the economy are negative:
Since rents merely represent redistributed revenue, with their rise both the average profit rate and
real wages tend to decline. Meanwhile, the rise in rents is in no way predicated upon a rise in
productivity (arguably, the opposite is the case) and, since it is not based on competitive success,
not tied to any incentive to reinvest productively. From a collective capitalist standpoint, therefore,
such rents are undesirable even as individual capitalists benefit. Regardless of property relations,
resource depletion makes itself felt in rising actual costs of extraction (see sections 6.3 and 6.4); this
squeezes  the overall  economic surplus  available  for  distribution.  In Walker’s  language,  socially
necessary unified labor-nature time embodied in these raw materials rises. Finally, absolute scarcity
–  meaning  not  only  rising  prices  but  decreasing  absolute  availability  of  necessary  inputs  to
production  –  obviously  poses  a  material  barrier  to  the  capitalist  (re)production  process  that
necessitates elaborate workarounds. 
One possible response is in consistency strategies (see section 5.1.3): Renewable energy
sources  may  increasingly  become  economically  preferable  from  a  systemic  accumulation
standpoint, even as they do not constitute Cheap Energy in a world-ecological sense (section 6.3).
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This is one of several cases in which “green” alternatives – regardless of their actual ecological
merits  –  are  preferable  to  future  “business  as  usual,”  but  nevertheless  allow for  less  dynamic
accumulation than was possible in a past age of cheap oil and coal.
Another  response,  in  line  with the  gospel  of  eco-efficiency,  are  (incremental)  efficiency
improvements. These, too, may be a cost-effective reaction to rising resource prices as long as the
immediate savings in resource costs outweigh implementation costs. But again, to positively boost
growth, these efficiency gains would have to outweigh the entire rise in resource costs, and this
condition is more difficult to fulfill.125 The question thus returns once more to the potential of green-
tech development to compensate for tightening ecological constraints (see chapter 5).
b) Pollution
This category includes air, water and soil contamination through harmful substances emitted in the
course of economic activity. These substances affect both humans and non-human nature and may
lead to health damages as well as ecosystem degradation (see d) below). Beyond the option of no
longer engaging in these activities,  which incurs a significant opportunity cost, common green-
capitalist solutions involve technical changes at various scales. The economic effect of any technical
change, aside from avoided health care or restoration costs (see below), of course depends on its
productivity impact. Traditional “end-of-pipe” solutions such as pollution filters and waste manage-
ment, realized downstream of the production process, usually entail extra costs without affecting
productivity;  hence  the  conventional  environmental-economic  wisdom of  regulating,  taxing and
innovating as close to the source as possible so as to maximize the potential for productive and
transformative changes. Both efficiency and consistency innovations can play a role here.
In his original formulation of the  second contradiction,  O’Connor  (1988, p. 27) added a
qualifier to his claim that restorative practices were unproductive: “unless they lowered the repro-
duction cost of laborpower [sic].” This is a transfer of Marx’ concept of an increase of  relative
surplus value by means of cheapening means of consumption (see section 5.2.3), which provides a
window on certain aspects of “greening” policies that are relatively attractive for capital.
The  pollution  case  is  peculiar  in  that  it  involves  massive  costs  that  capital  has  had to
internalize at least in part for some time. Pollution costs are not only part of a future arithmetic of a
Green Economy but already included in the “gray” economy’s cost-benefit calculus, promising even
shorter-term macroeconomic gains  from greening. In the European Commission’s  (2018, p.  16)
125 Of course, to the degree that the rise in costs is due to rent, the macroeconomic loss is arguably not 100%, and in 
this case even a less-than-full compensation of the firm’s input costs through efficiency savings may suffice to turn 
the macroeconomic balance sheet positive. But the point here is the considerable difference between the two 
criteria: Even a sensible business decision in favor of efficiency improvements under the given circumstances (of 
higher resource prices) may not offset the overall economic loss vis-à-vis an earlier state of lower resource prices.
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vision of a “green” economy, for instance, the annual savings in “health damage” from reduced
pollution just about balance the estimated investment needs for the realization of this scenario.126
Such claims – the EC provides no sources or explanation – should be treated with caution from a
capitalist standpoint, given that on the cost side they often include the quantification of subjective
welfare losses in addition to actual health care costs and productivity losses.127 Either way, the GDP
effect may be positive: Parts of these costs have always been externalized to those affected, but
other parts have been borne by capital in many places, driving up ancillary wage costs.  Investments
in  the  reduction  of  pollution  may  still  not  be  directly  “productive”  but  can  reduce  such
“unproductive” expenses, lower real wage costs without depressing wages and therefore benefit
economic growth and capital accumulation considerably. Relative to a past “empty” world, this still
represents a constraint and a net loss, but relative even to a present “gray” economy in a “full”
world with accumulating health costs, it can be a real gain in cases for which technical abatement
solutions are readily available.128
c) Sink exhaustion
Natural  sinks  provide  the  crucial  “ecosystem service”  of  absorbing  anthropogenic  wastes.  For
example, atmosphere, soil, forests and oceans all are capable of absorbing carbon emissions – but
not in infinite amounts, and when exhausted, negative effects such as atmospheric warming and
ocean acidification occur. Of course, there is an overlap with the pollution category here, as natural
sinks  can  also  absorb  certain  amounts  of  toxic  pollutants  such  as  carbon  monoxide  (cf.  U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 2013).
126 Likewise, Coady et al. (2017) argue that almost half of the unpriced externalities resulting from the burning of 
fossil fuels are health-related. Strictly speaking, the EU’s envisioned abatement costs here consist in additional 
investments for technical changes rather than restoration or conservation activities, but this is besides the point.
127 The standard accounting method for pollution-related mortality is the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), which is 
usually based on a willingness-to-pay (WTP) method: Individuals are here asked how much they would be willing 
to pay in order to reduce the risk of premature death from pollution by a certain amount, and the aggregate of these 
figures is then averaged and interpreted as the VSL (thus, individuals are not asked to stipulate how much they 
value their own life – most would probably give all they have if necessary – but how much they value, for example,
a reduction in the number of deaths by 1 per 100,000.). Willingness to pay is obviously correlated with ability to 
pay, and thus the value of a statistical life for a given country depends on its economic fortunes. (For a detailed 
discussion of this methodology including VSL figures for a series of countries, see WHO Regional Office for 
Europe & OECD, 2015.) Accordingly, a life in the Netherlands was worth about 8.5 lives in Uzbekistan in 2010; the
OECD-area “base value” for 2005 was US$ 3 million (ibid., p. 20).
While certainly ethically dubious, these calculations, widely used in environmental policy consulting, are 
remarkable in that they constitute an expression of capitalist logic – the political problem of air pollution is 
individualized and monetized – but not a measure of impact on capital. The VSL figures, after all, are purely 
fictitious entities designed to establish how much taxpayers should be willing, in theory, to have spent in their 
name. Taking the example of calculations concerning the effects of the U.S. Clean Air Act amendment, the 
WHO/OECD study argues that the VSL-based economic gain is astronomical – but the positive GDP effect 
(including savings in medical expenditures and reduced morbidity) is quite marginal (ibid., pp. 35–36). Here, green-
capitalist logic actually turns against capital, seeking to internalize socio-environmental costs (however unevenly) 
and, consequently, potentially establishing a large overall “economic gain” even where negative GDP effects occur. 
128 With increasingly privatized health care, these expenses are obviously partly recouped by capital, but not fully so. 
See previous discussions of privatization throughout this section and in sections 7.21 and 10.1.2.
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In distinguishing between two types of ecological crisis and their relation to capital, James
O’Connor wrote that “[n]ature as a tap has been more or less capitalized; nature as a sink is more or
less uncapitalized.” (J. O’Connor, 1998a, p. 185) Two decades later, the green-capitalist tendency is
clearly towards the capitalization of sinks as a central part of natural capital management. But sinks
in themselves do not add economic value; they simply maintain the conditions for accumulation by
contributing  to  ecological  stability  up  to  a  certain  point.  Historically,  this  service  was  largely
provided for free, in a constellation which is literally no longer sustainable. This remains true even
in cases where investments not only serve to maintain but to enhance sink capacities. The natural
capital  metaphor  may become more  graphic  here,  but  the  nature  of  the  “asset”  thus  produced
remains fundamentally different from ordinary fixed capital: Even the enhanced sinks only provide
the conditions for further emissions from productive and consumptive activities at a certain cost;
they do not directly contribute to such activities.
Generally,  as  implicitly  suggested  by  O’Connor  and  explicated  in  the  world-ecology
perspective, the active capitalization of human or non-human nature is always already a sign of
exhaustion: Capital thrives on the appropriation of fictitious commodities, and turning them into
actual  commodities  produced  at  full  cost  is  not  only  an  inherently  limited  strategy  (that  is
impossible  to  realize for  many parts  of  nature – and for  the human beings  who embody labor
power) but also one that hampers the accumulation process by raising costs for capital.129 From this
perspective,  the  green-capitalist  appreciation  of  nature,  importantly  including sinks such as  the
atmosphere, as natural capital is not so much a long-overdue recognition of the value of nature but
the final straw for a system that has undermined its own conditions of existence to a considerable
degree – a sign of crisis rather than its resolution.
Various responses to sink exhaustion have been discussed over the previous sections with
regard to the crucial case of greenhouse gases. A final potential response, which can only be treated
in purely speculative terms, may one day be found in geoengineering schemes (see section 7.3).
These would have to  be deployed at  enormous scales and,  if  realizable at  all,  are  likely to  be
extremely expensive – and just as unproductive of (surplus) value as most mitigation activities.
129 Witness also the complex discussions of semiproletarianization tendencies in world-systems analysis (Wallerstein, 
2004, 2011). Here, the argument is likewise that full proletarianization – in other words, the reproduction of labor 
power through commodities – tends to be avoided by capitalists when possible due to its negative effect on wage 
costs (this extends to considerations of the gendered division of labor, where much feminized domestic reproductive
work can in principle be replaced by commodified products and services). In this case, however, proletarianization 
comes with the important advantage of strengthening effective demand, so that commodification of labor’s 
reproduction is much more ambivalent for capital at the macroeconomic level than the commodification of nature 
(although the latter can also strengthen demand temporarily by absorbing excess capital; cf. section 10.2.1).
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d) Ecosystem degradation
This category obviously overlaps with all of the others: The degradation of ecosystems reduces the
“services”  they  provide,  including their  sink  function,  as  well  as  the  availability  of  renewable
resources (e.g. timber), and pollution is not just a human health issue but likewise contributes to
degradation. Even so, degradation is considered separately here in order to include another type of
policy  response,  namely  efforts  to  conserve  or  restore  natural  capital  stocks.  The logic  of  the
argument follows the analysis of carbon trading in section 4.4.3, but is applied more broadly here.
Two  kinds  of  costs  are  incurred  through  conservation  and  restoration  efforts:  First,
operational costs – expenses for staff and equipment – and the opportunity cost of not exploiting
resources  or  replacing  them  with  more  expensive  alternatives.  This  opportunity  cost  may  for
example make itself felt in the purchasing price of land area intended for conservation, assuming
that  land  prices  are  based  on  the  capitalization  of  expected  revenues  from the  exploitation  of
resources.  The  benefits,  meanwhile,  consist  in  the  maintenance  of  general  conditions  of
(re)production, such as climatic stability or biodiversity (which, for example, underpins agricultural
productivity), as well as of more specific local conditions – including air and water quality – and
resources. In other words, these activities may be an indispensable form of cost internalization but
do not produce value (see, once more, the value-theoretical discussion above).
Take, first, the example of environmental taxes or fees levied on corporate activities so as to
restore  ecosystems  degraded  by  these  same  activities,  or  to  conserve  ecosystems  that  provide
indispensable sink functions for them (as in case c) above). If the restoration/conservation is carried
out by a public agency, the case is relatively straightforward: The entire tax burden is deduced from
corporate revenue and presents a real cost to capital, except for the share that may be passed on to
customers130, and as the tax money is recycled to pay for wages (which workers then need to spend)
and commercially produced equipment,  part of the expenditure ends up being recouped by other
capitalist  firms  as  net  profit.  The  rest  remains  a  real  cost  for  capital,  which  is  forced  to  pay
indirectly for “unproductive” workers who merely work to maintain the conditions of production
but add no value to the firms’ balance sheet. It may be argued that this environmental maintenance
service is vital for the continuation of the very businesses in question (as well as many others), but
this does not mean that it adds value: Compared to a time when the level of production was small
enough not to degrade the ecosystems in question and thus the conditions of production came free
of charge (“naturally,” one is  tempted to say),  the new levy is  an additional cost which,  while
enabling workers to keep producing value, does not directly raise the level of production. If a firm
130 This share depends on the market situation. The immediate adverse impact on businesses is that it by raising prices, 
the tax reduces the competitiveness of their products if substitutes are available. If the costs can be passed on, taxed 
companies may still reap average profits but the overall surplus is reduced, and thus the general rate of profit sinks.
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is forced to double its restoration payments, this adds nothing to the saleable product stock.131 Or,
put differently, average labor productivity sinks as additional workers have to be hired (elsewhere,
but effectively paid by the producing company) in order to safeguard the same level of production.
What if the environmental service in question is provided by a for-profit business instead?
Here is the business opportunity routinely extolled by green-capitalist advocates and denounced as
cynical by anti-capitalists: Capital can benefit from the very degradation that it begets! In this case,
however, it cannot really, at least not in the aggregate. As the tax revenue is transferred to a private
business, a part of the taxed “gray” companies’ costs may be redistributed as profit to this “green”
business. In the worst case, from the gray-capitalist viewpoint, this profit is simply stacked on top
of the tax burden, resulting in a simple one-to-one transfer. If the private “green” service provider is
indeed able to increase operational efficiency – saving on equipment and workers – and run a leaner
business than its public predecessor, as the proponents of privatization certainly will have argued it
is, it may secure a profit without negatively affecting the tax burden, perhaps even reducing it.132 (It
is not entirely unreasonable to suspect that another part of this effect would be achieved through
wage depression – a form of re-externalization. Capital could, of course, also attempt to divest itself
of part of the tax burden by shifting it to the generic tax payer. Both of these strategies would
eventually undermine effective demand across the economy.) 
Either  way,  in the best  of privatization cases the overall  loss for capital  is  reduced, not
magically turned into a gain: All that green-capitalist approaches can do here is to rationalize the
costs of environmental degradation and compliance. It bears remembering that in the absence of the
tax, the entire tax revenue could have been productively reinvested by the taxed “gray” businesses
and thus enhanced real accumulation. If, finally, the detour through the public budget is avoided
and, in an even more textbook-neoliberal policy “solution,” a direct link established between the
“gray”  and  “green”  businesses  involved,  this  may  affect  transaction  costs  but  does  not
fundamentally alter the logic at play.
In  the  longer  term,  restoration  may  also  enable  resumed  exploitation  of  exhausted
ecosystems. Do these cases form exceptions to the rule of “unproductive” natural capital policies?
Afforestation projects, for example, can be exploited for bioeconomic purposes and thus generate
revenues apart from subsidies for conservational purposes (e.g. through PES schemes), providing
131 See the TEEB definition with regard to forestry PES: “The basic idea is that landowners or communities should be 
rewarded for practices that keep forests intact and maintain their services. This can be accomplished by using 
money and other incentives provided by the users of those services, be it society as a whole, through general 
taxation, downstream water users, through water tariffs, or distant emitters of greenhouse gases, through the carbon 
market or grants based on the role of forests in climate mitigation.” (UNEP, 2010b, p. 16) In this definition, the 
redistributive character (in the value-theoretical sense) of such payments is evident.
132 This, of course, would also reduce the “kickback” to capital as less demand for equipment and wage goods is 
created, thereby minimally lowering the macroeconomic difference between the private and the public solution.
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synergistic potential that subverts the greenness—accumulation contradiction to some degree.133 But
if these projects were viable in their own right, without receiving subsidies, they should have been
pursued before for purely economic reasons. If their realization depends on subsidies that detract
from the macroeconomic surplus, the original revenue created here at best serves to lower the net
costs of a conservation project.134 More generally, one may argue that through afforestation projects,
additional natural capital is created and sustainably harvested additional timber can be sold at a
profit. Narrowly understood, this may be considered a productive undertaking. But aside from the
opportunity costs involved, the case remains that this is vastly more expensive for capital than the
clear-cutting  of  pristine  forests.  As  long  as  such  “unsustainable”  timber  was  still  plentiful,
“sustainable” timber could hardly become economically competitive. This is obviously no longer
the case in many regions, where managed forestry has consequently become the (expensive) norm.
The point here is that the productiveness argument only holds in a context of already advanced
degradation; otherwise, no surplus could be realized by these means.135 From an ecological perspec-
tive, moreover, such timber plantations are categorically different from – and inferior to – restored
“natural” forests, which, again, require non-exploitation (Dooley & Stabinsky, 2018, pp. 17–20).
Returning to  the  accumulation  potential  of  conservation  practices  as  such,  Büscher  and
Fletcher (2014) consider the prospects for a future regime of accumulation by conservation (AbC)
to  revive systemic capital  accumulation. Their  analysis,  which is  not grounded in value theory,
mainly considers “green grabbing” practices and the “aesthetic production” value of conservation
for lending ideological support to  capitalism (and enabling ecotourism),  as well  as the reduced
transaction  costs for  capital  through  financialized,  offset-based  conservation  mechanisms
(“fictitious conservation”). While taking the possibility of AbC seriously, they ultimately converge
on the same conclusions presented here: The main material  effects of AbC strategies consist of
accumulation by dispossession through “green grabbing,” while decades of experimentation prove
the “fundamental inability of AbC to successfully capitalise on conserved nature” (ibid., p. 19), let
alone  to  resolve  the  ecological  contradictions  of  infinite  accumulation.  Büscher  and  Fletcher
conclude that proposals for “AbC can be viewed as something of a ‘pre-emptive strike’” to preclude
political alternatives (ibid., p. 21).
133 This example of “real” “green” accumulation was raised by Markus Wissen in personal communication. Brand and 
Wissen (2018, pp. 49–50) suggested that productive land investments may become a growth industry in a Green 
Economy that increasingly relies on renewable resources. While this is true, it does not necessarily suggest 
macroeconomic benefits (rising land rents, for example, signify a redistribution of surplus value).
134 This calculus includes opportunity costs. If the project were profitable without subsidies, but other land uses are 
more economically lucrative, the same logic applies: The enterprise depends on subsidies and is, 
macroeconomically speaking, a loss.
135 Climate considerations aside, Marx already remarked in his day that the (sustainable) forestry business was 
exceptionally unattractive from a capitalist standpoint due to the excruciatingly long turnover times. Forests, he 
remarked, were thus simply being destroyed rather than conserved (Marx, 1979, pp. 246–247). 
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To summarize,  these services,  privatized or not,  constitute  reproductive  tasks  in  Huws’s
sense  (Huws,  2014,  Chapter  7).136 Their  contribution  is,  ideally,  to  maintain  the  conditions  of
production  by  remedying  the  adverse  effects  of  capital  accumulation;  they  do  not  produce
additional use values and, thus, nothing that could be turned into  additional  exchange value, and
they must be paid out of the surplus produced elsewhere. The internalization of ecological costs
remains  just  that:  costly.  The first  way out  of  this  dilemma is  for  capital  to  re-externalize the
associated costs, in violation of the declared intentions of the Green Economy; but even for capital
this is, quite literally, not a  sustainable strategy, at least not with continuously escalating costs.137
The second way out, at least to preempt further damage to ecosystems, is, as always, technological
innovation that reduces environmental pressures and avoids clean-up costs from the outset.   
Therefore,  while  this  overview  provides  a  sobering  perspective  on  the  prospects  of  capitalist
revitalization by way of “greening,” it does suggest two potential – but already quite problematic –
sites  of  intervention to  upend the overall  green-capitalist  calculus  and turn it  positive:  “green”
technological  innovation  (if  it  ultimately  proves  superior  to  “gray”  incumbents)  and  cost  re-
externalizations (as through various forms of dispossession). These will be introduced as two of
four  “green”  systemic  accumulation  strategies  in  section  4.6.  The former  strategy will  then  be
investigated further in chapter 5 and the latter in bloc III.
4.5 The possibility space of “green” capitalism
What, then, are the limits to any conceivable “greening” of capitalism? What are the conditions that
would  have  to  be  fulfilled  in  order  to  square  ecological  with  capitalist  requirements?  What
accumulation strategies are available in a green-capitalist formation? The framework proposed in
the remainder of this chapter serves to contextualize the later discussion of the Green Economy as a
particular green-capitalist solution to a particular historical context of the 21st century, while also
clarifying the enormous challenges for any systemic “greening” of capitalism. (Again, a graphic
illustration of this framework is provided in Appendix 1.)
This section delineates the economic (1), environmental (2), and social (3) thresholds for
“green” capitalism as applied throughout this work. These three dimensions correspond to the three
136 See note 110.
137 Such re-externalizations have been central to the neoliberal regime of accumulation. In this case, the working 
classes could in principle be made to pay for waste management and conservation. But such strategies only provide 
a limited workaround for capital; at some point, such additional burdens on labor either drive up its price or cut into
effective demand. The persistence of such self-defeating re-externalization strategies only reinforces the point that 
the internalization of these costs poses a structural problem for capital. Throughout the neoliberal era, the problems 
arising from accumulation by dispossession have been displaced through various debt-based strategies which have 
increasingly served to destabilize the global economy (Streeck, 2017).
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“pillars” developed in earlier sustainable development debates, and to the green-capitalist notion of
a “triple bottom line” of “people, planet, profit” based on these pillars.138 The conditions outlined in
this section comprise both functional and normative criteria, with the normative share rising as we
move from economic to ecological and on to social criteria. While also drawing on concepts which
originate in discourses that are highly critical of capitalism, the criteria here are generally in line
with the normative foundations of green-capitalist  thought  as embodied in the  Green Economy
studies. Thus, they are intended to enable an immanent critique which confronts “green” capitalism
on its own turf and measures its abstract promises against its concrete strategies and practices, as
conducted throughout the following blocs. 
4.5.1 Economic criteria: Systemic accumulation
(1) Systemic accumulation: “Green” capitalism must develop an accumulation regime that enables
and stabilizes (infinite) systemic capital accumulation on the basis of a finite resource base.
As emphasized in section 4.1, in order to justify the term “capitalism,” there need to be structural
opportunities for systemic accumulation.139 As a rule of thumb, the average investor in a functioning
capitalist economy must be able, except in occasional periods of recession, to find profitable outlets
for their capital. In other words, the average capital investment must yield positive returns and the
average  rate  of  (expected)  profit  across  the  economy must  be  positive.  What  is  considered  an
appropriate rate of profit is of course context-specific. But if no profits, or even net losses, can be
expected, investments will dry up and the material process of capitalist reproduction – on which
large parts of the global population, and almost the entire population of the global North have come
to  depend  for  their  own sustenance  –  becomes  bogged  down.  If  capitalism  is  defined  by  the
expansive  process  of  capital  valorization,  and the  removal  of  this  process  presents  all  sorts  of
theoretical and practical problems, this is the sine qua non condition of “green” capitalism.140
138 The concept of the three pillars of ecology/economy/social concerns, espoused by industrial interest groups, has 
been criticized for relativizing the importance of ecology in favor of economic considerations and for its tendency 
to reduce the set of eligible sustainability strategies to a small subset that promises a win-win-win solution in all 
three dimensions (cf. discussion in von Hauff & Kleine, 2009). The concept is generally reaffirmed in the green-
capitalist literature – for example in the shape of the “triple bottom line.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 363)
139 What exactly does accumulation refer to? Marx (1981, Chapters 30–32) carefully distinguishes between “real” 
accumulation – the progressive development of productive capacity –  and the accumulation of money capital, 
noting both their longer-term interrelatedness and the temporary deviation between both indicators, even their 
opposing short-term movements. The immediate goal of capitalist economic activity is obviously monetary profit, 
M becoming M’. As highlighted below, however, the only sustainable road to (systemic) monetary accumulation is 
through C (expanded physical reproduction), as condensed in the M-C-M’ formula. Ultimately, Marx discusses 
these phenomena in the context of the overall reproduction process of capital, of which they each constitute an 
important element. In the long run, both should develop on roughly parallel trajectories. While the yardsticks 
suggested here, returns on capital or profit rates, only capture the monetary side of this process, as the key figures 
guiding immediate capitalist behavior they reveal the functioning of systemic accumulation in a synchronic 
perspective. This, of course, obscures questions of longer-term sustainability, particularly in cases where 
accumulation relies heavily on externalizations (see discussions below and in section 11.7).
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Systemic accumulation can generally proceed along two different – although interwoven –
tracks. The first is the “official” path of what Marx conceptualized as expanded reproduction, which
relies on the productive reinvestment of parts of the economic surplus, which in turn translates
immediately into what is now understood as economic growth – and progressive development of
production technologies (cf. Marx, 1968, Chapter 22, 1979, Chapter 2). The second track leads into
the  shadier  realm of  what  is  best  pinpointed  by  Harvey’s  (2004) concept  of  accumulation  by
dispossession.141 This  broad  category  generally  involves  various  forms  of  “taking”  rather  than
“making” (Moore, 2010, p. 390): Instead of additional wealth creation, wealth is here redistributed
– between capitalists in some cases, but mostly from workers and communities to capital, as in the
commodification  of  commons  and  public  infrastructures  (this  may  likewise  be  reflected  in
economic growth statistics as conventionally measured, as it usually increases the volume of market
transactions in the short run). 
While expanded reproduction follows a fairly straightforward logic (which still requires a
balance  of  supply  and  demand,  see  below),  accumulation  by  dispossession is  vastly  more
complicated  qua  (systemic) accumulation strategy. Certain forms of dispossession can indeed be
“productive” in the sense outlined in section 4.4; this is the case wherever the establishment of
property  rights  enables  the  further  expansion  of  reproduction  (for  example  through  “land
grabbing”).  Other  dispossessions  – the  privatization of  public  services,  for  example – may not
directly support expanded reproduction in the traditional sense but nevertheless constitute capitalist
Landnahmen  (see  section  4.6.2  below)  that  offer  short-term  (systemic)  accumulation
opportunities.142 These strategies, however, usually directly collide with the ecological and social
criteria  outlined  below.  This  second track  also  tends  to  be  less  sustainable  economically,  as  it
reinforces social inequality and thus provokes increasing imbalances between supply and effective
demand.  Paradoxically,  therefore,  a  properly  “green”  accumulation  regime  should  rely  on
expanded reproduction  to  an  even  larger  degree  than the  neoliberal  regime has over  the  past
140 The equalization of profit rates should not be taken for granted: Empirical studies have found persistent differences 
in profit rates between sectors (Fröhlich, 2013, for the case of the German economy) and between countries (Chou, 
Izyumov, & Vahaly, 2016; this study, however, also notes a clear trend of convergence between groups of 
countries). “Anti-market” forces and inter-capitalist power asymmetries, as suggested in section 4.1, may lead to 
diverging profit rates. But as previously suggested, it is assumed here that market forces are never fully 
incapacitated in a capitalist economy. The reproduction process could not be maintained in the longer-term absence 
of profitable outlets for capital, at least not without the type of state intervention that would render the label 
“capitalism” dubious. In this sense, the rule of thumb proposed here holds.
141 Accumulation by dispossession refers to the modern continuation of what Marx (1968, Chapter 24) conceptualized 
as primitive accumulation, the expulsion of rural populations from their lands that formed an essential condition of 
possibility for the development of modern capitalism. The accumulation by dispossession argument holds that such 
processes of capital accumulation driven by extra-economic (and often violent) force never really ceased and are 
still taking place today in many forms, e.g. when public infrastructures become privatized.
142 This distinction can be mapped onto the categories of extensive and intensive Landnahmen, respectively, as 
discussed in section 4.6.2.
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decades, even if this implies larger volumes of material output. In yet other cases, dispossession
only signifies inter-capitalist  redistribution by means of rent appropriation  (cf. the discussion in
Andreucci et al., 2017): Here, no  systemic accumulation occurs; the “normal” rate of profit even
tends to decline as more of the surplus is captured by other means. As argued in section 4.4, a host
of green-capitalist business models likewise rest on inter-capitalist redistribution, even if this does
not necessarily imply rent appropriation.143
Thus, in a properly “green” capitalism, the total mass of capital seeking valorization would
continue to grow every year while the process would be divested of its historical reliance on socio-
environmental cost externalizations. The stock of not-yet-consumed “dead” labor existing at any
moment would continue to increase, while the material embodiments of all this value would have to
grow ever lighter. “Green” capitalism would have to economize on the use of renewable and non-
renewable  resources  alike  for  purely  economic  reasons,  independent  of  any  consideration  of
ecological  concerns.  Green growth would have  to  become a reality:  Production  would need to
become ever more energy- and resource-efficient, and “immaterial” (or low-material) goods and
services would likely represent a rising share of the total economic product. The realization of rapid
and ongoing technological advances is indispensable for this (see section 4.6.1).
In regulationist terms, finally, a functioning regime of accumulation is needed to guarantee
the realization of surplus value and “balanced” growth between the different “departments” of the
economy (i.e., production of the means of production and of the means of consumption; in other
words, industrial/business demand and consumer demand; Aglietta, 2015a, pp. 104–108; Becker,
2013, pp.  36–41; cf. Marx, 1979, Chapter 20). In this  balancing act,  employment and effective
demand need to be maintained at the same time as waves of green-tech innovation potentially raise
labor  (along  with  resource)  productivity  and  displace  many  workers.  As  indicated  in  the
introduction,  the regulationist  regime of accumulation  – the structural-economic dimension of a
capitalist formation, whereas the notion of a  mode of regulation  primarily captures the political-
economic dimension – is generally conceptualized at the national scale. World-systems concepts
such  as  the  SCA add  a  more  global  or  systemic  dimension,  pointing  not  just  to  institutional
arrangements but also to a hierarchical global division of labor and (unequal) resource flows. The
latter are particularly highlighted in the world-ecology literature. 
The  concept  of  systemic  accumulation employed  here  needs  to  reflect  all  of  these
dimensions: The basic imperative of accumulation under competitive conditions, a value-theoretical
understanding of what does or does not constitute “net” accumulation, the need for the realization
143 The commodification of “ecosystem services,” for example, usually involves private actors receiving payments for 
conservation and restoration efforts. This is a form of surplus redistribution, but unless these actors can monopolize 
their service provision, they should not be able to exact rents (cf. discussions in section 4.4).
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of produced values  as  highlighted by regulationists  and the global  scale  emphasized by world-
systems/world-ecology analysts.
4.5.2 Ecological criteria: Light green
(2)  Light  green: “Green”  capitalism  cannot  correspond  to  a  deep  ecology  understanding  of
“greenness,” but it has to respect planetary boundaries at the global level, avoid local “sacrifice
zones” of extreme degradation and adhere to the precautionary principle.
Perhaps  the  thorniest  question  here  concerns  the  contested  signifier  “green.”  Essentialistic
understandings of nature and its intrinsic worth are impossible to translate into unambiguous policy
goals or indicators of success. This attests to unbridgeable gap between “romantic,” “deep” or eco-
centric understandings of nature and the rationalist world view at the root of modern economic
thought, which has never divested itself of a basically instrumental view of nature (for introductions
to deep ecology thought, see Katz, Rothenberg, & Light, 2000; Mathews, 2001). Green-capitalist
thought is firmly rooted in the ecological modernization paradigm (Krüger, 2014), which endowed
“modern” rationality with a somewhat more reflexive attitude vis-à-vis nature. But the enlightened-
managerial perspective of ecological modernization remains reductionist and placed at considerable
distance from more holistic forms of ecological thought – in Melissa Leach’s terms, it is a “light
green” standpoint (Leach, 2015, pp. 25–26; see sections 2.2 and 2.6.2 for a discussion of the GE’s
relationship to ecological modernization theory). In its instrumental rationality, anthropocentrism
and  at  best  superficially  ecological-relational  world  view,  this  ideal-type  embodies  a  perhaps
slightly more socially concerned version of the type of Northern-elitist “shallow ecology” against
which “deep” ecology initially defined itself (Katz et al., 2000; Naess, 1973).144 
For clarity’s sake, and to enable an immanent critique of “green” capitalism, I will make use
of more anthropocentric criteria which conceptualize ecosystems as  the environment  surrounding
humans,  in  line  with  the  ecological  modernization  tradition.  At the  global  level,  a  convenient
shorthand which provides operationalizable indicators is the concept of  planetary boundaries,  as
deployed in section 2.1.1. These indicators speak most directly to the historical challenge at hand,
namely  that  of  making  global  capitalism  conform  to  global  ecological  limits,  i.e.,  making  it
ecologically sustainable in the most literal sense.145
144 O’Riordan (1991) offered a tripartite classification according to which (nascent) green-capitalist thought spanned 
the categories of “shallow green” and “dry green” environmentalism while not extending to the “deep green” part 
of the spectrum. In this conceptualization, “dry greens” preferred voluntary and market-based regulations whereas 
“shallow” greens went a little further to endorse systemic infrastructural changes and “eco-auditing” (the latter 
essentially equals the ontology of natural capital macro-strategy introduced in section 2.6.1).
145 Planetary boundaries is a top-down concept, an expression of a problematic governmentality of planetary 
management as discussed in section 11.1. But precisely because it tends to abstract from the uneven social reality 
that leads “humanity” to shoot past its “safe operating space,” it is a perfect measure of green-capitalist 
performance according to the very managerial principles that are foundational to green-capitalist thought. Still, the 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 119
At smaller scales, “hard” criteria become increasingly difficult to choose: Different types of
ecosystems overlap, and it is hard to imagine a nature—humanity metabolism that does not impinge
on the integrity of any local ecosystem. But the no-externalizations perspective, as outlined in the
introduction, remains relevant: While an absolute end to any form and degree of externalizations is
perhaps  not  an  appropriate  measuring  rod,  one  could  reasonably  expect  a  seriously  “green”
capitalism to minimize their  extent and, at  the very least,  avoid the creation of local “sacrifice
zones,” to borrow a term from Naomi Klein (2014, pp. 310–315). A “green” capitalism would have
to  subvert  or  at  least  contain  the  historical  dynamic  by  which  the  accumulation  process  has
continued to leave behind degraded environments across the globe since the early days of merchant
capital (Moore, 2015, 2016) while accelerating the extinction of species (McBrien, 2016). 
This  relates  to  an  important  question  regarding  the  scale  and  uniformity  of  “green”
capitalism: While particular regional and national formations can certainly vary, and designs in the
global South would diverge from those in the North, “green” capitalism is only meaningful when it
allows  for  ecological  stability  at  the  global  level  (not  least  since  capital  accumulation  equally
proceeds  globally).  At  the  same time,  a  purely  deterritorialized  view which  glosses  over  local
“sacrifice zones” as long as planetary stability is maintained could not be said to fulfill the green-
capitalist promise of social well-being since real people’s lives are obviously tied, to greater or
lesser extents, to actual territories (see the social criteria below). Even as green-capitalist macro-
modeling, with its epistemic foundations in Earth System Science, tends to privilege the global,
preventing externalizations – patterns of problem displacement rather than problem solving – of
course requires local-level  protection.  Conformity with the no-externalizations  criterion may be
hard to verify, but it is easy to falsify through local evidence. 
While the planetary boundaries concept uses a variety of indicators and the complexity of
ecological dependencies is occasionally emphasized in the GE literature, the overriding concern
with  greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  green-capitalist  writing  points  towards  capital’s  structural
preference for simple metrics (see section 4.2). The latter  preference should not,  however,  take
precedence  over  significant  social  and  environmental  risks  entailed  in  potential  responses  that
unduly privilege one aspect of ecological degradation. According to the precautionary principle, a
concept developed in ecological modernization theory (Andersen & Massa, 2000; cf. also Burkett,
2016;  Jacobs,  1991,  pp.  98–100),  if  a plausible  risk of harm is  found with regard to  any new
technology, the burden of proof of its harmlessness lies with those seeking to apply this particular
technology.  The  principle  has  been  endorsed  with  varying  degrees  of  explicitness  not  only  by
planetary boundaries  researchers  (Steffen et al., 2015, pp. 1–2) but also by the OECD (2011b, p.
local criteria in the following paragraphs are included here as a corrective to this macro-perspective.
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130), UNEP (2010b, p. 26) and its  Finance Initiative  (UNEP Finance Initiative, 2011), although
never with reference to specific technologies. It is reasonable to argue for strict application of the
principle and thus exclude high-risk technologies from our definition of “green” capitalism.146
4.5.3 Social criteria: Social reproduction and inclusiveness
(3) Social reproduction and inclusiveness: “Green” capitalism must ensure social reproduction
while limiting cost externalizations and warranting “inclusiveness.”
In purely functional terms, as outlined in section 4.1.2, capital must guarantee not only its economic
but also its ecological and social conditions of (re)production. It must avoid crises of reproduction
that undermine public health and thus could threaten both social cohesion and the reproduction of
the labor force. The interrelated basic capitalist institutions of private property, wage labor for those
who do not own any property and commodity production for market exchange would need to be
retained in a green-capitalist formation. But the neoliberal tendency towards their “purification”
across  the  economy  increasingly  serves  to  undermine  basic  processes  of  social  reproduction,
particularly with regard to reproductive  work (Fraser, 2016), a problem which a green-capitalist
formation  needs  to  address.  More  generally,  a  relatively  cohesive  mode  of  regulation must  be
developed to mediate social conflicts in a green-capitalist society, which tend to be reinforced by
the tightening of ecological constraints. The question of employment may be most urgent here as it
so centrally relates to the social reproduction of the broader population: Mass unemployment under
conditions of wage dependence would violate these social criteria. 
But partisans of “green” capitalism, notably including the institutions advocating a  Green
Economy, tend to go beyond purely functional arguments about “low-carbon” and “low-pollution”
development. Normative promises of social equity, an end to poverty and greater environmental
justice are part and parcel of their models. The benefits of  green growth  are to be widely shared.
UNEP, for example, defined its GE as delivering “improved human well-being and social equity,
while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 16)
This  model  understands the present  multiple  crises  more broadly in  terms of  various  forms of
“capital misallocation” that allow for considerable “social and environmental externalities.” (Ibid.,
p. 15; see also section 2.3) When responding to criticism from “developing” countries, UNEP was
even more adamant about the centrality of the social “pillar” to the overall GE project, emphasizing
that “the implementation of green economy policies implies, by definition, a reduction of social
146 Resignedly, a group of climate scientists noted around the time the GE approach was developed: “Unfortunately, 
global environmental change has progressed too far already for a genuine precautionary policy that satisfies the 
criteria of common sense.” (Messner et al., 2010, p. 5) One would accordingly have to work with otherwise 
unacceptable risk ratios (see also note 1). But this only reinforces the dramatic challenge of a systemic “greening” 
of capitalism; it does not obviate the necessity of precaution. 
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inequality,” and even stating that “the more egalitarian a society is, the better its environmental
performance.” (UNEP, 2013, pp. 2, 30; see discussion in section 7.4.5) The OECD stressed that
green  growth  policies  must  be  matched  with  “poverty  reduction  objectives”  in  order  to  be
applicable globally  (OECD, 2011b, p.  11) and recently reaffirmed that “[r]educing poverty and
social exclusion are essential to green growth” (Capozza & Samson, 2019, p. 6), while the World
Bank  (2012) promised (socially) “inclusive green growth” and foregrounded the goal of poverty
reduction at the outset. According to the European Environment Agency  (2014, p. 6), “the green
economy  is,  today,  seen  as  a  strategic  way  of  delivering  a  fairer  society  living  in  a  better
environment,” with “enhancing social equity” as one of three main objectives. 
In order to live up to these promises, “green” capitalism would not only have to ensure
economic benefit sharing by improving distributive justice with regard to income and wealth; it
would also need to avoid externalizing health-related and other costs to workers and communities in
zones of extraction, manufacturing and consumption  (for these categories, see Kalt,  2019), even
beyond the degree that is demanded by functional reproduction concerns. An immanent critique of
the  Green Economy  in particular cannot simply bypass these social criteria and focus on strictly
ecological indicators only.147
The tensions and contradictions between these three dimensions are difficult to miss. Taking just the
two sine qua nons of ongoing capital accumulation (condition 1) and respecting multiple planetary
boundaries (condition 2), it appears that in attempting to satisfice on both counts, “green” capitalism
would find it difficult to accommodate either without compromise. “Green” capitalism, after all,
does not imply a resolution of all the tensions and contradictions outlined in the first parts of this
chapter  but  their  successful  management,  the  maintenance  of  an  always-fragile  economic,
environmental and social stability. All of this points to the possibility of ongoing externalizations –
and/or of capitalist crises. Both possibilities constitute the focus of much of the rest of this work.
These empirical analyses will be synthesized into an assessment of the “actually emerging” Green
Economy according to the three-dimensional criteria proposed here in chapter 9.
4.6 “Green” systemic accumulation strategies
The  final  cornerstone  of  this  theoretical  framework,  four  conceivable  “green”  systemic
accumulation  strategies  (GSASs)  are  outlined  here  as  building  blocks  of  a  potential  “green”
147 The distinction between “social” and “ecological” is, of course, only constructed for analytical purposes. Local 
environmental pollution in zones of extraction, for example, is inevitably also – indeed, primarily – a “social” issue 
for the communities affected. The point here is that any given atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases could,
in principle, be achieved with greater or lesser exploitation of workers and greater or lesser adverse effects on 
communities. 
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accumulation  regime.  Note  that  these  are  introduced  here  as  strategies  for  capital  to  sustain
accumulation under ecological constraints and avoid the undermining of its ecological conditions
of (re)production.  This does not preclude the possibility of tensions and contradictions between
these GSASs and the broader set of conditions for a “green” turn of capitalism outlined in the
previous section, which notably included normative and not only functional aspects. In regulationist
terms, for the mediation of such tensions an appropriate mode of regulation would be needed. It is
equally important to note that GSASs are a macroeconomic  means to support systemic accumu-
lation, not a direct microeconomic mechanism of accumulation: Not just a “business” issue, GSASs
are deeply political, and their pursuit requires the entire state—capital nexus.
A functioning “green” accumulation regime thus has to rely on some combination of the
following  four  strategies  to  enable  systemic  accumulation:  absolute  decoupling through
technological advances (1), new Landnahmen of economic territory that outweigh losses through
sustainability  constraints  (2),  a  “downsizing”  process  of  green creative  destruction (3)  and the
appropriation of  Cheap Nature (4). Overlaps between these strategies exist, even in theory – and
some of these overlaps will be discussed in the following.
4.6.1 GSAS 1: Absolute decoupling
(1) Absolute decoupling: Through massive technological advances that raise both resource  and
labor productivity simultaneously, “green” capitalism must achieve the absolute decoupling of eco-
nomic growth from resource consumption, pollution, sink exhaustion and ecosystem degradation.
The first and most obvious path of “green” accumulation involves technological development. The
crucial  role  of  “green” innovations  is  emphasized throughout  the green-capitalist  literature (see
section 2.6.2 and chapter 5). Two approaches are available: First,  efficiency improvements reduce
the amount of resource inputs (including energy) and waste outputs per unit (material or monetary)
of product. Second, changes in consistency substitute renewable and/or low-impact materials for
non-renewable and/or high-impact materials, including energy sources.148
Thinking back to section 4.2, it is worth noting that the available (non-renewable) resource
base is bound to shrink over time: Absent unspeakable biotechnological innovations, entropy will
inevitably  increase  at  human  time  scales.  Recycling  is  always  limited.  This  was  Georgescu-
Roegen’s objection to the idea of a “steady state,” leading him to insist that continuous degrowth
would be the appropriate response instead (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975, pp. 367–369). While a green-
capitalist  perspective  cannot  possibly  share  Georgescu-Roegen’s  pessimism,  it  should  take  into
148 In the sustainability literature, efficiency and consistency have been complemented with a sufficiency approach: 
Instead of better (efficiency) or different (consistency) production techniques, the idea here is to produce less (Linz,
2004; von Winterfeld, 2007). Given that it would amount to a deaccumulation strategy, it is not surprising that this 
dimension of the sustainability triad is largely forgotten in green-capitalist thought.
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account that absolute resource supplies will  decrease  in the very long run, and thus the economy
must generally be resilient enough to be able to adapt to changing sets of inputs – and to create ever
more value from ever fewer resources wherever substitution is not possible. 
This challenge is complicated even further through the competitive dynamics of capital. The
purpose of capital, of course, is valorization, and competition forces continual increases in labor
productivity. The value of each commodity thus produced, representing the socially necessary labor
input into their production, consequently tends to fall over time. Therefore, not only does the mass
of capital in circulation – and thus in need of valorization – keep growing, but each unit of capital
implies ever greater amounts of commodity output. The mathematics of compound growth further
imply that even with declining annual growth rates, the absolute amount of additional value added
per year may increase over time (1.5% of $15,000 is more than 2% of $10,000).
The case for this strategy nevertheless rests on the dynamic of technological development in
capitalist economies, in which firms seek to gain competitive advantage by lowering their costs and/
or improving quantity and quality of output relative to their competitors. But the logic of this profit-
maximizing strategy importantly differs from the green-tech rationale assumed here: The capitalist
law of  value  is  structured  around  labor productivity,  which  has  often  come at  the  expense  of
resource productivity, as in the industrialization of agriculture, which now relies on fewer hands but
massive fossil fuel inputs. Capital cannot simply switch priorities. “Green” capitalism, arguably,
needs to find means to improve both labor and resource productivity at the same time – the former
in order to remain capitalist and the latter in order to become “green.” These constraints to green-
tech development under capitalist conditions will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 10.
4.6.2 GSAS 2: New Landnahmen
(2) New Landnahmen: If certain resource-intensive fields of accumulation must be foreclosed or
restricted due to strict input and waste output limits, the seizure of new economic “territories” must
outweigh these losses. These Landnahmen may be extensive, involving new “green” products and
services, or intensive, for example in the shape of further privatizations in sectors such as health
care and education.
But what if the technological transformation is not realizable while maintaining macroeconomic
profitability  –  at  least  not  fast  enough  to  halt  climate  change?  What  if  more  drastic  political
interventions become necessary after all, interventions which curtail fossil fuel and other resource
consumption  to  such  a  degree  that  they  disrupt  capital  accumulation  across  the  economy?  To
address this question, it is helpful to approach the accumulation problem from a different angle.
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From  a  system-wide  perspective,  the  question  would  now  be  whether,  year  by  year,
foreclosed paths of accumulation – meaning most pertinently all carbon-heavy enterprises – can be
more than compensated for by new, more materially lightweight fields of accumulation in order to
allow for a smooth path of ongoing accumulation as envisioned in the  Green Economy  reports.
(Regarding these foreclosures as such, see GSAS 3 below.) Picking up on the concept of capitalist
Landnahmen  – seizures of social,  economic and also geographic territory for inclusion into the
circuit  of capitalist  accumulation – originally suggested by Rosa Luxemburg and more recently
reformulated by German sociologist Klaus Dörre  (2015b), the challenge could be formulated as
follows:  Each  year,  new  economic  “territory”  would  have  to  be  annexed  that  continuously
outweighs the losses incurred on fossil and otherwise unsustainable “territories.” In principle at
least,  given  the  fluid  nature  of  capital,  the  distribution  among  different  types  of  territories  is
flexible, as long as they are compatible with “green” accumulation.149 
This  perspective  combines  technological,  political,  social  and  ecological  potentials  and
constraints. Potential Landnahmen involve the development of new “green” products and services:
This is the extensive dimension, the realm of accumulation by expanded reproduction or “classical”
economic growth (see section 4.5.1 above).150 It  is driven to an important degree,  although not
exclusively,  by the development  of  “green” technologies  as  envisioned in  GSAS 1 above:  The
development of new products with low environmental impact does not require advances in “green”
technology in each case, but in many. Further processes of tertiarization – the relative increase in
149 The translators of Dörre’s essays likewise decided to stick with the original German term for want of a concise 
translation. In the most general formulation, “Landnahme … means the expansion of the capitalist mode of 
production internally and externally.” (Dörre, 2015b, p. 24) In the following, Dörre rejects Luxemburg’s linear 
understanding of Landnahmen (as an irreversible expansionary process that inevitably leads to capitalist collapse 
upon completion) in favor of a conception influenced by Harvey’s concepts of accumulation by dispossession and 
spatial fix (D. Harvey, 2004, 2001, respectively) as well as by regulation theory and Gramsci’s notion of passive 
revolution (invoked here in chapter 8): Here, capitalism survives through adaptation processes that involve 
successive rounds of decommodification and (re-)commodification, such that new “outsides” are continually re-
created as old ones are consumed. Waves of public investment (associated with the decommodification of public 
infrastructures) here are seen as fixes to absorb overaccumulated capital and provide the basis for expanded 
reproduction; pressure for the recommodification of these infrastructures tends to mount as soon as capital is once 
again desperate for new profitable outlets, and thus accumulation once more proceeds by means of dispossession. 
At times, Dörre suggests that the moments of (exploitative) decommodification equally constitute 
Landnahmen. Here, the concept veers very close to Moore’s idea of the appropriation of not-fully-commodified 
Cheap Nature (see GSAS 4 below). His emphatic rejection of Luxemburg’s linear understanding of Landnahmen 
further appears to downplay the basic expansionary logic of capital, under which the dialectic of 
decommodification—recommodification is bound to assume a clear overall directionality towards a greater absolute
amount of commodified territory (and therefore new territory will be increasingly difficult to enclose over time). 
For these reasons, I will deploy the Landnahmen concept in a more limited sense, referring only to cases of 
commodification/capitalization. The exploitation (and construction) of non-capitalist “outsides” here falls into the 
Cheap Nature category.
150 Direct “green” substitutes in established product markets (which attempt to displace “gray” incumbents) are not 
considered a Landnahme, as they do not systematically extend the reach of capital valorization. They constitute a 
combination of GSAS 1 (decoupling through technological advances) and 3 (“green” creative destruction).
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 125
economic importance of service industries – also play an important (but deeply ambivalent) role
here, which will be taken up in section 5.1.2.151
In its  intensive  dimension, by contrast,  the  Landnahmen  perspective points to a systemic
need  for  commodification  of  previously  not  fully  commodified  economic  sectors  in  order  to
compensate  for “lost” territory,  a hypothesis  elaborated in section 10.1.2.  This is  the terrain of
accumulation by dispossession.152 For example, health care and education are two important sectors
which, to different degrees in various countries, were once partially insulated from the accumulation
process in response to democratic demands (and in order to guarantee vital conditions of capitalist
reproduction). As emphasized by Dörre, the past decades of neoliberal reforms have already – for
similar  structural  reasons  –  seen  capital’s  (re-)annexation  of  much  of  this  territory  by  way of
privatizations. Structural and political pressures in this direction will persist either way, but these
tendencies are likely to receive an additional impetus in a green-capitalist scenario.
In how far Landnahmen serve as a green-capitalist strategy in practice must be determined,
like the overall question of “green” capitalism in the last instance,  politically: Political-economic
struggles will decide over successful Landnahmen, over which territories will be made available for
accumulation.  But  even  more  immediately,  long  before  accumulation  encounters  any  physical
limits, political struggles will determine to what extent capitalist access to fossil territories (and, by
extension, to territories pivotal for the protection of biodiversity and so on) really will be restricted,
and whether or not this will happen in time to avoid disastrous climate change.
4.6.3 GSAS 3: “Green” creative destruction
(3) “Green” creative destruction: Through state-enabled processes of  green creative destruction,
unsustainable  capital  assets  could  be  destroyed  so  that,  in  the  most  radical  case,  a  “green
industrial revolution” could take place in a “downsized” economy.
The third strategy considers the mechanisms that serve to contain the “gray” economy in order to
make  room  for  the  “green”  (see  below  for  this  concept’s  relation  to  the  notion  of  “green”
Landnahmen).  The  Green  Economy  model  seeks  to  avoid  economic  upheaval  and  envisions  a
smooth and stable transition. But the history of structural change in capitalist economies involves a
lot  of  what  Joseph  Schumpeter  famously  termed  creative  destruction  (Schumpeter,  2009).
According  to  Schumpeter,  the  development  of  capitalism  is  importantly  shaped  by  struggles
151 In principle, extensive “green” Landnahmen could also involve the development of new markets in not-yet-fully-
capitalist economies, much in the original Luxemburgian sense, but with a bias towards “green” products. As this 
possibility properly belongs into the broader category of capitalist-growth-within-ecological-constraints, it will not 
be treated separately here.
152 Dörre’s formulation, as previously emphasized, likewise builds on Harvey’s concept of accumulation by 
dispossession, with specific reference to the privatizations of the neoliberal era. Instead of my intensive/extensive 
distinction, Dörre speaks of internal and external Landnahmen, which are largely geographical categories. His 
internal category, however, is closely related to my intensive.
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between incumbents who engage in monopolistic practices to defend their market position and thus
contribute to systemic stabilization, on the one hand, and aggressive innovators who seek to disrupt
markets and thus lend the system its famous dynamism, on the other. Real-world capital is not all
fluid, and in the course of these struggles considerable amounts of fixed capital are devalorized
while new capitals develop. If a “green industrial revolution” really came to pass, it were bound to
involve such creative destruction at  an enormous scale – a massive devalorization of capital  in
“non-green” sectors. Sunk investments in fossil fuel infrastructures and fossil reserves that have
been turned into assets on corporate books but whose exploitation would exceed permissible carbon
emissions will have to be devalorized if “green” objectives are to be met (cf. section 2.1.2). 
What is unique to the “green industrial revolution” case of creative destruction is that it
would not be driven primarily by the vigor and superior technology of the new competitors but by
state intervention that destroys the incumbents’ no longer politically acceptable business models. In
other words, this accumulation strategy for “green” capital factions presupposes politically enforced
deaccumulation in “gray” sectors.153 Some “green” alternatives, as soon as they are established with
political support, may eventually turn out to be economically superior, but this is largely incidental
to the initial process of destruction. 
In turn, massive reverberations throughout the labor market and the financial sector are to be
expected, and consequently there is a need for further large-scale state involvement in stabilizing
this process of “green” creative destruction in order to safeguard the accumulation process and
avoid  systemic  breakdown.  To what  degree  asset  owners  will  be compensated,  of  course,  is  a
political question – but also one that immediately affects the economic consequences. This is one
point at which the need for new  Landnahmen  arises. In the case of full compensation, massive
additional  amounts  of  liquid  capital  would  flood  the  market,  and  if  productive  “green”
Landnahmen cannot keep pace, much of this may flow into highly speculative investments and/or
various forms of accumulation by dispossession.
What regulatory steps could lead in this direction? In order to ensure such alignment with
the finiteness of available material resources, a radically “green” capitalism could impose resource
input limits  to regulate material throughput as suggested in Herman Daly’s  (1991) Steady-State
Economy model. Any accumulation then would have to function on this restricted material basis.154
153 In Dörre’s (2015a, p. 259) reading, state intervention has always been part and parcel of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction. But Schumpeter (2009) really put market actors at the heart of his theorem and at best envisioned state 
action in the form of (careful and limited) trust busting to level the playing field – and not to prop up arguably less 
economically dynamic competitors.
154 While this may be relatively straightforward for renewable resources, which could theoretically be rationed 
according to their rate of renewal and thus be used sustainably, it is trickier with regard to nonrenewable resources 
like fossil fuels and minerals. Here, different criteria such as GHG emissions, recyclability and substitutability 
would have to be taken into account, and these obviously vary with the technologies deployed to process them (and 
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The input limits strategy would rely on the dynamic that Daly sought to harness: Technological
improvements could take place on a sound ecological basis without the latter being contingent upon
the success of the former. Accumulation would then have to be decoupled from both resource inputs
and waste outputs in order for “green” capitalism to be viable.
This process,  in principle, is even conceivable  without  uninterrupted economic growth (it
may,  in  fact,  be  hard  to  conceive  of  otherwise).  Precisely  because  it  is  enabled  by  political
intervention rather than economic progress, this “green” brand of creative destruction may turn out
to be regressive from a macro-capitalist standpoint. Unlike in Schumpeter’s conception, here it is
by  no  means  given  that  the  creative  aspect  will  outweigh  the  destructive.  In  the  vocabulary
deployed  above,  losses  of  economic  territory  would  not  necessarily  be  outweighed  by  new
Landnahmen “on the fly.” With adequate state power and appropriate international cooperation to
avoid  capital  flight,  an  absolute  “downsizing”  of  the  global  capitalist  economy is  theoretically
imaginable – a process by which massive amounts of capital vested in the “gray” economy are
effectively destroyed through strict regulation and indirect or direct expropriations.155 To cast these
matters in the terms suggested for the definition of capitalism’s two dimensions in section 4.1, an
emergency “anti-market” intervention would reduce – or at least temporarily contain – the power of
the  “force  field”  and  scale  back  capitalist  economic  activity  to  a  level  considered  sustainable,
without abandoning the principle of capital accumulation or the institutions of private property and
market exchange altogether. This would be an attempt to relax the structural-economic constraints
to “green” accumulation, but obviously, it immediately encounters political-economic obstacles.
Of course, this strategy would not solve the problem of compound growth in the long term,
and the fundamental contradiction between infinite growth and finite resources would reemerge
over time. The downsizing scenario would merely lower the bar for a “green industrial revolution”
somewhat as “green” accumulation initially would not have to valorize as much capital per year as
would be the case in the present global economy.
Landnahmen and  “green”  creative  destruction  are  listed  as  two  distinct  accumulation
strategies  here.  Are  they  merely  two sides  of  the  same coin?  Indeed,  their  complementarity  is
complicated by certain structural requirements of substitution. Energy infrastructures in particular
are critical enablers of capital accumulation across the economy: Decarbonization affects all manner
of production and circulation processes, and fossil fuel infrastructures as such cannot simply be
the specific uses these resources are put to). Waste outputs, including emissions, would have to be accounted for 
and restricted as well – whether by imposing separate output limits or incorporating calculations of tolerable 
outputs into input limits in order to reach a stable material throughput. In each case, the choice of regulatory focus 
between inputs and outputs may depend on technical properties of the resources and industrial processes involved.
155 This may appear paradoxical for a “systemic” accumulation strategy. But in the dialectics of capitalist development,
short-term systemic deaccumulation to facilitate longer-term accumulation opportunities is not at all unprecedented 
(cf. note 149). After all, as noted in the introduction, GSAS is a macroeconomic, not a microeconomic category.
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“foreclosed” in exchange for “green”  Landnahmen in  different  sectors but must be replaced with
equivalents.156 The same is  true of other extractive industries that  provide raw materials  for all
branches of production (see discussion of “cheap” raw materials in section 6.4). Full “territorial”
cessions  are  therefore  only  conceivable  in  certain  branches,  mostly  those  involving  specific
consumer  goods.  Cruise  ships  are  a  pertinent  example.157 In  these  cases,  Landnahmen,  which
generally refer to the development of  new markets, constitute a direct productive complement to
such  creative  destruction.  Otherwise,  “green”  creative  destruction  processes  mainly  involve  a
tipping of the scales in favor of “green” contenders within established sectors, who are driven by
technological advances towards decoupling (GSAS 1).
4.6.4 GSAS 4: Cheap Nature
(4) Cheap Nature: “Green” accumulation could proceed by reorganizing nature to sustain the
“cheap”  appropriation  of  human  and  non-human  resources  despite  tightening  ecological
constraints. But this frequently involves cost re-externalizations that directly contradict “green”
capitalism’s normative aspirations.
From a world-ecology perspective, the pivotal challenge for “green” capitalism is to find a feasible
way of organizing nature to make it work for capital without progressively undermining its capacity
to do so.158 The dilemma is that “green” capitalism as understood here, rather than securing its
purely functional survival “by any means necessary,” would have to meet certain environmental and
social demands while solving this task, as outlined in section 4.5. In order to keep its promises and
live  up to  its  definition  of  “greenness,”  it  needs  to  avoid  the  cost  externalizations  and violent
appropriations  that,  as  the  world-ecology  literature  amply  demonstrates,  have  characterized
previous  and present capitalist  formations.  Unfortunately,  the appropriation of  Cheap Nature in
Moore’s (2015, 2016) sense largely coincides with these externalizations and acts of violence. 
156 This, of course, also means that energy inputs factor as costs in practically all accumulation processes. Rising 
capitalization and profits in fossil industries therefore tend to act as a drag on overall accumulation. The loss of 
capitalist territory represented by the demise of fossil industries therefore is not necessarily catastrophic from the 
standpoint of capital as a whole. But unless energy needs can be met by other, not significantly more expensive 
means, it presents a grave problem. Here, even in a sectoral perspective, “green” gains must compensate for “gray” 
losses. As long as renewable energies are not competitive at the same scale and for the same wide range of purposes
as fossils, the latter remain capital’s “lifeblood.” (See also section 6.3.)
157 Cruise ships offer ecologically devastating consumer services which have no structural relevance. If forced to give 
up this enterprise, capital could then be redirected to new Landnahmen, for example lower-carbon branches of 
consumer amusement (extensive Landnahme) or perhaps private institutions of higher education that substitute for 
reduced places in public programs (intensive Landnahme).
158 It may be argued that from this angle, the question of “green” capitalism itself is an expression of a misguided 
nature—society dichotomy, suggesting that the task is to save nature from the encroachment of its other, humanity. 
In the world-ecology understanding, every capitalist formation in history has had to face the task of organizing 
nature under specific historical constraints in order to allow capital to reproduce itself, and the case of a potential 
“green” capitalism is no different. Like every previous formation, it would either manage or fail to organize nature 
according to its own requirements and, consequently, it would survive, become slowly supplanted or even collapse. 
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This constellation suggests – depending on one’s perspective – either another fundamental
contradiction of  or  at  least  a  dramatic  challenge for  “green” capitalism:  Unlike its  predecessor
regimes, it cannot rely on unchecked appropriation for its economic viability. From this perspective,
the ontology of natural capital – the first green-capitalist macro-strategy outlined in section 2.6.1 –
should be understood partly in terms of an attempt to square the circle by “streamlining” nature so
as  to  maximize,  as cheaply as possible,  the “ecological  services” it  provides  to  capital  without
eroding the stocks of natural capital. (In this definition, literal Landnahmen in the form of “green
grabbing” for conservation purposes also fall into the Cheap Nature category.) 
Against this background, and given that the discussion inevitably keeps returning to the
more general question of capitalism’s future and survival beyond idealized (and idealistic) models,
the economic and socio-ecological potential and limitations of the Green Economy’s Cheap Nature
strategies will receive detailed attention in chapter 6. The manifold cost re-externalizations implied
here have been identified as a third, “hidden” green-capitalist macro-strategy in section 2.6.3 and
will be discussed at length in chapter 7.
There are certain logical, structural and historical overlaps between these strategies. As suggested
above, any real-world “green” capitalism would likely rely on a – more or less contradictory –
combination of all four. Much of the established resource-intensive infrastructure is  functionally
indispensable for capital  accumulation,  and thus “green” modernization through replacement by
equivalent “green” alternatives (GSAS 1) is the only option in many cases; although this will also
involve some degree of state intervention to “creatively” destroy incumbent industries (GSAS 3).
But in certain areas, transformation will require established fields of accumulation to fall away or be
shrunk  (GSAS  3  again):  Individual  motorized  transport  via  SUVs  in  metropolitan  areas,  for
example, may be considered unaffordable. This loss of territory may need to be compensated for
through other consumption alternatives with smaller footprints, even if these may involve the quasi-
forced consumption of more expensive privatized education and other basic services (GSAS 2).
Another part of this loss will be replaced more directly with electric vehicles (GSAS 1 once more),
which,  however,  may  run  on  batteries  produced  from  raw  materials  cheaply  extracted  under
hazardous conditions with significant pollution of local environments (GSAS 4). 
A more  detailed  empirical  assessment  of  the  relative  weight  of  these  strategies  in  the
“actually emerging” Green Economy will be undertaken in section 9.1. Next, the discussion focuses
on the first of these strategies, decoupling, so prominently reflected in the gospel of eco-efficiency.
Meanwhile, the framework proposed here, and the underlying value-theoretical deliberations, may
be refined – and perhaps even developed further in a quantitative direction – in future research.
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5. “Green” technology: The Gospel of Eco-Efficiency
The  reliance  on  technology  to  solve  socio-ecological  problems  has  long  been  subjected  to  all
manner of critique. In the early 1960s, Herbert Marcuse (1964) insisted that the effect of technology
quickly evolved from the liberation into the domination of humans, and a half-century later, Evgeny
Morozov  decried  the  prevalent  culture  of  what  he  dubbed  “solutionism”  for  largely  the  same
reasons (2013). While acknowledging the ideological role of techno-optimism in depoliticizing the
question  of  a  “green”  transformation,  this  chapter  will  focus  on  political  economy  more  than
cultural aspects and  interrogate the  gospel of eco-efficiency –  the reliance on green-technological
solutions  to  ecological  problems,  identified  as  one  of  three  green-capitalist  macro-strategies  in
section 2.6 – from a number of related angles. The first section considers the physical and technical
dimension of decoupling, highlighting both limitations and side effects. The second section dissects
the complexity of “green” technological development under specifically capitalist conditions.
The category of “green” technology itself  is  of course contested; ultimately,  almost  any
technology  could  be  subject  to  “greenwashing.”  As  understood  here,  the  category  comprises
technologies to raise resource efficiency – potentially including “smart” IT applications – as well as
those that alter the economy’s material base, for example by enabling a turn to renewable resources
(consistency strategies as discussed in section 5.1.3). It may also refer to restorative technologies –
pollution filters may be the most basic example – or, with reference to greenhouse gas emissions,
negative  emissions  technologies  (NETs,  see  section  7.3).  The  quotation  marks  are  applied  to
highlight the contested nature of most of these technologies and the frequent re-externalizations that
render their “greenness” problematic. These will be more thoroughly scrutinized in bloc III.
5.1 Elusive decoupling
Thesis 5.1: At a systemic scale, absolute decoupling remains an elusive goal: Not only is it a great
challenge on arithmetic grounds, but much-promoted dematerialization methods such as tertiariza-
tion or digitalization do not lead to systemic decoupling. Consistency approaches may offer some
potential but are relatively neglected in the GE.
This  section  engages  with  the  stubborn  materiality  of  economic  processes  and  highlights  the
limitations of the Green Economy’s fixation on efficiency as a sustainability strategy.
5.1.1 The arithmetic of “green” growth
The difficulty of decoupling capital accumulation from resource and sink consumption is, first of
all, easy to illustrate through a few simple calculations for one exemplary dimension of ecological
sustainability.  Taking  the  case  of  climatic  stability,  Tim  Jackson  (2009) calculated  the  carbon
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intensity reductions for the global economy until 2050 that would be compatible with a 450 ppm
goal for atmospheric CO2 concentrations – the same number targeted in the GE reports, although it
remains questionable both from the standpoint of climate science and that of global justice (see
section 3.1). Given that Jackson begins from a historical starting point similar to the GE studies, his
work lends itself to an immanent critique of the GE’s decoupling promise. 
Jackson notes that from 1990 through 2007, global carbon intensity (emissions per dollar of
GDP) sank by about 0.7% per year – evidence of modest  relative  decoupling – while absolute
emissions still significantly increased; thus, no absolute decoupling was in sight. He calculates that
even with very modest global GDP growth of 1.4% p.a., the rate of decoupling needed to increase
tenfold to reach the 450 ppm goal with a world population of 9 billion in 2050. This would amount
to a decrease in carbon intensity by a factor of 21. To put this into perspective: A popular green-tech
vision is optimistically titled Factor Five (Weizsäcker et al., 2010), arguing that a fivefold increase
in resource efficiency throughout the economy was technically feasible. In another scenario that
factors in  global  equity concerns  – poverty alleviation and catch-up development  in  the global
South are core goals of the Green Economy after all –, to bring every country in the world to a level
of prosperity equal to the 2007 EU GDP plus 2% annual growth until 2050, global carbon intensity
needs to be optimized by 11% every  year, amounting to an improvement by a factor of 130 – in
other words, more or less a zero-carbon economy (6 grams of CO2 per dollar as opposed to 768 g in
2007). Green-technological change, accordingly, would need to be accelerated by a factor greater
than 15. Of course, for a 2% growth rate to be maintained after 2050, these annual improvements
would have to be taken further,  up to the point of total  decarbonization and, depending on the
stabilization scenario chosen, to negative net emissions by the end of the century (T. Jackson, 2009,
pp. 77–82, see also section 7.3). These numbers highlight that decoupling is decisively complicated
by the exponential arithmetic of growth. Sustainability here necessarily appears as a moving target
relative to the status quo – and it seems to accelerate continuously in its escape movement. 
Evidence of the decoupling of  economic growth from emissions,  meanwhile,  is  limited.
According to OECD data, for the CO2 intensity of global GDP, measured in emissions per unit of
GDP, progress is visible but much too slow: Over the first half of the 2010s, the average annual
improvement was 2.23%, up from the 2000s value of just below 1% p.a. (while the 1990s saw an
1.7% p.a.  increase).  For OECD countries as a whole,  the figure is  somewhat higher at  slightly
below 3%, but still far below the 7% and 11% p.a. benchmarks calculated by Tim Jackson (and
these are production-based figures which conceal the effects of “embodied” emissions, see section
2.1.2).  In  fact,  the global  efficiency gain exactly  equals  the per-capita  GDP growth rate,  while
absolute GDP growth even exceeds the efficiency increase (which is not the case for the OECD,
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given its modest economic and population growth rates).159 And these series cut off in 2016, at the
end  of  the  brief  period  of  stagnating  global  emissions.  The  ongoing  overall  growth  in  global
emissions throughout the 2010s means that the required improvement factors are even steeper now
than calculated by Jackson a decade earlier, even as relative carbon intensity has been reduced.160 In
absolute terms, massive economic growth continues to outweigh the efficiency effect.
As frequently noted, decoupling is further complicated by the  rebound effect,  also dubbed
the Jevons paradox (for a history of the concept, see Foster, Clark, & York, 2010c). This refers to
the tendency of efficiency gains to result in  increased resource consumption – for example, cars
with higher fuel economy make driving cheaper and thus provide an incentive to drive more. While
the extent to which such direct rebounds materialize varies according to the specificity of each good
and is generally contested (cf. Gillingham, 2013), the rebound effect, in its more indirect forms, is a
relevant  factor  at  the  macroeconomic  level.  Efficiency  savings,  wherever  they  are  not  directly
reinvested  in  “more  of  the  same,” free  up  income  to  be  spent  elsewhere  and  thus  generally
contribute  to  (material  and  economic)  growth.  This  effect,  after  all,  is  the  basis  of  the
macroeconomic argument for efficiency improvements in the first place. Even where the overall
environmental rebound is smaller than the original savings – which is eventually a highly context-
dependent empirical question –, it considerably reduces any net savings in resources and emissions
and further raises the bar for technological solutions, increasing the sheer magnitude of technical
efficiency gains necessary to reach a given level of total resource consumption or emissions.
Meanwhile,  UNEP acknowledges  that  in  manufacturing  industries,  the  “rate  of  energy
efficiency increase has been  slowing down since the 1960s.”  (2011, p. 269 emphasis added) Its
International Resource Panel  reports that overall energy productivity in the global economy has
been stagnant since 2000, and material  productivity has  declined over this  period  (International
Resource  Panel,  2017,  pp.  29–30;  supported  in  Parrique  et  al.,  2019,  pp.  20–21).161 Industrial
ecologist  Joseph  Huber  (1999,  p.  13) already  claimed  two  decades  ago  that  the  “efficiency
revolution”  had  reached  its  peak,  noting  the  tendency  of  efficiency  strategies  to  produce
increasingly  structurally  conservative  effects  (cf.  section  5.1.3).  Others  have  argued  that  the
ecological modernization paradigm’s approach to decoupling is much too narrow as it has unduly
prioritized efficiency in (broadly understood) technologies of resource consumption while ignoring
the fact that, with the depletion of high-quality and easily accessible resources, extraction itself has
become increasingly inefficient across many mineral and energy resources (Davidson, Andrews, &
159 All figures are author’s calculations based on data in OECD (n.d.).  
160 For a later edition, Jackson updated his calculations in view of rapidly dwindling carbon budgets. In a global equity 
scenario with emissions cuts of 95% by 2035 – required to avoid blowing the entire global budget in the near future
–, the annual carbon intensity improvement would have to reach 18% (cited in Parrique et al., 2019, p. 52).
161 Energy and material productivity are defined as GDP per MJ of energy or kg of raw material, respectively.
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Pauly, 2014; see discussion in section 6.4). All of this suggests that in some sectors at least, the
challenge is not just one of accelerating an established trend towards a more eco-efficient economy
but of fundamentally reversing a historical trend in which “low-hanging fruit” appear to have been
picked rapidly for economic reasons before ecological constraints emerged as a serious political
issue – a decline against which decades of environmental politics appear to have been powerless.
Recent modeling studies involuntarily confirm the difficulties of comprehensive decoupling.
An international  team of  researchers  deploying a  complex modeling  “architecture”  to  calculate
decoupling scenarios until 2050 – including raw material extraction and greenhouse gas emissions –
found that “economic growth, per se, is not the main problem for environmental pressures” and
there is “no real contradiction” in reconciling economic and environmental goals (Schandl et al.,
2016, p. 54). “Very strong” GHG abatement and resource efficiency policies would hardly put a
dent in global economic growth. Unfortunately, these conclusions are not supported by their own
best-case estimates for global resource use and carbon emissions, based on the assumption of global
economy-wide  implementation  of  the  most  efficient  technologies  and  a  global  carbon  tax  that
progressively rises to $236 per ton. In their model, global carbon emissions in 2050 would be at
about the mid-2010s level, and overall material extraction would rise by 20% over this period (in
which scenario this team, puzzlingly, spots “a good chance of limiting global warming to 2° C or
less”; ibid., p. 49 – see discussion in section 3.1).162 
The team next refined their modeling for UNEP’s International Resource Panel  (Hatfield-
Dodds et al., 2017; International Resource Panel, 2017; Ekins & Hughes, 2017), now coming to
paradoxical  conclusions.  Due to  increased  incorporation of  rebound effects  and the  inability  to
model gains from potential circular economy approaches (cf. section 10.1.3), their calculations now
found that resource use, in the most ambitious efficiency-and-abatement scenario, would rise by a
whopping 58% from 2015 to 2050. The carbon tax in this case – starting, again, at a mere US$5 in
2021 – is set to rise to $573 by 2050, and global GHG emissions are consequently supposed to fall
by 63% over the same period. This is particularly confounding given that in the first study, it was
repeatedly  emphasized that  the  absolute  amount  of  resource  extraction  was the  most  important
parameter  in  the  overall  relationship  between resource  use and GHG emissions,  a  vastly  more
important driver of emissions than the relative GHG intensity of the materials used. Now, despite a
drastically  more pessimistic  perspective on the potential  for  resource efficiency (the “greenest”
2050 scenario now puts total resource extraction at 132 billion tons, up from 95 billion), GHG
162 In fact, their “high efficiency” scenario sees an initial sharp decline in carbon emissions following the imposition of
a carbon tax, and then a slow but steady rise in emissions that is not reversed by 2050, when the model cuts off. The
authors themselves concede that the initial decline predicted in their model is “somewhat unrealistic” (ibid., p. 49), 
leaving the reader to wonder whether an improved model would not, with the same parameters, result simply in a 
somewhat flattened emissions growth curve until 2050 – and beyond. 
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emissions are suddenly projected to implode relative to the first model – simply through a doubling
of  the  carbon  tax.163 The  International  Resource  Panel (2017,  p.  44) derives  more  ambivalent
conclusions from these same numbers, noting “substantial potential” for “win-win outcomes” but
emphasizing that the best-case scenario would still entail “huge environmental impacts, contribute
to surpassing important global boundaries … and increase the risk of pushing the Earth System into
a different state.” All scenarios, meanwhile, project unbroken economic growth until 2050.164
5.1.2 The fallacy of the immaterial
This  also  bears  on  the  shift  to  “clean”  or  “immaterial”  services  or  a  “digital”  or  “knowledge
economy” frequently advertised as a decoupling strategy – an idea that can be traced back at least to
the early 1970s (Meadows, 1972, p. 174). Here, the stubborn “materiality of the immaterial” (Roos,
Kostakis, & Giotitsas, 2016) reveals itself. As Christian Fuchs put it, “the number of products that
can potentially be reduced to an ‘informational core’ is limited” and, thus, “[t]he knowledge society
is not an immaterial society, but a new phase in the material reality of capitalism.” (Fuchs, 2008, pp.
295, 299) Three arguments stand in the way of such dematerialization fantasies.
Firstly,  many of these services are  tied to quite material  infrastructures,  for example,  in
information  and  communication  technologies  (ICTs)  and  transportation  –  with  ICTs,  not  least
because of the rapid cycles of innovation and obsolescence combined with the toxicity of many
materials involved, accumulating increasingly worrisome ecological footprints (Chen, 2016; Lange
& Santarius,  2018).  A decade ago,  optimistic  assessments  held that  the efficiencies enabled by
digitalization could outweigh such effects (Ciocoiu, 2011; Forge, Blackman, Bohlin, & Cave, 2009;
The Climate Group, 2008). But the ICT sector’s energy use and GHG emissions have skyrocketed
throughout the 2010s with annual growth rates around 10% and 8%, respectively, and actual data
routinely exploding even short-term forecast trajectories (The Shift Project, 2019). The most recent
forecasts expect the sector’s share in global GHGs to reach 7.6% by 2025 (ibid., p. 64); here, even
energy intensity per dollar of output has increased by 37% since 2010, such that unlike the overall
163 It turns out that in these studies, even the baseline numbers for historical GHG emissions are, for some reason, 
much lower than in the cited source (and in official accounts). The Hatfield-Dodds study (2017, p. 407) cites the 
Climate Action Tracker database as the source of its emissions data. Its graph strangely provides two curves, one 
that resembles – but does not match exactly – the historical emissions figures provided by the Climate Action 
Tracker (2019b), which stipulate historical emissions of 51 GtCO2e in 2015, and a second line on which the study’s 
scenarios are based – this has global emissions at slightly above 40 GtCO2e in 2015. The Netherlands’ 
Environmental Assessment Agency, whose reports are frequently cited, indicates 49 GtCO2e in 2015 (Olivier et al., 
2017, p. 46).
164 The studies characterize the resource efficiency potential given here as “conservative” and “a reasonable minimum 
estimate.” (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2017, p. 408) (In particular, they exclude the possibility of technological 
breakthroughs.) At the same time, it is noted that “business and government actions [to achieve the resource 
efficiency potential estimated here] will also involve a range of upfront costs and expenses” which “have not been 
fully accounted for.” (Ekins & Hughes, 2017, p. 284) In other words, greater absolute savings in resources may be 
possible, but even the realization of the savings promised here may detract more from economic growth than the 
figures suggest.
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economy,  it  is  becoming  less  energy-efficient  (ibid.,  pp.  4,  60)  Digital  “mining”  for  the
cryptocurrency Bitcoin alone is now estimated to produce as much CO2 as the entire economy of
Austria, as well as ten million tons of e-waste per year (Digiconomist, 2019b, 2019a).165 Lange and
Santarius (2018) conclude that in  view of – usually fully intended – massive consumption rebounds
associated  with  efficiency-raising  “smart”  solutions  in  sectors  such  as  transportation  and
(e-)commerce, the environmental impact of most digital technologies strongly depends on actual
usage patterns – which, under capitalist conditions, have been mostly biased in favor of maximum
commercial gains rather than optimal environmental outcomes.
Secondly, many service industries only exist and grow because they cater to others who are
involved  in  very  material  production,  as  in  finance,  accounting  or  advertising.166 The  alleged
“dematerialization” of value creation in the  digital economy, again, is a salient case in point. A
particularly illustrative example is the debate around digital value production supposedly happening
on platforms such as Facebook. Much has been made of the apparent fact that Facebook, as one of
the flagship corporations of the digital economy, is appropriating value produced through the “free”
labor of its users (Böhm, Land, et al., 2012; cf. Fumagalli, Lucarelli, Musolino, & Rocchi, 2018).167
But, building on the discussion in section 4.4, it is worth emphasizing that these platforms represent
commercial capital that is properly located in the sphere of circulation, which serves the realization
of  (surplus)  value  produced in  the  sphere  of  production.168 Users’ “free”  labor  creates  a  social
commons controlled by Facebook and consisting of vast amounts of data, which enables a reduction
in transaction costs by creating a platform which tailors advertising to individual interests with
much greater precision than previous media channels, while requiring much lower operating costs.
165 In late 2017, at the height of the Bitcoin boom, it was projected based on an extrapolation of the then-current 
growth trend that Bitcoin would overtake the entire U.S. in electricity consumption by mid-2019 – and the rest of 
the world (!) by early 2020 (Holthaus, 2017; Shane, 2017). The Green Economy institutions, meanwhile, take a 
more sanguine perspective, arguing that despite “concerns around blockchains’ CO2 impacts …. the technology can 
also help fight climate change” by powering  investment platforms for low-carbon projects (OECD et al., 2018, p. 
15) – as if it were a lack of digital investment tools that has limited “green” investments up to this point.
166 Again, the integrated framework provided by Marx’s concept of the circuit of capital, developed in Volume II of 
Capital (Marx, 1979), is helpful to avoid fallacies based on isolated sectoral perspectives (cf. Mohun, 1996; see 
also Arboleda, 2019 for an application of this framework with respect to raw material extraction and the service 
industries involved).
167 This is here framed as an instance of the autonomist concept of the becoming-rent of profit (Vercellone, 2010): 
“This idea of a ‘profit-becoming rent’ shifts the dominant logic of value production in the heartlands of the so-
called advanced capitalist economies.” (Böhm, Land, & Beverungen, 2012, p. 12) Building on autonomist theories 
of immaterial labor (Atzert, 2006; Hardt & Negri, 2003, 2004, 2009) but apparently not sharing the latter’s view 
that such developments really sound capital’s death knell, this “free” or “digital” labor is understood to be a form of
exploitation that reaches beyond the wage relation to capitalize on everyday forms of social interaction that produce
data which “originates a ‘network value’ as the result of a[n] interaction between human and linguistic labour and 
digitalized infrastructures (the platforms).” (Fumagalli, Lucarelli, Musolino, & Rocchi, 2018, p. 2)
168 The raison d’être of commercial capital as a separate sphere of business is precisely that it allows for a reduction of 
transaction or realization costs relative to a model in which producing firms individually take care of all marketing 
and distribution matters. Commercial capital therefore gets to share in the surplus value extracted in production, and
industrial capital still fares better since the inevitable drain on its profit through the cumbersome work of value 
realization is reduced (Marx, 1981, Chapters 16–17). 
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This quasi-monopoly enables Facebook to extract a massive rent – but this  rent ultimately just
represents a share of the surplus value originating from the very material production sites run by its
advertising customers  (Srnicek, 2017; and Huws, 2014, Chapter 7 come to similar conclusions).
This facilitates systemic accumulation only in so far as it increases commercial efficiency, not by
shifting the  production  of value to the virtual  realm. Instead of a  “dematerialization” of value,
systemic accumulation in this constellation still rests on increasing volumes of ordinary material
production  and consumption.  The greater  the  positive  effect  on  accumulation,  the  more  output
growth is effected. Other digital economy giants have not dematerialized value production either.169
Thirdly, spatially uneven tertiarization processes – the shift of employment and GDP shares
to ostensibly “cleaner” service industries in the “old” industrial core zones – need to be understood
in the context of a  changing global division of labor.  This illustrates the dynamic described in
section  2.1.2:  Energy-  and  materials-intensive  production  activity  has  shifted  to  “emerging
economies”  –  and  the  environmental  “footprint,”  both  physical  and  statistical,  has  thus  been
outsourced while much of the product is re-imported for consumption in the newly “cleaned-up”
service economies  (OECD researchers  have documented this  for  carbon emissions  in Wiebe &
Yamano, 2016; a UNEP research team emphasizes these effects with regards all manner of raw
materials:  International  Resource  Panel,  2017).  Recent  research  found  that  this  “embodied”
resource use neutralized all evidence of decoupling of materials use across the OECD (Wiedmann
et al.,  2015), and no evidence of absolute decarbonization through tertiarization has been found
(Fix, 2019).  An isolated perspective on national or regional trends easily obscures such relation-
ships and enables misleading claims on the dematerializing effects of tertiarization. Even in their
GE reports, the OECD (2011b, p. 117) and UNEP (2011, pp. 259–260) have pointed out that much
of the historical statistical evidence of decoupling in the North stems from such shifts.  (See also
Zimmermann, 2019 for the very material labor realities underlying islands of “immaterial” labor.)
Coming from a global perspective, then, neither of the Green Economy reports makes much
of tertiarization as a means of decoupling (a  later OECD report  establishes this  link,  however;
OECD, 2017b). This is honest enough, but of course, it also signals that the pressure on material
infrastructures to receive an eco-efficiency overhaul is enormous.
169 The business models of the four corporations considered the major players of the digital economy, commonly 
bracketed together under the acronym GAFA, express the dilemma fairly well: Like Facebook, Google essentially 
functions as an advertising platform to facilitate the realization of (usually quite material) values produced 
elsewhere; Amazon is predominantly still a retailer of all manner of commodities (mostly physical, but also digital 
– offering, for example, highly energy-consuming high-definition video streaming); Apple, finally, produces 
physical devices whose enormous brand value allows for an intensified super-exploitation of cheap Asian labor, and
which leave a growing ecological footprint. (The Shift Project (2019, p. 30) cites figures which illustrate how each 
generation of Apple’s smartphones has become more carbon-intensive; its tablet computers likewise show a sharp 
uptick in production-related emissions.)
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5.1.3 The consistency dimension
The  gospel of eco-efficiency suggests a limited conception even of “green” technology. Whereas
efficiency means using less of the same materials  to yield a given level of service,  consistency
signals  a  sift  to  an  entirely  different  material  base,  which  is  less  subject  to  resource  and sink
constraints.  Forming  the  second  pillar  of  the  sustainability  triad  of  efficiency—consistency—
sufficiency170, consistency strategies envision the substitution of renewable for nonrenewable and
nontoxic  for  toxic  materials  and  energy  sources.  Partisans  have  argued  that  an  economic
transformation  towards  sustainability  would  require  privileging  such  strategies,  which  have
historically been marginalized in favor of more moderate and incremental efficiency approaches (J.
Huber, 1999). The appeal of visionary ideas of “green” capitalism rests, to a considerable degree, on
the breathtaking promise to replace coal and oil with solar energy and algae, concrete and plastics
with clean and flexible plant-based materials – and to develop, on this material basis, an economy
that functions as a closed loop, with adverse environmental impacts through waste and pollution
eliminated conceptually. This section thus covers a set of related strategies that all take the green-
tech case beyond mere efficiency and follow a consistency approach. These carry a plethora of
labels such as industrial ecology, biomimicry or the bioeconomy.171 
Renewable  energy  production  does  play  a  role  in  the  Green  Economy  reports.  Such
consistency efforts obviously can and must be coupled with efficiency increases in order to achieve
ambitious decarbonization targets. The OECD (2011b, Chapter 2) concentrates much of its policy
advice on strategies to foster renewable energy, through market-based incentives as well as research
and development funding. But even as UNEP predicts a 20-fold increase (!) in biofuels production
by 2050 (2011, p. 397), suggesting that much renewable energy production will continue to come
from the most socially and ecologically contested sources, by the same year it only envisions 27%
of  total  global  energy  production  to  hail  from  renewable  sources  (ibid.,  pp.  223–224)  The
170 The third pillar, sufficiency, refers to a sense of “enoughness” – the idea that material human needs are ultimately 
limited and an undue focus on more material goods at some point decreases the quality of life. Unsurprisingly, this 
concept is generally absent from capitalist Green Economy visions. (For brief introductions to the sustainability 
triad, see Linz, 2004, pp. 7–10; von Winterfeld, 2007, pp. 47–49; Bartkowski, 2012) 
171 The contested bioeconomy label, which has been adopted as an economic growth strategy by the EU and the United
States alike, comprises both a biomass-based “green” economy – this part falls into the consistency category – and 
biotechnological innovation more broadly defined (for overviews of this dual concept, see Birner, 2018; Pavone & 
Goven, 2017; for a critique of the inflationary use of increasingly fuzzy “bio-concepts,” see Birch, 2017).
The ambivalent role of biotechnology from both an economic and an ecological perspective will be briefly 
discussed in section 11.6. Generally, in spite of predictable industry communication touting the environmental 
benefits of biotechnology, it should not be confused with “green” technology. The overlap between the two 
categories as commonly understood is small, and their conflation, to a great extent, under the bioeconomy label is 
patently unhelpful.
At the same time, some biomass-oriented activities grouped under the bioeconomy label are not necessarily 
systemic accumulation strategies; they do not necessarily involve “green” high-tech innovation either. Payments for
ecosystem services (PES) schemes, for example, are usually redistributive programs to improve the efficiency of 
natural capital management. 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 138
limitations  of  these  “green”  energy  futures  will  be  discussed  in  section  6.3.  Beyond  energy,
however, the reports have little to say about consistency strategies. Even UNEP’s (2011, pp. 241–
286) chapter on manufacturing focuses almost exclusively on energy and resource efficiency.
At  the  level  of  industrial  technology,  meanwhile,  the  case  for  an  all-encompassing
bioeconomy has been presented by green-capitalist visionaries, writing in the tradition of industrial
ecology, in terms of a reconciliation between capital and nature (Fücks, 2013; Hawken et al., 2000).
Compared  to  the  ontology  of  natural  capital,  the  direction  of  mimesis  undergoes  a  reversal:
Strategies of  biomimicry or  bionics  seek to imitate the workings of nature in particular industrial
processes, for example by taking inspiration from plants and other organisms to meet engineering
challenges in an ecologically and economically efficient manner. “If you have to solve a problem,
chances are  nature already did it,”  as some proponents  jovially  put it  (Silverstein,  DeCarlo,  &
Samuel, 2009, p. 153). Such approaches even reach beyond the bioeconomy as defined above, and
they span across the categories of efficiency and consistency. For example, the development of new
coatings for the hulls of ships has been inspired by shark skin, whose structure reduces aquatic plant
growth and tractional resistance, thus improving fuel efficiency  (Fücks, 2013, p. 206). Early on,
biomimicry was proposed as a central green-capitalist strategy  (Hawken et al., 2000).  The larger
claim here is that these techniques are expressions of a holistic approach to industrial production
that, rather than working against the grain of nature and seeking to vanquish it, “goes with the flow”
of  natural  processes  and  profits  from  their  extension  into  industrial  settings  rather  than  their
disruption. Mimesis is thus understood as the ultimate gesture of respect for nature. 
But  while  there  may  be  considerable  technological  potential  in  biomimicry  and  other
industrial  ecology  approaches,  their  overall  ecological  impact  crucially  depends  on  the  wider
context in which these practices are embedded, as discussed in the second part of this chapter. For
capital, biomimicry is first and foremost interesting as a productivity-enhancing strategy, regardless
of ecological effects – so it prioritizes the most economically attractive, not necessarily the most
ecologically sensible applications of biomimicry. Many of these are strictly functional, involving
nonrenewable  resources  and  toxic  by-products,  with  no  declared  “green”  purpose  whatsoever.
While many material production processes may in principle be restructured in fascinating ways with
inspiration from nature, which in many cases leaves them better attuned to ecological reproduction
cycles, this is not the case with the abstract logic of capital and its manifestations in concrete market
situations,  which  significantly  constrain  the  realization  of  such  transformations  in  the  material
sphere.172 This helps to explain why many of the high-tech dreams the “natural capitalists” indulged
172 None of this, of course, is to suggest that social relations themselves should be derived from some “natural” model, 
which does not exist in the first place.
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in during the 1990s have not been implemented at larger scales, and why those innovations that
have been realized have not, cumulatively, yielded a significant reduction in resource throughput.
That consistency strategies play a subordinate role in the GE framework, as opposed to the
equal  footing suggested  by the  sustainability  triad,  is  nevertheless  somewhat  surprising  from a
Cheap Nature perspective: Significant potential for the appropriation of raw materials and energy
may be found here. This does not necessarily mean cheap in Moore’s original sense as discussed in
the following chapter.173 But in the long run, it may be argued that they could prove cheaper than
fully  capitalized  and  increasingly  expensive  conventional,  particularly  fossil,  resources  –
particularly if coupled with effective cost internalization measures that change relative price levels,
as  suggested  in  GE models.  Land  constraints,  of  course,  should  eventually  inhibit  growth  of
renewable  materials  production,  including  fiber-based  substitutes,  and  biofuels  production  is
already  proving  problematic  at  a  modest  scale  (see  section  6.3.3).  But  it  would  be  quite
uncharacteristic of the GE to refrain from exploring these limits.
The discussion in the second part of this chapter will probe into the economic roots of the
relative neglect of further-reaching decoupling strategies in the Green Economy. The political roots,
meanwhile, lie in the reluctance of the GE  models to advocate more robust interventions in and
beyond market processes that could manipulate incentive structures – and rework economic infra-
structures – in favor of greener technologies (see discussions in section 10.1), and their reluctance
to confront established industries head-on (see chapter 8) – hence the limited reach of the GE in a
field which arguably should constitute a cornerstone of a technology-oriented macro-strategy. In
this sense, the choice of gospel of eco-efficiency as a metaphor for technology-focused approaches
attests  to  a  reductionist  moment in  the hegemonic  model,  in  which even the realm of  “green”
technology itself is understood in remarkably narrow terms. This is particularly true for materials,
but even for energy, the Green Economy approach is relatively conservative in its ambition.
5.1.4 The enshrinement of efficiency
I will conclude this section by problematizing the notion of efficiency itself in the context of the
Green Economy. As we have seen, applied to technology – as energy or resource efficiency –, the
privileging  of  incremental  efficiency  strategies  distracts  from more  comprehensive  consistency
approaches.  Its  relative  prominence  in  the  GE model  may be explained in  part  by the  general
epistemic and discursive power enjoyed by the abstract concept of efficiency in economics. 
173 Moore’s concept revolves around the appropriation of nature at below-market rates. While biomimicry strategies 
may be said to freely appropriate and capitalize on nature’s problem-solving capacities, these solutions tend to be 
quite capital-intensive, as suggested by the term industrial ecology.
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“Efficiency” is not just to be critiqued as an abstraction – applied at a macroeconomic scale
and viewed in isolation, it is perhaps no more than a theoretical artifact. The GE studies insist on
efficiency as a supreme value, for example when they univocally call for the termination of fossil
fuel subsidies as the latter  reduce the economic (and ecological)  efficiency of many economies
(OECD,  2011b,  pp.  100–101;  UNEP,  2011,  pp.  214–217;  World  Bank,  2012,  p.  15).
Macroeconomic efficiency is also the crucial argument for market-based compliance schemes such
as carbon trading systems.  The obsession with efficiency goes so far as to prioritize this abstract
notion  over  the  actual  efficacy of  GE  policies.  UNEP  (2011,  pp.  172–173),  for  example,
acknowledges that the effectiveness of many forest-related PES schemes is very questionable, but it
nevertheless  appears  determined  to  continue  pursuing  these  market-based  policies  due  to  their
allegedly superior efficiency. 
Unfortunately,  of  course,  efficiency is  defined as  the  minimum expenditure  of  effort  to
accomplish a certain task – it  follows logically that if  the goal is not accomplished, the policy
cannot in any practical sense be considered  efficient; it might merely be  cheap. The OECD takes
this dilemma to an extreme when considering the optimal timing of policy action:  “On the one
hand, any additional delays … could lead to barely reversible environmental damage …. On the
other hand, taking action now runs the risk of being locked into inefficient technologies.” (OECD,
2013,  p.  3) The threat  of  irreversible  damages – perhaps even dangerous to  survival  – is  here
weighed against the threat of potential inefficiency, suggesting the latter’s sacrilegious status.
Either way, while revered by economists, real market actors and the power relations among
them, as well as between them and legislative institutions, hardly care about theoretical economy-
wide  efficiency.  In  each  case,  there  has  been  entrenched  resistance  against  actually  elevating
“efficiency” in this sense to a serious policy goal – as with full-price carbon trading, which would
deal a heavy blow to fossil industries (for detailed evidence of such resistance, see Brunnengräber,
2009a; Sander, 2016). As long as it abstracts from actual politics, as neoclassical economic theory
commonly does and liberalism more generally has tended towards by assuming a politics/economy
dualism (Polanyi, 1965, pp. 169–170), green-capitalist strategy is bound to run aground. This allows
the gap between  theoretically eco-efficient and  actually built infrastructure to grow even wider.
(This thread will be taken up in bloc IV.)
5.2 Green-tech development under capitalist conditions
Thesis 5.2: Green-tech development and diffusion under capitalist circumstances are constrained
by capital’s technological selectivity, which structurally privileges labor over resource productivity
and favors incremental innovation, and by restrictions imposed through intellectual property rights.
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The Green Economy narrative highlights the power of the market to drive green-tech development.
But a critical investigation points to several constraints to the development and diffusion of “green”
technologies  that  are  specific  to  capitalist  circumstances,  as  the  first  two  subsections  here
demonstrate.  The  final  subsection  then  begins  to  consider  the  capitalist  perspective  that
characterizes the following chapter: What can green-tech do for capital?
5.2.1 Capital’s technological selectivity
The sheer scale of the acceleration of technological progress necessary to contain climate change in
green growth scenarios is only one part of the problem. In principle, significant potential exists for
reducing  environmental  pressures  through  technology  across  many  sectors  of  the  economy,
stimulating visions of a high-tech Green Economy that divests itself of ecological burdens through
pure ingenuity. But while some advances in eco-efficiency have been realized and the deployment
of  renewable  energy,  for  example,  shows continuous growth,  the futuristic  promise of  painless
sustainability-cum-prosperity that works such as  Natural Capitalism  (Hawken et al., 2000) have
synthesized from experimental evidence since the 1990s is still just that: an “ever-receding future
possibility.”  (Goldstein, 2018, p. 142) And those developments that have been realized frequently
turned  out  controversial:  UNEP  (2011,  p.  207) recognizes  that  over  90% of  renewable  energy
production hails from the most contested renewable sources, large hydropower and biofuels, whose
negative social and environmental by-effects are well documented. Its GE report accordingly warns
that “[r]enewable energy is not synonymous with sustainability.” (Ibid., p. 235; cf. section 6.3) The
fact  that  those  renewable  capacities  that  have been  realized  are  those  most  laden with  painful
externalizations has everything to do with the technological selectivity of capitalist development.
Moore  (2016) points out that the rise of capitalism historically entailed a paradigm shift
from  land,  or  resource,  to  labor productivity  – one  of  the decisive changes  capital  brought  to
societal relations with nature. Ever since, the priority has not been to obtain the maximum utility
from a given input of scarce resources (even if it took more work), but to produce a given output
with the least possible amount of human labor (even if that required a much higher expenditure of
energy or material resources, which it commonly did). This is dictated by the capitalist value form,
each commodity’s value – and, consequently, its  exchange  value – here being based on the labor
time “socially necessary” for its production under given economic and technical circumstances,
including the “dead” labor embodied in inputs such as raw materials. This promises a competitive
advantage for those who innovatively economize on necessary labor time, as they can capture, at
least  temporarily,  some  extra  surplus  value  –  a  dynamic  largely  responsible  for  all  capitalist
technological development (cf. Wallerstein, 2004, Chapter 2). These circumstances place important
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constraints on any political desire – as expressed in earlier green-capitalist thought (Hawken et al.,
2000) – to prioritize, in the name of “greening” production, resource productivity instead. The latter
cannot be directly and systematically maximized as it relates to use values, whose development in
turn is only contingently related to that of the respective commodities’ exchange value, which, to
the extent that it is determined by commodity values rather than monopoly conditions or arbitrary
market fluctuations, remains fundamentally determined by the development of labor productivity.174
Under  capitalism,  thus,  with  profit  maximization  as  the  primary  criterion  for  economic
activity, there is a general selectivity to technological development that is difficult to reconcile with
a  clear  ecological  directionality.  Under  these  conditions,  the  frontiers  of  “green”  technological
development  that  are  conceivable for  each branch of  the economy from a  purely technical,  an
engineer’s perspective  – the most resource-efficient and non-polluting technical solutions for any
particular task –, are not immediately accessible. Instead, each technological advance must proceed
through  a  series  of  profitability  filters,  including  those  at  the  pre-market  stage  (where  initial
investment hinges on expected returns) and, later,  on product markets (where competition from
cheaper alternatives potentially reduces the market share of the “greenest” option and incumbent
market power can often nip competitors in the bud). Besides, thinking beyond industrial technolo-
gies,  these  dynamics  obviously  marginalize  readily  available  and  indubitably  “green”  low-tech
solutions – walking, cycling, re-localized and small-scale production, permaculture – that reduce
labor productivity and thus offer little potential for either individual or systemic accumulation.
Complex  sets  of  state  regulations  may  of  course  act  as  additional  filters  that  favor  or
obstruct  certain  technology  paths,  and  these  regulations  are  in  turn  influenced  by  established
industries.  In a particularly twisted historical case,  American car  manufacturers developed their
electric vehicle prototypes not to achieve market success but to improve their “green” credibility in
order  to fight  a piece of regulation that would force them to bring electric vehicles to  market,
enabling them to argue that their state-of-the-art prototypes were just too far from market readiness
(Fredrickson,  2017).  In  other  words,  this  significant  “green”  R&D  investment  by  private
corporations was, more or less from the outset, not intended to spread a putative “green” technology
but to prevent its diffusion in the interest of preserving established product markets. 
Whatever innovation makes it through these filters and political-economic entanglements
and becomes widely adopted is selected on the basis of its capability to circumnavigate all of these
obstacles, preferably without offending vested interests. That this should regularly coincide with
174 Of course, measures that increase resource productivity can be profitable under ceteris paribus (all else being 
equal) conditions. Any cheap way to save energy, and thus production costs, falls into this category. But wherever 
such measures negatively impact labor productivity (for example, if they involve the elimination of powerful but 
energy-intensive machinery), this profitability is quickly reversed.
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optimal ecological outcomes is statistically and logically highly unlikely. In this perspective, many
of the green-capitalist visionaries’ techno-miracles may be technically feasible per se but politico-
economically out of reach, or only realizable in distorted form, loaded with social-ecological con-
tradictions to foster profitability. Reliance on a pure strategy of “green”-growth-through-innovation
therefore requires a considerable leap of faith. For the actors involved, profitability functions as the
imperative, commonly resulting in growth, whereas “green” outcomes are contingent. 
Green-capitalist  advocates  argue  for  a  “new  economic  paradigm”  that  “would  allow
refocusing from a single objective of labour productivity to a multi-factor productivity objective.”
(International Resource Panel, 2017, p. 30) But to the degree that resource productivity is to be
elevated into a significant criterion, this has to be done through state interventions at each stage
directed  against the immediate logic of capital – through a  “green” creative destruction  strategy
(see section 4.6.3). But such strategies are, barring exceptional local and temporary circumstances,
in a capitalist economy ultimately limited by the sine-qua-non condition of general, macroeconomic
profitability:  Systemic accumulation must  still  be possible  (see section 4.5.1).  Radical  “green”
creative  destruction  interventions  that  could  remove  certain  assets  from  this  macroeconomic
equation have been disabled by political resistance (see bloc IV). This suggests why a central green-
capitalist strategy, the pricing of resource consumption to fully account for its associated negative
externalities, has so far never been seriously implemented: Complete internalization threatens to
raise (re)production costs to a degree that, while arguably forcing firms into more resource-efficient
processes, could undermine overall profitability, and any move in this direction has been fiercely
resisted by capital. 
A fascinating study revealing the dynamics and consequences that follow from this set-up
can  be  found  in  Jesse  Goldstein’s  (2018) recent  work  on  “cleantech  entrepreneurship.”  In
attempting to attract venture capital – remember that the Green Economy envisions “green” finance
to  come  largely  from  private  sources  –,  “green”  innovators  often  have  to  tone  down  their
environmental ambitions considerably; in Goldstein’s words, there is a deep “contradiction between
an investment in cleantech as an idea, and the very specific investment logics that prevailed in the
cleantech space.”  (Ibid.,  p.  28) Goldstein here reinterprets  the common mantra that “capitalism
spurs innovation,” pointing out that “to spur” also means “to discipline.” (Ibid., pp. 71–76) “Smart
money” (venture capital) demands innovations that are immediately marketable. “Disruptive” new
technologies that could potentially upend market structures are usually considered too risky; the
more reliable strategy is to focus innovative energy on established markets. Capital  markets, as
Goldstein argues, are structurally biased towards supporting incremental rather than transformative
innovations. For the latter, he suggests, more “patient” – potentially state-dispersed – capital would
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 144
be required. (Goldstein generally remains skeptical regarding technology-centered transformations.)
This encounter of green entrepreneurialism with capitalist market structure results in a “temporality
of progress that defers wholesale transformations to a not-yet, a never-yet that is too abstract and
too cerebral to directly impact the here and now” (ibid., p. 120), and that “refracts its visions of
possible futures through a perpetual present that is endlessly improved but never superseded” in “a
world  that  is  potentially,  but  not-yet  green.”  (Ibid.,  p.  139)  The  Green  Economy approach  to
technological  innovation  –  through  market-based  incentives  –  tends  to  exacerbate  this
incrementality bias (see section 10.1.1).
In  this  context,  the  GE  bias  towards  efficiency  over  consistency  approaches  is  easily
explicable.  Bioeconomy  and  industrial  ecology  approaches  frequently  involve  risky  upfront
investments in sectors dominated by established and proven technologies as well as tried-and-tested
mechanisms of large-scale cost externalization, fossil fuels in the energy sector being a particularly
salient  case.  This  structural  and cultural  short-termism puts  industrial  ecology innovations  in  a
difficult  position to  attract  private  capital.  Isolated interventions in  industrial  processes  through
biomimicry, on the other hand, may in some cases be more immediately competitive, but these
cases hardly add up to an “industrial revolution”: They tend to be easiest to realize where they
improve efficiency rather than changing consistency.
To complicate matters even further at the macroeconomic level, rising labor productivity
leads  to  lower  commodity  values.  Under  competitive  conditions,  this  means  that  less  and  less
surplus value can be realized per unit of output (cf. section 4.5.1). The result is a dynamic of ever-
rising levels of production forced onto capitalist firms just to realize modest rates of accumulation,
with  the  need  to  maintain  effective  demand  by  any  means  –  advertising  and  branding,  trivial
distinction in product development, credit and debt from consumer to state level, expansion into
“new” markets – as a mere consequence. Historically and logically, increases in labor productivity
have thus  represented  an  ecologically  disastrous  tendency in their  own right.  Wherever  energy
efficiency improvements also effectively increase labor productivity, the rebound effect is directly
linked to this value-theoretical consideration. In light of this ongoing dynamic, inherent to capitalist
accumulation in competitive settings, the prospects for absolute decoupling appear even dimmer. In
the  longer  run,  “greening”  here  would  require  the  realization  of  what  Daly  (1991,  passim)
sardonically called an “angelized” economy – an absurd scenario in which the materiality of human
existence is somehow suspended through “green” technology. 
This notion appears even more absurd in light of the formidable obstacles to capitalist green-
tech  development  discussed  here.  Capital  is  in  a  double  bind: To  be  competitive  and
(eco-)politically acceptable, its innovations must fulfill the labor productivity criterion while at the
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same time raising resource productivity, which capitalism has historically and structurally sacrificed
to  the  supreme  criterion  of  labor  productivity;  and  these  innovations  need  to  keep  coming  at
unprecedented rates, against all resistance offered by those invested in incumbent technologies.
But even if it were realized, this vision implies adverse social by-effects: Dramatic increases
in labor productivity in a green high-tech scenario could reinforce technological unemployment, as I
have detailed elsewhere (Thiele, 2019). This is not only a social but also an economic problem from
the standpoint of capital, as it undermines effective demand. These issues are less apparent when the
discussion is based on micro-level examples, as is often the case (a company reduces pollution
through some low-cost retrofits enabled by investments in “green” innovation and thus defends its
market  position  with  no  immediate  effects  on  company  staff).  Sinking labor  productivity,  by
contrast, is only imaginable under capitalism if surplus value can be increasingly extracted by other
means – for example, through wage depression. Such strategies of dispossession tend to face limits
in the long run, both economically and politically. 
5.2.2 Technology diffusion vs. intellectual property
An additional layer of complication arises when it comes to the uptake of green-tech innovations
across the economy. Economic models of “green” transitions tend to assume that available “best
practice”  options  are  simply  deployed  globally  (e.g.  Schandl  et  al.,  2016).  But  technological
innovations usually are not in the public domain. The entire argument for green-capitalist leadership
rests  on the ability  of  innovators  to  capture a  sizable part  of the economic benefits  from their
innovations; otherwise, so the argument, private investment in new technologies could not happen.
This  is  a  correct  portrayal  of  the  behavioral  logic  of  capitalist  markets.  Consequently,  Green
Economy  advocates are adamant about the protection and strengthening of  intellectual property
rights (IPRs), mostly in the form of patent and licensing rights, as a prerequisite to accelerated
“green” innovation  (OECD, 2011b, p. 12; UNEP, 2011, pp. 567–568). 
Jealous guarding of intellectual property rights, of course, also has limiting effects on green-
tech development, preventing collaborative innovation (cf. Rifkin, 2014) and complicating effective
regulation by reinforcing a “dynamic of informational asymmetry” in which “capitalists will go to
extraordinary ends to maintain their informational advantage.”  (Fredrickson, 2017, pp. 144–145)
Unfortunately, it not only affects the development of new technologies but also presents an obstacle
to  their  widest  possible  diffusion,  particularly  to  regions  with  less  purchasing  power.  UNEP
acknowledges  this  contradiction,  stating  that  “IPRs  create  barriers  to  the  transfer  of  the  very
technologies and innovations to which they give rise” and thus attesting to the “need for balance
between innovation and dissemination.”  (UNEP, 2011, p.  568, cf.  also p.  65) It  had previously
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found that “[t]here are certain technologies whose transfer to developing countries, especially low-
income countries, has been hampered by … stringent intellectual property rights” and suggested –
adhering to the priority of market-based solutions – that reduced IPR protection periods might be
counted  as  carbon  trading  offsets  (UNEP,  2009,  p.  16).  Likewise,  the  OECD  (2011b,  p.  61)
recognizes  that  “[t]ension  can  arise  between  technology  diffusion  and  maintaining  appropriate
incentives for investment in innovation.” The World Bank, meanwhile, advocates for a plethora of
workarounds  including  “patent  buyouts,  compulsory  licenses,  patent  pools,  and  open  source
approaches” (World Bank, 2012, p. 78), although it is unclear who should be responsible for these
and whether or not they will be enforceable at an international level. The European Environment
Agency, in its take on the Green Economy, goes further in arguing that “[a]doption and diffusion of
eco-innovation are extremely important,  even more so than invention,”  and this  requires “open
circulation of green knowledge.” (European Environment Agency, 2014, p. 7, emphasis in original)
In order to balance the contradiction between IPRs and the need for technology diffusion,
several green-capitalist mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer between the global North and
the South have been implemented. These will be discussed in section 7.4.4, particularly with regard
to their effect on North—South relations. Besides global equity concerns, however, it is clear that
these have not been effective in maximizing the diffusion of “green” technologies across the globe.
We therefore diagnose another widening of the gap between theoretically possible and “actually
realized” eco-efficient infrastructure, in this instance manifested in persistent patterns of  spatially
uneven technological development in which (particularly social) externalizations persist. Again, the
Green  Economy  is  structurally  compelled  to  remain  “less  green”  than  even  already  available
technologies would in principle allow because it remains entangled in capital’s contradictions and
bound to capital’s needs.  
5.2.3 Green-tech innovation: A literal deus ex machina? 
Thesis 5.2.3: Green-tech innovation could, in theory, help to avoid the negative effects of ecological
degradation on systemic accumulation.  But the market as arbiter has not identified – let alone
unlocked – such potential at relevant scales.
Finally, when exploring the prospects of “green” capitalism, the question of “green” technology
deserves  to  be  considered  from  the  standpoint  of  capital.  Green-tech  innovation  is  not  only
technically but also politically pivotal to the balance sheet of “green” capitalism. The ontology of
natural  capital  primarily  functions  as  a  “negative”  accumulation strategy that  reduces  capital’s
losses from tightening ecological constraints (see sections 4.4 and 9.1.3). Can the  gospel of eco-
efficiency reverse the tide and allow for a positive boost to systemic accumulation?
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 On the  level  of  theory,  we here  turn  to  the  idea  of  increases  in  relative surplus  value
extraction enabled by a cheapening of the means of consumption: If the reproduction of workers
can be warranted with lower real wages, the rate of exploitation can rise and, accordingly, more
surplus value can be extracted  (Marx,  1968, Chapter  10; cf.  Aglietta,  2015a, pp.  52–61).175 As
argued above, any green-capitalist technological revolution depends on capital’s ability to increase
both resource and labor productivity at the same time. Hence the green-capitalist preference for the
decoupling-by-innovation  route  among  the  available  “green”  accumulation  strategies,  and  the
centrality of the  gospel of eco-efficiency within the green-capitalist imaginary. Between labor and
resource  productivity,  both  synergies  and  trade-offs  may  occur:  Historically,  gains  in  labor
productivity  – increasing relative surplus value – frequently depended on increased energy and
material inputs (as in the industrialization of agriculture), which in many cases decreased resource
productivity (cf. International Resource Panel, 2017, p. 30); conversely,  ceteris paribus, increased
resource productivity – the reduction of material inputs necessary for a certain commodity output –
reduces  the  a  commodity’s  labor  content  and  increases  overall  labor  productivity.  For  an
accumulation-boosting “greening” of capitalism, the synergies created by lowered input costs would
need  to  outweigh  the  trade-offs  in  the  form  of  rising  energy  expenses  by  far:  an  uncertain
proposition and, if realized, a historical novelty.
In theory, therefore, “green” technological breakthroughs – entirely new technologies that
allow for advances in both labor and resource productivity instead of depending on minor trade-offs
or synergies – could circumvent the problem of ecological constraints as a drag on accumulation by
producing win-win(-win)  outcomes.  But  there  are  important  obstacles  to  the realization  of  this
scenario, as discussed throughout this section. While the earlier treatment focused on the mismatch
between ecological and economic aspects of technological development, this section will approach
the issue from a systemic accumulation perspective.
 It should be noted at the outset that in the case of energy and some raw materials, a special
constellation occurs: Where conventional inputs are rendered more expensive by scarcity/monopoly
rents  (oil  is  an  obvious  case),  consistency  strategies  that  circumvent  rentiers  by  allowing  for
decentralized  production  of  more  ecologically  sustainable  substitute  inputs  may  theoretically
175 Ultimately, every productivity increase should directly or indirectly cheapen the “means of consumption.” At the 
firm level, under competitive conditions, productivity increases usually only enable the capture of a temporary 
extra-surplus until such time as competitors implement similar changes and the value of the goods produced, ceteris
paribus, simply falls in proportion to the increase in labor productivity. A durable change in the rate of surplus value
(other than by “absolute” means such as a lengthening of the working day) – to boost systemic accumulation – is 
beyond the power of individual capitalists and only takes effect as such productivity increases are generalized and 
lower the costs of the reproduction of labor power and, therefore, wage levels. (Actual wages, of course, are always 
subject to political struggles. But productivity gains allow for the possibility of relative wage depression without 
interfering with the immediate reproduction of the work force.)
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cheapen these inputs even if the labor productivity for these substitutes compares unfavorably. This
would  be  a  positive  systemic  accumulation  opportunity  tied  to  “greener”  technologies.  But  as
indicated  throughout  this  work,  many  obstacles  persist:  Renewable  energy  production  at  scale
depends  on  scarce  mineral  resources  itself,  potentially  shifting  the  rent  problem  instead  of
dissolving it. The growing marginal competitiveness of renewables still does not mean that they can
cheaply  substitute  for  fossil-fuel  infrastructures  at  the  systemic level  (see  section  6.3).  And
conventional “dirty” resources may ultimately retain their competitiveness if producers reduce their
rents  –  an  economic  bonus,  certainly,  but  ecologically  counterproductive.  (Of  course,  even
incremental efficiency gains may reduce the scarcity of certain resources and thus decrease rents.)
But  let  us  now  consider  the  productivity  of  “green”  technologies  proper,  aside  from
considerations of rent. This section will take a market-centered perspective, largely accepting “the
market” as the arbiter of capitalist rationality. From a free-market angle, the non-appearance of a
comprehensive green-tech revolution attests  to a persistent lack of competitiveness:  Technically
feasible “green” innovations that are so microeconomically attractive (i.e., immediately profitable)
as to outweigh, easily, the costs of development and large-scale deployment should not depend on
“green” pricing support to begin with. In the market-oriented  Green Economy  framework, with
intellectual property rights in place, developers should normally be able to capture much of the
economic benefits of their (incremental or within-market) innovations, so that even if they were
unable  to  externalize  the  associated  development  costs  and  not  threatened  with  penalties  for
excessive resource use in the absence of technological improvements, they should go forward with
their “green” innovations out of sheer economic self-interest. 
Working with these assumptions, one would have to wonder why the green-technological
miracle has not been realized already. The enthusiastically reported, dramatic 1990s eco-innovations
that inspired Natural Capitalism (Hawken et al., 2000), for example, should easily have taken over
markets if they were indeed realizable under competitive conditions, but most of them have not (and
these authors did rely on the power of the market). From this angle, “green” technology has largely
failed  the  market  test  and remains  a  second-best  option  necessitated  by the  unsustainability  of
“gray”  incumbent  infrastructures:  Again,  in  the  long  run  “greening”  may  be  economically
preferable to business as usual, but it reduces economic growth compared to a counterfactual world
in which ongoing “gray” accumulation carried no negative by-effects. 
The  neoliberal  response  to  this  recognizes  that  “the  market”  needs  some  pushing  and
nudging.  The  Porter  hypothesis,  which  argues  that  stringent  environmental  regulation  is
economically  beneficial  for  its  stimulating  effect  on  innovation (see  section  11.4.1),  offers
explanations for the non-occurrence of profitable  innovations: According to  Porter and van der
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Linde  (1995),  such  innovations  are  not  happening  due  to  a  host  of  factors  such  as  lack  of
information  and  attention  among  corporate  executives  or  organizational  inertia.  Environmental
regulation here educates industry for its own good, prodding it to seek out potential improvements
that would otherwise remain overlooked. In this view, which is reflected in the GE approach as
well,  green-capitalist  regulation – including the valuation of  natural  capital  – acts as a sort  of
cunning of history, provoking capitalists into developing revolutionary “green” technologies whose
superior resource productivity compensates for the new regulatory premium on resource use, while
their  superior  labor productivity  constitutes  the  actual  blessing  for  capital.  There  is  certainly
potential for such synergies to ameliorate the weight of ecological constraints. But to extend this
strategy of “CEO-nudging” into a macroeconomic, even global, claim for the superior dynamics of
“green” capitalism, as the Green Economy institutions are wont to do, is quite a stretch. 
The market-oriented schools’ gospel for eco-efficiency, thus, has not been able to overcome
the  obstacles  to  a  growth-enhancing  green-tech  revolution  in  order  to  reconcile  systemic
accumulation with ecological constraints. While it may be argued that the free-market perspective
of lacking competitiveness constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy on the part of those who are overly
trusting  in  market  forces,  it  contains  a  kernel  of  empirical  truth,  a  hunch  that  the  synergistic
potential of “green” technologies has been limited so far. The Porter case gives more grounds for
optimism, but the innovations stimulated through GE-style policies have obviously not reversed
overall trends in resource consumption and ecological degradation either. It may be argued that
these  policies  simply  need  to  be  implemented  with  greater  consistency  –  but  one  reason  for
political-economic resistance to this path is that it is, quite plausibly, not seen as leading along the
promised path of relatively smooth and painless accumulation.
But this is not quite the end of the road for green-capitalist development yet. The market is a
questionable arbiter of capitalist interests, after all: The forces of competition do not necessarily
produce optimal results  from the standpoint of capital  as a whole; the aggregate preferences of
individual capitalists as determined in the marketplace do not necessarily add up to an expression of
their “general” interest, as, for example, testified by both the “first” and the “second” contradiction
of capitalism identified in Marxist thought. Even “green” technologies that may ultimately become
competitive require coordinated political support that goes beyond the correction of prices. Chapter
10 will explore the potential for more far-reaching state interventions in market processes to realize
a green-tech “revolution.” Meanwhile, the economic potential of “green” technologies – along with
their side-effects – will receive detailed attention in the following chapter.
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BLOC III:
RE-EXTERNALIZATIONS
Equipped with the theoretical framework developed in the previous bloc, we
now  approach the  second  lead  question,  How  consistent  is  the  Green
Economy’s  promise  to  reconcile  economic  growth  with  environmental
sustainability  and social  equity  and,  effectively,  to  end  capital’s  systematic
externalization of costs?  The  re-externalization  of socio-ecological costs was
anticipated  in  section  2.6  as  a  third,  hidden  macro-strategy  underlying  the
Green Economy model. Bloc III seeks to corroborate this finding by illustrating
a variety of cost-shifting mechanisms.
Chapter 6 focuses on the material appropriations of various categories
of  Cheap  Nature  through  green-capitalist  strategies,  which  are  generally
closely linked to the physical technologies theorized in the preceding chapter.
This  analysis  repeatedly  finds  the  second  of  the  Green  Economy’s  macro-
strategies,  the  gospel  of  eco-efficiency,  in  action  –  but,  particularly  in  its
discussion of  Cheap Food, also relates  to the first,  the  ontology of  natural
capital. The analysis of broader patterns of cost re-externalization to capital’s
“others” in chapter 7 extends to political “technologies” of externalization –
which again importantly involves the ontology. 
The discussion throughout bloc III not only highlights the adverse side-
effects of “green” accumulation strategies and technologies but, at the same
time,  points  to  their  limited  ability  to  sustain  capital  accumulation  under
ecological constraints: Win-win-win solutions are not on the horizon.
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6. Cheap Natures: The Green Economy’s strategies to 
put nature at work
In order to trace the patterns of externalization in the  Green Economy more systematically, this
chapter will draw on Jason W. Moore’s typology of Cheap Nature(s). Based on evidence both from
the GE reports and from green-capitalist practice, it analyzes the potential of the macro-strategies
introduced in section 2.6 to tap into new reservoirs of what Moore calls Cheap Nature, and thus of
the Green Economy  to find ways to make nature “work for” – or at least not “work against” –
capital in the 21st century. The structure here follows Moore’s typology of four cheaps: labor, food,
energy and raw materials. How is their appropriation envisioned in the  Green Economy  models
advanced by the OECD, the World Bank and UNEP? Which problems do these strategies encounter
– and which continuities with historical and present appropriations of  Cheap Nature are evident?
What are the implications for systemic capital accumulation?
A few comments  on Moore’s  conceptualization may be helpful  by way of introduction.
Moore  (2010, 2015, 2016) reads increasing levels of commodification in all spheres of life and
across  the  globe  as  a  sign  of  capitalist  crisis  since,  all  else  being  equal,  capital  prefers  the
appropriation of unpaid (“cheap”) work and energy, human and non-human, to capitalization (i.e.,
to paying the full costs of its inputs). Cheap Nature  draws together such disparate phenomena as
unpaid feminized reproductive work, slave labor, the quick extraction and burning of geological
fossil fuel reserves or soil-exhausting industrialized agriculture in a common theoretical framework,
which  aligns  with  those  conceptions  of  capitalism  that  highlight  the  role  of  extra-economic
mechanisms in  facilitating  capital  accumulation  (see  section  4.1.2): “Cheap  nature  is  produced
when the interlocking agencies of capital, science and empire … succeed in releasing new sources
of  free  or  low-cost  human  and  extra-human  natures  for  capital.” (Moore,  2015,  p.  53) Such
appropriations generally enable rising productivity of the share of labor that is actually paid – and
thus increase (relative) surplus value.176 Moore suggests that capital  is  currently running out  of
Cheap Nature to appropriate;  in fact,  he interprets  the whole neoliberal era as evidence to this
effect.  This  trend  is  ultimately  inevitable  if  one  considers  that  appropriation  always  refers  to
176 The concept of relative surplus value (Marx, 1968, Chapter 10) expresses an increase in labor productivity that 
enables a decrease in the wage share of the total product – and hence an increase in the rate of exploitation – 
without reducing worker’s real wages (see section 5.2.3). Cheap Nature is one way of opening the black box of 
“technological progress” that underpins labor productivity and demonstrating that this box not only contains 
genuine innovations but is also filled with appropriated resources whose costs have been externalized to a large 
degree. Many technological advances of course combine both: The internal combustion engine’s success, for 
example, was arguably based on a feat of engineering but underwritten by the availability of cheap oil and free 
atmospheric sinks. Moore (2015, pp. 15–16), with his broad understanding of wage labor, suggests a blurring of the 
distinction between relative and absolute surplus value, highlighting that historically technical innovation and extra-
economic violence each have been deployed to raise both absolute and relative surplus value. Otherwise, my 
reading above appears in line with his.
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“outsides,” and capitalist expansion necessarily continues to reduce the reservoir of such “outsides”:
The (re)production of the four cheaps is increasingly commodified. In the case of energy and raw
materials,  this  is  partly  a  consequence  of  increasing  depletion  of  accessible  resources,  while
agricultural production is threatened by intensified climate change and chemical-resistant pests.
The two strategies, capitalization and appropriation, while conceptually distinct, arguably
cannot  be  neatly  separated  in  practice.  Even what  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  fully  capitalized
production has historically always involved significant externalization of socio-ecological costs –
moments of appropriation, so to speak. This is only natural for Moore, who, as previously cited,
argues that there can be no full capitalization: “To call for capital to pay its own way is to call for
the abolition of capitalism.” (Moore, 2015, p. 145) Conversely, as we will see in the following, the
appropriation of Cheap Nature at times has been enabled by capitalization, with newly capitalized
infrastructures or commodified resources allowing for new appropriations elsewhere,  as already
implied by Moore’s wording cited in the previous paragraph (“releasing”; cf. section 7.4.2).177
The point is that the relative weight of internalized and externalized moments matters, and
the world-ecology framework can shed light on shifts in the balance between the two as well as in
the specific composition of externalizations. Likewise, the concept of “unpaid” work/energy may
appear fuzzy at times – for human labor it is relatively straightforward, but pedantically speaking,
non-human work could not possibly be “paid,” and energy is ultimately always appropriated by
humans and not payable, either. But the distinction remains a useful heuristic. Synthetic fertilizers
required to substitute for exhausted natural soil fertility are one example in which, following the
intensification of appropriation of nature’s “work,” the production of nature must be taken over by
capital  at  a  cost  much  higher  than  otherwise  necessary.  The  progressive  exhaustion  of  easily
accessible fossil fuel stocks is another case, in which increasingly expensive extraction technologies
must compensate for the fact that the unpaid work of “geological accumulations” (Moore, 2015, p.
102), the expedient concentration over geological timescales of large stocks of energy in “syntropy
islands” (Karathanassis, 2015, p. 20), can no longer be conveniently appropriated. 
To illustrate this particular case, Moore (2015, p. 96) modifies the concept of EROI/EROEI
(energy returned on energy invested) into EROCI (energy returned on capital invested): The relative
degree of capitalization ultimately determines how cheap a particular “service” of nature still is for
capital. This central tenet informs his – heuristic – notion of a  (world-)ecological surplus: Each
capitalist cycle of accumulation depends on the realization of a high ecological surplus, meaning
that large amounts of Cheap Nature can initially be appropriated with relatively little capitalization
(ibid., pp. 94–98). In many cases, the prices of such appropriated services are (sometimes by defini-
177  The close link between the two strategies is acknowledged in Moore’s most recent work (Walker & Moore, 2019).
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tion) not as conveniently measurable, but, taking a big-picture view, quantification is ultimately not
as important for the purposes of my analysis as the identification of (macro-)tendencies.178 
This being said, the prospects of the Green Economy will in this chapter be probed by means
of detailed attention to its strategies for the appropriation of Cheap Nature, including human labor-
power.  In  light  of  the  set  of  criteria  for  “green”  capitalism  as  well  as  the  “green”  systemic
accumulation  strategies  expounded  in  sections  4.5  and  4.6,  a  fundamental  dilemma  recurs
throughout this chapter: If the GE is, by and large, to put an end to capital’s externalizations, it
generally has to follow what amounts to an Expensive Natures strategy, thus undermining systemic
accumulation. If, on the other hand, it ensures its economic viability through the appropriation of
new Cheap Natures (one of the four accumulations strategies outlined in section 4.6) and thereby
regains  a  larger  ecological  surplus,  it  always  threatens  to  violate  the  promise  to  internalize  its
operational costs. So, can the GE unlock new Cheap Natures – and if so, what externalizations do
these acts of appropriation involve? This, of course, offers valuable insights on the feasibility of any
conceivable “green” capitalism: Is Moore right in positing the dilemma as irresolvable?
178 Besides the charge of non-measurability (Nayeri, 2016), Moore’s work has been heavily criticized by a range of 
eco-Marxists, most notably John Bellamy Foster (2016) and Andreas Malm (2018, Chapter 6), in what amounts to 
another round in the second contradiction debate (cf. section 4.3) – with Moore following in the tradition of 
O’Connor’s second contradiction thesis. Much of the criticism focuses on three aspects: Moore’s ontological 
premises, his methodology and the political implications of his work.
As for the ontological dimension, on both sides the particularities of the unity-in-difference of society (or 
capital) and nature are discussed at great length, and the actual differences do not appear to warrant the polemics. In
many cases, they stem from these authors’ diverging analytical interests, with Malm exploring the political 
implications of competing perspectives on the “warming condition” – the era of anthropogenic climate change – 
and Moore investigating the world-historical prospects for capitalism’s survival. When Malm speaks of nature as 
distinct from society, he refers to the laws of physics and the biogeochemical cycles that make up the global 
climate; these have been fatefully – perhaps fatally – distorted but not created by humans. When Moore emphasizes
how “historical natures” have been co-produced by capital, he is mostly concerned with concrete ecosystems in 
various parts of the world that have been conditioned by capitalist development over the past centuries. It is 
therefore not surprising that the former highlights the collision of two entities at a particular (drawn-out) moment in
history (industrial capitalism progressively ruining the global climate over the span of two centuries) whereas the 
latter sees a longer process of co-evolution that may run out of steam (capital’s organization of nature through a 
sequence of “long centuries”), without either perspective necessarily ruling out the other’s accuracy.
Regarding methodology, much confusion arises from the fact that Moore takes a largely “capitalocentric” 
approach. It is surprising that his method of immanent critique – analyzing capitalist development from within the 
logic of capital – should draw so much criticism from orthodox Marxists, given that it largely corresponds to 
Marx’s own method. But Malm and Foster continue to attack Moore’s analytical approach on moral grounds, 
alleging that his perspective ultimately amounts to a green-capitalist position that is only interested in capital’s 
survival while downplaying the human suffering involved. 
This obviously leads into the matter of political implications. Malm charges that Moore’s position encourages 
political passivity as it predicts capital to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions sooner or later. 
Malm’s message, certainly in line with Foster’s, is clear: “Dare to feel the panic” and get militant (ibid., p. 226). 
While Malm clearly provides better guidance for struggles in the here and now, this does not devalue Moore’s 
longue durée analysis of capitalist development as such; political strategy is simply not Moore’s primary focus. 
Even so, Moore’s argument for the secular decline of capitalist strength is partly based on a variety of recent social 
struggles that complicate capital’s appropriation of cheap resources based on social and environmental 
externalizations: Social antagonisms and political practice clearly do not disappear from view in his work, but are 
drawn directly into the ontology of capitalism-in-nature.
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6.1 Labor
Thesis 6.1: Cheap Labor is sought through neoliberal labor market policies in the Green Economy,
but further wage depression interferes with effective demand concerns. While the social promises of
the GE imply more expensive labor in many sectors, further reservoirs of Cheap Labor can only be
tapped through the reinforcement of uneven development across the North—South divide.
Labor, the human contribution to the reservoirs of work/energy appropriated by capital, is the first
dimension of Cheap Nature to be discussed here. UNEP’s (2011) Green Economy report, with its
more extensive sectoral analyses, provides the greatest body of projections on employment effects
of  Green Economy  policies until 2050, which vary wildly from palpable increases in agriculture,
forestry, waste management and tourism to considerable decreases in the water and fishing sectors.
A great unknown here is the labor-displacing effect of increases in labor productivity, which is
occasionally acknowledged  (UNEP, 2011, pp. 54, 247, 267, 354; OECD, 2017b, pp. 13, 18) but
generally downplayed. I have argued elsewhere that this is a massive blind spot for policy models
that are as technology-driven as the Green Economy, and that the realization of a “green” high-tech
economy could displace many jobs, with ambivalent consequences for capital (Thiele, 2019).
6.1.1 Conceptual issues
A few theoretical considerations are in order here. As such, labor-saving measures do not directly
function as Cheap Labor measures in the world-ecology sense. They may cheapen labor costs as a
total  input  factor  for  producing  firms,  but  this  is  a  classic  strategy  of  exploitation-through-
capitalization,  not  appropriation.  Conversely,  measures  that  increase the  labor  intensity  of
production in a particular sector should not necessarily be understood as expressions of expensive
labor strategies: When the  Green Economy reports note that (desirable) organic farming practices
may increase the labor intensity of agricultural production and the sector will gain 47 million jobs
globally in a green scenario compared to  business as usual  by 2050  (UNEP, 2011, pp.  37,  59;
OECD, 2017b, pp. 10–11), or that renewable energy could have similar but more modest effects in
the energy sector, which may however be outweighed by productivity increases and reductions in
total  energy  demand  (UNEP,  2011,  pp.  203,  218,  224;  OECD,  2017b,  p.  9),  these  projected
developments exemplify “expensive” production  of food and energy, respectively (see respective
sections of this chapter below). Likewise, UNEP suggested that natural capital could be managed
with labor-based methods, which – even if only partially implemented – could add more than 100
million jobs globally (UNEP, 2009, p. 24): This could signal more expensive raw materials from a
world-ecology perspective.179  
179 UNEP here (2009, p. 24) argues that labor-based methods “compare favorably” with more capital-intensive 
methods in terms of cost. In this sense, the former approaches would not render raw materials more “expensive” 
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Cheap Labor strategies in the proper sense applied to wage labor – that is, to labor that is
generally paid – must be directed towards the cheapening of each  unit  of labor, in other words,
through increases in surplus value, a widening of the gap between the value of labor power (as
expressed  in  the  wage)  and  the  value  produced  by labor  (as  expressed  in  each  worker’s  total
product) that signifies capital’s appropriation of surplus labor. This can be done by lowering the cost
of social reproduction that allows for lower relative wages; it is here that the importance of Cheap
Food  for  capital  is  revealed.  In  addition,  the  cost  of  social  reproduction  has  been traditionally
lowered otherwise, through the indirect exploitation of – typically feminized – non-waged labor: In
Maria Mies’s words, “labour can only be productive in the sense of producing surplus value as long
as it can tap, extract, exploit and appropriate labour which is spent in the production of life.” (Mies,
1986, p. 47, emphasis in original; cf. Federici, 2004) 
These alternative strategies for cheaper labor are immediately political, and their realization
always depends on extra-economic forces: state policies, international treaties, (para)military force.
Moore  (2015,  pp.  236–240) outlines  such  mechanisms  for  the  neoliberal  era,  including  wage
repression,  shifting  of  employment  to  low-cost  locales  and  waves  of  proletarianization  (in  the
urbanizing global South, but also with respect to Northern females who entered the formal labor
market in great numbers while still delivering a “second shift” of unpaid domestic labor). All of
these, he argues, have lost momentum since the early 2000s as global frontiers of appropriation
have been closing, workers in low-wage areas have organized and real labor costs have increased. 
6.1.2 The Green Economy’s labor market strategies
But returning to the prospects for Cheap Labor – what new reservoirs could the Green Economy tap
into?  Its  labor  market  strategies,  arguably,  are  a  simple  reiteration  of  the  familiar  neoliberal
paradigm. This is particularly the case for the World Bank and the OECD, both of which claim
persistently that the transition to green growth will not impact labor markets much.180 According to
the Bank, “odds are that the impacts will be quite moderate.” (World Bank, 2012, p. 92; cf. OECD,
2011b, p. 91, 2015a, p. 24, 2017b) Policies to facilitate the efficient movement of some workers
from “gray” to “green” sectors are encouraged in order to allow them to pick up the necessary skills
quickly (OECD, 2011b, pp. 95–96; cf. UNEP, 2011, pp. 572–573). The bulk of recommendations
here,  only recently reiterated in an OECD paper  (2017b),  speak for themselves:  “Labor market
policies need to be flexible enough to facilitate the movement of workers” (OECD, 2011b, p. 51);
relative to the latter, but the absolute costs added to – previously freely available – raw materials are of course 
significant in either case.
180 The OECD’s calculations, however, are based on a scenario in which emissions are only reduced moderately 
throughout the OECD area and continue to grow in the rest of the world; this scenario itself is starkly at odds with 
the overall ambition for green growth (see section 3.1).
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“moderate employment protection and strong product market competition are important supports
for vigorous job creation” (ibid., p. 95); “labor market rigidities” (World Bank, 2012, p. 94) are to
be  removed,  whereas  “it  is  vital  to  invest  in  human capital  to  accelerate  growth and to  green
growth.” (Ibid., p. 102; for an extensive discussion, see Thiele, 2019)
The same impetus drives the proposals for environmental tax reforms, intended to forgo
taxation of “goods” such as labor in favor of taxing “bads” such as pollution, which is supposed to
favor job creation by cheapening the cost of labor (OECD, 2011b, pp. 39, 92, 97; UNEP, 2011, p.
559).  While the OECD holds that these are to  be implemented in  “ways that do not make the
distribution of income less equal” (2011b, p. 40),  it is difficult to see how the “lowering of social
security contributions” that UNEP (2011, p. 559) explicitly advocates in return for carbon taxation
could not have precisely such an inegalitarian impact.  Carbon taxes,  after  all,  are flat  taxes on
consumption  and  thus  clearly  regressive  compared  to  employers’ social  security  contributions,
which form an important part of what is denounced as “taxes on labor.”181 Taken to its extreme, this
strategy would mean that social security provisions are coupled to ongoing carbon emissions, which
effectively installs a trade-off between social and environmental objectives – precisely the trade-off
which the Green Economy explicitly seeks to to debunk as a “myth.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 628)
At the same time, there are also scattered instances of genuine expensive labor strategies in
the Green Economy literature, as in the case of UNEP’s call for formalization of the waste recycling
sector in the global South (see section 6.4 below). Other cases are more ambiguous: UNEP’s plan to
drastically  reduce  global  fishing  fleets  (UNEP,  2011,  pp.  94–97),  for  example,  seeks  to  target
mainly commercial fleet capacity to protect at least some smaller, lower-productivity vessels in the
global  South.  This  would,  according  to  its  projections,  lower  overall  wages  relative  to  overall
employment – an element of Cheap Labor if viewed in isolation –, but most of all, it would starkly
reduce labor productivity and overall output, render fish more expensive by massively increasing
rents to “resource” owners, and mark, above all, another expensive food strategy.182
6.1.3 Mixed prospects
When considering the prospects of future  Cheap Labor, a distinction between long-industrialized
Northern countries and Southern contexts is in order. Having developed during the neoliberal era,
“actually existing” green sectors in the global North are already characterized by low levels of
181 Many carbon tax proposals indeed involve a direct redistribution of revenues to citizens to avoid a regressive 
outcome (Zerzawy & Fiedler, 2019). But if the revenue is taken to lower employers’ social security contributions 
instead, workers are effectively made to subsidize their own ancillary wage costs.
182 UNEP’s “balanced” scenario would cut capacity mostly from large industrial vessels, but 8.3 million of the 9.6 
million jobs projected to disappear are those of small-scale fishers. So, much of the cost in terms of livelihood 
security would still be imposed on a vulnerable social group, mostly from the global South. On UNEP’s fisheries 
plan, see also section 6.2.2 below.
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unionization relative to “gray” industries, and massive offshoring of manufacturing to low-wage
locations has taken place  (Boewe & Schulten, 2013; Lenz, Ludwig, & Timm, 2017; Littig, 2013;
Mattera, 2009; Rosen, 2016). This may have helped the competitivity of, for example, renewable
energy technologies  vis-à-vis  fossil  branches.  It  also signals  that  a  shift  in  the relative balance
between “green” and “gray” sectors could further undermine the last union strongholds and serve to
cheapen labor at least modestly.183 
Meanwhile,  shifts  in  the  global  division  of  labor  –  tertiarization  in  the  North,  “dirty”
industrialization in the South –, while sometimes interpreted as evidence of “greening,” are not
generally  ecologically  beneficial  (cf.  section  5.1.2).  But  from  a  Cheap  Labor perspective,
tertiarization processes are part and parcel of the neoliberal labor regime; in Northern contexts, the
services sector is arguably where labor is most “flexible,” precarious and – in many cases – badly
paid. Again, a further shift in the balance among sectors may give capital access to some cheapened
labor. The effect could be amplified by labor-saving innovation that increases the “reserve army”
available as a cheap labor pool: If sufficiently generalized to drive down wages, labor productivity
does constitute a Cheap Labor strategy of sorts (in the classical Marxist sense of increasing relative
surplus value) – but one that works through massive capitalization rather than “pure” appropriation.
The North—South divide in the projections of job creation potential, meanwhile, is worth
noting from an externalizations perspective. George Caffentzis  (2013), working with the Marxian
notion of the equalization of profit rates (see section 4.1.2), notes how high-wage jobs – particularly
in  high-tech  sectors  –  which  allow for  relatively  little  direct  surplus  extraction  are  effectively
subsidized by lower-wage, more highly exploited labor elsewhere. Discussing various development
paths proposed in response to the 1970s energy crisis, including high-tech efficiency strategies and
low-tech back-to-the-land movements, he maintains that “the seemingly opposing utopias of High
and Low organic composition [of capital,  meaning value ratio between labor and capital  goods
employed in production] necessarily complement each other.” (Ibid., p. 56) Applied to the  Green
Economy, this argument suggests that a “green” Cheap Labor regime would need to rest on ongoing
unequal exchange within the global economy, with scarce, mostly Northern and still relatively high-
paying green-tech jobs subsidized by an army of cheap (mostly Southern,  partly migrant)  rural
workers tasked with the maintenance of natural capital as well as with agricultural production and
raw material extraction. This is broadly in line with the projections cited above.184
183 Politically, and partly for this reason, a reverse effect may be noted: In Germany, the high degree of unionization in 
the coal industry has led to a similarly high degree of union support for the industry, which has been threatened by 
the government’s energy transition program to foster renewable energy production (on this broader conflict, see 
Sander, 2016). The more harmonious labor relations in the “gray” sector therefore benefit the sector politically.
184 As extensively discussed in section 4.4, however, natural capital management is usually not productive of surplus 
value at all. In this sense, it does not exactly fit Caffentzis’ value-focused equation. While this signals a problem 
from a systemic accumulation perspective, the cross-subsidization argument remains valid for a capitalist formation
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Hence, in the bigger picture, rather than being triggered by benevolent GE policies, rising
costs of labor are more likely to ensue from sundry forms of labor resistance across the globe (as
not only in the distant but also in the more recent past, cf. Moore, 2015, Chapter 9)  and from the
macroeconomic barriers imposed by effective demand considerations: The strategies proposed in
the GE reports raise questions as to whether effective demand can be maintained under conditions
of ongoing and perhaps even intensified wage depression in formal labor markets (I have discussed
this latter point in more detail in Thiele, 2019). Finally, the potential exhaustion of  Cheap Food
could be another driver of labor costs – to which the discussion will turn in the following section.
We may not be surprised that the Green Economy seeks to perpetuate the neoliberal Cheap
Labor regime with all its attendant and obvious externalizations. But, as Moore emphasized, this
model  began to run out  of  steam even before the 2007–2009 crisis.  The low-hanging fruit  are
picked, and it is unclear how labor could be cheapened much further by means of wage depression,
proletarianization  and  consistent  ignorance  towards  the  burden  of  (mostly  feminized)  “second
shifts,” even if these may well be sustained politically for some time. In principle, rural reserve
armies in the global South still exist, but they are shrinking relative to the share of available labor
already incorporated in the global economy. Likewise, the availability of unpaid work in highly
capitalized societies can hardly be extended further without interfering with the reproduction of
labor  power.  Capital’s  structural  dependence  on  “sacrifice  zones”  further  reduces  the  pool  of
effectively appropriable  labor  (cf.  section 11.7).  If  it  is  to  ignite  a new wave of  accumulation,
however, the Green Economy must unlock massive additional surplus potential here.
In summary, there is some potential for the appropriation of additional  Cheap Labor  in a
neoliberal  Green  Economy,  but  it  faces  both  structural-economic  limits  and  political-economic
barriers. Moreover,  some passages of the  Green Economy  reports propose the internalization of
costs previously externalized to workers, in other words, selective increases in the effective price of
labor that counteract the cheapening efforts. Due to the particularly clear antagonism in this field,
every successful act  of appropriation here immediately tends to contradict  the GE’s promise to
finally internalize the costs of capital’s operations, and vice versa, every cost internalization that
reduces externalities obviously drives up the price of labor, at least in the short term.
6.2 Food
Thesis 6.2: The  Green Economy’s  strategies of  sustainable intensification  of agriculture are not
only questionable on ecological grounds but also fail to provide  Cheap Food,  even according to
UNEP’s own projections.
that vitally depends on these maintenance efforts and seeks to cheapen their delivery.
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Global  agricultural  production  is  far  from sustainable.  Both  in  the  global  North  and,  with  the
globalization of the Green Revolution since the 1950s also in parts of the global South, yield gains
have been achieved through fossil-fuel driven industrialization and the large-scale use of synthetic
fertilizers  with considerable negative environmental  impacts –  UNEP frankly admits  this  much
(2011, p. 40). As the much-noted IAASTD185 study (2009, p. 3) put it, “[t]he general model has been
to continuously innovate, reduce farm gate prices and externalize costs.” In world-ecology terms, of
course, making nature “work harder” by recourse to externalizations is capital’s established modus
operandi. But it is not just productivity per land area that counts for capital; Cheap Food requires
that yields be raised  relative  to capitalized inputs. In order to meet the  Green Economy’s criteria,
this must obviously be achieved while internalizing many of the costs previously shifted to human
and non-human “others.” 
In agriculture, this appropriation of both human and non-human work and energy – capital’s
attempts to make these natures “work harder” – is particularly obvious, and much of Moore’s (2010,
2015) historical argument about the impending limits of capitalism as a way of organizing nature
indeed centers on the exhaustion of  Cheap Food.186 Despite much media and investor excitement
about biotechnological revolutions, he argues, agricultural yield gains have decreased over the last
decades (Moore, 2015, Chapter 10; this is a commonly cited argument in the literature, cf. Marcus
Taylor,  2014,  p.  102;  Godfray,  2015,  p.  200).  Indeed,  while  warning that  global  average  yield
changes are difficult to interpret, Beddow, Pardey and Alston (2009) argue that for all four staple
crops considered, global productivity growth has slowed in the post-1990 period relative to the
previous three decades according to FAO data; for two of these (rice and soybeans), it practically
dropped  to  zero,  in  “high-income”  countries  at  least.  Overall  land  and  agricultural  labor
productivity  growth  rates  likewise  trended  downward,  with  the  notable  exception  of  China.
According to more recent World Bank data, global cereal yield growth per hectare, for example,
185 The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development was co-initiated
by the World Bank and significantly sponsored by UNEP. Due to the highly contentious political terrain covered in 
this survey of agricultural practices and opportunities, it claimed to refrain from recommendations in favor of 
presenting “options”; nevertheless, the study drew criticism for being too “negative,” and some national delegations
refused to support the findings in their entirety (IAASTD, 2009, pp. vi–ix). Interestingly, some harsh criticism of 
environmentally destructive and/or risky practices (including biotechnology) and the unfair global trade regime is 
not just buried somewhere in the text but foregrounded in the executive summary. The contrast in terms of tone and 
message with the Green Economy studies published soon after is striking.
186 Moore actually defines Cheap Food simply as “[m]ore calories produced with less average labor-time in the 
commodity system.” (2015, p. 241, emphasis added) This straightforward capitalist calculation, however, involves 
far more complex and less controllable interactions of human and non-human “work” and energy than 
corresponding measures of labor productivity in a factory setting. The formula is a good reminder, nevertheless, of 
the utility of cheap fossil fuels in enhancing industrialized agriculture’s ability to deliver Cheap Food by 
substituting, in the short term, nature’s free “work” of geological accumulation for large amounts of manual labor. It
also clarifies how smallholder peasants who only produce for the market to achieve a supplementary income and 
rely on subsistence otherwise can, through their Cheap Labor, constitute a (limited) source of Cheap Food for the 
“commodity system.” 
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dropped from 2.73% p.a. during the period 1964–1984 to 1.02% during 1984–2012; the last few
years, however, have seen revived growth here: 2.39% p.a. from 2012–2017 (World Bank, 2019a). 
Biotechnology,  according  to  Moore  (2010),  has  not  found  ways  to  cheapen  food
systemically; its deployment has mostly served as a new strategy to redistribute wealth away from
peasants and towards agro-industrial corporations  (see also Deckard, 2016); in the process, it has
brought ecological degradation – including aggravated climate change – and soil exhaustion, thus
further  undermining  “cheap”  food  production  for  the  future.  Large  investments  in  genetic
engineering have brought few yield gains (Hakim, 2016); a 2009 study found that most of the yield
gains recorded since the 1990s for two staple crops for which genetically modified seeds have been
used extensively,  corn and soybeans,  stemmed from the refinement of more traditional farming
practices instead (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2009). Even a Green Revolution 2.0 advocate (see
below) acknowledges that “[t]he slowdown in yield growth that has been observed since the mid-
1980s can be attributed, in part, to the above degradation of the agricultural resource base,” while
otherwise  arguing  that  a  drop  in  research  investment  in  the  post-Green  Revolution  period  had
impeded agricultural development – and that returns on research investment, to the extent that it still
took place, had not declined (Pingali, 2012, pp. 12304, 12302–12303).187
I am no specialist in agricultural science, and I cannot provide any conclusive judgment on
the  technical  and  biophysical  feasibility  of  the  Green  Economy strategies  of  sustainable
intensification  (SI, see below). But nevertheless, close attention to the GE reports in combination
with  a  brief  review of  the  academic  debate  on  SI  allows  for  some  conclusions  regarding  the
appropriation of Cheap Food in  Green Economy models, along with the attendant mechanisms of
externalization.  In  this  discussion,  the  development  of  the  agricultural  labor  force  –  which
significantly influences food prices – will play a particularly important role, as will the political
economy of global agricultural relations.
6.2.1 Sustainable intensification and the Green Economy
The pivotal concept for the Green Economy approach to agriculture and food security is sustainable
intensification. Loos et al. (2014, p. 357) point out that this concept originally “focused on building
adaptable farming systems that support the livelihoods of the rural poor” through locally developed,
small-scale  technologies.  It  was  later  re-framed  to  focus  narrowly  on  global-level  yield  gains,
187 Beddow et al. (2009) likewise make a (perhaps not altogether disinterested) case for increased agricultural R&D. 
Their assessment also points to important goal conflicts in this field: For example, they argue that not only 
moderate overall R&D spending but also a change of R&D priorities away from maximum yield gains and towards 
concerns such as environmental effects and food safety had dampened productivity growth, and that – partly 
because of political resistance – the latest biotechnological innovations had not yet diffused widely enough to make 
themselves felt in productivity statistics. All of this indicates tensions between the objective of Cheap Food and 
concerns with the agroindustrial externalization of social and environmental costs.
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including through the latest  biotechnological  developments.  In the dominant  usage,  sustainable
intensification now refers to the realization of higher yields with lower environmental externalities
on smaller  areas  of  land – as  opposed to  extensification,  which expands production simply  by
appropriating larger areas of land (Garnett et al., 2013; Godfray, 2015). Proponents emphasize their
agnosticism on the means by which to achieve this – from conventional agriculture with genetically
modified seeds to organic farming to holistic agroecology approaches. Critics have objected that the
concept is essentially a greenwashing device, mainly used to legitimize the continued intensification
of conventional agriculture (Loos et al., 2014; cf. Godfray, 2015). Particularly in Southern contexts,
the Green Revolution has been absorbed by and incorporated into the Green Economy discourse in
spite  of  the  very  different  original  meanings  of  the  signifier  “green”  (referring  to  industrially
stimulated plant growth in the former case and to environmental sustainability in the latter), such
that the imperative of sustainability now gets combined with that of industrial yield improvements
in the Green Economy  (Buseth, 2017).
The World Bank (2012, pp. 113–117) is particularly explicit in its pursuit of a sustainable
intensification  agenda.  The  “main  policy  challenges”  according  to  the  Bank  “are  to  support
sustainable increases in productivity and resource-efficient production by focusing on innovation,
increasing efficiency in input use, regulating pollution, and ensuring that smallholder farming more
fully realizes its potential.” (Ibid., p. 113) To these ends, it seeks to make nature “work harder” in
quite drastic ways, advocating, for example, factory farming as a means of increasing both land and
animal  productivity  –  in  India,  to  illustrate  this  rationale,  “doubling  productivity  would  halve
greenhouse emissions per cow.” (Ibid., p. 114) While the Bank acknowledges some trade-offs and
past  shortcomings,  it  seeks  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Green  Revolution,  highlights  the
intensification gains of previous decades and promises to maximize the synergies between Cheap
Food  and environmental conservation. At the same time, it  praises the potential of agroforestry
systems (ibid., p. 117), which also seek to increase productivity but for the most part do not drive
agricultural  practices  in  the  direction  of  mechanized  monoculture  plantations.  The  Bank  also
positively comments on changes to European subsidy mechanisms that decouple payments from
production levels (ibid., p. 116) – arguably both an act of de-marketization and a move away from
the stubborn maximization of production levels. Nevertheless, the primacy of productivity growth
emerges as a clear message. 
While the GE report’s passage on agriculture includes some more nuanced measures, the
Bank has aggressively pursued the modernization, intensification and marketization of agriculture
in the global South for decades; the emergence of climate change as a major political issue only
served to reinforce the Bank’s modernization narrative  (Marcus Taylor,  2014).  This narrative is
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reproduced in the GE report,  which also effectively strengthened the agricultural  modernization
agenda: The Bank has since framed agricultural modernization investment projects in Africa as a
green  growth  strategy,  at  times  grafting  the  “green”  label  onto  initiatives  that  were  originally
conceived as modernization projects pure and simple (Bergius et al., 2018; Buseth, 2017). Finally,
the SI paradigm is also applied to climate change adaptation, under the banner of “climate-smart
agriculture,” which the Bank declared  a priority field for investment “in at  least  20 countries.”
(World Bank Group, 2018b, p. 2; cf. Heuwieser, 2015, pp. 18–20)
UNEP (2011, pp. 30–75) dedicates an extensive chapter to agriculture, and another one to
fisheries (ibid., pp. 76-109). Its promise of sustainable intensification has been cited as the first item
of evidence to support one critic’s claim that the report reads “rather like a science fiction novel at
times.” (Brockington, 2012, p. 410) The report does not make explicit use of the concept as such,
but  it  lists  strategies  to  improve  yields  sustainably  and  promises  that  its  “green”  investment
scenario, besides providing “improved soil quality, increased agricultural yield and reduced land
and water requirements,” would “increase GDP growth and employment,  improve nutrition and
reduce energy consumption and CO2 emissions” including through soil sequestration (UNEP, 2011,
p. 61), while also allowing global meat production to increase by 66% (ibid., p. 62). In other words,
UNEP  suggests  a  win-win-win  improvement  over  the  present  constellation  in  line  with  the
sustainable intensification paradigm. But while listing evidence from a number of case studies that
certain agricultural techniques can improve yields locally at low costs, UNEP conspicuously fails to
address the environmental impacts of each proposed technique (ibid., pp. 52–58).
The  tone  here,  nevertheless,  is  different  from  that  emanating  from  the  World  Bank’s
elaborations. UNEP (ibid., pp. 44–48) acknowledges rising costs of production – due to climate-
change-related water scarcity, rising fertilizer costs, desertification etc. – and the food insecurity
resulting from these factors, which is aggravated by competition from biofuels consumption, as well
as the particular gender inequalities in Southern agricultural  economies. Its first  “key message”
envisions  “managed  transitions”  that  promise  to  “significantly  reduce  the  environmental  and
economic costs associated with today’s industrial farming practices.” (Ibid., p. 36) Even GMOs are
viewed much more critically than in the World Bank study, in line with the IAASTD assessment
(see above; ibid., p. 52). Some technological advances are explicitly framed as reactions to nature
becoming more “expensive,” as in  the case of water-saving practices necessitated by mounting
water scarcity (ibid., p. 46). The drip irrigation systems promoted in response (ibid., pp. 55–57)
certainly allow for higher yields with low water consumption, improving the efficiency of nature’s
productive work.  They notably also constitute  a  slightly more  capitalized production method –
albeit, according to UNEP’s data, a very profitable one. Meanwhile, the environmental gains in the
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“green” scenario may be quite modest, if not negative: Agricultural CO2 emissions are projected to
rise  by 11% (and decrease by only 2% relative to BAU), which balance UNEP claims may be
improved when accounting for the effects of soil sequestration – but no further figures are provided
here (ibid., p. 62; cf. section 3.1.2).188 
For UNEP, smallholder agriculture is to be protected. Yields per area here often surpass
those of large-scale farming (ibid., p. 41), suggesting that subsistence farmers may be a model for
sustainable intensification. But while their contribution to global food security is immense, these
farms,  as  also  becomes  abundantly  clear  from UNEP’s  narrative,  are  failures  from a  capitalist
standpoint – low in labor productivity, often based on non-modern tenure systems (i.e., their land is
not yet privatized and commodified), insufficiently integrated into the world market and lacking
access to finance for improved technologies (ibid., pp. 41–43). GE policies such as  payments for
ecosystem services (PES), after  all,  are easiest  to implement in their  more orthodox forms in a
marketized context. In order to do justice to a  green-capitalist  economy, therefore,  smallholder
agriculture must be commercialized. The “greening of agriculture” for UNEP implies “practices and
technologies that simultaneously … maintain and increase farm productivity and profitability while
ensuring the provision of food and ecosystem services on a sustainable basis.” (Ibid., p. 42) In other
words,  it  is  only  “green”  if  it  raises  both  (land)  productivity  and  profitability  in  addition  to
achieving social and environmental goals.
A contrasting perspective suggests that “deep green” agroecological principles are quite at
odds with the SI paradigm: Agroecology privileges nutrient recycling and agrobiodiversity through
diversified  cropping  systems (intercropping,  polycultures  and agroforestry  systems)  and  locally
adapted seed varieties  (Dooley & Stabinsky, 2018, pp. 22–32). The authors note that while these
strategies reduce nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic  fertilizer use,  are  more resilient  to  the
effects of climate change, benefit subsistence farmers and produce comparably high yields per acre,
they  also  tend  to  be  more  labor-intensive.  This  is  quite  intuitive,  given  that  these  biodiverse
cultivation areas are obviously difficult to farm with heavy machinery. But if such agroecological
strategies,  while  arguably  improving  food  security  along  with  land  productivity,  reduce  labor
productivity, they are inherently problematic from a capitalist standpoint. Hence, there seems to be
no workable capitalist alternative to sustainable intensification. 
But ultimately, while SI is a strategy of commercialization, it is not necessarily a  Cheap
Food strategy either, given that it reduces, in principle, the scope for cheap appropriation outside
market relations. Bringing about relatively higher food prices, moreover, increased “profitability” of
188 No comment is provided on non-carbon greenhouse gas emissions, which are arguably a major factor in the 
agricultural sector (methane and nitrous oxide in particular).
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 164
the  agricultural  sector  may raise  production  costs  across  the  economy.  While  downplaying the
heavy social  implications of  world market  integration for  subsistence farmers,  the treatment  of
smallholder agriculture in this literature reveals, upon closer inspection, the dilemma between the
two forms of productivity – land and labor – that need to be raised simultaneously while  also
ensuring ecological sustainability.
6.2.2 Agricultural projections
UNEP links its policy recommendations to a range of intriguing statistical projections that provide
valuable insights into the functioning of its Green Economy qua Cheap Food regime. Perhaps the
most  dramatic  implications  for  Cheap  Food  are  suggested  in  the  fisheries  chapter.  Here,  as
mentioned above in the  Cheap Labor  section, UNEP (2011) proposes a sort of emergency brake
scenario in order to avoid the total  collapse of global fish stocks (ibid.,  p. 87), with massively
reduced fleets, production and employment levels – but considerably larger revenues, with value
added seeing a fourfold (!) increase from $17 bn. to $67 bn. (ibid., p. 97). In a sector currently vital
for the food security of one billion people (ibid., p. 82), the report argues that “target output should
be set on the basis of maximizing either food supply or fishing rent” (ibid., p. 100) after having
already signaled its priorities by promising significant increases in rents across the sector (ibid., p.
94). In other words, in this particular sector UNEP actually advocates an extreme expensive food
strategy,  whose  repercussions  for  food  security  would  depend  on  trade  policies  and  other
regulations that co-determine actual prices in each particular location. Moreover, sustainability is
here envisioned to be realized by means of the extraction of scarcity rents, which serves particular
interests but not the overall capitalist interest.
Given  the  centrality  of  agriculture’s  labor  intensity  for  food  prices,  a  salient  aspect  of
UNEP’s study in terms of Cheap Food is the predicted development of the agricultural labor force
in the “green” scenario. The report refers to the higher labor intensity for organic agriculture (ibid.,
p. 59), as does the OECD elsewhere  (2017b, pp. 10–11). Overall, its green scenario envisions 47
million additional jobs in the agricultural sector compared to its BAU scenario – one of the “key
messages” highlighted for agriculture (UNEP, 2011, pp. 37, 62). This sounds impressive, compared
to the numbers compiled for other sectors. But given the huge overall employment numbers in
agriculture, the projected difference is less than 3%, and the difference in labor intensity is a mere
1.5%. The labor intensity increase relative to historical (2011) levels is almost identical, at 1.6%.189
189 UNEP only provides total employment figures, and these labor intensity calculations express calories produced per 
worker. Admittedly, this is not a completely reliable indicator of technical labor intensity, given the possibility that 
labor hours per worker may change in either direction. But for assessing the Cheap Food situation, I would argue 
that total employment is a useful enough proxy (and after all, overall labor costs in this sector are unlikely to be 
determined on a per-hour basis).
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The BAU scenario itself  involves a 54% increase in the agricultural  labor force vis-à-vis 2011,
almost on a level with the projected 53% increase in effective calories produced (ibid., p. 62). In
other words, UNEP’s projection for the labor cost of food production is neutral  if one accepts the
2011 baseline as a “normal” situation – which it was not, as I will emphasize in a moment. This
neutral forecast is surprising in so far as the agricultural modernization narrative, including in the
version  advanced  by  the  World  Bank,  generally  envisions  the  large-scale  displacement  of
agricultural labor through mechanization – with an urbanization effect as part and parcel of the
modernization effort  (Bergius et al., 2018, pp. 828, 843; Marcus Taylor, 2014, pp. 104, 109). It is
unclear why such effects are not reflected in UNEP’s “business as usual” scenario.190
UNEP also provides some intriguing statistical projections of the future world food situation
in terms of production revenues and calories provided. Altogether, compared to a 2011 baseline, the
US$ value of agricultural production in the 2050 “green” scenario is to increase by 48%, while
calories available for consumption  per capita are to increase by 21% (ibid., p. 62). Factoring in
population growth during the same period, from roughly 7 to 9 billion – a 28% increase – the
relative cost of this improved food situation is to sink slightly, with total calories produced per
dollar rising from 2,768 to 2,906.191 In other words, UNEP’s modeling predicts a slight gain in terms
of Cheap Food relative to the then-present situation – which, however, was one of historically high
food prices:  In the FAO global Food Price Index,  2011 stands out as the peak year in the 21st
century, with prices two-and-a-half times as high as they had been a decade before; after five years
of recovery, by 2016 the index was down by 30% from its 2011 record level before climbing again
in 2017 (FAO, 2018). According to the FAO index, therefore, global food prices are still at almost
twice their early 2000s level, and UNEP’s 2050 scenario envisions them to rise some more so as to
clock in just below their 2011 peak. Even if UNEP’s optimistic prediction is to come true and world
food production is  to  keep up with population growth and even improve in  terms of  available
calories per capita – which, obviously, does not say whether or not these will be distributed in a
manner that actually reduces world hunger –, these numbers only reaffirm Moore’s claim that the
era of Cheap Food is over.192
190 Since the projected labor intensity figures are almost equal for “business as usual” and “green” scenarios, the higher
labor intensity of “greener” agriculture cannot be responsible for this projected deviation from the modernization 
agenda.
191 Author’s calculations based on the above-cited detailed projections for agricultural production values and per-capita
calories and very rough population figures of 7 and 9 billion – meaning that slight deviations in terms of total 
population may reverse the prediction of sinking costs. 
192 In UNEP’s “business as usual” scenario, only marginally fewer calories are provided, but the economic value of 
agricultural production is 10% lower. “Non-green” food here is supposed to be somewhat cheaper, but still well 
within the historically high range of food prices of the past decade.
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6.2.3 Food and power
Like in the energy sector (cf. section 6.3), the implementation success of the strategy outlined here
hinges to a significant extent on the political ability to actually overcome “environmentally harm-
ful” subsidies as called for (e.g. UNEP, 2011, p. 37). But transnational corporate power in the agri-
cultural sector is found to have increased dramatically since the 1970s (Hall, 2015). The promised
strengthening of smallholder agriculture can only be won against agribusiness. Within the generally
non-confrontational political economy of UNEP’s strategy – which intends to convince investors
and  agribusinesses  of  the  economic  viability  of  “green”  agricultural  practices,  seeking  change
through the market more than through coercive policies –, this is unlikely to happen (cf. chapter 8). 
UNEP takes  its  emphasis  on  cooperation  in  the  face  of  extreme power  asymmetries  to
almost comical proportions: “A small number of corporations control a large share of the global
agribusiness (…) By greening the core business operations and supply chains, these corporations
can play a major role in supporting a transition to greener agriculture.” (Ibid., p. 53) Hope is placed
on (Northern) consumer willingness to pay a premium for organic and/or “fair trade” products and
thus  support  smallholder  agriculture,  without  regard  for  either  the  scalability  of  voluntary
approaches  or  the  difficult  political  economy of  global  supply chains,  which  traditionally  have
allowed very little revenue to trickle down to Southern peasants. Through UNEP’s wider strategy of
leveraging private finance through public incentives (e.g. ibid., pp. 594, 622), echoed by the other
organizations (OECD, 2015a, p. 39; World Bank, 2012, pp. 19–21), the profitability criterion – in
this case for agriculture – is even further entrenched. From this angle, it is not surprising that the
focus is on purely positive incentives for capital rather than on making “green” investments only
relatively more profitable through the penalization of conventional investments.
This political-economic dilemma also applies to sustainable intensification strategies more
generally, as becomes readily apparent in the writings of one frequently cited proponent. H. Charles
J. Godfray argues that the concept is “genuinely radical” and “seeks radical change in the way food
is produced.” (Godfray, 2015, p. 201) He emphasizes that “[i]t should not be seen as a business-as-
usual with marginal improvements that benefit the environment” (ibid., p. 202), only to argue a few
pages later, in rejecting the more fundamental (i.e.,  radical)  political criticisms of the concept’s
detractors, that “we live in the world we live in and progress is most likely to be made at  the
margin.” (Ibid., p. 205) Godfray short-circuits the entire debate by explicitly refusing to engage
with “politicized” arguments about distribution and unequal power relations (both on the side of
farmers and of consumers) that distract from the technical feasibility of yield gains by variable
means, which he considers the only reliable way to improve global food security and combat hunger
as political change is too fickle to depend on (and political issues must be separated from technical
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ones).  The “politicized” point  made by critics,  however,  is  of  course that  increased production
levels do not easily translate into food security for the poor, and that an agenda narrowly focused on
productivity gains while ignoring the institutional context in which they are realized runs the risk of
reinforcing  food  insecurity  (Loos  et  al.,  2014).  In  isolating  technical  questions  from  political
considerations,  Godfray’s  position  perfectly  encapsulates  the  technocratic  world  view  so
characteristic of the Green Economy discourse.
As discussed extensively in section 5.2, even the technical dimension itself is complicated
by  the  challenges  of  implementation  under  capitalist  conditions,  where  the  most  resource-
productive  method (or  the  least-externalizing,  which  may again  differ)  usually  is  not  the  most
profitable. How can internalization be enforced in the face of political-economic barriers? How can
capital really be made to “pay its own way”? In the world-ecology sense, capital is forced to pay a
larger share of its costs with each instance of capitalization, but these instances themselves must be
politically enforced – while both avoiding new re-externalizations and, from a capitalist standpoint,
maintaining macroeconomic profitability. 
6.2.4 Cheap Green Food from a world-ecology perspective
Viewed through a world-ecology lens, the  Green Economy’s reference to the  Green Revolution’s
intensification gains constitutes another highly problematic aspect. The rising yields of the past are
used  here  as  evidence  of  the  general  possibility  of  ongoing  intensification;  the  ecological
externalities that the  Green Revolution  entailed are portrayed as amendable mistakes, stemming
from a combination of technical  and governance failures that  are now subject  to improvement.
Instead  of  being  mere  collateral  damage that  can  be  fixed  through better-targeted  policies  and
agricultural techniques, however, from a world-ecological perspective, these externalizations were
the crucial enabling factor for the impressive yield gains of the Green Revolution, in which limited
soil fertility was enhanced through massive amounts of fossil-based fertilizers, with a considerable
toxicity penalty (Moore, 2015, pp. 249–255). 
In addition, there are again interdependencies and rivalries among the  Four Cheaps  that
complicate the picture. Even UNEP (2011, p. 45) acknowledges the food—energy price nexus: If
affordable food has so far depended on cheap fossil fuel inputs, in the future its realization could be
impeded by competition for land and crops that could be used for nutrition as well as bioenergy. If
progress, as Godfray predicts, will take place “at the margin” and environmentally benign agro-
ecological practices are understood as only one item in the agro-industrial toolbox, some further
intensification may still be feasible, but it is likely to rely on ongoing externalizations in order to
provide Cheap Food – or its gains may be diverted to provide (not-so-)Cheap Energy instead.
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The question,  then,  would be to  what  extent,  and for how long,  capital  will  be able  to
maintain these externalizations and keep food cheap. In Moore’s view, increasing problems with
pesticide-resistent “superweeds” and the agricultural upheavals caused by climate change, as well
as the conspicuous absence of further yield gains afforded by all the biotechnological research of
the last few decades, suggest that in the future it may no longer be possible for capital to pass on as
large a share of these costs as in previous periods, and the era of Cheap Food may be coming to an
end (Moore, 2015, pp. 264–286). While I cannot ultimately pass any judgment on the possibility of
future biotech miracles, there is little evidence in the  Green Economy  reports that could assuage
these concerns, and UNEP’s projections arguably support Moore’s point. 
The mixed strategy bundle of sustainable intensification fails to transcend the always latent
tension between the concept’s two components. Some of the proposed steps emphasize the intensifi-
cation part and point, contrary to Godfray’s assertions, in the direction of “business-as-usual with
marginal improvements,” whereas others involve ecologically sustainable practices whose scalabi-
lity  at  low  costs  remains  questionable.  For  these  low-tech  “green”  agricultural  practices,  the
dilemma  of  land  versus  labor  productivity  asserts  itself:  More  ecologically  sensitive  forms  of
enhancing land productivity in line with agroecological principles are not “cheap” by the standards
of capitalist mass production. They decrease labor productivity to such a degree that they hardly
constitute a suitable foundation for system-wide accumulation fed by Cheap Food. 
Thus, moments of both “growth” strategies and “green” strategies regarding food coexist in
these reports, but it is unclear in how far these disparate elements combine to form a green growth
strategy, let alone one capable of providing  Cheap Food. The most consistent narrative element
across the reports refers not to agricultural practices at all but to modernization in the sense of
further  commercialization  and  world  market  integration,  with  the  attendant  threats  to  rural
livelihoods. While the prospects for realizing future Cheap Food, thus, appear not particularly great,
the  possibility  of  realizing  it,  for  the  first  time  in  capitalist  history,  without significant  socio-
ecological  externalizations  seems to  exist  in  abstract  promises  at  best.  This,  in  turn,  given the
persistent influence of food prices on the value of labor power, complicates the provisioning of
Cheap Labor. It seems that “nature” can only be brought to work “harder,” per acre farmed, through
additional human efforts that lower the rate of exploitation for both non-human and human work.
6.3 Energy
Thesis 6.3: With rising costs of fossil fuel extraction, renewable sources of energy are becoming
more competitive – but not necessarily cheap relative to cheap fossil energy of the past, and their
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large-scale deployment is fraught with adverse by-effects, goal conflicts and resource constraints,
particularly in non-electrified sectors. Efficiency gains may temper these rising energy costs.
Energy is obviously a central input factor for all economic activity, and price fluctuations here have
repercussions throughout the economy. The main components of the GE’s energy strategy point
towards more expensive energy provision, although some caveats and counter-tendencies apply.
6.3.1 The Third Carbon Age and the end of cheap fossil fuels
First of all, fossil fuels can no longer serve as the basis of a cheap energy system. This has to do
with  the  increasing  immediate  costs  of  extraction  as  easily  accessible  stocks  are  progressively
exhausted, but also with their role in overflowing atmospheric sink capacities and thereby creating
massive  and  no  longer  fully  externalizable  costs.  Researchers  associated  with  the  IMF  have
estimated the externalities from fossil fuel use alone at 6.5% of global GDP in 2015 (Coady, Parry,
Sears, & Shang, 2017).193 The end of what may be dubbed “cheap sinks” has provoked expensive
strategies of carbon pricing (OECD, 2015a, pp. 13, 32; UNEP, 2011, p. 559; World Bank, 2012, pp.
47–48) and geoengineering technologies including carbon capture and storage (CCS), as outlined in
more detail in section 7.3. Unsurprisingly, the Green Economy reports emphasize that fossil fuels
have not  been “cheap” for a  long time in that  their  extraction has been facilitated by massive
subsidies – around $500 billion annually – that need to be phased out (UNEP, 2011, p. 621; World
Bank, 2012, pp. 15, 47). These subsidies have been identified by the OECD  (2015a, p. 15) as a
“major impediment” to green growth, “acting as a negative price on carbon.” The (theoretical) pos-
sibility of redirecting “gray” subsidies to “green” sectors therefore is an opportunity to restructure at
least some part of capital’s appropriation of energy without incurring additional costs, albeit one
whose realization has historically been complicated by the political resistance of vested interests. 
Still, by 2050, reference models cited by UNEP (2011, pp. 223–224) predict 61% of total
global energy supply to be provided by fossil fuels in the “greenest” case, and the OECD concurs
that “[f]ossil fuels in particular will continue to dominate energy supply for some time.” (2011b, p.
63) But fossil fuel exploration has become more expensive as the “industry has been spending more
and more in recent years just to tread water.”  (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2015, p. 16) In the real
world, therefore, supply is increasingly provided through the exploitation of “unconventional” fossil
193 The study notably found almost half of these costs to be caused by adverse health effects resulting from local air 
pollution (calculated according to the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) methodology, see note 127 in section 4.4.5). 
Together with other local factors such as traffic congestion, domestically incurred costs added up to 78%, while 
global warming effects in this study only accounted for 22% of the total. Given that so little of the total is being 
externalized across borders, the authors concluded that full-cost pricing should generally be in the domestic interest 
of each country. They acknowledge, however, that many components of the cost-benefit analysis are riddled with 
“significant uncertainties and controversies” (Coady et al., 2017, p. 19) and sensitive to a series of different 
assumptions. For the social cost of carbon, for example, the study relies on the quite moderate cost estimates used 
by U.S. government authorities (cf. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, 2016).
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fuels in what one observer has termed the “fossil-fuels version of an arms race” (Klare, 2013, n.p.)
and  another,  the  “late  neoliberal  regime”  of  “extreme  energy.”  (Deckard,  2016,  p.  164)
Unconventional  fossil  fuels  are  generally  more  expensive  to  extract  and  provide  lower  energy
returns on energy investments, meaning that they effectively are higher-carbon energy sources, not
to  speak  of  the  social  and  ecological  “sacrifice  zones”  often  created  throughout  territories  of
extraction  (Klein,  2014,  pp.  311–315).  The  shift  to  unconventional  sources  also  implies  a
geopolitical reordering, with states such as Canada and Venezuela suddenly in possession of the
world’s largest energy reserves. Likewise, to the degree that gas fracking may substitute for coal
mining, it suggests new externalizations in the shape of massive local pollution and public health
hazards  (Ciplet et al., 2015, pp. 45–48). At the same time, the IEA (2017, p. 4) projects U.S. oil
output  growth – largely from unconventional  sources  – to  translate  into the “highest  sustained
period of oil output growth by a single country in the history of oil markets,” which it considers one
of four relevant trends in the global energy sector.
But not only unconventional fossil fuels flourish. Even coal is far from being abandoned as a
large-scale energy source. According to the IPCC (2014, p. 8), since the turn of the millennium,
“[i]ncreased use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed the long-standing trend of
gradual decarbonization of the world’s energy supply.” The IEA (2017, p. 2) recently suggested that
the global coal boom was coming to an end. Nevertheless, this Third Carbon Age (Klare, 2013) is
an empirical reality completely at odds with the Green Economy vision. The rise of unconventional
fossil fuels in particular serves to prop up the old “gray” hegemony in the name of “energy security”
(cf. section 2.1 and chapter 8) and threatens to explode all medium-term GE scenarios.
At the same time, the Third Carbon Age is not a new Cheap Energy era. While depletion of
cheap conventional stocks has turned unconventional fossil fuels into a viable business model for
the  industry,  replete  with  massive  social  and  environmental  cost  externalizations  as  well  as
geopolitical  shifts, their  ascendancy – enabled by rising energy costs that made their  extraction
economically viable in the first place, as well as by political concerns over energy security – still
signals an age of expensive energy from the standpoint of capital as a whole. This is true even if the
short-term effect  of  the  Third Carbon Age,  as  intended by its  political  supporters, has been to
moderate the historically high price of oil, with devastating ecological implications.194
194 The numbers suggest that the short-term negative effect of unconventional fossil fuels on fuel prices is closely 
linked to the waning ability of conventional oil producers to exact scarcity rents. The price of crude oil imploded 
from 2014 through early 2016 (it has since recovered, but remains considerably lower than in the period 2004–
2014, with the exception of a brief crisis-induced drop in late 2008/early 2009; cf. MacroTrends, 2019). Meanwhile,
oil rents (as a share of global GDP) imploded to less than one-third of their 2011 levels, with most of the drop 
occurring in 2014–2016 (World Bank, 2019f). The 2014 turning point coincided with the rise of U.S. oil reserves 
(i.e., oil that is considered to be economically extractable) to levels last seen in the 1970s (MacroTrends, n.d.), 
enabled by unconventional sources and extraction technologies. While this collapse of rents may dry up the flood of
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6.3.2 Cheap renewables?
As argued in section 5.1.3, support for renewable energy production is a staple item on the Green
Economy  agenda. In principle, renewable energy can be appropriated without any (or with very
little) capitalization, photosynthesis and vessels carried by water and wind being obvious cases in
point. But in order to serve the purposes of industrial capitalism, in order to be made to work for
capital,  highly  capitalized  infrastructures  are  necessary  to  concentrate  the  relatively  weak,
dispersed, synchronous and often discontinuous flows of renewable energy (relative, that is, to the
long-accumulated and well-concentrated  stocks of fossil fuels which enabled the development of
industrial capitalism in the first place).
In marginal terms (meaning costs per kilowatt hour) and for new investment decisions, it has
been emphasized that renewable electricity is increasingly becoming economically competitive with
fossil  alternatives  (IEA,  2018c;  IRENA,  2019;  Kost,  Shammugam,  Jülch,  Nguyen,  &  Schlegl,
2018).  IRENA,  the  International  Renewable  Energy  Agency founded  in  2009,  is  particularly
enthusiastic, claiming that “[i]n most parts of the world today, renewables are the lowest-cost source
of new power generation” (IRENA, 2019, p. 9) and costs will continue to fall considerably over the
coming years.195 Kost et al.  (2018), whose calculations for Germany include estimates of carbon
prices  and  therefore  are  already  biased  towards  renewables,  are  more  cautiously  optimistic
concerning competitiveness. But all agree that recent green-technological development in this field
has rendered “green” alternatives more competitive.
A number of “buts” apply here, all revolving around the  scalability of these technologies.
First,  the  focus  on  marginal  or  project  costs  does  not  take  into  account  the  problem  of  land
constraints and “low-hanging fruit.” The IRENA study notes, for example, that costs for hydro-
power development  have been stable  or even tending slightly upward,  partly because the “best
sites”  have  already  been  developed  (ibid.,  p.  27).  Small  hydropower  capacity  (which  tends  to
involve fewer environmental and social externalizations than megaprojects, which often displace
large populations) is more expensive to install than large (ibid., p. 59). Offshore wind costs have not
decreased much either, as technological advances have been neutralized by the increasing need for
deployment further offshore, in greater water depths, where winds are stronger but construction and
cheap money that has fueled finance-driven accumulation in the neoliberal era, it should impact positively on 
productive industries and “real” accumulation. But in previous eras of oil abundance, the opportunities for rentism 
were smaller without the alternative necessity of exploiting more difficult-to-extract fossil reserves by even dirtier 
means. Economic considerations aside, the ecological effect of this development is obviously devastating, with not 
only emissions and local ecosystem destruction per unit of energy sharply rising but also attenuated oil prices 
skewing short-term incentives for all economic actors in favor of fossil fuels rather than renewables.
195 IRENA’s levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) calculation excludes any subsidies or CO2 pricing but includes a flat 
estimate of capital costs. The global weighted-average costs in 2018 were 6.2 US$c/kWh for bioenergy and 5.6 for 
onshore wind, 8.5 for solar photovoltaics and 4.7 for hydropower, respectively. The fossil plant cost range was 
between 4.9 and 17.4 US$c/kWh (IRENA, 2019, pp. 10–11).
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operating  costs  much  higher  (ibid.,  pp.  23–25,  49–53).  Another  study notes  that  for  Germany,
levelized costs of photovoltaic and wind electricity are likewise highly location-dependent (Kost et
al.,  2018). As the world approaches a 100% renewable electricity scenario, in other words, new
capacity  development  will  increasingly  have  to  take  place  in  less  attractive,  costlier  locations.
Optimists  here project  that  the additional  land use (counting both  direct  footprint  and required
spacing between, for example, wind turbines) in such a scenario will “only” amount to 1% of global
land surface and “[w]ind in developable locations can power the world about 3–5 times over and
solar, about 15–20 times over.” (M. Z. Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011, p. 1159) But their optimism is
based on rough calculations that exclude any consideration of real-world land use competition or of
local factors that reduce the extent of factually available suitable locations. To put their figures into
perspective, 1% of global land surface roughly corresponds to the world’s entire urbanized area.196
Other estimates are much higher:  Wynn  (2015), assuming full  electrification (see next section),
guesses that 12% of UK land area may suffice to provide the country’s primary energy need with
wind and solar  energy;  the  purpose  of  his  calculations  is  to  reject  Vaclav  Smil’s  much bolder
hypothesis that domestic production of 100% renewables (in a not fully electrified scenario) would
require  more than the entire land mass of countries such as the UK or Germany. According to
Smil’s  (2010) estimates, depending on the mix of renewables chosen, switching only electricity
production  to  renewable  sources  would  generally  increase  land  requirements  in  this  sector  by
between one  and  three  orders  of  magnitude.197 Smil  has  further  emphasized  the  vastly  uneven
geographical  distribution  of  exploitable  renewable  energy resources,  noting  that  “some densely
populated regions have no significant locally available sources at all.” (Smil, 2015, p. 23) 
Second, marginal project costs are different from systemic costs. IRENA emphasizes that the
latter become more important as the share of variable (i.e., discontinuous) electricity sources in the
mix rises  (IRENA, 2019, p. 9). Storage becomes an increasingly salient problem, and affordable
technological solutions here are still few and far between. Only concentrated solar power (CSP)
plants, it has been suggested, currently have the potential for large-scale storage, but these produce
much more expensive energy than photovoltaic plants (Kost et al., 2018, pp. 24–25). Furthermore,
196 Estimates on urbanized area differ; Ritchie and Roser (2018) suggest an area that only corresponds to 0.42% of 
global land surface for the year 2000 (reference data for the latter taken from World Bank, 2019e) while a 2010 
Columbia University project provided a figure as high as 2.7% (cf. W. Cox, 2010). Cox suggests a more correct 
figure may be around 1%.
197 Smil, gleefully cited and published by “free-market” environmentalists (in this case, the Master Resource blog) 
because of his warnings against overly fast “green” transition attempts, appears to underestimate the actual land 
needs for fossil energy production here. In his “primer,” he calculates the respective power densities (i.e., land 
requirements per unit of energy, measured in W/m²) of various fossil and renewable energy sources. For coal mined 
in opencast mines, he is mainly concerned with the footprint of the power plants and transmission infrastructure; as 
far as the mines are concerned, he only factors in the footprint of the actual coal seam extracted each year, while 
these mines arguably cover far more territory.
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 173
energy not only needs to be stored temporarily but, with site-dependent generation, also transported
across  space.  It  remains  unclear  whether  uneven industrial  geographies  with  highly  centralized
points  of  demand  should  be  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  decentralized  renewable  energy
production or vice versa, but either way, this transition is unlikely to be cheap. One illustrative case
is Germany, where the construction of massive power lines from northern zones of wind energy
production  to  southern  centers  of  industrial  power  consumption  has  sparked  protests  from
environmentalists,  farmers and residents along the envisioned routes,  which prompted a turn to
more expensive underground infrastructures (Handelsblatt, 2018). 
Third,  the  enormous  need  for  raw  materials  to  create  and  maintain  renewable  energy
infrastructures constitutes another possible bottleneck, threatening to raise costs or even render the
massive expansion of certain technologies unfeasible in a seriously “green” development scenario.
This will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.4.2 below. Studies that are very optimistic about
the  potential  for  low-cost  “100%  renewables”  scenarios,  including  grid  infrastructures  and
“ancillary” stabilization services, tend to ignore both the declining quality of sites and resource
constraints (e.g. Brown et al., 2018). The cumulative effect of these constraints is reflected in EROI
calculations (energy return on investment, see chapter introduction): A hypothetical increase in the
share of renewables in the global energy system to 50% by 2050 has been projected to reduce the
global EROI from 6:1 to a dangerously low 3:1, accounting for the effects of renewable sources’
intermittency (Capellán-Pérez, de Castro, & Miguel González, 2018).
Fourth,  from  a  world-ecology  perspective,  the  reference  point  for  the  comparative
“cheapness” of renewables is the bygone era of cheap oil and coal, not the comparatively high cost
of fossil fuels in the  Third Carbon Age. (According to the last cited source, the global EROI has
shrunk from 7:1 to below 6:1 since the mid-1990s, with the BAU scenario suggesting an ongoing
decline.) While renewables may become an increasingly attractive option for new capacity, they
hardly match the cheap energy sources of historical accumulation regimes and tend to be relatively
“expensive” in the world-ecological sense. Concerning the transition to a Green Economy, there is
also the problem of sunk costs; renewables not only need to beat new fossil infrastructures but also
compete with existing fossil capacity.198 In order to overcome political-economic resistance, it has
been argued, renewables need to be not only competitive with but significantly cheaper than fossil
alternatives (Bernes, 2019). Rising overall capitalization levels – “the ratio of global power sector
investment to demand growth more than doubled on average” over ten years, according to the IEA
(2018b, p. 3, cf. 2018d, p. 5) –  suggest that  Cheap Energy  in the world-ecological sense remains
198 IRENA (2019, pp. 9, 16) makes a more cautious argument that renewables in the near future will become 
increasingly competitive with the marginal operating costs of existing coal power plants in certain places.
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elusive even for the electricity sector. The present constellation points more in the direction of an
Economy of Additionality (see section 9.3) in which existing fossil fuel capacity is complemented
with renewable capacity to meet rising energy demand – and perhaps slowly, too slowly, replaced
by renewables, according to economic lifetime rather than climate mitigation schedules. 
Beyond scalability issues, what might make renewables even more expensive is their alleged
higher labor intensity. This has often been advanced as an argument for its job creation potential
vis-à-vis fossil energy (Bowen et al., 2009, p. 10; OECD, 2011b, pp. 91–92, 2017b; Pollin et al.,
2008, p. 11; UNEP, 2011, pp. 203, 218; World Bank, 2012, pp. 94–95). Higher requirements of
wage labor inputs –  paid  as opposed to  unpaid work  – are obviously a classic source of price
increases for what once was Cheap Nature. But UNEP, acknowledging that “considerable net job
creation can imply higher-cost energy” (2011, p. 224) also recognizes that these may be short-term
changes, and projects that with long-run productivity increases, direct job numbers in the energy
sector in a “green” scenario may end up slightly below the non-green BAU scenario. Much of the
initial rise in labor intensity may have to do with installation and construction efforts during the
capacity build-up period and therefore be temporary (cf. OECD, 2017b, p. 9). These caveats suggest
that the role of higher labor intensity in rendering renewables more expensive may be limited, at
least if these are deployed at industrial scales.
6.3.3 Biofuels
Important additional limitations for the transition to renewable energy production reveal themselves
when one considers different energy  forms  and purposes. Beyond electricity, the development of
“renewables” tends to become much more difficult, and “there are large segments of modern energy
consumption where we do not have any readily available alternatives of the required scales.” (Smil,
2015, n.p.) This explains why the  electrification of previously differently powered sectors plays
such a big role in future energy scenarios: The IEA (2017) lists it as one of four megatrends in the
global energy system, and IRENA (2019, p. 17) projects that the share of electricity in global energy
consumption could jump from 19% to 49% by 2050, with electricity providing 43% of all transport
energy.  This  obviously  reinforces  the  pressure  on  renewable  electricity  generation.  But  beyond
scalability issues, for transportation purposes, to stick to this example, dense and easily storable
petroleum-based fuels are difficult to substitute with electricity or hydrogen. This is particularly true
for the growth sectors aviation and shipping (see section 3.2.3).
An  alternative  response  is  reliance  on  biofuels,  liquid  fuel  produced  from  bio-based
materials  that  could  provide  energy  not  only  for  the  electricity  sector  but  also  directly  as  a
transportation  fuel.  Biofuels  are  projected  by  UNEP  (2011,  p.  397) to  account  for  40% (!)  of
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 175
transportation energy by 2050 (the study also erroneously expected much of this growth to happen
during the 2010s; ibid., p. 62). The GE’s reliance on manyfold increases in biofuels production (cf.
section 5.1.3) has been subjected to much criticism, partly because of its role – especially when
applied at large scales – in competing for land needed for food production (Fairhead et al., 2012;
FDCL & Lateinamerika Nachrichten, 2015; Heuwieser, 2015; Tanuro, 2013, pp. 102–104).
UNEP (2011, p. 186) admitted that increased biofuel production tended to put pressure on
forests, whose preservation as a natural capital asset (valued as a cheap carbon sink, among other
functions)  is  another  Green  Economy  goal.  Biofuels  are  frequently  produced  in  monoculture
plantations (FDCL & Lateinamerika Nachrichten, 2015), intended to make “nature” work harder by
providing cheap sources of energy at larger scales – clearly a Cheap Nature strategy. This strategy
also endangers biodiversity. Even OECD researchers acknowledge, for example, that “Indonesia’s
ambitious biofuel blending mandate …. [is] likely to further drive expansion of palm oil plantations
at the expense of forests and peatland”  (Capozza & Samson, 2019, p. 24), and the international
body tasked with protecting the latter states unequivocally that “[b]iodiversity objectives can only
be  attained  if  massive  deployment  of  biofuels  is  avoided.”  (Secretariat  of  the  Convention  on
Biological  Diversity,  2014,  p.  16) Finally,  even  the  climatic  effects  are  dubious.  The cheapest
production methods also tend to be relatively carbon-intensive; in some cases, biofuels produce
higher emissions than the fossils they replace (Dooley & Stabinsky, 2018, p. 18).
UNEP (2011, pp. 44–45) acknowledged some of these problems and placed its hopes on
second-generation biofuels that are in less direct competition with food demands, but whose large-
scale  realization  is  also  uncertain;  UNEP admitted  that  they  may  disrupt  nutrient  cycles.  The
agency’s  projection  for  the  massive  expansion  of  biofuels,  mostly  of  the  second  generation,
typically argues that these will be “primarily grown on marginal land,” meaning land not suitable
for food production (ibid., p. 62). But it is worth considering the massive amounts of “marginal”
land that would be required to fuel even 40% of global transportation activities, which themselves
are projected to grow rapidly.
Recent  reviews  suggest  that  growth  in  second-generation  or  “advanced”  biofuels  has
remained very modest,  and due  to  lacking investment  in  research  and development  this  is  not
expected to change over the coming decade; at the same time, only very slow growth is projected
for traditional corn- and sugarcane-based biofuels  (OECD & FAO, 2018, p. 194). Over the past
decades, the U.S. regulatory authorities repeatedly had to waive the levels mandated for advanced
biofuel production because production capacity was lacking (ibid.).  By 2027, only 4.5% of the
production volume for advanced cellulosic biofuels mandated for that year in a 2007 legislative
decision is expected to materialize (ibid., p. 192). Contrary to UNEP’s expectations, overall biofuels
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only amount to 3% of transportation fuels, and only a tiny fraction of this is from second-generation
sources. In high-growth transportation sectors such as aviation and shipping, biofuels uptake has
been negligible (Le Feuvre, 2019). While “greener” advanced biofuels have not been successfully
commercialized at all, even the externalities-laden first-generation biofuels, at currently realizable
production scales, are only cost-competitive with conventional fuels in case of exceptionally high
oil prices (which, of course, may become more common in the future), and marginal production
costs exceed those of OPEC oil by about an order of magnitude – in other words, they are not
exactly a Cheap Energy solution.199 
Critical observers summarized the prospects of bioenergy as a “green” solution as follows:
“[S]ourcing bioenergy from forest harvest is not carbon neutral; any bioenergy from the ‘dedicated
use of land’ is unlikely to be carbon neutral and comes with a significant land opportunity cost; and
the use of residues and wastes for bioenergy is limited.” (Dooley & Stabinsky, 2018, p. 18) Biofuels
(or bioenergy more broadly understood), in other words, are neither cheap nor ecologically effective
at scale – but still laden with cost re-externalizations. 
6.3.4 Negawatts to the rescue?
Another potential twist is implicit in the energy efficiency part of the Green Economy agenda. The
OECD  (2017b,  p.  9) points  in  this  direction  when  emphasizing  that  while  energy  efficiency
measures  also  create  jobs,  overall  employment  in  the  energy  sector  may  still  shrink  with  the
successful implementation of energy efficiency measures throughout the economy. Ceteris paribus,
renewables may be more labor-intensive per unit of energy output. But with parallel gains in energy
efficiency in a broader “green” scenario, ceteris paribus assumptions will not hold. This suggests
that efficiency gains should be considered a way of appropriating “cheap” energy: After all,  as
green-capitalist writers like to point out, the cheapest energy is that which is saved, as expressed in
the notion of negawatts (Fücks, 2013, p. 270; Hawken et al., 2000, p. 279). Indeed, from an output
199 Industry-sponsored think tanks and blogs argue that conventional biofuels become cost-competitive at oil prices of 
about $US 75-90 per barrel, which historically were only recorded in the peak periods during the early 1980s and 
from the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s (Biofuels for Europe, 2017; Lane, 2017; historical oil prices from 
MacroTrends, 2019). (Biofuels for Europe boasts that cost competitiveness “by volume” is warranted at $US 60 per 
barrel, but a barrel of ethanol only has two-thirds of the energy content of conventional oil, so that the figure must 
be multiplied by 1.5 in order to compare both as fuels rather than as liquids.) Marginal production costs in 2014 
were estimated in a range from $US 3–20 per barrel for conventional oil from most OPEC countries, whereas for 
Brazilian ethanol the figure stood at $66 and for European biofuels, above $100 per barrel (Knoema, 2019). 
 System-level price comparisons between biofuels and fossil alternatives are not a straightforward matter – 
should one compare production costs or market prices which may involve both subsidies (on both sides) and 
massive rents (in the case of conventional oil)? This certainly depends on the actors concerned, and a “neutral” 
standpoint with regard to the systemic implications for capitalism is difficult to identify. If cheap biofuels indeed 
were to force down oil rents, this would lower production costs across the global economy while diminishing 
financial accumulation in oil-producing regions. In reality, biofuels have been used almost exclusively as 
government-mandated low-percentage blends with conventional transport fuels rather than marketed as alternatives,
and they pose no serious threat to oil rents.
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perspective, efficiency gains effectively do cause “nature” to work “harder” for capital (providing
more output per dollar of input), and amazingly, this is an appropriation that does not directly rely
on externalizations. Here, technology can, in principle, produce win-win-win situations of the sort
generally advocated in the GE studies. 
Of course, while  negawatts visualize the business case for energy efficiency, they should
also be understood as a – frequently capital-intensive – reaction to the exhaustion of cheap energy, a
reaction that is prompted by a business environment in which energy costs are a significant factor
for many businesses and vulnerability to price fluctuations poses a considerable risk. Compared to
an era in which oil seemed to shoot up from the ground in fountains wherever one drove a pipe into
the ground, today’s dependency on energy-efficient solutions  is  a real constraint, and even to the
extent that these solutions can be realized, simply equating them with “cheap” energy would be
misleading. Nevertheless,  negawatts  do offer important potential to drive down energy costs, and
not all  savings necessarily require increased capital inputs. From an ecological perspective, this
strength is obviously also a weakness, as it tends to provoke rebound effects (see section 5.1).
Finally,  some interdependencies  and  potential  conflicts  with  other  forms  of  Cheap  Nature  are
worthy of attention. One straightforward case is once again that of biofuels, which tend to compete
for land with food production. If this act of appropriation drives up food prices, it of course directly
interferes with the provision of another one of the  Four Cheaps  so central to the functioning of
capital  accumulation.  In  addition,  noting  that  energy  production  and  water  provisioning  are
mutually  interdependent,  UNEP  (2011,  p.  122) also  suggests  that  the  decreasing  availability  of
“cheap”  water  may  result  in  reduced  energy  returns  on  energy  invested,  equally  signaling  a
movement  away  from “cheap”  energy.  Finally,  leading  into  the  following  section,  demand  for
renewable energy infrastructures is also likely to bid up the prices and aggravate the scarcity of
many important raw materials.
6.4 Raw materials
Thesis 6.4: Industrial-scale  “green” technologies critically depend on increasingly scarcer raw
materials  whose  (limited)  potential  for  “cheap”  extraction  usually  hinges  on  the  ongoing
externalization of socio-environmental costs. Goal conflicts abound, and the history of capitalist
extractivism continues.
UNEP (2011, pp. 246–255) concedes that raw materials tend to become more expensive factors of
production  due  to  increasing  scarcity,  including  the  specialty  minerals  needed  for  high-tech
production. Its chosen strategies of technological innovation that envision efficiency gains and a
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circular  economy (cf.  section  10.1.3)  may  therefore,  in  the  first  instance,  be  understood  as  a
response to these tendencies,  with the same implications for the cheapness of raw materials  as
discussed above for energy. The GE reports generally do not discuss raw materials very explicitly,
beyond the terrain already covered in the previous sections. But in the meantime, a rich body of
literature  around  the  question  of  raw  materials  for  “green”  technologies  has  emerged.  In  this
section, I will raise a few points about the prospects for “cheap” raw materials in a Green Economy,
along with a discussion of the future of extractivism and the special case of green-tech minerals. 
6.4.1 Extractivism as a Cheap Nature practice
Globally, growth in resource extraction accelerated in the post-2000 period,  as did international
trade in resources, which led to the increasing concentration of the mounting socio-environmental
impacts of extraction in relatively underprivileged regions  (International Resource Panel, 2017).
The notion of extractivism emerged against this background. Extractivism denotes an ideology and
a set of political and economic practices revolving around the large-scale appropriation of nature –
mineral resources, but also “renewables” – for economic purposes, with attendant externalizations
of social and environmental costs and particularly destructive effects on local communities (Acosta,
2013; Svampa, 2013). Naomi Klein characterizes extractivism as “a non-reciprocal, dominance-
based relationship with the earth”  (2014, p. 169), whereas others have conceptualized it in more
sober terms as a conflict-laden national development model geared towards primary-sector exports
in  Southern  contexts  (Dietz  &  Engels,  2017).  Along  with  environmental  destruction,  social
externalization is part and parcel of extractivism: Acosta  (2013, p. 63) argues that “[i]n practice,
extractivism has been a mechanism of colonial and neocolonial plunder and appropriation,” while
Svampa (2013, p. 118) emphasizes that in Latin America, “the new Commodities Consensus” – the
neo-extractivist turn associated with the departure from neoliberal orthodoxy in the name of social
redistribution  – “adds to  the  dynamic  of  dispossession of  land,  resources  and territories  whilst
simultaneously  creating  new  forms  of  dependency  and  domination.”200 The  essence  of  the
phenomenon discussed under the label of extractivism, I would argue, is the appropriation of Cheap
Nature in precisely those ways that the Green Economy renounces: ruthless, with little to no regard
for the social and environmental “pillars” of sustainable development.
Even  empirical  research  produced  for  a  business  lobby  organization  highlights  global
capital’s dependence on cost externalizations: Only accounting for a substantial but not all-encom-
passing set of “unpaid” costs of a (large) number of primary extractive and processing sectors, one
200 As practiced under leftist Pink Tide governments, relatively broadly redistributed resource rents even enabled 
considerably sinking poverty rates (at the expense of creating local sacrifice zones, frequently on indigenous 
territories). But this model was so dependent on extractivist practices that harsh austerity policies swiftly took its 
place once commodity prices fell (Riofrancos, 2019a).  
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extensive study found these to amount to 13% of global GDP in 2009 (Trucost, 2013).201 For three-
quarters of the 20 highest-impact sectors – disaggregated by world region and economic branch –
the study found the externalized costs to exceed total revenues, while they exceeded profits in all
cases. The report warned that these externalizations exposed whole industries to significant risks,
and internalization might trigger massive cost increases to consumers.202
Will the Green Economy consequently mark a decisive break with extractivism? In the same
region, Latin America, continuities between old extractivist patterns and the newer practices of the
bioeconomy have been noted. For example, the intensified monocultural production of eucalyptus,
palm oil and algae – all at least partly used for bioenergy – is quintessentially extractive (FDCL &
Lateinamerika Nachrichten, 2015). Critics point out that environmental discourses are increasingly
deployed to legitimize or blanket neo-extractivist practices – notably in Bolivia and Ecuador, whose
recent constitutional recognition of the rights of “Mother Nature” garnered global public attention
while both governments continued to push forward conventional extractivist projects in vulnerable
ecosystems (Svampa, 2013, pp. 122–126). Arguably, the whole ontology of natural capital betrays a
deeply  extractivist  perspective,  simply  updated  in  order  to  prevent  the  impending  depletion  of
stocks and thus extend their extraction into the future. 
Against  this  background,  as  amply  demonstrated  in  this  section,  the  degree  of  cost
internalization  that  the  Green  Economy  can  realize  while  still  enabling  ongoing  growth  is  an
empirical question, and it appears severely limited if extraction is to remain profitable.
6.4.2 Raw materials for “green” infrastructures 
Beyond the ongoing extraction of conventional resources, the question of extractivism in the Green
Economy may be explored most fruitfully with regard to the specific raw material requirements of
“green” technologies. Both renewable energy infrastructures and a host of technologies to improve
energy efficiency across the economy are heavily dependent on “rare” or “critical” metals which are
often highly concentrated in one or several countries and usually mined in relatively low quantities
as by-products of the extraction of more voluminous metals (as extracting minuscule amounts of
201 Highlighting the vast discrepancy between existing market-based pricing mechanisms and the social costs 
associated with the activities thus priced, the report drily states: “Given the lack of materiality, taxes and tradable 
permit costs have not been subtracted from the estimated social costs in this study.” (Trucost, 2013, p. 18)
202 Trucost mainly refers to the immediate risk of natural capital depletion for businesses that rely on the cheap 
appropriation of nature. With regard to carbon emissions in particular, Labatt and White (2007) specify that in 
addition to such “physical” risks, business (vulnerability to litigation and damage to reputation) and regulatory risks
(i.e., the risk of being eventually forced to internalize these costs) should also be considered. This is certainly 
applicable to other environmental impacts as well. The category of regulatory risks is implicitly present throughout 
the Trucost study, whose central message is a warning to certain industries – agriculture in particular, but also coal –
that they might be overwhelmed by effective cost internalization measures. The frankness with which the study also
raises the specter of massive cost increases that would be passed on to all downstream industries and, accordingly, 
to final consumers, is remarkable for an organization dedicated to a Green Economy approach. 
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rare  earths  from vast  amounts  of  rock  would  not  be  economic  otherwise).203 Vast  increases  in
demand  are  projected  for  these  metals,  leading  to  higher  costs  of  extraction  and  larger
environmental  impacts,  and recycling tends  to  be costly  due to  their  widespread application in
minimal amounts  (Abraham, 2012; APS Panel on Public Affairs  & Materials  Research Society,
2011). Where resources exist in the North, rare earths extraction and processing, which involves the
production  of  “mildly”  radioactive  waste,  have  historically  sparked protests  that  reinforced the
outsourcing of these activities to the global South  (Ali, 2014) – a considerable externalization of
toxicity. Most reserves are concentrated in Inner Mongolia, China, and extraction – which has been
intensified due to demand for “green” technologies such as wind turbines – has had disastrous toxic
pollution impacts locally (Maughan, 2015; Parry & Douglas, 2011). 
One industry expert concludes that “as nations begin to rely on green energy products, they
are trading one set of resource dependencies for another” (Abraham, 2012, p. 2), noting widespread
concerns over resource scarcity in the renewable energy sector. Material needs for infrastructure to
provide one gigawatt of photovoltaic electricity would exceed the total global production (in 2009)
of  tellurium  (APS Panel  on Public  Affairs  & Materials  Research Society,  2011, p.  11) – using
UNEP’s 2050 G2 scenario, renewable electricity needs by 2050 amount to about  1,400 gigawatts
(cf. UNEP, 2011, p. 223).204 Around the same time – remarkably, also the same period during which
the Green Economy reports were released – another study estimated that battery demand for both
electric  vehicles,  assuming  only  a  modest  and  steady  increase  in  production,  and  consumer
electronics would lead lithium demand to overshoot supply by 2025 (Wanger, 2011). While there
was much room for improved recycling rates, even these would not fill the projected gap, and this
was assumed to prompt increased mining of more diluted lithium resources, “to the detriment of
local people, biodiversity, and ecosystems services.” (Ibid., p. 204) In 2017, even the World Bank
acknowledged a host of environmental problems associated with the massive demand for metals
and rare earths triggered by the rise of “clean” energies (Sanderson, 2017; World Bank, 2017). The
Bank stated unequivocally that “the technologies assumed to populate the clean energy shift—wind,
solar, hydrogen, and electricity systems—are in fact significantly MORE material intensive in their
203 “Rare” earths are not necessarily in short overall supply; the term reflects their low degrees of concentration, which 
makes extraction costlier. Since they generally occur in groups and can be mined simultaneously, this effect is 
somewhat offset. 
204 The scenario envisions power generation in 2050 to amount to about 27,500 Twh/yr, with a 45% share of 
renewables (including hydropower, waste, wind, geothermal, solar, tidal and wave) – i.e., 12,375 TWh. This equals 
a constant generation of about 1.41 TW, or 1,410 GW. Most of this supply would arguably come from other 
sources, but as photovoltaic energy avoids most of the externalities associated with large hydropower or biomass 
operations, it would be a promising “green” candidate from a no-externalizations standpoint – were it not for the 
excessive requirements in terms of scarce materials. (The APS calculation assumes a utilization factor of 25%, 
meaning that actually produced power equals one-fourth of installed photovoltaic capacity. Smil (2010), by 
contrast, provides capacity figures for large solar PV parks in Spain, Portugal and Germany ranging from 11 to 
22%, which suggests even greater capacity needs.)
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composition than current traditional fossil-fuel-based energy supply systems.” (World Bank, 2017,
p. xii, capitals in original)
Jacobson and Delucchi (2011), once more, came to optimistic conclusions on this count. But
their  100% renewables  scenario,  which  claimed to rely  only on already available  and scalable
technological  solutions,  in  fact  assumed  that  electric  or  hydrogen  solutions  for  all  modes  of
transportation would be developed (which are still notably lacking, particularly for shipping and
aviation) – and that the market would work out the real constraints on important materials such as
neodymium, lithium and platinum. For the former two, they calculate the need for five-fold and ten-
fold increases, respectively, in global production to satisfy energy infrastructure needs (including
batteries for electric vehicles). Their scenarios are only feasible if new recycling technologies for
these materials were developed and consistently applied – and if worldwide reserves could be used
up exclusively for the production of these energy infrastructures. But unfortunately, for many of
these  resources,  “green”  technologies  compete  with  other  growth  sectors,  including  ICTs
(Groneweg, Pilgrim, & Reckordt, 2017; The Shift Project, 2019, pp. 25, 30).
“Green”  technology  not  only  needs  rare  metals.  Renewable  energy  infrastructures,  for
example, also involve massive amounts of base metals such as steel, copper and aluminum, as well
as concrete (Vidal, Goffé, & Arndt, 2013). Their supply is not as critical, but they are even harder to
substitute than rare metals. The realization of a 100%-renewable-energy-by-2050 scenario proposed
by the WWF – admittedly, a much “greener” future than envisioned in the GE reports – would
increase world demand for these basic materials by 5-18% respectively, fueling higher economic
and environmental costs of extraction (ibid., p. 895). These base materials of course remain relevant
to the wider economic infrastructure as well.  Likewise,  electric vehicles consume much greater
amounts of  materials  than conventional  vehicles,  notably copper  and lithium  (Groneweg et  al.,
2017, pp. 14–15). The Green Economy thus remains entangled in the endless debates that have been
held ever since the Club of Rome’s legendary Limits to Growth report (Meadows, 1972) over how
much of the planet’s resources is left, how fast these will be used up and what this signifies for
global economic prospects. 
And  these  questions  continue  to  puzzle  researchers.  Even  a  careful  study  of  current
production levels and reserve/resource estimates (British Geological Survey, 2017; U.S. Geological
Survey, 2017) reveals no conclusive results as to the overall sustainability of resource consumption
patterns. Availability generally depends on production technology but also on price levels. For some
minerals  like copper,  nickel  and zinc current  reserves only last  another  20-30 years  at  current
production  levels,  but  identified  resources  are  far  larger.  Of  these  three,  only  copper  –  with
combined resources projected to last for centuries – has seen growth in global production levels
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recently. (Rare earths and tantalum, so important for the production of electronics, show no signs of
absolute  exhaustion  either  –  the  severe  social  implications  of  “conflict  mineral”  extraction
notwithstanding.)  Critics  of  resource  “alarmism”  point  out  that  with  ongoing  exploration  and
technological advances, available reserves have continued to grow over the past century (Meinert,
Robinson, & Nassar,  2016). But their  assessment also points to the more immediate social  and
environmental risks associated with the extractivist position: They cheerfully argue that there is
always more to be found in deep-sea deposits, deep in the earth’s crust and in outer space. This
certainly  raises  questions  about  potentially  destructive  extraction  operations,  which  the  authors
benignly refer to as “externalities.” 
Economic feasibility is a related question: Meinert et al. point out that past decade’s more-
than-tenfold  increase  in  exploration  investments  has  not  produced  proportionate  new  resource
discoveries,  suggesting  that  the  economic  (as  well  as  the  social  and  environmental)  costs  of
accessing remaining resources may rise progressively as the “low-hanging fruit” – high-quality and
easily  accessible  resources  – are  exhausted.  This  has  been  conceptualized  as  the  effort  factor
(Davidson et al., 2014), building on the insight that “ecological impact is a function of [extraction]
effort,  not  reward.”  (Ibid.,  p.  63)  The energy needs  of  mining  operations,  for  example,  which
already account for about 8–10% of total world energy consumption, increase as ore grades decline
(Calvo, Mudd, Valero, & Valero, 2016).  While absolute exhaustion is not an immediate concern
regarding most mineral resources, the ecological, social and economic crunch may be expected to
come with the rising costs of maintaining and expanding global production over the next decades,
and with attempts to minimize these costs by means of externalization. 
The literature on “green” minerals reflects these dilemmas. It is pervaded by anxiety over
new labor and environmental regulations that threaten supply, by simultaneous concern with the
externalities produced by ramped-up extraction – and by geopolitical conflicts and fears leading to
less  and  less  open  trade  in  “critical”  materials.  Fittingly,  China,  having  built  its  global  near-
monopoly on rare earths on low environmental standards and cheap labor, justified its restrictions
on rare earth exports in 2010 with the need to protect its domestic environment (Abraham, 2012, p.
6;  APS Panel  on  Public  Affairs  & Materials  Research  Society,  2011,  p.  9).  Bans  on  “conflict
minerals” may interfere with procuring supplies  (Abraham, 2012, p. 9), and increasingly applied
environmental regulations and taxes “add to the final cost of minerals and may make some mining
operations  unprofitable,  jeopardizing future supplies  and subsequently  the deployment of  green
technology.” (Ibid., p. 12, cf. also APS Panel on Public Affairs & Materials Research Society, 2011,
p.  11) The  need  for  green-tech  development  has  already  been  forwarded  as  a  justification  for
extractivist practices and as an argument to repeal such protective legislation in the U.S. (Ali et al.,
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2017; Graham, 2017; Jones, 2013). Given the prevalence of conflicts around extractivist projects,
researchers have admonished extraction companies to factor “social and environmental risk” into
their business decisions (Franks et al., 2014), while – revealingly – arguing that the business may
still be worthwhile as “higher managerial costs associated with social conflict could potentially,
however,  be  offset  by  higher  profitability  and  lower  operational  costs  (e.g.,  labor)  in  such
locations.” (Ibid., p. 7579) 
In  summary,  the  specific  raw  materials  demanded  by  a  Green  Economy  are  not  only
increasingly costly, their production has historically also been associated with massive social and
ecological externalizations that are rarely addressed in the GE reports – and these are projected to
become aggravated  as  ever  lower-quality  resources  need  to  be  tapped. Once  more,  the  Green
Economy appears to depend on large-scale externalizations for its economic viability. Extractivism
persists, now partly to enable “green” technologies.
6.4.3 Greening extraction?
As the Green Economy envisions a more circular model of production, consumption and recycling,
recycled raw materials of all types could become an increasingly important resource. This would
first  require  historical  tendencies  to  be  reversed,  given  that  recycling  rates  for  important  raw
materials such as iron and steel have dropped dramatically in recent decades and will, according to
UNEP’s projections, still be below 1980s levels in a “green” scenario for 2050  (UNEP, 2011, p.
263). Either  way,  UNEP emphasizes  that  “[i]mproving labour  conditions  in  the waste  sector  is
imperative” (ibid., p. 293), adding that “where waste collection and recycling involves child labour
or indecent and unsafe working conditions,” as is frequently the case, “the waste market should not
be  considered  green.”  (Ibid.,  p.  303)  Here,  the  envisioned  formalization  of  the  sector  in
“developing” countries (ibid., pp. 306, 311) in order to comply with the GE’s social objectives is an
instance of internalization that could render recycled raw materials more expensive. 
“Greener”  extraction  models  for  green-tech  minerals  –  with  careful  monitoring  and
recycling rates approaching circular economy models – may be technologically conceivable, but
would require considerable infrastructural changes and add significant costs (Ali, 2014). Significant
potential  for  resource  efficiency  gains  in  extractive  sectors  has  been  identified  –  but,  through
rebound effects and given ongoing economic growth, even full realization of this potential is only
expected to dampen the massive  growth in resource extraction over the next decades (see section
5.1.3). Generally, circular production models have only been realized partially and selectively (see
also section 10.1.3). They might be successfully implemented in some sectors through adequate
policy  frameworks  that  enforce  the  internalization  of  costs  commonly  externalized  in  linear
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production processes. But, while an assessment of their economic viability under capitalist market
conditions is beyond the scope of this work, it is conceivable that the cost of their generalization
across  the  economy  –  in  the  form  of  both  energy  and  labor  inputs  –  could  render  systemic
accumulation difficult to sustain. And ultimately, physical limits to recycling restrict the potential
for  circularity  (see  section  4.2):  “An  infinitely  growing  circular  economy  is  an  arithmetical
impossibility, and a contradiction in terms.” (Parrique et al., 2019, p. 49)
As in the case of energy, trade-offs among the  Four Cheaps  and between  Cheap Nature
opportunities and Green Economy objectives occur. Recycling is a case in point, given that energy
constraints  tend  to  limit  the  practical  (most  importantly,  commercial)  feasibility  of  “cheap”
conservation  of  materials  (see  also  discussion  in  section  4.2).  But  these  tensions  can  also  be
illustrated  with  respect  to  more  conventional  raw  materials  and  stocks  of  natural  capital.
Afforestation and forest conservation – if intended to enhance carbon sink capacities, a way of
making nature work against capital’s acts of destruction elsewhere – involve dilemmas concerning
the particular ecosystem services demanded in each case (this discussion draws from R. B. Jackson
& Baker, 2010): What should forests be optimized for, biodiversity (which may mean prioritization
of  local  species)  or  climate  change mitigation  (which  may  involve  the  introduction  of  foreign
species with higher carbon uptake and, although this is contested in its climatic effects, monoculture
plantations)? But more dramatically, subject to economic pressures, forestry is caught between the
cheapest possible extraction of fiber as a raw material and each of the ecological priorities. A study
that quantifies the potential for climate change mitigation through biodiversity-friendly ecosystem
restoration (particularly through the restoration of “degraded” forest areas) notes that this would
require an overall decrease of about 25% in the extraction of forest products (Dooley & Stabinsky,
2018, p.  19);  a significant opportunity cost  for capital.  The negative impacts of intensification,
including higher water consumption and fertilizer use, can be addressed, but this tends to reduce
immediate  “productivity” and thus render  this  particular  nature more expensive.  In the case of
afforestation,  moreover,  land  use  competition  following  the  introduction  of  carbon  prices  is
projected to displace agricultural lands and raise agricultural commodity prices, constituting another
trade-off between Cheap Natures. All of this illustrates how the competing and often contradictory
demands that capital places on nature in order to make it “work harder” for both productive and
restorative purposes tend to be, in the aggregate, impossible to satisfy.   
In the Green Economy reports, there are only scarce examples of advocacy for “innovative”
practices that “go with the grain” of ecosystem functions in order to appropriate economic resources
without either considerable risky interventions in ecosystems or recourse to schemes that tend to
take advantage of the weaker social positioning of marginalized groups. For example, UNEP (2011,
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 185
p. 118) identifies a “potential to make greater use of biodiversity and ecosystem services in reducing
water  treatment  costs  and  increasing  productivity.”  In  a  celebrated  case,  New  York  City’s
administration has been paying rural landowners in upstate New York to improve water quality in
order to avoid much larger expenditures for water treatment facilities (UNEP, 2010b, p. 20). While
this example arguably transcends the poverty of technocratic thought, going beyond mere process
efficiency and substituting “low-tech” for “higher-tech” end-of-pipe solutions at a relatively local
scale, the water deal has been fraught with rural-versus-urban tensions over access and control over
resources, development rights and environmental side-effects (Corasaniti, 2017; Navarro, 2012).205
Besides, this more careful employment of natural “services” should only count as an appropriation
of  Cheap Nature  to a limited extent: While avoiding more capitalized and thus expensive alter-
natives, at its core it still is a relatively costly adjustment of agricultural and development practices
in order to spare water resources. Rather than the free appropriation of abundance, it is, once more,
a reaction to ecological constraints resulting from earlier practices of capitalist appropriation. 
6.5 The limits of Cheap Nature
In summary, the prospects for further Cheap Nature in a Green Economy are modest. Some more
Cheap Labor  may be appropriated by extra-economic means, in violation of the GE’s normative
standards, but Cheap Food – which also importantly determines the price of labor – appears out of
reach. As for energy, neither “unconventional” fossil fuels nor renewables are “cheap” compared to
the past golden age of abundant oil, even though energy efficiency gains may attenuate these rising
costs. Raw materials are by tendency also getting costlier, especially those specifically needed for
“green” technologies, and recycled materials tend to be more expensive than those that could be
cheaply accessed in the past. Meanwhile, as most abstractly suggested by Moore’s appropriation—
capitalization  heuristic,  the  general  tendency  of  the  GE  towards  market-based  internalization
policies (again, carbon pricing is most illustrative) indeed points to an exhaustion of Cheap Nature.
Wherever  the  Green  Economy attempts  to,  or  is  forced  to,  internalize  costs  through
marketization, however, a dialectic of moments of in- and exclusion ensues that tends to produce
new externalities as capital seeks to make nature “work harder” only for its own purposes. So, at the
surface, the GE’s strategies may be about rendering nature more expensive and then using these
scarce goods more efficiently. “Cheapening” moments are usually more hidden. If cost-shifting onto
“nature”  is  increasingly  constrained  in  a  resource-depleted  and  global-warming-plagued
205 Ironically, one of the issues inciting claims of rural disenfranchisement (reported in Navarro, 2012) is a ban on 
natural gas fracking around water sources for New York City. In this case, the narrative of urban overreach appears 
to be a product of developers’ PR strategies rather than “authentic” social justice concerns. But more substantive 
issues around the appropriation of rural hinterlands for urban needs remain.
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environment,  however,  capital  must  find  new ways  to  offload  its  costs  to  various  “others.”  A
number of such ways have emerged here; more will be addressed in the following chapter.
At  this  point,  to  return  to  the  technology  debate  of  the  previous  chapter,  it  is  worth
contemplating the side effects of core “green” technologies as discussed throughout this chapter.
Renewable  electricity  infrastructures,  as  we have  seen,  rely  on  scarce  resources  whose mining
leaves  behind  toxic  wastelands.  The  same is  true  of  the  batteries  for  electric  vehicles,  whose
production process is extremely energy-intensive. Market-ready biofuels produce substantial GHG
emissions, threaten biodiversity and are land-intensive, therefore threatening food security. In each
of these cases, there is a problem of  scalability:  While feasible as niche solutions or at smaller
scales,  each  fails  to  replace  those  fossil-based  infrastructures  that  underpin  the  increasingly
integrated  global  capitalist  economy.  Finally,  the  “sustainable  intensification” of  agriculture  is
largely newspeak for the intensification of conventional agro-industrial  practices, whereas agro-
ecology approaches, hopelessly uncompetitive in the world market, are marginalized.
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7. Patterns of Re-Externalization
In quest of the workings of the Green Economy’s third, “hidden” macro-strategy of modifying old
and creating new externalizations, this chapter will highlight a set of exercises in discursive  and
material  cost  and  problem  shifting,  which  point  to  several  paths  along  which  the  costs  of
accumulation in a capitalist Green Economy can be re-externalized, yet again, to capital’s “others.”
With respect to the previous chapter, it is worth noting that these cost re-externalizations all
facilitate the cheaper appropriation of various “natures” – including human labor – and thus may be
understood  as  compensatory  mechanisms  for  both  the  exhaustion  of  Cheap  Natures  through
degradation and the cost internalizations that, as a consequence, have been envisioned in the GE.
7.1 The ontology of natural capital as ecological problem shifting 
This section argues that the particular mode of cost internalization suggested by the  ontology of
natural capital  – namely, the conceptual incorporation of nature into the economic calculus  on
capitalist terms – already paves the way for sundry re-externalizations. The capitalist construction
of nature facilitates all manner of problem shifting between ecological trouble spots.
At  the  most  abstract  level,  considerable  epistemic  “violence”  inheres  in  the  purely
instrumental view of nature as stocks and flows of capital assets and “services,” even in cases where
this conceptual approach does not yet involve the actual commodification of nature.206 Clearly, no
“intrinsic” value of nature – whatever this may signify – is quantifiable in monetary terms. The
monetary valuation of nature inevitably is a reflection of human preferences207, and, in the context
of a global capitalist economy, of capital’s need to make nature “work for” itself in particular. The
choice of terminology – ecosystem services – points directly to this world-ecology notion of nature
as capital’s workhorse. Monetary value assigned to nature must either be determined politically or
directly by the market, where scarcity of particular elements of nature in relation to solvent demand
determines price. In the  Green Economy, political interventions are preferably conceptualized as
corrections of market failure, as in the old credo of environmental economics:  getting the prices
right.208 This frequently involves mechanisms of actual commodification. 
206 The authors of the influential TEEB study (UNEP, 2010b) repeatedly emphasize that commodification is not always
appropriate – while maintaining that the value heuristic and the quantification remain helpful to assess the relative 
merits of different options (similarly: Natural Capital Coalition, 2016).
207 While this may appear obvious, some influential environmental economists have portrayed the so-called 
willingness to pay (WTP) principle, according to which elements of nature are valued based on humans’ willingness
to pay for their conservation, as a quantitative measure of nature’s “intrinsic” value (D. W. Pearce et al., 1989, pp. 
60–62). 
208 The idea of environmental externalities and the consequent need to get the prices right has been identified as the 
“starting point” of (neoclassical) environmental economics (Loiseau et al., 2016, p. 364). Indeed, in an early 
contribution to environmental economics and the growth debate, William Nordhaus and James Tobin claimed that 
“[t]he mistake of the antigrowth men [sic] is to blame economic growth per se for the misdirection of economic 
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Generally,  the  capitalist  construction  of  nature  frames  nature as  nobody’s  property  and
therefore open to appropriation by and transformation into capital  (M. O’Connor, 1994b, pp. 10–
11). Nature thus gets remade by capital in its own image (M. O’Connor, 1994c), in a process both
material and ideological.209 The conceptualization of ecosystems as stocks of natural capital may be
considered an ideological effect of this procedure. Its main discursive function rests in its particular
construction of hierarchical order: Instead of subsuming the human economy (here represented by
capital) under its planetary basis (nature), the ontology of natural capital opts for the reverse, the
subsumption of nature under capital. This entails a common neoliberal strategy, namely the system-
atic conceptual – indeed, ontological – foreclosure of any systemic alternatives to capital and the
alignment of any possible solutions with neoliberal marketization principles. The ontology of nature
as “service provider” has been advocated by UNEP as a “unifying language”  (Sullivan, 2009, p.
262) – constructing, as Sian Sullivan argues, a false universal that displaces other cultural under-
standings of or societal relations with nature. In either case, the ontology of natural capital, like all
green-capitalist policy based on it, operates at a distance to actual ecological crises; it even works to
create this distance, in line with Mark Fisher’s “simulacra” dictum quoted in the introduction. 
In practice, this subsumption tends to negate ecological complexity, as outlined in section
4.2.3,  and  thus  facilitates  problem shifting.  For  example,  the  application  of  a  one-dimensional
benchmark for  ecological  sustainability  lends  itself  to  capitalist  logic:  If  CO2e (greenhouse gas
emissions or concentrations equivalent to the atmospheric impact of one unit of carbon dioxide,
which  in  itself  is  a  misleading,  reductionist  accounting  method210)  here  becomes  the  decisive
criterion,  the one figure towards whose minimization all  climate policy is  geared,  analogous to
corporate profits or shareholder value at the corporate level or GDP at the level of national politics,
goal conflicts and trade-offs with other ecological problems such as biodiversity or soil degradation
tend to become obscured.211 Without seeking to deny the urgency of climate change mitigation – in
fact, my own analysis here tends to privilege this absolutely time-critical issue –, it is essential to
growth. The misdirection is due to a defect of the pricing system (…) The proper remedy is to correct the price 
system” so as to internalize social and ecological costs (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972, p. 17). Notably, Michael Jacobs 
(1991, p. 138) pointed out that fixing prices – effective internalization – does not require any explicit valuation of 
nature – it simply takes an accurate assessment of demand elasticity and a sustainability target to which prices need 
to be adjusted (for example, through taxation).
209 This is at times advocated quite literally, such as in the World Bank’s High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices’ 
(2017, p. 7) call for the creation of “‘climate-friendly’ landscapes.”
210 These commensuration efforts require the conversion of different types of gases from different industrial and non-
industrial sources into one accounting unit, which already both abstracts from persistent scientific uncertainties (for 
the benefit of political clarity) and implies value judgments, for example regarding time horizons – as greenhouse 
gases remain in the atmosphere for vastly different time periods, the chosen cutoff point for equivalence 
calculations influences the relative weight given to each (Lohmann, 2009a; Moreno, Speich Chassé, & Fuhr, 2015). 
The emissions thus managed, even if their impact on the atmosphere was equivalent, are arguably non-identical and
non-equivalent in senses that are important both to ecosystem integrity and social relations.
211 Moreno et al. (2015) elaborate on the logical and historical carbon accounting/GDP analogy in fascinating detail.
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emphasize  that  the  ontology  of  natural  capital  here  has  deeply  misleading  implications  of
substitutability:  If  climatic  stability  and  biodiversity  are  each  furnished  with  a  price  tag,  their
functional non-equivalence tends to become erased in the economic calculus. If five billion dollars
are subtracted from biodiversity conservation to be invested in climate mitigation,  the complex
effects in both areas certainly do not simply cancel each other out.212
But such problem shifting from one ecological trouble spot to the next – and from global- to
local-scale  problems and vice  versa  –  is  involved in  many “green”  policies,  as  the  discussion
throughout  the  previous  two  chapters  has  already  clarified  with  regard  to  renewable  energy
technologies or electric vehicles, whose production entails massive local pollution in the zones of
raw mineral extraction. Here, the “end of pipe” GHG emissions reduction in Western “green” cities
comes at the expense of water pollution and conspicuous cancer rates halfway across the globe
(Kalt,  2019; cf.  section 6.4).  The redefinition of nuclear energy as “green” (framed as a “low-
carbon” technology)  in  this  context  is  a  particularly  striking  example  (see  e.g.  Brunnengräber,
2009a, Chapter 15; Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, pp. 87–91), given the pivotal role of this issue in the
development  of  the  modern  environmental  movements  of  several  countries.  Historically,  these
tensions have also cut the other way: Lenton (2016, p. 88) notes how retrofits at coal power stations
installed to reduce acid rain – an earlier environmentalist preoccupation – exacerbated the plants’
greenhouse  gas  effect,  demonstrating  a  goal  conflict  between  more  local  or  regional  forms  of
pollution,  on the one hand,  and global  atmospheric  effects,  on the other.  Another  case,  related
directly to  natural capital  policies, is biodiversity-threatening monoculture reforestation rewarded
through the REDD+ program (R. B. Jackson & Baker, 2010; Lovera, 2009; see section 3.2.4). 
This tunnel vision, finally, is one of the reasons that geoengineering schemes – large-scale
technological manipulations of the earth system in order to mitigate climate change, for example
through  solar  radiation  management  (SRM)  techniques  designed  to  prevent  solar  influx  from
reaching the earth system in the first place – have been subject to virulent criticism. Geoengineering
represents a highly capitalized attempt to manage  natural capital that glosses over the complex
interdependencies of interlocking ecosystems and frequently risks to destroy more than it preserves.
This is even the case with low-tech approaches: While generally forest preservation is considered to
offer  synergies  between  climate  and  biodiversity  protection,  warming-enabled  forest  growth  in
tundra regions has been found to reduce those areas’ surface albedo (i.e., reflection of sunlight back
into  the  atmosphere  and,  ultimately,  into  outer  space),  leading  to  considerations  of  large-scale
deforestation  in  high-latitude  areas  in  the  name  of  climate  protection  (Bits  of  Science,  2012;
212 The OECD itself recognizes the problem with regard to many real-world policy frameworks, in which “there is 
some risk that climate-related questions crowd out other important environment and development issues, such as 
biodiversity and water.” (OECD, 2013, p. 6, emphasis added to highlight the economic language applied)
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 190
University  of  Oxford,  2012;  Walsh,  2011).213 (A number  of  other  social  and  ecological  risks
associated with these externalizations-laden technologies are discussed in section 7.3.)
7.2 From environmental to social externalizations 
Any dualistic understanding of the two categories of “environmental” and “social” externalizations
is obviously misleading. “The environment” usually refers to  some people’s  environment, and the
degradation of ecosystems affects every aspect of human life. The entire tradition of research and
activism around environmental justice (Byrne, Martinez, & Glover, 2002; Gosine & Teelucksingh,
2008a) is born from the painful experience of patterns in which the adverse effects of pollution are
shifted to underprivileged social groups, and attempts to quantify environmental degradation are
often based on the computation of adverse public health  – i.e.,  social – impacts.  Nevertheless,
distinguishing between these analytical categories remains helpful to trace a particular set of re-
externalization strategies related to the internalization of ecological costs, where “environmental”
externalizations are reduced (yielding global or local benefits) but costs are instead shifted along
social  (often class  and racialized)  axes,  to  the  benefit  of  global  capital.  The  set  of  criteria  for
“green”  capitalism  outlined  in  section  4.5  holds  that  both  forms  of  externalization  should  be
avoided, and neither should be played off against the other. On the surface, this is reaffirmed in the
OECD’s polluter pays principle, according to which the costs of pollution should be borne by those
responsible – but how exactly is responsibility assigned, and who is in effect made to pay? 
In an important historical period, re-externalizations went from social to environmental. The
post-war social compromise in capitalist core countries, for example, involved a massive strain on
nature  (Exner,  Lauk,  & Kulterer,  2008,  p.  145).  The  democratization  of  consumption  –  partly
enabled by higher wages that capital was forced to pay, i.e., a form of cost internalization – partly
displaced the conflict between capital and labor onto “nature.” In many Green Economy policies,
following in the wake of capital’s abandonment of this social compromise during the neoliberal era,
the direction of re-externalizations is reversed, from environmental to social.214
7.2.1 “Green” privatizations
Indeed, there is a complex affinity between the  Green Economy’s internalization maxim and the
entire neoliberal tradition of privatization, individualized responsibility and public choice theory.
213 Of course, it may be argued that as long as such deforestation is restricted to the areas that have seen very recent, 
global-warming enabled forest growth, it does not involve any serious ecological heresy. But such nuances, again, 
reaffirm the point that complicated ecological, political and ethical choices are involved in global warming 
mitigation measures, which fact is obscured through a narrow focus on emissions.
214 This relative neglect of the social dimension is visible already at the level of academic debate, as a bibliometric 
analysis of the Green Economy discourse suggests (Loiseau et al., 2016). While purely quantitative measures may 
not be too reliable, my reading of the GE reports certainly agrees with this finding.
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For one thing, much like the GE’s problem definitions tend to shift blame to the citizens of the
global  South  (see  section  7.4.1  below),  the  individualization  of  responsibility  in  market-based
internalization policies short-circuits the public, collective dimension of ecological problems and
suggests a degree of consumer sovereignty that simply does not exist.  The individual choice of
means of transportation, for example, is decisively conditioned by the range of available options,
over which the individual qua consumer has arguably even less power than the individual qua part
of a  collective political  subject  (the discussion of market-based versus more directly politically
interventionist transformation approaches is taken up in section 10.1). 
In a similar vein, concerns about environmental “performance” and the need to invest in the
ecological  modernization  of  (heretofore)  public  infrastructures  have  provided  legitimation  for
privatizations, for example in the water sector, which led to massive cost increases for households
(Bakker, 2007 discusses this explicitly as an environmental-to-social shift of externalizations; see
also Goldman, 2005, Chapter 6; discussed here in section 4.4.4). In these cases, consumers are not
only made to pay for environmental “services,” but at the same time also for the profits of private
water  companies.  From  a  green-capitalist  standpoint,  of  course,  this  is  not  problematic;  the
“polluter”  in  the  polluter  pays  principle  may  well  be  replaced  with  “consumer.”  In  many
applications, the principle indeed is progressive as the rich tend to externalize costs more lavishly
through their consumption. But in the case of basic public infrastructures, from a social citizenship
perspective (Fraser & Gordon, 1992; Marshall, 2009) it should be argued that if the move towards
environmental cost internalization is bundled with the dispossession of citizens – the reversal of
historical  social  rights  achievements  –,  this  is  not  simply  a  case  of  individual  consumer
responsibility but involves a real re-externalization. Here, the internalization and the externalization
are unified in a single move.
The environmental-to-social re-externalization also extends to the “privatization” of labor
relations. As argued in section 6.1, “green” sectors, with many firms founded in a neoliberal envi-
ronment, tend to be less unionized than traditional “gray” industries. In this sense, “green” capital
thrives partly on its ability to shift the internalized cost premium for greening its operations to its
atomized workforce, perhaps facilitated by the positive public image cultivated by “green” firms.
7.2.2 Getting whose prices right?
“Getting the prices right” is an inevitable green-capitalist mantra (see sections 2.3 and 7.1). What is
the “right” price, however? Various methods of calculation are employed, which invariably reflect –
and routinely obscure – deeply political preferences in contexts of asymmetrical power relations. 
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Stark  asymmetries  become  apparent  in  the  case  of  standard  accounting  methods  for
pollution-related mortality, such as the  Value of a Statistical Life  (VSL, cf. note  127), which is
usually based on the willingness-to-pay (WTP) principle: Individuals are here asked how much they
would be willing to pay in order to reduce the risk of premature death from pollution by a certain
amount (e.g., a statistical reduction of deaths by 1 per 100,000), and the aggregate of these figures is
then averaged and interpreted as the VSL. Willingness to pay is obviously correlated with ability to
pay, and thus the value of a statistical life for a given country depends on its economic fortunes: A
life in the Netherlands was worth about 8.5 lives in Uzbekistan in 2010 (WHO Regional Office for
Europe & OECD, 2015, p. 20). Pollution, in other words,  should be cheaper in poorer regions –
which at one point the World Bank itself famously argued.215 From comparing such figures with the
cost of reducing air pollution, it may also be deducted how many lives are worth saving: WHO and
OECD locate the appropriate cutoff point in the EU somewhere between the 76th and 92nd percentile,
meaning that the remaining 8–24% of air-pollution-related deaths are economically justified (ibid.,
p.  33).  These  figures  of  course  also  generally  exclude  any  consideration  of  the  non-random
distribution of these deaths, with pollution hot spots usually populated by otherwise disadvantaged
communities (cf. Gosine & Teelucksingh, 2008a).
For  the  proper  cost  of  carbon  emissions,  two  standard  methods  are  employed:  Cost-
effectiveness  approaches  stipulate  a  climate  target  politically  and  then  consider  how  much
abatement of each excess ton of carbon emissions,  relative to the stipulated target,  costs;  cost-
benefit  analyses  determine  the  appropriate  amount  of  abatement  by  locating  the  intersection
between abatement costs (which rise as targets become more ambitious) and the  social cost of
carbon,  a measure of the adverse consequences of each ton of emissions  (Rogelj  et  al.,  2018).
Estimates  of  abatement  cost  obviously  depend  on  assumptions  about  available  and  preferable
technological  options.  GE  abatement  paths  commonly  involve  technologies  that  are  highly
environmentally risky (such as nuclear energy) and/or not yet scalable or commercially applicable
(such as CCS; see sections 3.1 and 7.3). As for the social cost of carbon, much here depends on the
applied discount rate: How much should future costs count when compared to present costs? Even
marginal changes to this parameter, which importantly determines intergenerational cost shifts (see
section 7.3), easily double – or halve – the social cost estimate. Using different methodologies and
discount rates, governments currently assume a “social cost” of between US$ 1–7 (Trump’s EPA for
2020; Plumer, 2018), US$ 42  (U.S. administration under Obama for 2020; Interagency Working
215 In 1992, Lawrence Summers, then Chief Economist at the World Bank, followed this exact train of thought to the 
logical conclusion that many African countries were “underpolluted.” He added that there may be moral objections 
to this, but these were problematic since they “could be turned around and used more or less effectively against 
every Bank proposal for liberalisation.” (Cited in F. Pearce, 1992, n.p.) I have nothing to add.
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Group  on  Social  Cost  of  Greenhouse  Gases,  2016) or  US  $200  per  ton  of  CO2e (German
Umweltbundesamt  for  2016;  Umweltbundesamt,  2019,  p.  4) –  just  between  two  governments,
estimates can vary by a factor of 200. Regarding abatement costs, for 2030, the IPCC suggests a
range of (undiscounted) costs between 15 and 6,050 US$2010/tCO2e: Even for a given temperature
target, upper and lower estimates diverge by a factor of up to 40 (Rogelj et al., 2018, p. 152).216
Damage functions form an important and contested part of “social cost” calculations. In the
case of global warming, the calculation of some damages – while of course not perfectly predictable
– is least relatively straightforward in principle, as for flood or crop damages. For others it is more
difficult to establish meaningful proportionality – how should two hours of additional daily walking
time for peasant women to fetch water due to increasing aridification be properly valued if their
market income is close to zero either way? Based on prevalent methods such as WTP,  again, this
would count almost nothing compared to even minor inconveniences for richer people elsewhere. 
The point is that the pricing of intact ecosystems fully depends on ethical judgments fed into
the  model,  and it  reflects,  reproduces  and in  the worst  instances  even reinforces  the  economic
inequities  of  capitalist  economies.  Complex  webs  of  conflictual  socio-ecological  relations  are
routinely  hidden  underneath  dollar  figures  that  ostensibly  reflect  an  “objective,”  “scientific”
valuation of ecosystems and their  “services.”  This,  again,  resonates with a  broader  tradition of
neoliberal practice, in which monetary valuation tends to be associated with a superior expression
of truth or rationality. But power and money are obviously entangled, and any notion of “neutral”
economic analysis  is  illusory.  Cost-benefit  analyses are  thus  powerful  tools to  obscure cost  re-
externalizations through differential valuation of adverse impacts on various social groups. Even as
cost-benefit  analyses  may  be  expedient  to  defend  subaltern  interests  in  certain  cases  as  well,
externalizations remain a fundamentally political issue irreducible to such utilitarian calculations.
Power relations, after all, not only determine valuation practices but also practical policy
implementation. Some externalizations are less politically viable than others, and this viability is
only contingently related to the magnitude of the externality in question as calculated by environ-
mental economists or determined by moral philosophers. A philosopher may conclude that the taint-
ing effect of wind turbines on a middle-class exurb’s view of the countryside counts for less than the
heightened incidence of respiratory diseases in a community located close to a coal power plant, but
the relative political weight of both externalities may stand in inverse proportion to this finding. 
Fossil fuel subsidies present another illustrative case. Power asymmetries here add further
unevenness  to  the “correction” of  prices.  GE institutions  and sympathetic  economists  generally
216 On the different technological and policy assumptions underlying these discrepancies, see High-Level Commission 
on Carbon Prices (2017, pp. 32–34). The commission reports a range of “only” US$15–360 for 2030. 
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claim that consumer subsidies in poorer countries are regressive as they benefit richer households
more than poorer, at least in absolute terms. Given that poorer households nevertheless frequently
depend on such subsidies to meet their basic needs, the argument is that the removal of subsidies
should  be  paired  with  targeted  compensatory  measures  that  support  poor  households  without
simultaneously stimulating fossil fuel consumption across the economy. While this argument is fair
enough, and some governments have recently followed this approach, in many places subsidy cuts
have primarily served as fiscal consolidation measures and provoked social unrest; besides, while
consumer subsidies have been cut over the past decade, subsidies to fossil fuel companies were
even expanded in a number of cases (see section 3.2.1). Such lopsided outcomes are facilitated by
the governance attitude taken in GE advocacy (as well as in the literature on fossil fuel subsidy
reform),  which sees “equity concerns” mainly as stumbling blocks in the policy process,  to  be
circumnavigated with the minimum effort required, rather than a substantive policy goal in its own
right (see section 8.3.5).
Two important instances of social cost externalization will be discussed in the remaining sections of
this chapter. The first one, intergenerational cost shifting, is not an environmental-to-social shifting
in the sense presented here (as no environmental pressures are reduced); the second, North—South
cost shifting, does involve some further environmental-to-social re-externalizations.
7.3 Shifting action to a science-fiction future
Early responses to environmental problems on the part of economists used the standard discounting
procedures of orthodox economics in order to argue for a “grow now, clean up later” approach to
environmental policy. In the future, so the argument went, “everyone” would be richer and thus
environmental  protection  measures  –  and  other  desirable  public  policies  –  relatively  more
affordable (cf. critically Jacobs, 1991, pp. 80–82; see also Norgaard, 2011 for a critical discussion
of discounting methods with regard to climate policy). After all, “[w]e have actually done quite well
at the hands of our ancestors” (Solow, 1974, p. 9, emphasis in original), so we should be careful not
to worry about our descendants too much.  Substitutes for exhausted resources, economists in the
1970s argued, would in many cases be available, and proper discounting rates could determine the
optimal  allocation of resources  over  time in case there are  actual  problems with depletion  (for
arguments to this effect, see Nordhaus & Tobin, 1972; Solow, 1974). Within this logic, one only
needed to discount the future sufficiently in order for any cost-benefit analysis to conclude that
environmental action and radical efficiency measures should be delayed.217 
217 As Herman Daly argued long ago: “Discounting can easily become a pseudoscientific way of making the ethical 
judgment that the future is not worth anything.” (1991, p. 142) 
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By  the  late  1980s,  green-capitalist  economists  already  renounced  this  “tyranny  of
discounting”  (D. W. Pearce et al., 1989, pp. 136–137) and advocated more balanced approaches,
given that the risk of irreversible and/or catastrophic ecological damages could not be properly
recognized within the orthodox framework, and that substitutes for exhausted resources would often
not be available. In the same vein, the World Bank’s (2012, pp. 30–32) GE report roundly rejects
the “grow now, clean up later” approach and the related notion of an environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC).218 Arguably,  consistency  with  the  sustainable  development  paradigm  within  which  the
Green  Economy  operates prescribes  this  attitude,  given  that  it  clearly  prohibits  a  strategy  of
sacrificing the future for the benefits of current generations.219
Nevertheless, the  Green Economy,  in line with international climate politics, in fact still
applies a comparable logic of externalization-to-the-future to climate change mitigation.  This is
rooted in the technological optimism at the root of the gospel of eco-efficiency: Not only will “we”
be richer fifty years from now (according to UNEP’s “green” scenarios, global GDP per capita will
more than double over the period 2011-2050; UNEP, 2011, p. 518), but “we” will also have as-yet-
unavailable technological fixes to the climate crisis at our disposal. Like the GE models, the Paris
Agreement (United Nations, 2015, p. 4) involves a scenario in which the next few decades will see
an emissions overshoot above the curve required to achieve its temperature goals, to be corrected in
the second half of the century, in which anthropogenic emissions and removal by sinks are to be
balanced. But “[a]llowing an overshoot,” as den Elzen and Höhne (2008, p. 262) correctly observed
a decade ago, means “shifting the burden into the future.” As critics have pointed out,  all still
feasible scenarios (i.e., those not already disproved by historical events) provided by the IPCC for
staying below 2 °C warming, and accordingly, the Paris deal as well, are heavily reliant on as-yet-
unavailable negative emissions technologies (NETs) (K. Anderson, 2015; Lewis, 2015; see section
3.1 for the GE’s reliance on such overshoot scenarios).  
NETs form one category of  geoengineering technologies.  Geoengineering is  intended to
control the global  climate through human intervention and thus correct anthropogenic warming
effects. It  adds a whole new verse to the  gospel of eco-efficiency.  Implicitly admitting that the
218 The case for discounting has frequently been paired with the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (D. I. Stern, 
2017), according to which economic growth in any given society first led to increasing levels of pollution, but at a 
certain level of wealth, (middle-class) environmental concerns automatically became more prominent and then led 
to remedial action, so that with further increases in wealth, pollution levels would decline again. Recently, the WTO
(2011, p. 8) still advanced this argument. For local air and water pollution, there is some historical merit to this 
claim, but of course it overlooks the externalization of pollution to poorer locales, coupled with further increases in 
consumption that exhaust global resources and sinks even while they may no longer cause local pollution. 
219 The idea has not been entirely abandoned in the Green Economy literature, however. In its collaboration with a 
Chinese think tank, the OECD repeatedly claimed that China’s environmental policy could be expected to converge 
with the OECD countries’ for the same reasons usually provided in the EKC literature (greater public demand for 
pollution-free environments and greater economic resources to realize these) (DRC & OECD, 2017, pp. 2, 29).
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prospects for a zero-carbon growth economy are not too bright while not willing to forgo growth,
techno-fixes  at  an  even grander  scale  – capable  of  correcting  the  first-order  failure  –  must  be
envisioned: Either carbon must be sucked out of the atmosphere, or the Earth must be shielded from
solar radiation. For the former, a number of NETs for  carbon dioxide removal (CDR) have been
proposed, whereas for the latter, solar radiation management (SRM) techniques are considered (for
overviews, see European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, 2018; Heinrich Böll Stiftung &
ETC group, 2017). 
NETs include fairly low-tech measures such as afforestation/reforestation (UNEP, 2011, pp.
151–193) or improved carbon soil sequestration through “greener” agricultural practices  (UNEP,
2011, pp. 60–61), which could contribute to mitigation efforts but do not nearly suffice to fix all
emissions.  More  ambitious  schemes  seek  to  remove  carbon  directly  from  the  air,  to  enhance
geochemical weathering processes that absorb CO2 or to increase oceanic carbon uptake. None of
these are proven to work at a planetary scale, and many risks and uncertainties regarding ecosystem
disturbances (e.g. negative impacts on biodiversity, vegetation growth, water availability and marine
food webs), massive land use requirements – which may also induce competition for land among
NETs –, prohibitive energy costs and the climatic effects caused in the period between emission and
removal remain (see sources cited above). In other words: foreseeable externalities at vast scales. 
In order to mitigate climate change, the GE thus depends on a range of geoengineering
technologies  that  are  far  from large-scale  applicability.  Notably,  workable  solutions  for  carbon
capture and storage (CCS) are an essential  prerequisite  for  many carbon removal  technologies,
given  that  the  carbon  removed  from  the  atmosphere  must  be  stored  somewhere  (European
Academies’ Science Advisory Council, 2018).220 
The Green Economy’s dependence on CCS, which involves the large-scale sequestration of
carbon emissions from power plants in natural underground reservoirs, is particularly striking. The
OECD  (2011b,  p.  64) cites  a  scenario  modeled  by the  IEA,  which  projects  19% of  emissions
savings by 2050 (relative to BAU) to be realized through CCS; in its follow-up study, this share had
increased to 21% (OECD, 2015a, p. 14). UNEP, while expressing skepticism regarding the viability
of large-scale CCS application and calling the technology both extremely costly  (UNEP, 2011, p.
265) and “very energy intensive and resource inefficient” (ibid., p. 281), still relies on the same IEA
projection (ibid., p. 207). It also refers to an alternative, more “conservative” scenario, considered
“more feasible than more ambitious projections.” (Ibid., p. 225) This scenario only relies on CCS to
deliver 7% of all emissions savings – notably, it is also considered likely to exceed the atmospheric
220 With some techniques, the carbon would be “stored” directly in plant biomass, topsoil or the oceans instead. 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 197
CO2(e) concentration target of 450 ppm, unless the most optimistic but quite uncertain estimates of
agricultural carbon sequestration can be met (ibid., pp. 222–225; cf. section 3.1.2). 
Unfortunately, CCS has not only provoked ecological and human safety concerns; it is still
uncertain whether the technology will ever be commercially viable. It is considered the last hope of
the coal industry (G. Parkinson, 2015) and gladly accepted for future climate scenarios projected by
major institutions because it  holds out  the promise of a “greened” fossil  fuel sector,  putatively
enabling structural transformations of the energy sector to be put off. But recent reviews of the
current state of CCS pilot projects consider the prospects for large-scale deployment uncertain at
best,  with  CCS  implementation  lagging  far  behind  the  build-up  trajectory  envisioned  in  the
previously cited emissions scenarios. None of these projects have been able to sequester a lot of
emissions; they have proved extremely costly in a situation where carbon prices are far too low to
attract investments into sequestration, leading investors and fossil fuel companies to abandon plans
for further trials (Holmes à Court, 2018; European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, 2018). 
These recent developments imply that even if carbon prices were to be raised significantly in
the medium term, making CCS economically more attractive, its marketability may be delayed even
further on technical grounds.  The GE’s ecological success here relies on the breakthrough of a
technology that is, after many years of testing, widely considered to have failed. The possibility of
such a breakthrough is nevertheless held up to justify the deferral of drastic mitigation measures
into the future so as not to interfere with growth today – thus,  “CCS technology is perennially
described as ‘ten years away’ from implementation.”  (Ciplet et al., 2015, p. 219) In Goldstein’s
(2018, pp. 141–142) words, “[t]he green of this green spirit of capitalism must always be contained,
set off in a spatiotemporal register where it can serve as an ever-receding future possibility.” 
Veering  even  further  into  science-fiction  terrain,  geoengineering  technologies  for  solar
radiation management, none of which are anywhere near deployment, also play a decisive role in
overshoot scenarios. These involve, for example, schemes to reflect radiation back to space through
vast mirrors installed in the upper atmosphere as well as massive injection of aerosols into the
atmosphere, fired up from ships moving across the oceans  (Heinrich Böll Stiftung & ETC group,
2017; Rotman, 2013). The Green Economy reports are entirely silent on the issue, but the emissions
scenarios they are referring to clearly depend on techno-fixes for the second half of the century (cf.
section 3.1), and if NETs do not deliver the required reductions in atmospheric GHG concentration,
other climate engineering techniques are a measure of last resort.221 Generally, geoengineering is
221 One may argue that the OECD indirectly rules out most geoengineering schemes through its general criterion that 
policies be “adaptable, with regular review and adjustment.” (OECD, 2011b, p. 37). As emphasized below, large-
scale manipulations of the earth system that contain global warming while GHG emissions continue to rise cannot 
fulfill this criterion, assuming that adaptability also implies reversibility. This also applies to CCS.
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attractive from a green-capitalist standpoint in that it promises a route out of global warming that
does not interfere with today’s economic infrastructure but adds another capital-intensive layer to it.
Beyond the unresolved question of their purely technical and economic feasibility, the long
list of warnings and criticisms about these techno-fixes includes: the impossibility of ruling out
negative by-effects when experimenting with the Earth system, the inability of these technologies to
stop  climatic  changes  other  than  warming  temperatures  (e.g.,  ocean  acidification),  the  path
dependency created once these technologies  are  installed while  GHG emissions  continue (with
humanity  condemned  to  keep  these  infrastructures  running  for  all  eternity  or  else  face  drastic
overnight  warming),  the  generally  tough political  question  of  control  over  such vital  planetary
infrastructures – and the role of geoengineering discourses in diverting attention from more reliable
and equitable solutions (Altvater, 2016; Ciplet et al., 2015, pp. 216–220; Heinrich Böll Stiftung &
ETC group, 2017; IPCC, 2013, p. 29; Klein, 2014, Chapter 8; Rotman, 2013; Wainwright & Mann,
2018, Chapter 6). Unlike CCS, touted as the key to “clean coal,” SRM is not necessarily framed as
“green.” But the Green Economy nevertheless implicitly relies on such as-yet-fictional solutions to
compensate for its climate-related shortcomings. The risk externalized to future generations here not
only obtains in case these technologies fail to materialize. Even in the less likely case that SRM is
deployed at a scale large enough to bring global warming to a halt, this particular solution would
present future generations with an inheritance full of ecological risks and (geo)political dilemmas.
The “ever-receding possibility” of a green-tech (or not-so-green but at least global-warming-
averting) silver bullet, of course, can never be definitely disproved. But a political macro-strategy
that relies, against all historical evidence, on such vague possibility is a gamble with very high
stakes. The spontaneous construction of an abstract nature in which emissions can be moved not
just  geographically  but  also  temporally  suggests  externalizations  at  unimaginable  scales,  here
mostly of an intergenerational type. The ethical implications of a gamble in which the players are
insulated in time from those who, yet unborn, will  be forced to cover the losses are clear. The
president of the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (2018, p. iv) aptly concludes that
the “belief that somehow ‘technology’ will come to the rescue,” abetting a strategy of avoiding
actual mitigation of emissions, is “the antithesis of sustainable development.”
But,  finally,  we  may  also  look  at  the  dilemma  from  a  world-ecological  perspective.
Particularly in the case of greenhouse gases,  cheap sinks constitute an important aspect of Cheap
Nature, and one that cuts across all the other categories.222 The capitalization of sinks – nominal,
222 Within Moore’s framework, this aspect is subsumed under the category of negative-value. “Negative-value can be 
understood as the accumulation of limits to capital in the web of life that are direct barriers to the restoration of the 
Four Cheaps.” (Moore, 2015, p. 277) Moore cites capital’s overflowing of atmospheric sink capacities as a prime 
example (ibid., pp. 277–283). I decided to foreground cheap sinks as such in order to highlight the world-ecological
implications of hyper-capitalized geoengineering strategies.
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through carbon pricing, and technical, through geoengineering – in turn renders all other “cheaps”
more expensive. Geoengineering technologies, whether NETs (including CCS) or SRM, may be
understood as extremely expensive means of enhancing a particular function of nature, namely its
capacity to act as a sink for anthropogenic carbon emissions. Both to the extent that they fail and in
the side effects of their successful deployment, they involve important externalizations. To illustrate
the magnitude of externalization, one may imagine a hypothetical insurer asked to specify the risk
premium for insuring the global population a century from now against the potential  absence of
effective NETs and SRM technologies that were factored into 2010s calculations in order to come
up with policy scenarios that allow a stabilization of both the global climate  and global capital
accumulation. Translated into a carbon tax, this insurance premium would likely wreak havoc on
vast sectors of the global economy. But the successful application of such technologies would also
come with a significant price tag for capital,  a non-externalizable remainder reflecting a socio-
nature whose services are becoming more expensive. In addition, it should be noted that the totality
of costs shifted to future generations will also need to be borne partly by future capital. 
7.4 North—South re-externalizations
Global power asymmetries underpin a variety of cost-shifting mechanisms. Strategies of shifting
responsibility,  at  the ideological level,  legitimize corresponding shifts  of the material  burden of
coping with ecological constraints.
7.4.1 Shifting blame
As highlighted throughout my overview of the institutional histories of the GE’s main actors in
section 2.5, the Green Economy emerges from a tradition of institutionalized global environmental
politics which has been reproducing, since at least around 1970, a narrative of enlightened Northern
struggles  for  environmental  progress,  which  must  be  wrought  from  stubborn,  backward,  self-
seeking Southerners (for a Foucauldian analysis of this particular “truth regime,” see also Goldman,
2005, Chapter 4). Although not as prominent as in earlier decades, the specter of population growth
still looms large, and the bulk of the chapters of the GE reports – less so in the case of the Northern
policy think tank that is the OECD and most prominently in the case of UNEP – is implicitly or
explicitly devoted to Southern contexts.  (The OECD has since produced its own line of policy
advocacy for Southern governments, see e.g. Capozza & Samson, 2019.) The South must engage in
“sustainable  development”  and  finally  begin  to  manage  its  often  squandered  natural  capital
properly; first of all, of course, it must develop institutions and practices of “good governance.” 
Although the reports acknowledge in principle the undeniable fact that historical responsibi-
lity for ecological degradation, and climate change in particular, lies primarily with the North, their
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approach tends  to  erase this  history  by taking the historical  status  quo largely  for  granted  and
turning immediately towards policy prescriptions for technical solutions – in the direct sense of
applied technologies or the indirect of technocratic policy schemes – intended to enable incremental
changes to the global economic infrastructure. This happens in the context of a “one world” envi-
ronmental rhetoric, according to which “we” are all in the same boat and everyone has to assume
part of the responsibility for keeping it afloat  (cf. Gosine & Teelucksingh, 2008b; Chaturvedi &
Doyle, 2015, Chapter 3; early on, Enzensberger, 1974, conceptualized this as “global projection”). 
Market-based  approaches  then  dictate  that  changes  have  to  be  made  where  they  come
cheapest,  and the lowest prices – involving all  manner  of externalizations – can,  of course,  be
exacted  in  Southern  contexts  where  land  and  labor  are  cheap  and  the  build-out  of  industrial
infrastructures  is  relatively  modest.  While  these  approaches  claim  to  reduce  inequities,  global
market-based approaches fundamentally depend on the persistence of such geographically uneven
development  that  makes  international  offsetting  so  attractive  (cf.  discussion  in  McAfee,  2016).
Meanwhile, even the alleged statistical effects of green-technological improvements in the North,
the evident relative decoupling of GDP growth from GHG emissions, have been found to be en-
abled by patterns of “neo-colonial value capture” in which cheap Southern labor is exploited while
most of the economic gains appear in Northern books as presumably “low-carbon” value creation
(Burton & Somerville, 2019, p. 99). For the German sociologist Stephan Lessenich, this pattern
centrally characterizes the German “externalization society” (and, presumably, others like it). He
argues that “the sociopolitical interpretative offer according to which ‘we’ have lived above ‘our’
means – in this case, above those of ‘our’ planet – is a drastic ideological distortion and, still more,
an instrument of externalization in its own right.” (Lessenich, 2015, p. 25, author’s translation) 223 
Examples abound. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, see sections 3.2.3 and 7.4.4)
is a salient case in point, first exploiting cheap potential for “greening” technologies deployed in the
South to put off more costly transformation in the North. But as Buseth  (2017) notes, there is a
further  North—South division  in  the  interpretation  of  Green Economy priorities:  Whereas  eco-
efficiency and technology-centered approaches (in our terms, the gospel of eco-efficiency) dominate
in the North, the management of natural resources (the  ontology of natural capital) is central to
discourses in and about the South.
223 The Green Economy’s focus on the South is additionally legitimized by reference to the greater economic growth 
rates projected for “emerging” economies. The World Bank (2012, p. 32), for example, argues that most new 
infrastructure in coming decades will be built in “developing” countries and thus the potential for shifting to 
greener trajectories is greater here. This is a better argument, but it still does not account for the fact that offset 
schemes allow the “greening” of Northern infrastructures to be delayed so as to avoid any disruptions to Northern 
lifestyles and capital accumulation.
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Here, the REDD+ forestry scheme evaluated in section 3.2.4 is exemplary.  REDD+ was
developed in the hope of exploiting particularly cheap opportunities to mitigate carbon emissions –
although, as an offsetting scheme, it of course mitigates no  net emissions at all. The scheme not
only  turns  on the  subsistence  activities  of  the  poorest  forest  users  for  economic  reasons while
largely ignoring (illegal and legal) industrial-scale logging; the program’s logic requires the explicit
shifting of blame: As offsets always depend on the criterion of additionality (see section 3.2.3), the
functioning  of  the  scheme  depends  on  the  portrayal  of  local  communities  as  threats  to  forest
conservation.  While  forest-dependent  communities  tend  to  practice  conservation  in  their  own
interest, project developers can only claim credits for their efforts if the forest area in question could
be expected to be cut in the absence of such project  (Kill,  2015). Consequently,  many projects
provoked  severe  conflicts  over  evictions  of  and  access  restrictions  for  local  forest-dependent
communities, causing divisions within communities whose consent was often not sought in the first
place or only obtained in documents written in languages locals did not speak, while most of the
financial benefits accrued to project developers and NGOs (dozens of cases are discussed in Kill,
2015).224 This is not a mere matter of oversight: Notably, Southern concerns with adverse social
impacts and the dubious additionality of forestry carbon credits led, originally, to the exclusion of
forestry credits from the CDM when the mechanism was fleshed out after Kyoto; incepted a few
years after this political defeat, REDD+ essentially marked a return of the same (Paterson, 2009).
Similar North—South asymmetries are visible in other sectors. UNEP praises the recent,
ecologically beneficial (but mostly: market-oriented) adjustments to agricultural subsidy policies in
OECD countries, attesting to “a need to strengthen these recent trends in developed countries and
replicate them in those developing countries that offer farm subsidies.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 66) The
convoluted  history  of  agricultural  subsidies,  which  has  mostly  seen  state-sponsored  Northern
overproduction dumped on Southern markets, destroying agricultural livelihoods and undermining
food security in the global South (Khor, 2011, pp. 24–25), disappears from view here. The North is
the model, on the right track to a Green Economy although it has not quite reached the destination,
and  the  South  the  apprentice.  Likewise,  in  their  full-cost  charging  for  water,  many  Northern
countries have already installed incidentally “green” policies (getting the prices right!), while the
South is deficient on this count (UNEP, 2011, p. 142). Unfortunately, “there is a dilemma as access
to  clean  water  and adequate  sanitation services  is  a  human right” and public  health  issues  are
224 It has been argued from a progressive perspective that the strengthening of collective land rights instead of such 
dispossessions – leaving forests to traditional community management practices – would constitute not only an 
equitable but also a cost-effective solution (Dooley & Stabinsky, 2018, pp. 5–8). This suggests a Cheap Nature 
strategy without externalizations. It should be remembered, however, that despite ostensibly low operating costs a 
considerable opportunity cost is involved for capital: Even if these forests provide certain ecosystem services 
cheaply, they can only do so if capital refrains from accessing the productive resources embodied in the same trees.
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involved (ibid.). But socially differentiated water tariffs that enable access to basic water provision
for the poor – a policy incidentally demanded by Khor  (2011, p. 17) as an example of socially
modified  market-based  solutions  –  are  only  considered  permissible  as  an  option  of  last  resort
(UNEP,  2011,  p.  144).  In  the  2015 progress  report  on  the  OECD’s  green growth  strategy,  the
organization admonishes with a nod to the technology transfer debate (see sections 5.2.2 and 7.4.4)
that “[o]penness to the world technology frontier is essential to maximise the benefits  of green
innovation.” (OECD, 2015a, p. 51) Again, the (Northern-produced) blessings of “green” technology
are construed here as simply “out there” and available – the responsibility for successful technology
transfer rest with the South, all the (Northern-produced) difficulties notwithstanding.
In the vice president’s foreword to its GE report, the World Bank (2012, p. xi) goes so far as
to use the development needs of the South – the need to overcome poverty – as its main justification
for demanding “green growth” across the planet. Instead of reflecting on the roots of global poverty
in the history of (neo-)colonialism and violently imposed uneven development, as well as on the
implications of competitive growth for (shrinking) global environmental space  (as summarized in
the concept of the “imperial mode of living,” Brand & Wissen, 2018), further economic growth in
the North is here effectively framed as a duty in solidarity with the South (the OECD mirrors this
discursive move: 2011b, p. 18). Together, these two strategies form a discourse in which the South
is to follow the North’s example while the North, obliged by the “white man’s burden” of leading its
brethren  to  the  light,  must  soldier  on  with  some  “green”  adjustments.  Within  this  logic,  any
opportunity to challenge global power relations and patterns of externalization is foreclosed. This
helps to explain a highly uneven pattern of  Green Economy  implementation up to this historical
moment,  in  which  large  areas  in  the  global  South  have  been  claimed  in  the  name  of  global
sustainability  whereas  Northern  zones  of  ecologically  intensive  consumption  have  only  been
modestly affected by “greening” initiatives. The phenomenon extends to matters such as fossil fuel
subsidies, discussed in sections 7.2.2 and 3.2.1, where international institutions have focused much
attention on reforms in Southern context while neglecting Northern subsidy schemes. 
Goldman’s (2005) history of the World Bank’s “green” policy record demonstrates how this
mindset has been translated into policy and material infrastructures for decades, partly by way of
diffusion among Southern elites through carefully constructed transnational policy networks. Thus,
it helped form new Southern “environmental states” which, administratively dominated by World
Bank staffers, conducted water privatizations in the name of ecological efficiency (or were forced to
conduct  these  during  debt  service  negotiations).  These  state  apparatuses  moreover  forged  new
“ideal” subjectivities by characterizing all manner of local subsistence practices as environmentally
destructive and equating positive citizenship with green-neoliberal project participation. Using Laos
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as  an  example,  Goldman  shows  how  “green”  megaprojects  would  be  used  to  rewrite  laws,
restructure state agencies and codify practices of “green” land grabbing and austerity policies, all
the while blaming local indigenous groups for the degradation of the country’s diverse ecosystems
and even enlisting international  conservation NGOs in the service of such projects  (chapter  5).
Returning to the issue of water privatization, which quickly became a prerequisite for World Bank
loans to states, Goldman demonstrates the efficacy of the Bank’s hegemony strategies, including the
construction of a “global civil society” in its own image (chapter 6): Even as water privatization
demonstrably  led  to  epidemics  and  transnational  corporations  began  to  realize  the  economic
fragility  of  their  attempts  to  squeeze  significant  profits  out  of  extremely  poor  communities’
infrastructures,  the  outcome  document  of  the  2002  Johannesburg  UN  summit  on  sustainable
development (the Rio+10 conference) presented the strategy in celebratory tones taken more or less
straight from World Bank advocacy papers (ibid., pp. 263–266).
7.4.2 Shifting scales and global power relations
More or less subtle North—South cost shifts are effected by strategies of pitting costs and benefits
on various geographical scales against one another. Problems such as climate change are defined
globally, but their specific determinants and effects occur locally  (De Lucia, 2009, pp. 238–239),
thus offering opportunities for all manner of spatial, often cross-scale cost and problem shifting.  
Presumably  “green”  technologies  which,  while  reducing  or  eliminating  pollution  in  the
(primarily  Northern)  zones  of  consumption,  rely  for  the  sourcing  of  components  on
externalizations-laden extraction in poorer locales, constitute one pertinent case  (see section 6.4).
Generally, power relations and technological choices are obviously interdependent. This includes
the question of control over the benefits as well as the externalization of both risks – potential costs
– and actual costs associated with the appropriation of  Cheap Nature. The promotion of capital-
intensive agricultural technologies in the name of sustainable intensification, a concept shifted from
the local to the global scale under very different premises (see section 6.2), is a salient example. As
Marcus Taylor  (2014) argues,  the particular  framing on the part  of the World Bank of  climate
change as further  evidence for the need to  modernize and intensify agricultural  production has
permitted a further push towards biotechnological solutions that empower transnational corpora-
tions  while  disenfranchising rural populations.  These technologies  not only increase the market
dependence  of  agricultural  smallholders  in  terms of  inputs  like  genetically  modified  seeds  and
fertilizers but, perhaps more crucially, the lack of local control over these technologies also signals a
lack of control over the – potential or actual – externalities they entail. This constellation facilitates
the straightforward externalization of risks onto peasants, including the deliberately imposed risk of
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losing their subsistence livelihoods altogether through market-mediated “modernization” processes
that push labor out of the agricultural sector. Far from being fringe concerns, these issues of risk,
control and concentration of power associated with biotechnology (as well as bioenergy) were even
noted in the IAASTD study, initiated and co-sponsored by the World Bank and UNEP and released
a few years before the Green Economy reports (IAASTD, 2009, pp. 7–8). 
The North—South divide is also reflected in the GE institutions’ differential capacities as
outlined in section 2.5. While the  OECD’s leverage over, for example, fossil fuel subsidies in its
Northern member states is limited to high-level advisory access, the World Bank’s ability to impose
effectively, via its financial power, “green” projects and policies onto its dependent Southern client
governments is far greater. The Bank’s GE report arguably stood in more seamless continuity with
its practical activities in the previous two decades of “green neoliberalism” extensively analyzed, as
previously  outlined,  by  Goldman  (2005) –  even though  its  overall  practices  have  been just  as
contradictory,  with  massive  “gray”  investments  occurring  alongside  the  “green.”  The  Green
Economy paradigm, consequently, carries much greater material consequences for states, businesses
and citizens of the global South – and low-income countries in particular. 
But perhaps the quintessential tool in this respect are carbon offsetting schemes, a staple in
the Green Economy toolkit. As emphasized in the previous section, these schemes are built on the
rationale that while Northern societies are the highest per-capita emitters, the most cost-effective
changes can and should be made in Southern locations. Some analysts have highlighted the role of
offsetting schemes in linking various spatial scales of governance  (Boyd et al., 2011; Bumpus &
Liverman, 2008). These links, unsurprisingly, are asymmetrical: As argued throughout this work,
the negative social and ecological by-effects of such schemes are often effectively externalized to
the global South. 
This  involves  “green  grabbing”  –  the  appropriation  of  (often  forest)  land  from  local
communities legitimized through environmental argumentation, which in turn threatens livelihoods
dependent on access to these lands –, but also support for monoculture plantations that threaten
biodiversity (Fairhead et al., 2012; FDCL & Lateinamerika Nachrichten, 2015; Heuwieser, 2015; R.
B. Jackson & Baker, 2010; Lovera, 2009). UNEP (2011, pp. 156–187) places its greatest hopes for
forest protection in REDD+, the scheme which has given rise to much of the “green grabbing”
debate. Discussing forest protection, it claims that “global benefits … outweigh … costs to local
communities” (ibid., p. 171), which therefore require compensation; it then goes on to concede that
“[h]istorically, this compensation to communities has rarely happened. This highlights a challenge
and an opportunity.” (Ibid.) As critics have argued, the historical pattern still holds and few of the
REDD+ benefits are captured by local communities – monetary rewards go to national governments
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without  any  rules  for  redistribution  to  affected  communities.  REDD+ has  been  criticized  as  a
vehicle for the centralization of control over community resources by state governments (McAfee,
2016, p. 335). Even UNEP shortly after conceded that corruption and land grabbing issues had
brought REDD+ to the brink of failure, but it pinned its hopes once more on improved governance
(UNEP  Global  Environmental  Alert  Service,  2013,  pp.  6–7).  In  the  modality  of  hope  so
characteristic of the Green Economy language, every shortcoming is an opportunity – or, to invoke
Goldstein’s expression once more, that which is not green is by definition “not-yet green.”
Thus, on the one hand, local sustainability is sacrificed in the name of global, which calls
into question the  Green Economy’s environmental credentials. But of course, this environmental
problem is  always  also  a  social  problem.  As  offset  mechanisms  attempt  to  shift  the  costs  of
degradation from the global  “us” to  a  particular  (Southern)  “them,” the re-externalization from
environmental to social costs importantly occurs along a North—South axis.
The power relations at play are certainly multi-scalar. While international institutions are
heavily implicated (see the previous section), cost externalizations are not always only externally
imposed. Many states, particularly the so-called “emerging economies,” have evolved into “green
states”  with  a  more  autonomous  agenda  and  now  use  “green  branding  to  legitimate  their
development politics,” at times through authoritarian measures  (Death, 2015, p. 2219). Domestic
power  shifts,  therefore,  in  complex  interaction  with  the  strategies  of  international  actors,  add
another layer to the complexity of Green Economy politics and facilitate new externalizations, for
example  by  legitimizing  large-scale  national  development  projects  with  “green”  credentials
imposed at the expense of marginalized social groups  (for such dynamics in the case of the GE
poster child South Korea, cf. Bluemling & Yun, 2016; the REDD+ cases discussed above likewise
exemplify this strategy).
Finally, the Green Economy involves a struggle over control of resources. In this context, it
may be argued that the commodification of land in the global South facilitated through GE policies
and legitimized through its conservationist rhetoric (green grabbing) amounts to a new historical
wave of enclosures that itself represents a Cheap Nature strategy. The argument holds even as many
of these appropriations are not directly productive for capital (see section 4.4): They at least serve to
cheapen the maintenance of conditions of production. An African critic of the Green Economy, for
example, insists  that  the  Green Revolution  programs now once more propagated for the global
South  with  an  environmental  corollary  are  really  about  corporate  “control  over  Africa’s  plant
biomass.” (Tandon, 2011, p. 139; a similar case is presented by a Northern scholar in Buseth, 2017)
Past  waves  of  enclosures  served  to  break  the  ground  for  capitalist  accumulation,  not  least  by
triggering urbanization processes that supplied pools of cheap wage labor for nascent industries
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(Polanyi, 1965). The GE’s insistence on a global “free”-trade regime (to which we will turn next),
reducing barriers not only for commodity exports but also for foreign direct investment and other
capital flows, is a cornerstone of a policy framework designed to facilitate these appropriations. 
This case serves to remind us that simplistic, axiomatic readings of the world-ecology claim
regarding capital’s preference for appropriation over commodification are inappropriate, given that
enclosures generally involve appropriation by means of commodification. New Cheap Nature, land
as well as labor-power otherwise not accessible to capital, is appropriated politically via the market,
which  (together  with  “green”  rhetoric)  makes  land  grabs  more  ideologically  palatable  and
politically feasible, while still cheap compared to prices demanded elsewhere.225 This is also true for
more  “remote-control”  mechanisms  such as  carbon  offsetting  schemes,  which  may  not  always
involve a transfer of formal ownership but considerable restrictions of local access rights. Some
payments are involved, but the enclosures generally serve to drive down resource prices and wages,
thus making these “natures” relatively cheaper. Market dependence  is a form of political control,
and  as  argued  before,  asymmetrical  power  relations  are  foundational  to  these  particular
transnational markets in natural capital and ecosystem services. Once more, the distinction between
the two strategies – appropriation and commodification – is blurred (cf. introduction to chapter 6).
7.4.3 “Free” trade as unequal exchange
While the GE institutions have mixed positions regarding the relationship between environmental
regulation, international competition and environmental degradation, they all converge on the same
non-sequitur: “Free”-trade agreements are inevitably part of the solution, almost regardless of the
particular problem at hand (OECD, 2011b, pp. 12–14, 47, 50, 61, 102, 105–106, 118; UNEP, 2011,
pp. 64, 137, 567–568, 629; World Bank, 2012, pp. 20, 69–70, 78–79, 83).226 Trade liberalization for
“green”  goods  and  services  is  ceaselessly  promoted  here,  and  meanwhile,  the  green-capitalist
225 Similarly, Moore (2015, Chapter 10) emphasizes that capital’s Cheap Food system was based historically on the 
commodification of agricultural production. This equally contradicts the notion of a simple “appropriation over 
commodification” strategy on the part of capital; by contrast, in important cases, commodification of central inputs 
that determine the cost of production across the economy indeed appears to have been the high road for capital to 
maximize its gains, partly because it allowed for (and was in turn facilitated and cheapened by) the appropriation of
yet more Cheap Nature. (This resonates with Meiksins Wood’s account of the origin of capitalism in the 
marketization of agricultural relations in England, which boosted productivity and thus enabled rapid urbanization 
and industrialization processes; Meiksins Wood, 2017.) Indeed, Moore’s conceptualization acknowledges this 
complexity; appropriation, he effectively argues, is preferred ceteris paribus and in real-world contexts is usually 
mediated through moments of capitalization. For him, the relative weight between the two moments matters, as 
expressed in his concept of the ecological surplus, outlined above in the introduction to chapter 6. 
226 The European Commission’s ambitious strategy to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 reproduces the exact 
same discourse: “Open markets, a globalised world and multilateralism are a precondition for the EU to be able to 
benefit from the clean energy transition domestically and also globally” and, notably, to access critical raw 
materials (European Commission, 2018, p. 20). Of course, “the EU’s trade policy is already contributing to 
sustainable development in the EU and in third countries.” (Ibid., p. 21)
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 207
unconscious seems to be haunted to comical proportions by the specter of environmentally justified
trade restrictions – perhaps because the case for the latter is so obvious.
According  to  World  Bank  statistics,  the  share  of  “green”  products  and  services  in
international trade has been relatively small – between two and six percent of all exports from
“developing” and “high-income” countries, respectively, throughout the 2000s (World Bank, 2012,
p. 71). This share may grow, of course, in a “green” scenario. But these figures inadvertently re-
emphasize  the  obvious  point:  The  most  important  effects  of  “free”-trade  agreements  on  the
environment are not in what these agreements do to this moderate “green” fraction of the overall
trade volume – but in what they do to overall economic and trade activity and to the balance of
forces between environmental regulation and corporate interests. The figures compiled in section
2.1 already highlighted the drastic environmental footprint left by sharply increasing volumes of
international trade (see also Bello, 2009). International shipping and aviation continue to grow at an
enormous pace (cf. section 3.2.3). Even within the EU, which modestly reduced its overall GHG
emissions since 1990, the increase in market integration has left the transport sector with steadily
growing emissions; since 1990, this trend has been only briefly interrupted during the crisis years
beginning in 2008 (EEA, 2018b). While more radical environmentalisms consequently advocate for
bioregionalism  (Atkinson,  1991;  Exner  et  al.,  2008;  T.  Jackson,  2009) and even  earlier  green-
capitalist writings problematized the “free”-trade agenda for these reasons (Hawken, 1993, pp. 96–
101), this entire problematique is disregarded in the GE proposals’ passages on trade.
Perhaps no other issue receives a comparably lopsided treatment in the  Green Economy
reports and in broader green-capitalist discourse. “Free”-trade agreements (FTAs) with their wide-
ranging investor protection clauses – which understand “any regulatory action by a government that
reduces the maximum conceivable value of private property [as] a form of expropriation” deserving
of  compensation  – have  been actively  sought  by  neoliberal  political  forces  to  bypass  effective
national-level resistance to environmental degradation  (McCarthy, 2007, p. 41). Time and again,
progress on climate change mitigation has been blocked through international trade and investment
law, which complicates or rules out local “green” content provisions and weakens state capacity to
regulate the operations of transnational firms in extractive industries  (Cosbey, 2017; Klein, 2014,
Chapter 2, 2018a).227 By illegalizing subsidies linked to export performance, these agreements also
happen to undercut the “leadership” case for “green” innovation advanced in the GE studies. The
energy sector has been the most active branch in seeking investor-state dispute settlements through
227 Even in a UNEP-published study highlighting the need to create domestic consensus for “green” industrial policy, it
has been noted that the exemplary efforts by the government of Ontario have been hindered by a WTO challenge 
which forced the province to drop the local content requirements of its renewable energy policy (Cosbey, Wooders, 
Bridle, & Casier, 2017, p. 78).
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trade law,  exacting billions of dollars  from governments that  actively attempted to  “green” the
energy sector and exerting a “regulatory chill” effect that discourages environmental regulation for
fear  of  retribution  (PowerShift,  Corporate  Europe  Observatory,  Transnational  Institute,  &
Association Internationale des Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs, 2015). 
At the international level,  FTAs have been a crucial  mechanism to curtail  the power of
Southern governments to retain control over domestic resources and foster domestic development
(Frame, 2016; Rodrik, 2001) – i.e., the primary means to prevent any country’s coordinated attempt
to  “move  up the  value  chain.”  Countries  that  first  integrate  into  the  world  market  as  primary
suppliers thus tend to remain locked into this position at the bottom of the economic hierarchy
(Wade,  2003,  p.  631). As  Frame  (2016) argues,  FTAs have thus  exacerbated  the  asymmetrical
relations facilitating what Hornborg  (2015) calls  uneven ecological  exchange – in other words,
massive externalizations of social and environmental costs across the globe. This has not entirely
escaped the GE institutions’ attention: UNEP’s  International Resource Panel  (2017, p. 33) notes
how global  trade  “leads  to  a  redistribution  of  environmental  burdens to  resource-extracing and
producing  countries”  while  acknowledging  that,  from  a  global  environmental  perspective,
transportation efforts may well cancel out theoretical allocative efficiency gains.
NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement which entered into force in 1994, is still
held up by free-trade proponents as a model of innovative and pro-environmental trade law (Berger,
Brandi, & Bruhn, 2017). During the negotiation phase, pressure from environmental groups led to
the conclusion of an environmental side agreement. But NAFTA seems to be a model of co-optation
by pseudo-regulation  more  than  anything  else:  Critics  argue  that  the  deal  received its  “green”
reputation  mainly  because  the  environmental  side  agreement  as  such was  a  novelty  in  trade
diplomacy  (Sanchez,  2002).  Its  provisions  have  no  effective  sanctioning  mechanisms  since
governments, while willing or forced to surrender judicial authority over corporate conduct to trade
dispute  settlement  courts,  were  unwilling  to  accept  any  superordinated  regulatory  body  for
environmental matters.  The newly created environmental bodies have been effectively sidelined
under NAFTA, and environmental concerns are dealt with mainly as potential trade barriers (ibid.).
Meanwhile, economists found NAFTA responsible for an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in
both Mexico and the U.S.  (Yu, Kim, & Cho, 2011). It has complicated regulatory state action as
companies  with negative environmental  track records have successfully  sued governments  over
losses incurred through conventional regulatory measures (McCarthy, 2007). This bears directly on
high-profile  environmental issues:  When the Obama administration decided to  reject the wildly
controversial Keystone XL pipeline project, designed to transport tar sands oil from Canada to the
U.S., developer TransCanada promptly filed a NAFTA claim over US$ 15 billion, most of which
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was to compensate for expected future profits, and experts considered the chances of success fairly
high despite the fact that the U.S. had never before lost a NAFTA dispute  (Tucker, 2016). The
dispute was suspended and quickly buried after Trump reversed the Obama decision (“TransCanada
suspends $15-billion NAFTA suit on Keystone XL pipeline,” 2017; U.S. Department of State, n.d.).
Indeed, the main argument made at the time for the agreement’s environmental benignancy
was the orthodox claim that economic growth leads more or less automatically to environmental
improvements as more means become available to attend to environmental problems, in line with
the notion of an environmental Kuznets Curve (D. I. Stern, 2017). This claim, invariably cited in the
literature (McCarthy, 2007; Sanchez, 2002; Yu et al., 2011), is given up in the GE models, based as
they are on the admission that growth has historically produced environmental degradation. Instead,
the  argumentation has  been shifted  towards  the alleged benefits  of  “free”  trade  for  technology
diffusion (see below). The main concern, however, remains the defense against “protectionism”:
Environmental  policies  shall  never  constitute  barriers  to  trade.  Once  more,  between  the  three
dimensions it is supposed to balance, the GE prioritizes the economic, no matter how weak the
evidence provided. This also has far-reaching implications for North—South technology transfer.
7.4.4 Technology transfer
Technology  transfer  –  the  diffusion  of  (eco-efficient)  technologies  from  centers  of  industrial
innovation to other, less solvent regions – has been recognized in international politics as a crucial
mechanism for sustainable development, and contested in terms of its actual implementation, since
the 1992 Rio summit (Khor, 2011, p. 34). It has been named one of two decisive “‘proxies’ or test
issues” (ibid., p. 4) for a  Green Economy  from a Southern perspective (the other being finance).
And  indeed,  the  Green  Economy explicitly  seeks  to  increase  the  eco-efficiency  of  the  global
economy by facilitating technology transfers to poorer regions  (OECD, 2011b, pp. 50, 60; World
Bank,  2012, p.  20).  This issue is  closely linked to two previously discussed questions,  namely
intellectual property rights (see section 5.2.2) and “free” trade (see previous section). 
One  channel  promoted  to  realize  technology  transfer  is  the  Kyoto  Protocol’s  Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM, cf. OECD, 2011b, p. 103; UNEP, 2011, pp. 276, 282). Within the
broader landscape of technology transfer initiatives, the wildly controversial CDM is still seen as
exceptional in that two-fifths of its projects actually claim to involve some transfer of technology
(Coninck  &  Puig,  2015,  p.  425) –  whereas  other  schemes  “have  neglected  many  countries,
technologies and ‘innovation system functions,’” restricting themselves to fostering “inter-linkages,
including activities such as networking, advocacy and information sharing.” (Ibid., p. 431) But the
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CDM market has long collapsed, and the second major official funding mechanism – the  Green
Climate Fund – has only provided marginal sums throughout its first decade (see section 3.2.3). 
In 2010, the international climate negotiations within the UNFCCC framework added the
Technology Mechanism to facilitate technology transfer. UNEP’s GE report (2011, p. 233) places its
hopes  on  this  new  institution  to  overcome  the  difficulties  with  technology  diffusion.  This
“mechanism,” however, mainly adds another layer to the bureaucracy complex – its role is, as with
so many previous initiatives, restricted to policy consulting, facilitation of international communi-
cation on technology transfer and, to a limited degree, “technical assistance” (i.e., more project-
centered consulting) for “developing” countries; IPR issues appear to play no role, and, contrary to
what the name suggests, no funding or transfers are directly effected through the mechanism (cf.
UNFCCC, 2015a). The mechanism’s  Technology Executive Committee replicates the familiar GE
narrative of public finance needed to leverage private, emphasizing that financial  risks are to be
shifted  away from private  to  public  actors  while  remaining silent  on  a  conceivable  concurrent
shifting of benefits (UNFCCC Technology Executive Committee, 2015). This suggests a pattern of
externalization in which Southern governments and Northern “donors” together insure the profits of
(presumably mostly Northern) firms in “green” sectors – hardly an “innovative” setup, but one that
has  long been characteristic  of  the  World  Bank’s  “green”  financing  mechanisms  (Honkaniemi,
2011; cf. also Goldman, 2005) and has underpinned relations between public and private sectors in
the neoliberal era more generally  (Crouch, 2004). If this model is seen as the only way to drive
forward green technology diffusion, its limited adoption by real-world (public) actors may reflect an
awareness of these externalizations rather than a lack of awareness of reasonable policy options.
From the  South,  several  fears  concerning  FTAs  and  sustainable  development  –  usually
substantiated by actual policy proposals and/or Northern corporate and governmental practices –
have  been  voiced  (Khor,  2011):  One  relates  to  Northern  protectionism  with  environmental
justification – the imposition of tariffs on imported goods according to environmental footprints
associated with their production in particular countries of origin – as discussed and defeated in the
WTO negotiations in the 1990s; another relates to the inverse case, in which Northern governments
– as in a 2007 EU/U.S. proposal – push for the removal of protective tariffs in Southern countries in
order  to  be  able  to  export  their  “green”  goods  and  technologies  more  cheaply;  and  yet  other
concerns revolve around subsidy agreements, where the current WTO setup allows for large-scale
subsidies for industrial agriculture in the North but disallows certain forms of “green” subsidies that
would be useful in Southern contexts. 
In this context, it is important to understand the GE’s free-trade argument for technology
diffusion as a very particular and Northern-biased strategy of technology “transfer”  through the
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market. Against this, Martin Khor emphasizes that in Rio 1992, “it was recognised that technology
transfer  had to  be undertaken beyond the commercial  arena,”  but  “there has been in  fact  little
transfer  of  climate-friendly  technology  under  the  UNFCCC”  (ibid.,  p.  29),  a  finding  certainly
reaffirmed since with regard to the Technology Mechanism discussed above. He admonishes:
“Technology transfer is not merely the import or purchase of machines and other hardware at commercial
rates (…) Technology transfer may involve the purchase and acquisition of equipment; the know-how to
use, maintain and repair it; the ability to make it through ‘emulation’ or reverse engineering; to adapt it to
local conditions; and eventually to design and manufacture original products.” (Ibid., pp. 29–30)
Technology transfer is here seen as a facilitation of endogenous technology development in order to
avoid an ongoing dependency on imports – an entirely different meaning for the same signifier. To
this end, Khor calls for an expanded technology space in the public domain and a restriction of
intellectual property rights obstacles; he lists a number of cases in which “developing” countries
were prevented from adopting “green” technologies by means of excessive license fee demands on
the  part  of  Northern  corporations.  Khor  favorably  mentions  Southern  initiatives  to  prohibit
patenting  of  green  technologies,  and he  wants  the  compulsory  licensing  mechanisms  specified
under international trade law to be applied to “green” tech (ibid., pp. 27–33). The latter proposal is
casually listed by the World Bank as well  (2012, p. 78), but any implementation attempts would
invite significant political-economic conflict. 
Khor’s perspective, while remaining within the framework of a global “green” capitalism,
significantly departs from the neoliberal inflection of the GE. The market-based approach, which
understands  technology  transfer  mainly  to  happen  through  offset  schemes  and  tariff-free
commercial exports, not only shifts a significant share of the costs for a green-tech clean-up of the
global economy to the South despite the North’s historical responsibility for ecological degradation
– it is also inherently limited in that it fundamentally depends on Southern ability to pay (in the case
of exports) or links financing to avoided technological change in the North (in the case of offsets). 
The  Green Economy  strategy for technology diffusion through “free” trade,  by contrast,
seems to equate the concept with the sheer presence of certain technologies in a country and avoids
questions  of  actual  control  or  ownership.  “[E]conomic  globalization,”  argues  one  paper  in  the
OECD  Green  Growth  Papers  series,  “implies  technology  diffusion,  almost  by  definition.”
(Glachant, 2013, p. 14) The author here deploys a non-sequitur that seems to sit at the root of the
GE strategy: “[I]nternational technology transfers take place through market channels such as trade
or FDI [foreign direct investment]. Accordingly, lowering barriers to trade and FDI is an effective
policy leverage to foster the transfer of green technologies.” (Ibid., p. 9) If market channels – the
predominant form of international economic interaction – have led to a limited degree of technology
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diffusion, the conclusion that more market exchange will solve the problem may be convenient, but
not convincing. Ironically, the model “developing” country cited for technology diffusion is China,
which,  as the paper concedes,  followed a more protectionist  and state-interventionist  path,  with
policy mechanisms such as local content requirements – a red rag from a free-trade perspective –
that it was able to implement partly due to the strength of its domestic market (see sections 10.1.3
and 11.5). In the same paper, moreover, the strategy of “free” trade and intellectual property rights
enforcement is presented as workable only for “emerging economies,” whereas the author concedes
that it is useless for those countries at the bottom of the global economic hierarchy.
The CDM, touted as the best solution in the GE reports, has not been able to resolve the
problem at all.  For one thing, to the (low) degree that it provides the always-assumed emission
reductions in the South at all, it tends to do so, following the logic of offset schemes, at the expense
of the further development and application of emissions-reducing technologies in the North. For
another,  most  CDM investments  follow the  same logic  of  incrementality  that  characterizes  the
“actually  existing” green-tech sector  in  general,  inhibiting a  transformation away from existing
fossil fuel infrastructures in favor of short-term fixes to gradually improve the efficiency of these
infrastructures  and  thereby  extend  their  lifespan.  Other  initiatives,  including  the  Technology
Mechanism, involve few or no “hard” resources and thus appear equally unable to overcome the
contradictions of green-capitalist technology diffusion, while in a purely market-based approach,
intellectual property rights make green-tech diffusion prohibitively costly for the global South.
7.4.5 Is there an alternative? Absorbing opposition
How do the GE institutions  handle  the  sensitive issues  raised in  this  chapter?  One fascinating
document amidst the prolific publishing output of the GE institutions over the past decade is a study
prepared by UNEP immediately after the 2012 Rio+20 summit, which provides valuable insight on
GE strategies to co-opt political opposition. Innocuously titled Development strategies of selected
Latin American and Caribbean countries and the green economy approach: A comparative analysis
(UNEP, 2013), the report, as is frankly described in its pages, was a reaction to the vocal opposition
of several, mostly left-leaning, governments in the above-named regions to the  Green Economy
agenda during the preparation process for the Rio summit.  These governments228,  almost all  of
which were organized in the ALBA group that formed as a counterweight to the U.S.-led  Free
Trade Area of the Americas project, had rejected the Green Economy as a false, neoliberal solution
to the multiple crises of the era, which would reinforce North—South inequality. This prompted
UNEP’s  attempt  to  “set  the  foundation  for  a  post-Rio+20  regional  debate,”  seeing  as  it  was
“fundamental to find areas where there was agreement” amid all the controversy (ibid., pp. 2, 12).
228 The six states under consideration include Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
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Whatever their actual environmental merits, this group of governments arguably represented the
most  politically  relevant  left-wing opposition to neoliberal hegemony in international politics –
even a relatively cogent counter-hegemonic force – during the 2000s. Their pressure had led to the
removal of the concept of natural capital from the Rio+20 outcome document (Levidow, 2014, p. 8;
for the document, see United Nations General Assembly, 2012). If any progressive challenge to the
GE needed to be taken seriously, it was theirs.
And agreement the study did find – mostly by collapsing the wide range of socialist-leaning
development approaches proposed by these governments, which were often inspired by indigenous
cosmologies of human—nature harmony, into UNEP’s much more technical and market-oriented
agenda.229 This operation exploited abstract  common values such as “wealth” and “equality” in
order to obscure substantive differences in policy approaches. UNEP (2013, p. 3) even counted the
inevitable fact that all positions were somehow concerned with the regulation of human—nature
relationships as a notable political commonality. The report made repeated reference to the use of
“economic  instruments”  on  the  part  of  Latin  American  governments,  but  while  in  orthodox
language this  may refer  to market mechanisms, here it  repeatedly lauded Cuba’s more stalwart
interventions  that  enabled  the  country’s  globally  unparalleled  sustainable  development
achievements.230 Praise was also awarded to  the Ecuadorian Yasuní-ITT initiative (ibid.,  p.  34),
which incidentally was an attempt at a payments for ecosystem services (PES) scheme that was non-
market-based and domestically controlled, by marked contrast to international schemes endorsed
(and co-operated) by the Green Economy institutions, such as REDD+. (Yasuní-ITT faltered shortly
after, as little support could be garnered from Northern institutions for such a heretic approach.231)
Bolivia’s constitutionally imposed limits on the commodification of the country’s  natural capital
stocks received further mention, along with similar regulations in both Ecuador and Cuba (ibid., pp.
34–5).  “In  the  same way as the  green  economy approach,  the  countries  analysed  promote  the
leadership of the state in directing the economy and regulating the market” (ibid., p. 2, emphasis
added), and thus both Pink Tide interventionism and “conventional” Cuban state socialism were
229 The contradictions, particularly strong in some of these countries, between these harmonious accounts and the on-
the-ground realities of neo-extractivism are noted not only in the report but also by critical observers (Acosta, 2013;
Svampa, 2013). The point here, however, is not the consistency of Latin American governments but the ideological 
operations of the Green Economy. 
230 The Cuban example occasionally pops up in various parts of the political spectrum of literature on “green” 
transformations, noting that the country scores unusually high on the Human Development Index relative to its 
modest GDP, and does so with a small ecological footprint. Cuba’s sustainable development policies – including the
large-scale encouragement of urban farming – were to a large extent born of necessity due to the country’s 
increasing economic isolation after the Soviet Union’s demise (cf. Green New Deal Group, 2008; M. Koch, 2011, 
pp. 133–134).   
231 The Yasuní-ITT initiative was a proposal by the Ecuadorian government to the international community concerning 
the oil reserves under a protected area in the Amazonian rain forest. Ecuador was willing to forgo the oil revenue 
under the condition that international donors compensate it for half of the expected revenue. After six years, the 
fund contained <1% of the requested sum, and the Ecuadorian state went ahead with drilling (cf. Puig, 2013).
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equated with the GE’s market-based approaches, apparently on the banal factual basis that all of
these involve some form of state regulation – the absence of which under capitalism only hard-core
libertarians would consider possible in the first place.   
Ostensibly in reaction to accusations of eco-colonialism, the report emphasized the validity
and  value  of  national  sovereignty  throughout,  and  even  went  as  far  as  describing  the  Green
Economy as the “opposite of the ‘structural adjustments.’” (Ibid., p. 29) In the same vein, it aligned
itself  with  the  call  for  global  financial  regulation,  explaining  that  “green economy emerged in
response  to  speculation  (…)  green  economy  is  an  appeal  to  rectify  this  economic  model”  of
financialization (ibid., p. 37). This is intriguing, given that although UNEP’s 2011 Green Economy
report bemoaned the “misallocation” of capital for speculative purposes, its 630 pages did not call
for any reforms to the global financial architecture; instead, the final chapter was dedicated to the
mobilization of (voluntary) finance under the current financialized regime.232
So it continues until eventually, the appeasement attempt culminates in the claim that “[t]he
focus on rights, ethics and standards … is fully compatible with market reform and the economic
instruments implicit in the concept of green economy.” (UNEP, 2013, p. 40) Confronted with anti-
neoliberal discontent from the Left, UNEP tries to explain away the differences and ends on vague
recommendations for further “dialogue” (especially of the “high-level” kind) and regional strategy
development.  Perhaps better  than any other,  this  document reveals UNEP’s role  within the GE
“trinity”: By contrast to the World Bank’s image of toughness, UNEP sells what is essentially the
same policy set as a far more socially sensitive alternative – even as the “opposite” of the structural
adjustment  policies  associated  with  the  Bank  (cf.  section  2.5.4).  In  this  case,  it  acknowledges
cultural diversity and differences in political traditions just to fold them back into the established
Green Economy  framework. If some fall  under the impression that  there is no alternative,  it  is
suggested  here,  that  must  be  because  all  sides  have  been  giving  different  names  to  the  same
universal aspirations.
7.5 Summary: Four dimensions of re-externalization
This  chapter  has  outlined  several  overlapping  dimensions  of  re-externalization  mechanisms:
environmental,  social,  temporal  and spatial.  The  quintessential  Green Economy  policy  of  GHG
emissions pricing and trading, which reappeared throughout this chapter, illustrates these layered
mechanisms well. This case is chosen here to summarize the dynamics described in this chapter. 
Ecologically,  the  equivalence  of  such  emissions,  and  hence  their  commensurability  as
commodities, is questionable (see section 7.1).  The determination of the “proper” price of carbon
232 UNEP’s earlier, more Keynesian Global Green New Deal proposal (UNEP, 2009) had acknowledged the need for 
financial reforms in principle but considered it outside the scope of Green Economy concerns.
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depends on a complex set of highly political assumptions (see section 7.2), which extend to the
anticipated long-term availability of adventurous negative emissions technologies, most of which
are expected to entail entirely new externalities at enormous scales – if they are realizable at all (see
section 7.3). Socially, except in the case of carbon trading schemes’ frequent allotting of emission
allowances, often for free, to polluters on the basis of past patterns of emissions, carbon accounting
neither  discriminates  between emitters  nor  between the  purposes  of  their  emissions  (Lohmann,
2016, p. 65). Thus, the emissions from heating a private swimming pool or flying a private jet – if
even included in the scheme – hold the same status and legitimacy as those produced by heating a
little shack in the slums or driving to a low-paid service job in an area with inadequate public
transportation  infrastructure.  Without  countermeasures,  flat  emissions  pricing  is  starkly  socially
regressive (see related discussion of social-to-environmental cost shifting in section 7.2). Likewise,
joining the categories of the social and the ecological, the uniform logic blurs the ecologically and
socially crucial distinction between the carbon stored in fossil fuels – the stocks accumulated over
millions  of  years  and  now depleted  over  mere  centuries  –  and  that  circulating  through  living
“biomass,” facilitating the diversion of attention away from (predominantly) Northern burning of
fossil  fuels  towards  (often)  Southern  forestry  practices,  as  embodied  in  all  manner  of  offset
mechanisms  (cf.  section  7.4). Thus,  “pricing  CO2 reduces  the  extraordinary  socio-spatial
heterogeneities and complexities of ‘natural’ CO2’s [sic] to a single universal” (Swyngedouw, 2013,
p. 4) as it “abstracts from where, how, when and by whom the cuts are made, disembedding climate
solutions from history and technology.” (Lohmann, 2009a, p. 28) 
With this extensive overview of internalization challenges and re-externalization dynamics,
the ground is prepared for the evaluation of the Green Economy model and its practical realization
up to this historical moment in bloc IV.
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BLOC IV:
THE ECONOMY OF ADDITIONALITY
The first  lead question proposed at  the outset  of  this  thesis  was, Could the
strategies pursued in major international institutions’ Green Economy models
enable a “green” systemic cycle of capital accumulation in the 21st century?
The investigations throughout the first three blocs now culminate, at the end of
this  fourth bloc,  in a negative response: The  Green Economy  emerges as an
Economy  of  Additionality  whose  uneven  selection  of  “green”  systemic
accumulation  strategies  leaves  the  fossil-fueled  infrastructure  of  global
capitalism in place and develops little transformative power. 
Chapter  8  discusses  the  hesitant  political-economic  strategies  of  the
Green Economy: With its non-confrontational approach, the GE project fails to
mobilize sufficient support to overcome the powerful resistance it faces from
those vested in the “gray” economy. Even for the institutions supporting the
GE,  the  defense  of  neoliberal hegemony  ultimately  takes  priority  over  the
achievement  of  green-capitalist  hegemony.  Chapter  9  then  provides  a
systematic  assessment  of  the  Green  Economy  based  on  the  framework
developed in chapter  4 and concludes with the diagnosis of an  Economy of
Additionality.
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8. The non-confrontational politics of the Green 
Economy
This  chapter  considers  the  political-economic  development  of  the  Green  Economy  within  its
historical  context.  Returning to  the distinction proposed in  the introduction between  structural-
economic and  political-economic constraints to the development of “green” capitalism, previous
blocs  often  prioritized  the  structural-economic  dimension,  discussing  the  imperative  of
accumulation, the structure, capital masses and “footprint” of the global economy in the 2010s and
the resources available for “green” accumulation. But not only is the ultimate technical realizability
of a green-capitalist growth regime highly questionable – even the journey towards that horizon is
anything but straightforward, littered as it is with political pitfalls. As emphasized in the introduc-
tion, both dimensions are tightly interwoven, and consequently, the political was never quite absent
from the story until this point, for example in the shape of power struggles over externalizations old
and new (chapter 7). In this chapter, political economy finally takes center stage. 
The particular choices among the conceivable “green” accumulation strategies outlined in
section 4.6 are inherently political and contested.  Accordingly, the numbers presented in previous
chapters need to be read politically in order to stake out the conflicting interests at play. Drawing on
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and passive revolutions, this chapter provides such a reading, paying
attention to the political dynamics unfolding within the structural framework of capitalism. While
these  political  dynamics  are  importantly  shaped  by  the  functional  imperatives  of  capitalist
competition and accumulation,  they are not fully determined by the latter  and certainly can be
distinguished  analytically.  Thus,  as  outlined  in  the  introduction,  beyond  the  “technical”  (or
structural)  constraint for “green” capitalism posed by the general imperative of macroeconomic
profitability and the dramatic transformation required particularly to avert climate change, political-
economic barriers can further restrict the actual policy space for Green Economy implementation,
and  future  trajectories  ultimately  depend  on  political-economic  struggles  rather  than  technical
imperatives. These complex struggles over hegemony take place along horizontal and vertical axes:
between “gray”233 and “green” capital interests and between capital and “subaltern” classes. Popular
movements may side with either of the capital factions in different places and contexts – or oppose
both. A graphic visualization of these struggles is offered in the final section of this chapter.
233 To describe the “dirty” industries and the associated interest groups in juxtaposition to the “green,” the term 
“brown” economy (or “brown” capital) is frequently used. I prefer the “gray” economy both because the color does 
not carry racial connotations and because, as a metaphor, it covers a wider set of industries beyond the extractive 
sectors while evoking the same association with pollution. 
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Is the Green Economy ready to confront the incumbent powers of the “gray” economy? This
chapter seeks to understand the logic and recent historical development of such struggles as they
relate to the GE. But first, it theorizes these hegemonic struggles from a Gramscian perspective.
8.1 Gramscian political economy: Hegemony and passive 
revolution
Writing from a prison cell, Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) famously revolutionized Marxist thinking
on power by exploring the role of culture and ideology in maintaining relations of domination. For
our purposes, the key concepts emanating from his work are hegemony and passive revolution.
The  Gramscian  concept  of  hegemony  is  frequently  cited  but  often  deployed  rather
superficially;  if  used  to  anchor  an  analysis  of  political-economic  struggles,  it  warrants  closer
attention. Hegemony in a bourgeois democracy, according to Gramsci, involves a “combination of
force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally”  (Gramsci, 1971, p. 80, note 49), or an
exercise of leadership on the part of the hegemonic social group over allied groups or classes (the
moment of consent) and  domination over antagonistic groups (the moment of force or coercion;
ibid., p. 57).234 These groups are usually class-based; in order to attain hegemonic status, they need
to enter into relatively broad, informally stratified coalitions.  In the context of my argument here,
hegemony will  usually  refer  to  a  congruence of  normative  leadership  or  consent  and material-
physical domination, which Gramsci (ibid., pp. 137, 366, 377, 418) conceptualizes as leading to the
formation  of  a  historical  bloc.235 A hegemonic  project,  then,  in  the  usage  proposed here,  is  a
contender for the formation of a  historical bloc, involving a substantial political agenda, a set of
political  strategies  (and  compromises)  and  a  coalition  of  actors,  which  typically  requires
concessions on the part of the leading group to the subordinated groups involved.236
The relationship between the normative-cultural (leadership/consent) and physical-material-
legal (domination/coercion) moments of hegemony is complex, and the usage of these terms varies
throughout the literature, including in Gramsci’s writings. For the purposes of this work, I would
interpret  the  Gramscian  dialectic  as  follows:  Domination is  a  fairly  straightforward  concept,
involving relatively direct access to coercive state power and economic resources on the part of the
234 The use of the concept of hegemony is somewhat ambiguous in Gramsci’s writings, often referring to the moment 
of consent or leadership exclusively but, at other times, encompassing the full dialectic between consent and force 
or leadership and domination while highlighting the previously neglected importance of the moment of consent to 
stabilize class rule. With Opratko (2012), I would argue that both moments are closely intertwined and only 
analytically distinct (see below).
235 The notion of historical bloc has a strong affinity with the regulation-theoretical concept of mode of development. 
Pointing out the affinity between Gramsci and the regulation school, Jessop (1997) defines the historical bloc as a 
coherent combination of a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation.
236 “[A]lthough the hegemonic project serves the long-term interests of the dominant class (or class fraction), this class 
will typically sacrifice certain economic-corporate interests in the short term to help legitimate its overall 
hegemonic project.” (Jessop, 1997, p. 62)
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dominant class or group. The moment of leadership does relate to norms and ideas – the “ethico-
political” dimension in Gramscian terms –, but it clearly is not determined on a level playing field
either.237 While societal  consent for a  certain political  regime is  partly  a  question of prevailing
ethical and moral norms and beliefs, it also involves a “rational and economic core” (Riley, 2011,
n.p.): Relevant subaltern groups must perceive the current order as serving their own interests better
than (realistically accessible) alternatives could. Hegemony as the production and maintenance of
consent in the reading proposed here is conditioned by the material capabilities of the leading group
to offer the agenda whose implementation other groups perceive as corresponding more closely to
the “general” (“ethico-political”) as well as their own material (“economic-corporate”) interest than
any alternative,  within the “realistic” constraints imposed by the structural selectivity of capitalist
(state) institutions.238 (A revolutionary situation would be one in which these constraints are for
some combination of reasons no longer effective.) Thus, while the two moments of hegemony are
closely interrelated – which makes the formation of counter-hegemonic projects by subaltern groups
all the more problematic –, allowing for an analytical distinction between the two is helpful in
tracing the dynamics of shifting balances of force. This being said, it is no easy task to assess the
relative success of each hegemonic project, class or actor in achieving a position of leadership;
many Gramscians consequently tend to evade such detailed analysis. 
“Dominant” and “subaltern” groups, I would argue, should be understood as  relative  and
contingent categories. Hegemony, likewise, is never total but relative: In a Gramscian framework,
constellations of interests and political coalitions are by no means static entities. Struggles over
hegemony, while being class struggles in important senses, do not follow a simple back-and-forth
logic in which a pro-capitalist hegemonic project faces an anti-capitalist counter-hegemonic project.
Instead, in the approach taken in this work hegemonic struggles take place along a continuum, in
which each of several identifiable projects covers a part of the spectrum within which it exerts a
certain gravitational force, from one extreme – which seeks to preserve the status quo as wholly as
possible – to the other, which seeks to overturn the status quo altogether. For the case of “green”
capitalism, this  is visualized in Illustrations 1–3 in section 8.5.  Leadership is  notably exercised
237 Whereas domination relates to the core functions of the state (“political society” in Gramsci’s words), leadership is 
rooted in civil society, which, however, for Gramscians is not an open forum for the exchange of arguments in a 
pluralist or Habermasian sense but notably populated by large institutional complexes with more or less direct links 
to political power, such as church, school and various professional organizations.
238 This is in line with a critical realist reading of Gramsci: “Gramscian thought … emphasiz[es] that although 
structures do not define outcomes, they do define the potential range of alternative strategies from which different 
agents can choose (…) Agency is thus located in structure, but not determined by it.” (Okereke, Bulkeley, & 
Schroeder, 2009, p. 69) For the concepts of state institutions’ structural and strategic selectivity in historical-
materialist state theory, which are heavily influenced by Gramsci, see Jessop (2010). 
Jessop complained earlier that the “decisive economic nucleus of hegemony” (1997, p. 71) was relatively 
neglected in Gramsci’s writings, a neglect which led many later neo-Gramscian analysts to downplay the role of 
economic relations in hegemonic struggles even further.
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within these spectra or projects, whose coverage of the entire continuum must be expanded in order
to attain hegemony. These projects are thus, in the context of established bourgeois democracies,
constantly engaged in a protracted, detailed “war of position.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 235) Whether any
particular move in this  game ultimately benefits  a particular force more than another is always
subject to debate, and given the complexity of such struggles, unintended consequences abound.
The provisional outcomes of these struggles are hegemonic shifts, which range in depth from subtle
to transformative.
With  the  term  passive  revolution Gramsci  (1971,  pp.  106–120  and  passim) sought  to
describe, first, attempts of bourgeois parties to conquer state power without involving the popular
masses – the primary historical case being the Italian Risorgimento – and, second, where bourgeois
rule  was  already  established,  projects  seeking  to  defend  it;  under  the  latter  category,  Gramsci
considered both Fordism and Italian fascism  (Morton, 2010, pp. 324–325; Schwarzmantel, 2015;
Thomas, 2006; Callinicos, 2010, is critical of the conflation of the two ideas, given that the latter is
more of a counter-revolutionary exercise). If Gramsci seems to hold that passive revolutions are
necessarily incomplete and at least partial failures  (cf. discussion in Schwarzmantel, 2015), this
assessment seems to apply to the former cases more than the latter,  which involve more subtle
operations.239 In  this  second  sense,  which  is  more  relevant  to  the  present  discussion,  passive
revolution refers to the strategic efforts of hegemonic forces – i.e., usually “progressive” factions of
capital  and  associated  interest  groups  –  to  adapt  power  structures  to  changing  historical
circumstances, thereby preserving class power in spite of looming or even manifest crises for as
long as possible.240 In the process, demands – and even personnel – of subaltern movements that
emerged  as  potential  threats  to  the  status  quo  are  selectively  integrated  and  absorbed  while  a
fundamental change in social relations is avoided.241 In the words of one Gramsci scholar:
“Revolution here refers to the capacity of the ruling class still to deliver substantive and real historical
gains,  producing  real  social  transformations  that  could  be  comprehended,  formally  at  least,  as
progressive;  passive continues  to  denote  the  attempt  to  produce  these  transformations  without  the
extensive involvement of  subaltern classes as classes,  but  by means of  molecular absorption of their
leading elements into an already established hegemonic project.” (Thomas, 2006, p. 73, emphasis added)
239 Gramsci’s judgment on the failure of the bourgeoisie to carry out its “historical mission” during the Risorgimento is
arguably linked to the vestiges of teleology in his understanding of history (cf. note 247). 
240 The point of departure for Gramsci is Marx’s Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx,
1977), to which the concept of passive revolution serves as a “necessary critical corollary.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 114) 
Paraphrasing the Preface, Gramsci begins with the idea that “no social formation disappears as long as the 
productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward movement.” (Ibid., p. 106) 
241 In Hegelian language: “The thesis alone in fact develops to the full its potential for struggle, up to the point where it
absorbs even the so-called representatives of the antithesis.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 110) In most historical cases, 
Gramsci argues, established forces have thus been able to take over popular mass movements – partly due to the 
latter’s lack of awareness of their own role within the struggle – and redirect them to more conformable positions 
(ibid., pp. 112-3).
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The latter aspect is crucial: As Callinicos (2010) suggests, the exclusion of the broader population
from these processes is the strongest link between Gramsci’s two usages of the passive revolution
concept, the historical instances of bourgeois struggles to conquer state power and of struggles to
defend it.  In  each case,  the leading groups seek to keep popular  mobilization to the minimum
considered necessary within a given historical situation.242 The cooptation of “subaltern” forces and
movements, as conceptualized in this work, does not necessarily involve a simple act of defection
or changeover among their leadership but more commonly refers to a rather subtle and gradual
movement within the “war of position.”  
As Thomas  (2006, p. 73) argues, passive revolution in this sense involves “a logic of (a
certain type)  of modernization”; it  is  not an event  but  a  drawn-out process of adaptation.  This
process  takes  places  through  everyday politics:  “The conjunctural  is  also  the  terrain  on  which
passive revolution is pursued as a means of curing the structural contradictions by offering (in the
case of Gramsci’s own time) caricatural and partial versions of the genuine solutions that would
resolve them.”  (Callinicos, 2010, p. 504) This perspective on the structural evolution of capitalist
regimes establishes, once more, a fairly direct link between the concept of passive revolution and
the regulation school.243 Besides, beginning with Gramsci’s original case study of the Risorgimento,
passive revolution processes have often involved the imposition of internationally developed ideas
onto  varying local  contexts  (cf.  Morton,  2010,  p.  317).  At  the  level  of  theory,  meanwhile,  the
concept  cannot  simply  be  transferred  (or  applied)  to  changing  historical  contexts but  always
requires adaptation by means of critical historicization (ibid., p. 331).
While passive revolutions are often more the effect of complex struggles than a consciously
designed solution (ibid.,  p.  318),  the definition above clearly betrays a strategic dimension. By
calling the GE a passive revolution  strategy, I do not claim that the actors involved at all levels
share this particular strategic outlook. Having actively produced its own ontology for centuries,
capitalism  is  deeply  entrenched  in  the  mindsets  of  the  transnational  class  of  professionals
242 Gramsci himself argued with regard to his most important historical case study – the Italian Risorgimento – that a 
larger mobilization of the masses on the part of the progressive factions of the bourgeoisie (the Action Party) would 
have been possible; its neglect helped the centrist forces, which, he maintained, was a common historical pattern 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 110–112). But this particular case represents a passive revolution of the first type – given that 
these struggles preceded, and strove for, modern bourgeois-parliamentary rule, with the Action Party considered a 
revolutionary-populist republican party – and is thus difficult to generalize and apply to the present situation. 
Gramsci here considered the question of broader mobilization also in terms of enabling conditions for the 
possibility of an eventual popular-revolutionary outburst. 
A common contemporary interpretation of Gramsci’s work, maintained by all the authors cited in this section, 
holds that in a passive revolution, subaltern forces are generally “kept away from power, made politically passive” 
(Brand & Wissen, 2018, p. 56), suggesting that true mass mobilization is never a serious option in such situations.
243 In the words of Adam Morton, “the strategy of passive revolution becomes the historical path by which the 
development of capital can occur within spatially- (peripheral capitalist development) and temporally- (organic 
junctures) linked conditions of uneven and combined development but without resolving or surmounting those very
contradictions of accumulation.” (Morton, 2010, p. 332)
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populating these institutions – an important marker of hegemony (cf. Sklair, 2001, 2016; see also
discussions  in  section  2.5).  Indeed,  similar  to  Goldman’s  (2005) impressions  of  World  Bank
employees,  my personal impression of both OECD and Bank staff speaking on  Green Economy
matters in front of audiences largely made up of their peers was that they indeed believed their work
to consist of an impartial quest for “good” policies to save “our” future.  Within this ontology, the
basic equation of prosperity with capitalist growth and waged employment sets the parameters for
any  imaginable  solution  to  ecological  problems,  in  line  with  what  Mark  Fisher  (2009) called
capitalist  realism.  At  the  same time,  the  practices  of  massive,  hierarchical  institutions  like  the
OECD, the World Bank or UNEP cannot with any plausibility be understood only as the passively,
innocently produced outcomes of such ideological entrapments. Any perspective that denied the
strategic dimension of these institutions’ campaigns would be unduly naive. 
8.2 Restoring hegemony: The Green Economy historicized
Thesis 8.2: The Green Economy model was developed as part of a broader post-crisis strategy to
defend neoliberal hegemony while making as few concessions to oppositional forces as possible. 
This section picks up the thread of the Green Economy’s historical context as outlined in sections
2.2 and 2.4 in order to contextualize the GE’s hegemonic function at the time of its conception. My
argument is that the  Green Economy reports, devised in the aftermath of the crisis and published
when the austerity backlash was in full swing, formed an intervention that may be understood as
part of this backlash, intended to prop up and repair the crumbling hegemony of the neoliberal
model of development that international institutions had promulgated for decades. 
Capitalism, and its neoliberal incarnation in particular, faced a crisis of legitimacy resulting
from the multiple crises produced and/or aggravated throughout its neoliberal period – financial/
economic, ecological and also reproductive (Fraser, 2016). For a brief period, even though capital-
ism was not seriously politically threatened in its existence, the specter of reforms that could at least
have put an end to the neoliberal regime appeared on the horizon. Neoliberals were no longer the
“leading” force among larger parts of the electorate, their ideas having been discredited and their
capacity to maintain political consent through debt-based prosperity (cf. Crouch, 2008) eroded for
the moment by the massive repercussions of  the financial  collapse.  But  the incumbent  regime,
firmly embedded in national governments and bureaucracies but also in international institutions
(i.e., still materially dominant), was not willing to make such drastic concessions, and it managed to
persist – partly by redefining the crisis of a finance-driven accumulation regime as a  public debt
crisis, to which aggravated austerity policies were presented as the logical remedy  (J. Clarke &
Newman, 2012). But while neoliberalism’s material force was unbroken, consent remained fragile. 
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At this point, UNEP jumped ship and turned from the Green New Deal – which, in its UNEP
incarnation,  had been more market-oriented than other  proposals to  begin with – to  the  Green
Economy (Sander, 2016, pp. 84–85; Tienhaara, 2014).244 The Green Economy may here be read as a
post-crisis  attempt  to  capture  the  concept  of  “greenness,”  further  reduce  the  extent  of  popular
concessions  and  shift  the  focus  back  to  market-based  solutions.245 While  the GND  became
politically marginalized for the time being (Levidow, 2014), the GE radiated a bright message: The
dynamism of the market does not stand in the way of ecological and social objectives – this is a
“myth” (UNEP, 2011, p. 16)246 – but, following a set of reforms, can actually help achieve the latter
and overcome the multiple crises all at once, safeguarding future stability and prosperity.    
From a Gramscian perspective, Goodman and Salleh (2013) detail how the Green Economy
agenda was framed by institutions including the World Bank and UNEP in the run-up to the 2012
Rio+20 summit, seeking to establish the GE as the official global development agenda for the next
decades by securing the international community’s endorsement at the summit. They even saw this
process as “introducing a new chapter in the history of class conflict” (ibid., p. 412), given that civil
society  organizations  from  across  the  planet  actively  resisted  the  final  neoliberal  capture  of
sustainable development.  Indeed, the UN-sponsored civil  society platform that accompanied the
summit process turned into an embarrassment  for the official  GE agenda.  Its  separate  outcome
document  Another Future Is Possible  (Thematic Social Forum, 2012) constitutes a frontal assault
on every part  of the  Green Economy  model. Goodman and Salleh view the official  conference
outcome  –  which  is  captured  in  the  document  The  Future  We  Want  (United  Nations  General
244 UNEP’s first publications advocating a Global Green New Deal (Barbier, 2009; UNEP, 2009) had combined a set of
Keynesian measures – government stimulus spending aiming at job creation, vague references to a strengthened 
regulation of the global financial system – with more boilerplate neoliberal policy mechanisms like carbon trading, 
water commodification, trade liberalization and the taxation of pollution instead of labor. UNEP explicitly credited 
the OECD and the World Bank, among other organizations, for their contribution to its set of policy 
recommendations (UNEP, 2009, p. ii).
245 Such musings on the motivation of international institutions are of course somewhat speculative. Since UNEP as a 
UN organization has a mediating function, it may be argued that its report was more of a pragmatic reaction to 
changing political tides, while the OECD and the World Bank – with their more clearly Northern-dominated 
political agenda – pushed for green growth in order to advance a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis and the ways 
in which it could be overcome. Either way, the Green Economy does assume this legitimatory function in public 
discourse regardless of the intentions of its promoters.
246 The shift in UNEP’s position may be discerned through a close reading of the “mythical” trade-off it seeks to 
deconstruct. In the Global Green New Deal proposal, it was the trade-off between “economic development” read as
the overcoming of poverty and “environmental stewardship.” (UNEP, 2009, p. 5) Two years later, in the Green 
Economy, this myth was presented as secondary, whereas in the “most prevalent myth,” the trade-off was between 
“environmental sustainability” and “economic progress” in the form of “significant opportunities for investment, 
growth and jobs.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 16) From a critical perspective, there is a substantial difference between the 
compatibility of sustainability and modest material prosperity, on the one hand, and the compatibility of 
sustainability and ongoing capital accumulation, on the other. The first relates to a sufficient provision with use 
values, whereas the latter means the infinite self-valorization of capital – two qualitatively distinct matters, and, 
more crucially, two competing class interests. In terms of the three dimensions outlined in section 4.5, UNEP’s 
focus shifted from the contradiction between the environmental and the social dimension to that between the 
environmental and the economic. The contradiction between the social and economic dimension (in class terms, 
labor and capital) is not of interest.
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Assembly, 2012) – as a failure from a neoliberal standpoint, emptied out by anti-colonial resistance
from the global South in particular (cf. section 7.4.5). The UN resolution, however, is a non-binding
document either way. This underlines that the neoliberal GE’s leadership in a Gramscian sense was
not unchallenged within “green” discourse, even if the opposition could not successfully promote
alternative approaches as the superior material resources available to neoliberal political forces still
secured some degree of relative dominance for the latter. 
Ultimately,  the  Rio+20  summit  is  widely  understood  to  have  marked  the  moment  of
hegemony for the  Green Economy  approach to sustainable development  (Krüger,  2014; Lander,
2011; Littig, 2013; Tienhaara, 2014; Wanner, 2015; Wichterich, 2015; World Social Forum Working
Group on Green Economy, 2012). Thus, the GE concept has been called the “pinnacle of ecological
modernization” (MacDonald, 2013, p. 55), the latest product of the progressive institutionalization
of environmentalism in the interest of capital and of capital’s “grabbing” of the signifier “green.”
But, as we will see throughout this chapter, this hegemony is relatively weak. Within debates over
sustainable development and “green” transformations, the GE approach is relatively dominant due
to  the  resourceful  actors  involved.  When  confronted  with  the  “gray”  economy,  meanwhile,  it
remains in such a materially subordinated position that it fails to exert effective leadership.
8.3 Alliance building for a passive revolution
Thesis 8.3: The Green Economy lays out a technocratic plan for a passive revolution that is likely
to  falter  over  intra-elite  conflicts;  while  it  is  to  a  limited  extent  dominant  among  “green”
approaches,  its  downplaying of  political-economic conflicts  and disregard for  social  regulation
minimize its capacity for the type of social mobilization needed to prevail over the resistance of
incumbent powers. 
Historical  transformations  within  capitalism  of  course  did  not  happen  by  design,  as  orderly
implementations of political programs, but emerged from complex and essentially contingent social
struggles. The same is to be expected for a potential “green” capitalism. In this case, besides the
vertical dimension of “traditional” class conflict, the dimension of roughly horizontal (while still
asymmetrical) conflicts between, broadly speaking, “gray” and “green” capital interests – as well as
more “agnostic” forces situated in between – initially occupies a more central role. In the end,
however, these tend to collapse back into vertical conflicts between ruling and subaltern forces. To
unpack this constellation, we now turn to Gramsci’s notion of a passive revolution.
8.3.1 The green-capitalist hegemony dilemma
The  Green  Economy  as  a  hegemonic  project  will  here  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  passive
revolution  strategy, as previously suggested by several observers  (Brand & Wissen, 2018, p. 44;
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Kenis & Lievens, 2015; Wanner, 2015): In brief, the GE is a project led by “formally” progressive247
actors among global elites, including international bureaucracies such as UNEP, which envisions an
ecological  modernization of  global  capitalist  infrastructures as  a  means to increase capitalism’s
resilience  in  the  face  of  the  faults  torn  open  by  the  system’s  massive  ecological  and  social
externalizations. It selectively integrates and transforms environmentalist demands – some of which
originally carried quite confrontational implications – so as to align them with the parameters of
capitalist  economies  and  social  relations,  inviting  aboard  those  parts  of  the  environmental
movement that  are  willing to  conform to its  market-driven agenda.  This  socio-ecological  crisis
management would ideally  lead beyond the increasingly untenable “gray” accumulation regime
while maintaining established (class) power relations.248 
Instead of a more open process of transformation that actively involves entire societies, an
orderly, largely top-down transition is envisioned (Brand, 2012; cf. also Stirling, 2015).249 Putting
aside for a moment the question of whether effective ecological modernization is, from a functional
standpoint, compatible with the expansive dynamics of capital, we here question whether a “green”
passive revolution is a plausible  political  scenario. I will argue that  this passive revolution would
require a massive recomposition of political forces, which in turn would require large-scale political
mobilization; but as in any passive revolution, it is precisely this that the Green Economy faction is
eager to avoid.250 
247 The notion of “progressive” forces in Gramscian thought is certainly problematic. Gramsci was an unabashed 
proponent of modernization (in the case of contemporary Italy, this importantly involved industrialization), and as 
the previous notes demonstrate, while he is correctly credited with emphasizing the contingency of historical 
struggles he never quite abandoned the teleological underpinnings which orthodox Marxism had inherited and 
adapted from Hegel’s theory of history. His judgment on the relative failure of the Italian bourgeoisie in terms of its 
“historical mission” of modernization betrays a stages-of-history perspective in which “progressive” capitalist 
development, through the modernization and socialization of production, unwillingly prepares the ground for the 
final stages, socialism and communism. The line between analytical and normative judgment of progressiveness 
tends to become blurred.
Here, the term “progressive” will be used to denote those factions of capital that seek to manage the 
contradictions of contemporary capitalism proactively through processes of adaptation, whereas “reactionary” 
factions are those who resist such change. Both seek to defend class divisions, but the former take a longer-term 
approach, whereas the latter tend to focus on short-term interests (among business interests, such divisions are of 
course closely related to the particular fields these respective factions are invested in). 
248 Of course, from this angle, the entire ecological modernization paradigm is quintessentially a passive revolution 
strategy; the Green Economy is its latest articulation.
249 In this work, I do not always follow the transformation—transition distinction proposed here; given that green-
capitalist scenarios usually do not envision deep societal change either way, I sometimes use the term 
transformation in a more limited sense, referring to a large-scale technical and infrastructural overhaul (as opposed 
to mere incremental changes to infrastructures). This is arguably closer to the usage of transition proposed by 
Brand; but transformation does not evoke the same degree of centralized, top-down management.
250 In Gramscian theory, which emphasizes the contingency of political, economic and cultural struggles, there is no 
recipe as to the “permissible” extent of an integration-by-way-of-mobilization of subaltern forces and demands in a 
passive revolution, which after all could imply a significant recomposition of the dominant bloc. But dominant 
groups are generally assumed to keep popular mobilization to the minimum level considered necessary, while  
preferring concessions in forms that conform with, and thus reinforce, the given institutional framework (see 
section 8.1). This minimum level, however, may be exceptionally high in this particular case. 
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In a constellation not uncommon for a passive revolution scenario, the GE’s most committed
opponents are split between subaltern movements – those for environmental and climate justice,
whose perhaps most trenchant global articulation is encapsulated in the manifesto Another Future Is
Possible (Thematic Social Forum, 2012) – and those reactionary factions of capital invested in the
“gray” economy (see Illustration 1 in section 8.5). Each questions the “win-win-win” rhetoric from
a  different  angle,  with  “gray”  capital  emphasizing  a  prosperity—ecology  contradiction  and
subaltern movements insisting on the capital—ecology antagonism. The “gray” factions of capital,
moreover, remain in a position of hegemonic leadership vis-à-vis large constituencies in Northern
societies, underscored by the recent electoral success of generally anti-environmentalist right-wing
platforms (see section 8.4). In this setup, the Green Economy project faces difficult choices in that it
has to prioritize among the goals of  defending neoliberal hegemony – or that of capitalism more
broadly – against counter-hegemonic opponents and of winning green-neoliberal hegemony against
the resistance of “gray” forces. 
This does not mean that “green” capital is completely isolated – besides the institutional
support from the ranks of the OECD, World Bank and UNEP, big mainstream ENGOs, particularly
in the U.S., began advancing a similar, market-oriented agenda and even cooperated with fossil
corporations  on  these  foundations  before  the  Green  Economy  theme  emerged  in  its  present
incarnation  (Ciplet  et  al.,  2015,  Chapter  7;  De Lucia,  2009;  Klein,  2014,  Chapter  6).251 Green
parties, some financial institutions and liberal parties have also positioned themselves accordingly.
Together, these form the hegemonic project for a Green Economy as conceptualized in section 8.5
(see also discussion of the power differential between projects in section 8.3.3). Now, while the GE
project may occupy a dominant position within “green” discourse, articulating the position backed
by the greatest institutional and political-economic power that has been able to marginalize more
radical subaltern responses to the crisis and shape regulatory approaches to environmental matters,
it is not nearly as dominant vis-à-vis “gray” capital interests  (a similar case is made by Candeias,
2014).252 In fact, the inter-capitalist division is palpable within two of the “big three” institutions,
the OECD and the World Bank. Arguably, “gray” forces prevail even within both these institutions,
251 This may be read as an absorption of the leadership of “subaltern” forces in the Gramscian model; but it is limited 
to a spectrum of centrist, (upper-)middle-class-based environmental groups whose “subaltern” status is debatable.
252 Here, again, hegemony is understood in terms of a congruence of leadership and domination. Within “green” 
discourses, the hegemony of the Green Economy approach is based not only on its claim to political realism – its 
envisioned functioning within the established institutional setting that may elicit consent even among those who 
might prefer more radical social change but consider it unachievable – but also on its promotion by relatively 
resource-rich institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD. In its conflict with the “gray” economy, the GE 
may still carry greater public legitimacy but faces a drastic asymmetry in terms of material resources.
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which are located between the “gray” and “green” camps rather than firmly within the green (see
section 8.5).253 
The  Green Economy’s dilemma now presents itself as following: For the “progressive” or
green-capitalist factions to develop enough political clout to drive forward their greening agenda,
they would need to mobilize a much broader coalition of active supporters than has been the case in
order  to  compensate  for  the  prevalence  of  “reactionary”  or  “gray”  factions  within  the  current
dominant bloc. But the substantial concessions to broader constituencies that this would require –
something along the lines of the Green New Deal proposals that the GE marginalized and replaced
with its more market-driven approach (see section 8.3.4) – pose a threat to the dominant (neoliberal)
bloc, of which the GE institutions have been one part, in its entirety.
8.3.2 Stakeholder management as conflict mediation 
Scholars have routinely bemoaned a general depoliticization of environmental politics over the past
few decades  (Bluehdorn, 2013; Latour, 2015; Machin, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2013). In this “post-
political”  condition,  technocracy reigns  and solutions  tend to  be  sought  through markets  while
avoiding open political conflict. In the case of climate policy, an automatic “leap from science to
strategy” is seen to take place, based on “the idea that there is a one-to-one, non-contingent relation
between natural scientific insights on the state of the climate and the policies and strategies needed
to tackle it.” (Lievens & Kenis, 2018, pp. 89–90) Instead of fundamental political antagonisms, CO2
is constructed as an “externalized and socially disembodied enemy” (ibid., p. 89), against which all
combative energies are directed. The Green Economy has been identified as the latest step in this
development  (Caprotti & Bailey, 2014; Kenis & Lievens, 2015). While the nostalgia-laden “post-
political” label is certainly questionable254, the Green Economy with its win-win-win rhetoric – in
which power asymmetries and social  conflicts  are  consistently  downplayed – does exemplify a
remarkably  depoliticized  approach.  As  Edgardo  Lander  remarked  with  respect  to  the  political
naivety and pseudo-neutrality of UNEP’s opus magnum: “The report repeatedly refers to policies,
but never to politics, never to power.” (Lander, 2011, p. 9, emphases in original)
253 See section 2.5.2 for the World Bank. The strength of “gray” interests within the OECD may for example be 
concluded from the politics of its daughter organization, the IEA, which provides a widely influential platform for 
fossil industries and has been accused of systematically downplaying the relevance of “green” developments in the 
energy sector (cf. section 3.1.1, note 43).
254 Much like the somewhat more (in)famous “post-democracy” (Crouch, 2004), the “post-political” label seems to 
evoke a fictional golden past in which political elites openly invited fundamental, antagonistic debates on the issues
of the day among broad constituencies. As James McCarthy rightly points out, technocracy has a long tradition, as 
has resistance against it, and thus “we have never been post-political.” (McCarthy, 2013) Besides, the obsession 
among the diagnosticians of the “post-political” with discursive openness at times serves to obscure material power
relations and their role in foreclosing political alternatives. 
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When it comes to social (class) and political conflicts, the GE strategy is generally non-
confrontational. One key to this politics may be found in the problem definition provided in the
UNEP report, which proposes that “at a fundamental level [the multiple crises] all share a common
feature: the gross misallocation of capital.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 14) Instead of investment in “clean”
production and “natural” capital, so the argument goes, over the previous decades too much capital
went into real estate bubbles and fossil fuels. This is a quite clever semantic operation, positing that
capital per se is not the problem but instead offers the solution. It need not be confronted politically
but indulged – and gently nudged in the proper direction: Just 2% of global GDP for additional
“green”  investment  would  suffice,  as  UNEP  suggests.  Not  capital’s  overbearing  presence is
problematic but only its absence in the right spots. 
The problematique of ever-growing amounts of capital in compulsive search of investment
is thus inverted into an opportunity: “The good news is that there is enough capital out there to do
it,” as an OECD representative put it with regard to the transition to renewable energy (Ang, 2017,
p.  15).  When  it  comes  to  securing  access  to  safe  drinking  water  and  sanitation  for  excluded
populations, OECD staff exhort professionals in the sector to  join the  Roundtable on Financing
Water “and contribute to ensuring that water can deliver investment-grade opportunities.” (Leflaive
& Dominique, 2017, p. 29) 255 What is needed, then, is a matchmaker between capital and “green”
investment opportunities, and here the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation has
conveniently offered its services. In the words of its CEO, “there are literally trillions of dollars of
opportunities for the private sector to invest in projects that will help save the planet” and “[o]ur job
is to go out and proactively find those opportunities.”  (World Bank, 2018, n.p.) Ironically, in the
Green Economy, the very notion of  mobilization  remains discursively coupled to private finance
rather than broader political constituencies.
In  these  instances,  the  Green  Economy is  not  conceptualized  in  terms  of  an  ongoing
political-economic struggle to keep the material and ecological footprint of a growing economy
within bounds. Instead, the transition is pictured as an orderly, one-off investment effort to achieve
permanent absolute decoupling – a technical and managerial challenge. The state, as emphasized in
section 2.4, is needed here as an enabler of capital flows, not as a counterweight that constrains
them. From this  angle,  it  is  obvious why broader political  constituencies are  not understood to
matter much, except as potential sources of disruption that need to be bought off if necessary to
smoothen the transition. Ultimately, beyond management of such nuisances, power relations are
255 By the same logic, other OECD colleagues even seek to solve the problem of global poverty in its entirety along 
with that of climate change, through “blended finance” that reduces the overall investment gap for both crises. “All 
countries are ‘investable,’” they cheerfully conclude, and thus poverty is equally reduced to an investment 
challenge (Morgado & Sedemund, 2017, p. 22).
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irrelevant in this paternalist logic; what is good for capital will be good for the environment and the
world’s poor. What is not good for capital will remain off the table, including any “green” measures
that fail the profitability test.
In a particularly illustrative example, UNEP concludes its study with a plea that paints a
picture of harmony and unity: “Moving towards a green economy will require world leaders, civil
society and leading businesses to collaboratively engage in this transition.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 630)
Throughout  the  report,  there  are  traces  of  political-economic  conflict  –  according to  a  passing
remark, “chronic asymmetries” (ibid., p. 64) in market power need to be redressed, and incumbent
companies in the energy sector may pose “barriers.” (Ibid., p. 232) Their monopolies then may need
to be “challenged” (ibid., p. 273) through government support for decentralized energy production,
even though decentralization could “effectively undermine the political control of national elites
over local territories” (ibid.,  p. 479), presumably primarily in the global South. But much more
dominant is the idea of cooperation between groups with unequal power, as well as between various
levels  of  government.  In  the  greening  of  cities,  “[t]here  are  tradeoffs  and  switching  [!]  costs,
creating both winners and losers” (ibid, p. 485), which is taken to mean that “[o]nly a coalition of
actors and effective multilevel governance can ensure the success of green cities.” (Ibid., p. 459)
Recognizing that labor organization has faced difficulties in “green” sectors, UNEP reasons that
“enthusiasm for green construction … may open a new door to dialogue with workers on labour
issues.” (Ibid., p. 356) The idea of labor and capital bonding over excitement about “green” building
techniques  expresses  the  voluntarism  so  often  substituted  for  conflictual  politics  and  “hard”
regulation in the Green Economy approach fairly well. If there were no conflict, why would such
happy and harmonious outcomes not have emerged organically so far? If the enthusiasm for modern
industrial technology expressed in the  Communist Manifesto  (Marx & Engels, 1848) is any indi-
cation, it should have come about spontaneously in the 19th-century “gray” economy. Labor unions,
meanwhile, are hardly ever mentioned in the GE reports: a far-reaching oversight (cf. section 8.5.1).
Abstract appellations to “civil society” and consultation with “stakeholders” aside, the wider
public only plays a very limited role in these reports and throughout the broader  Green Economy
literature256, where citizens are mainly discussed as workers to be re-skilled and re-allocated – and
as consumers to be nudged towards “greener” consumption habits. If necessary, public “acceptance”
or  “buy-in”  has  to  be  secured  through targeted redistributive measures.  Otherwise,  citizens  are
256 UNEP makes one reference to complementary grassroots activism, claiming that “civil society-activism and 
autonomous green initiatives can be effective … especially in weaker institutions and less mature democracies.” 
(UNEP, 2011, p. 478, emphasis added) This particular framing suggests that wherever parliamentary democracy is 
consolidated, a balancing of interests can be more or less taken for granted, and technocratic governance is 
sufficient. Once more, this view completely underestimates the political-economic barriers to the type of 
transformation suggested by the Green Economy. 
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implicitly  envisioned  as  wide-eyed  spectators  of  a  technological  revolution  rather  than  active
political subjects. When the OECD argues that “[w]e have to make sure to take our citizens with us
on this journey” (2011b, p. 3), this is apparently a matter of selective integration and good public
relations work rather than broader political mobilization: “The communication process can be aided
by ‘points of light’ – people across society, ranging from business people to journalists to NGOs –
who  complement  the  top-down  approach  with  more  diverse,  and  more  local,  elaboration  and
support.” (Ibid., p. 87, emphasis added) As it highlights the need to “engender public trust” through
policy transparency (ibid., p. 37), the OECD’s approach suggests that the popular consent it seeks is
largely of a passive nature: trust in policy elites rather than active involvement.
Even “stakeholder engagement,” meanwhile,  is often described purely instrumentally,  an
asset in some cases and a liability in others: As the OECD (2017a) discusses the political economy
of biodiversity policies, it seeks to address resistance preferably by means of revenue recycling,
clever coalition building and better public relations efforts. On the other hand, having highlighted
the  importance  of  the  “systematic  environmental  assessment  of  projects”  and  “better  public
participation  in  decision  making”  to  avoid  conflicts,  OECD  researchers  eventually  advise
“emerging  economies”  to  streamline  environmental  permit  procedures  for  large  infrastructure
projects despite “concerns that it may limit public participation.” (Capozza & Samson, 2019, pp. 6,
27) Likewise, as the World Bank (2012, p. 18) moves to illustrate, in a half-page box within its 170-
page report, the “importance of political economy” with reference to a case study, it foregrounds the
public relations and communication strategies surrounding reform policies rather than their content.
Curiously, a paper published by the Bank claims to discuss the “green growth movement” (emphasis
added) in South Korea but almost exclusively speaks about top-down government action  (Choi,
2015,  p.  3).257 In  the  same  vein,  a  recent  UNEP report  discusses  the  “role  of  non-state  and
subnational  actors”  (NSAs)  in  climate  change  mitigation  in  extremely  technocratic  language,
mentioning  the  political  participation  of  civil  society  organizations  only  in  passing  while
recommending “principles” for NSA engagement  that  include  “quantifiable  targets … technical
capacity  … financial  incentives,  and … regulatory  support.”  (UNEP,  2018a,  p.  5) Meanwhile,
UNEP’s  Handbook  for  Stakeholder  Engagement  (2015) is  dedicated  mainly  to  the  formal
proceedings of “stakeholder” accreditation to  its  official  events and sessions.  Even independent
academic literature in support of the GE agenda, from authors insistent on democratic participation
that  is  “categorically  different”  from  top-down  policymaking,  remains  firmly  on  neoliberal-
technocratic terrain in calling for “multi-stakeholder governance” that “will be required to provide
257 One complementary public information campaign was, as a footnote mentions, realized in cooperation with 
“industries” and “civic groups.” (Choi, 2015, p. 3)
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government  institutions  with the inclusive  perspective  needed to  advance sustainable  economic
activity.” (Vazquez-Brust, Smith, & Sarkis, 2014, pp. 39, 47) 
From this survey of the literature, it is fair to argue that the entire GE mindset is wired to
ignore the possibility of engaging in active, broad, confrontational social mobilization. This class
politics unsurprisingly translates into biased policy: Just like the GE routinely reduces fundamental
goal conflicts to manageable “trade-offs,” social conflicts can only be managed in the GE by means
of  “compensating”  various  social  groups  that  could  lose  through  “greening”  reforms  (OECD,
2011b, p. 98, 2015a, pp. 21, 24, 43; World Bank, 2012, pp. 48–50).258 But UNEP itself admits that,
historically, such compensation has hardly materialized whenever those “losers” happened to be
poor and marginalized in the first place – such hard facts nevertheless are immediately rhetorically
inverted as “challenges” and “opportunities” to do better in the future (UNEP, 2011, pp. 169–178).
More honestly, and revealing a strategic orientation, the OECD recommends “targeted measures to
compensate the most visible or politically influential losers.” (2015a, p. 43, emphasis added) 
But although sporadically proposed (Alperovitz et al., 2017), the full compensation of more
powerful  potential  “losers” in  a  GE scenario – those factions of  capital  invested in  the “gray”
economy  –  appears  prohibitively  expensive  and  ecologically  self-defeating.  In  an  illustrative
passage, having previously explained the collapse of carbon prices on the European market due to
overly  lenient  allocation  practices,  the  OECD  still  maintains  that “[f]ree  allocation  of  carbon
permits  and  exemptions  have  been  instrumental  in  overcoming  resistance”  to  carbon  pricing
(OECD, 2013, p. 19). The case at  hand expresses the dilemma: The path chosen to “overcome
resistance” was to avoid making fossil interests “losers” at all by lavishing them with free permits,
at the expense of losing any emissions-reducing effect. The removal of subsidies to fossil industries
and the devaluation of their massive capital assets are only conceivable if a strong political alliance
can  push  through  such  reforms  against  the  resistance  of  incumbent  powers  and  without fully
compensating their losses, particularly if those include all expected future earnings.259 The building
of such confrontational alliances, however, obviously has no place in GE models. The next sections
will explore the material underpinnings and political implications of this particular ignorance.
258 The general notion of “trade-offs” frequently appears in the GE reports. UNEP admits that “goals of economic 
growth, environmental protection, national and energy security involve a complex set of trade-offs” (2011, p. 508), 
and the World Bank states even more bluntly: “In some cases, growth and green outcomes … will involve 
tradeoffs.” (2012, p. 105) Discussing the case of “greening” buildings, the Bank states that “huge unmet needs also 
can imply difficult trade-offs between ‘building right’ and ‘building more.’” (Ibid, p. 133) This particular framing – 
“trade-offs” among policy goals are to be adjusted by managerial decision – obscures the fact that these conflicting 
goals tend to reflect different groups’ fundamental interests, and that the particular choice of outcome will reflect 
the differential power of these groups rather than some neutral “expert” choice.
259 In this context, it should be noted that the category of “fossil fuel subsidies” comprises both producer and consumer
support. This suggests a complex political economy around such measures, with some policies intended primarily to
prop up domestic industries and others to facilitate access to energy (for poor, middle-class and/or industrial 
consumers). See also sections 3.2.1 and 7.2.2.
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8.3.3 Material power asymmetries
What  prospects  remain,  then,  for  green-capitalist  alliance  building?  Much of  the  struggle  over
hegemony – and, thus, over the implementation of the GE agenda – will be, and has been, played
out through conflicts over specific policies rather than abstract concepts (Jacobs, 2013). Here, brute
material relations of force between competing factions are often decisive. And in this respect, the
interest groups in favor of green-capitalist developments are for the most part relatively weak and
scattered  across  branches  with  decentralized  market  structures,  while  opposition  has  been
concentrated, more resourceful and well organized  (cf. Rest, 2011, pp. 84–112; see also Sander,
2016).  Despite  organizational  advances  such  as  the  protracted  establishment  of  IRENA,  the
International Renewable Energy Agency, completed in 2011260, the seriously “green” capital faction
remains marginal. By contrast, the enormous economic power behind – and sunk costs in – fossil
capital,  as  illustrated  in  section  2.1.2,  obviously  translates  into  equally  powerful  political  foot-
dragging. When proposing to wipe out most of this capital,  a sizeable portion of overall global
wealth, one critic drily remarked that “you should expect the owners of that wealth to fight you with
everything they  have,  which  is  more  or  less  everything.”  (Bernes,  2019,  n.p.) And this  power
asymmetry appears fairly stable: Over the period 2007–2014, total capitalization of (large firms in)
“clean”  technology sectors  was stagnant,  while  it  rose considerably  for  oil  and gas  companies
despite much recession-related turbulence (Di Muzio, 2015, pp. 147–149). It has been argued that
many capital factions could potentially be interested in a green-capitalist agenda (Candeias, 2014),
but in practice, this “new multiculturalism” of business interests has been fairly limited (Ciplet et
al., 2015, Chapter 6), and, with regard to climate policy, “fossil fuel industries remain unequivocally
dominant.” (Ibid., p. 151; cf. Di Muzio, 2015, Chapter 1) This power differential poses an enormous
obstacle to the passive revolution agenda. 
Analyses of corporate power distinguish between “tacit” (or structural) and relational power:
The  former  is  derived  from  the  general  dependence  of  governments  on  functioning  capital
accumulation while the latter is reflected in the political activity of corporate actors  (Vormedal,
2008). Structural power can be analyzed at a more abstract theoretical level, whereas relational
power  requires  empirical  work  on  political  processes.  Fossil  fuel  industries,  as  Ciplet  and
colleagues argue, exercise great tacit influence on the international bargaining position of national
governments in particular. Meanwhile, the perceived variety of official business stances on climate
policy is  rooted not  only in  the emergence of “green” business  sectors  which identify positive
business opportunities in climate change mitigation, but to a large extent in a strategic shift during
260 IRENA, whose publications have been variously cited in the preceding chapters, was first proposed in 1981. 
Serious preparations for its establishment only began in 2008, however, coinciding with the beginning of the GE 
“era.” (Cf. IRENA, 2018a)
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the 1990s on the part of “gray” interests, from (no longer tenable) denialism towards “constructive”
engagement in the form of strategic lobbying for flexible, market-based policies that were expected
to lower compliance costs  (cf. Vormedal, 2008).261 For Sklair  (2001), the 1990s’ proliferation of
“green” business networks, which “all had one thing in common, their emphasis on self-assessment
and voluntary codes where possible, but a decisive input into regulation where necessary,” provided
an “object lesson” in the Gramscian co-optation of potential opponents (ibid., pp. 205, 206). Sklair
even saw an emerging “sustainable development historical block” which comprised most of the
transnational capitalist class in alliance with a “transnational environmental elite,” keen to avoid
that  what  was  framed  as  a  series  of  manageable  “environmental  problems” eventually  be
understood as a singular “ecological crisis” that demonstrated capitalism’s unsustainability (ibid.).
One  of  these  networks,  the  Global  Climate  Coalition, was  credited  with  having  deflated  the
outcome of the Kyoto negotiations; some corporations subsequently defected from the alliance to
avoid the bad publicity and moved to publicly endorse carbon trading (ibid., pp. 213–2014).   
On these grounds, green-capitalist thought in its most superficial forms could gain more
prominence and make some inroads towards normative hegemony both within the dominant bloc
and within discourses on “green” transformation, while actual transformative effects were prevented
due to the ongoing domination by incumbent powers. This, it is worth remembering, describes the
dynamics during the 1990s heyday of climate multilateralism, before the 2000s securitization turn
(cf. section 2.2). In this period, even the patterns of “gray” corporate efforts supported the notion of
a rudimentary, minimal passive revolution, with strategic concessions to emerging “green” norms
chosen to keep effective economic losses to a minimum and largely preserve structural power.
One frequently noted case of potential “green” business interest relates to finance capital
and financial industries, which, so the argument goes, may be won for a “light,” market-oriented
green transformation at least  (Spratt, 2015; Vormedal, 2008, p. 43). Particular firms specialized in
financial services certainly see a business opportunity in carbon trading, and many of them have
been involved in  the  international  carbon trading lobbying organization  IETA,  which  has  been
described as perhaps the most active business lobby group in international climate politics – and
one  that  cooperates  closely  with  the  World  Bank  (Vormedal,  2008).  The  insurance  industry,
meanwhile, has been concerned with the impacts of climate change on their business for some time
and was suggested in a World Bank-sponsored paper as “partners” in green growth (Mills, 2013).
But insurers can price in additional risks from climate change, and by “offering  innovative risk
management products and services” (ibid., p. 2) one of their suggested main contributions to a GE
261 In addition, as Vormedal argues, fossil industries possess considerable “technological” power as they can provide 
the greatest expertise on particular mitigation technologies such as CCS and thus shape the general orientation of 
the international regulatory regime according to their preferences.
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thrives on mounting ecological crises rather than on their prevention.262 Finance capital as such,
after all,  is ultimately agnostic – it will invest wherever gains can be expected, and its primary
interest is in securing as much terrain for accumulation as possible.  “The actors behind [big new
fossil fuel projects] are not threatened by the green economy debate. They will invest in a ‘green
economy’ too and hedge their bets,” as Newell  (2015, p. 81) argues. But of course, even finance
capital is not all fluid: Most significant actors in finance are also invested in “gray” sectors; drastic
“greening” measures that would devalue these investments run counter to their short- to medium-
term interests. More generally, and this point is crucial, in the longer run all returns on financial
investments remain dependent on very material systemic accumulation processes, as any surplus
value captured in the financial sector is, in the final instance, redistributed from material production
(see value-theoretical discussion in section 4.4).
Everything suggests, therefore, that for finance capital, the  Green Economy is welcome in
precisely the form in which it has been emerging: as an  Economy of Additionality offering new
fields for accumulation, whereas the foreclosure of vast areas of “gray” capital accumulation with
massive sunk investments would be an unacceptable loss (see section 9.3). From this standpoint, a
“green-only” economy is not nearly as attractive as a “both-and” economy in the medium term, and
evidence of limited political support from financial institutions for “green” initiatives and policies
should be read this way.263 For instance, the Natural Capital Declaration (UNEP Finance Initiative
& Global Canopy Programme, 2012), for which UNEP mobilized financial sector institutions in the
run-up to the Rio+20 summit, shows a great interest in the financialization of ecosystems – but
avoids commitments to divestment from fossil fuels.264 
Unequivocal supporters of “greening” among the broader capitalist class – those actors who
are exclusively or at least primarily invested in “green” sectors – thus remain a small minority.
Partly, this conservative power constellation is inevitable as long as massive sunk investments exist
in the “gray” economy while their  equivalents in the yet-to-be-developed “green” economy are
much smaller. As argued before, “green” challengers will  have a hard time leveling this power
262 Similarly, Labatt and White (2007, p. 21), who value the role of the financial sector in mitigating climate change, 
see a “dual responsibility” for financial firms, which are supposed to protect themselves and their clients from 
climate-related risks and provide the public with adequate risk management products. The former may be 
understood to include “regulatory risk” (ibid., pp. 11–13), against which political resistance to regulation may still 
be perceived to be the best short-term strategy. The latter, again, may constitute a business opportunity that can be 
expected to grow in the absence of stringent regulation. From this constellation, it is by no means clear why the 
financial sector should be a logical political ally for a serious “green” transition.
263 It should further be noted that where private finance turns to climate mitigation and adaptation, the concrete 
benefits of projects tend to be skewed towards Northern capital interests rather than vulnerable populations 
(Honkaniemi, 2011).
264 The closest the declaration comes to even broaching the issue is in its intention to “develop methodologies” to 
“[s]ystematically consider and value Natural Capital in the credit policies of specific sectors, including commodi-
ties, that may have a major impact on Natural Capital either directly or through the supply chain.” (Ibid., n.p.)
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differential by purely economic means. Political support would need to be based on resources other
than finance.  This  foregrounds the need for  broader  political  mobilization in  order to  realize a
green-capitalist agenda, which, first of all, brings us to the question of the organization of popular
consent behind such an agenda. Here, beyond struggles over specific policies, the formulation of
grander projects and narratives does become relevant after all.
8.3.4 The mobilization problem
The Gramscian view of hegemony, as previously explained, involves a combination of material
force and organized consent as the foundation of bourgeois rule. Is there a compelling narrative to
mobilize consent behind a  Green Economy  project, helping to win concrete battles over policies
while defending the overall project against the backlash of vested interests? Timmo Krüger (2014)
argues that the ecological modernization paradigm, with the GE as its latest incarnation, has been
hegemonic within environmental politics since the 1990s but has not developed a broader integra-
tive force, a narrative that takes effect beyond policy expert circles and across the socio-political
terrain. I would argue that this has to do with a lack of material concessions to broader constitu-
encies – the lack of a “rational and economic core” from their perspective – that is particularly
palpable in the GE models. Green New Deal proposals indeed may be seen as an attempt to fill this
gap and connect green-capitalist reforms to a more credible basis for social mobilization by offering
tangible benefits to working-class constituencies while maintaining capitalist social relations.265
Questions of employment and social redistribution form one important part of the debate.
The  labor  market  policies  suggested  in  the  GE reports  are  taken  straight  from  the  neoliberal
playbook, and the envisioned environmental tax reform, at worst, threatens the stability of social
security  schemes  (see  section  6.1.2).  With  such  slim  offerings,  and  given  the  persistent
marginalization of organized labor among the “stakeholders” under consideration in the GE reports,
it is little wonder that labor unions tend to rally to the rival projects on both sides of the Gramscian
spectrum depicted in section 8.5, “gray” capitalism and, to a lesser degree, the GND. 
The latter project offers an illustrative contrast. Many proposals for a Green New Deal (see
section 2.2) involve a strengthened effort to reconcile social and environmental objectives through
redistributive measures, active industrial and labor market policies and a general neo-Keynesian
emphasis on state intervention and spending. While these proposals have somewhat divided the
academic Left, they have been met with much greater resonance than the GE among trade unions
and social democratic, socialist and green parties (cf. Ajl, 2018; Altvater, 2009; Blackwater, 2012;
265 It is worth noting that as Keynesian policies generally seek to revive economic growth and a green-Keynesian 
economy is at least as dependent on functioning accumulation as a neoliberal Green Economy, the GND project 
implies the same – if not larger – functional problems with actually realizing ecological sustainability (to be 
discussed in section 10.2). The discussion in this section focuses on the project’s political prospects.
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Dellheim & Wolf, 2009; Kaufmann & Müller, 2009; Riofrancos, 2019b; Schachtschneider, 2009).
From a somewhat different angle, the label was even promoted by more market-oriented liberals
like  Thomas  Friedman  (2007b),  who  still  emphasized  the  need  for  public  investments.  This
fuzziness of content and diversity of actors may indeed be taken to signal the broader relevance of a
political project for ecological modernization under this banner. (In actual political discourse, the
Green Economy and the Green New Deal camps are not neatly distinguishable, with many political
actors located somewhere between the more market-oriented,  capital-friendly GE and the more
state-interventionist, labor-oriented GND. Both are conceptualized here – see section 8.5 – as non-
monolithic hegemonic projects, each of which exerts “gravitational” force within a segment of the
political spectrum.)
Even more radical proposals such as that forwarded in the UK by the  Green New Deal
Group (Green New Deal Group, 2008) arguably reflect the top-down orientation of the Keynesian
tradition. But the “top” here is envisioned to be backed by broader and more active support than the
neoliberal  technocrats  associated with  the development  and implementation of  Green Economy
policies. A confrontational, counter-hegemonic politics is suggested in order to “become state” in
the  Gramscian  sense  (cf.  Gramsci,  1971,  pp.  144–152) and  displace  the  incumbent  neoliberal
regime. This did not work out at the time, and Wainwright and Mann  (2018, p. 114) argue that
“these intuitive and eminently reasonable arguments gained no purchase, and the proposals went
nowhere” precisely because they went against the grain of the neoliberal state and could not muster
the political strength to overcome the latter’s dominance. As the brief neo-Keynesian revival in
crisis responses gave way to neoliberal resurgence, the GND quickly faded from view within elite
policy circles.  But  the concept  has  recently seen a  revival  in  the U.S.,  with a  group of  young
members  of  Congress  pushing  for  a  Select  Committee  to  develop  a  GND  plan  that  centrally
involved social and environmental justice objectives (Klein, 2018b). Naomi Klein pinned her hopes
precisely on the mobilization potential of this proposal, arguing that “unlike previous attempts to
introduce climate legislation, the Green New Deal has the capacity to mobilize a truly intersectional
mass movement behind it — not despite its sweeping ambition, but precisely because of it.” (Ibid.,
n.p.) While quickly struck down in the Senate, the proposal served to reignite the dormant U.S.
public debate about large-scale political action on global warming (cf. discussion in section 8.4.3).
Thus,  from a  serious  green-capitalist  perspective,  the  drag  of  concessions  to  a  broader
coalition of social and political forces could be outweighed by the greater ability of such a project to
shift  hegemony  away  from  “gray”  factions  of  capital.  But  again,  such  notions  of  large-scale
confrontation  are  off  the  table  from  a  Green  Economy perspective.  Further  complicating  the
prospects  of  “green”  capital  factions  as  a  progressive  force  is  the  fact  that  while  these  actors
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certainly have an interest in extended subsidies, growing markets for “green” products and services
and a level playing field vis-à-vis “gray” competitors (for example through carbon pricing), they
may  not  ultimately  prioritize  the  political  elimination  of  “gray”  sectors,  particularly  if  this  is
understood to undermine macroeconomic stability. Whether they would see it in such drastic terms
or  not,  their  political  interest  in  medium-term systemic  and  regime  stability  –  defending  their
immediate class power qua capitalists and even qua neoliberals – may be more important than their
particular interest qua “green” capitalists.
In the politics of the OECD and the World Bank as the ideological “leadership” of the green-
capitalist project in particular, the unity of class interest seems to take precedence over the need for
a “green” transformation.  These ostensible leaders of the “progressive” capitalist  factions prove
altogether too conservative for the job – consequently, they are mapped here not within the green-
capitalist spectrum but in between the “gray” and “green” projects (Illustration 1, section 8.5). In the
traditional  institutional  division  of  labor,  the  World  Bank  has  imposed  neoliberal  structural
adjustment on many countries, and the OECD’s work has provided expert  legitimation to these
efforts. With its GE study, the OECD left no doubt that this was still its primary objective for the
2010s: “Green growth should be conceived as a strategic complement to existing environmental and
economic policy reform priorities.” (OECD, 2011b, p. 125, emphasis added) But this time around,
on the face of it, the interests represented in its GE study lack the necessary position of dominance,
and its policy advice appears to fall into a void in the absence of strategic hegemonic forces in its
member countries that could enforce implementation. Again, this is only the case when “green”
interests  encounter  “gray.”  The OECD’s work still  serves  legitimatory purposes  within  “green”
debates. The main objective here apparently is to ensure that “greening,” to the extent that it takes
place,  will  not  entail  a  departure  from  the  neoliberal  paradigm,  neither  within  the  OECD’s
membership nor elsewhere.266 As exercising neoliberal leadership takes precedence over exercising
green leadership, developing the  Green Economy as an  Economy of Additionality (chapter 9) and
deploying  it  so  as  to  reinforce  neoliberal  policy  principles  may  be  understood  as  the  optimal
compromise to serve the institutions’ medium-term interests even as it fails to “save the world.”
Compared to the 21st-century situation, the historical New Deal emerged from a much more
condensed and immediate  crisis  for  capital that  threatened class  interests;  fear  of  social  unrest
enabled a tectonic shift in class relations. A parallel to this situation was only briefly perceived
around 2008. It appears that it would take a much greater political threat for significant factions of
266 To cite just one example: At the first Global Forum on Just Transition, the OECD representative emphasized that 
“[p]ro-growth reforms should be combined with coherent climate policy” so as to ensure ongoing GDP growth 
(UNFCCC & ILO, 2017, p. 6).
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 238
capital to rally, with some seriousness, behind a comparable class compromise agenda once more.267
But absent such initiatives, the GE project remains politically impotent. With such lack of resolve
among dominant groups, even a “passive” revolution of significant proportions is not contrivable.
Should  ecological  disasters  rattle  the  system,  meanwhile,  elites  are  more  likely  to  resort  to
authoritarian responses (see conclusion). 
8.3.5 Turning to political economy?
Most recently, the GE institutions – and the OECD in particular, for example in its role as host of
the annual Green Growth and Sustainable Development Forum (GGSD) in Paris (OECD, 2018b) –
have come to focus  more  strongly  on political-economic  concerns,  particularly  considering  the
relationship between GE policies’ adverse effects on some constituencies and the lack of public
support for these policies. Does this reflect a recognition of the need for broader social mobilization
as diagnosed here? Both the publications surrounding the 2018 GGSD and the proceedings at the
conference are instructive in this regard (see Mackie & Haščič, 2018; OECD, 2018d, 2018b).
First, the debate focused on the perception of “justice,” “fairness” or “inclusiveness” more
than substantial outcomes. One OECD economist expressed the overall message emerging from the
conference relatively clearly:  The proper  strategy was seen to consist  in  “doing precisely what
we’ve been doing” – including reforms to increase the “flexibility” of labor markets – with an
additional effort to identify “winners and losers” so as to improve communications and calibrate
policy design. Time and again, from all sides the importance of communication and public relations
in order to improve public acceptance and “buy-in” was emphasized. While labor representatives
emphasized that material concessions to working classes were important to secure such “buy-in,”
the  exchanges  between labor  and business  representatives  consistently  evoked  cooperation  and
“dialogue” over conflict, with green growth as a common objective towards which “we must work
together.”  As  some  OECD  staff  recently  summed  up:  “Inequality  can  foster  mistrust  in  new
developments, investment and policy changes, potentially leading to conflict” (Capozza & Samson,
2019, p. 8) – the real problem being conflict, not inequality as such. Occasional dissenting voices
notwithstanding,  the  majority  opinion  at  the  conference  suggested  that  the  political-economic
267 The original 1930s New Deal, which helped to establish the U.S.-dominated systemic cycle of accumulation and the
corresponding Fordist—Keynesian mode of regulation (Arrighi & Silver, 2001), offered a comparably credible way
out of the crisis, with a new model of benefit and risk sharing in which the immediate economic interests of capital 
and of large parts of the population – at least of most White U.S. Americans – coincided to a relatively large extent.
In the most recent round of debates, left critiques of the GND have pointed out the weaknesses of the New 
Deal analogy. In the absence of a comparable red menace, there is hardly a place for such containment strategies 
(Ajl, 2018). Besides, as Jasper Bernes (2019, n.p.) argued, “rather than get capitalism to do what it wants to do [as 
the original Keynesian fix of the New Deal attempted to do], [the GND] has to get it to pursue a path that is 
certainly bad for the owners of capital in the long run,” by drastically intervening in economic activity for 
ecological reasons. This resonates with the discussions in chapter 10.
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difficulties of the Green Economy were largely rooted in communicational failures and needed to be
rectified accordingly. The  key  challenge  identified  was  better  to  communicate  to  obstinate
constituencies in a “post-truth world” that Green Economy policies – which should be implemented
regardless of public opinion – really are environmentally, economically and socially beneficial.268 If
not  through  factual  information,  this  communication  should  succeed  through  skillfully  framed
positive narratives and “human stories” instead of boring reiterations of scientific data. “Don’t call
it  a  carbon  tax,”  several  strategists  advised,  suggesting  various  alternatives  such  as  “full-cost
pricing,” “carbon dividend” and “climate contribution.” 
Second, the discussion of “green” policies’ actual distributional effects is conducted here in
largely  apolitical  terms.  Since  these  vary  from instance  to  instance,  with  some  policies  more
progressive and others regressive, distributional outcomes are treated as a matter of policy design,
assuming that “policymakers” can simply choose their preferred combination of cost-effectiveness,
distributive  and environmental  effects.  In  a  narrative  devoid  of  power  asymmetries,  occasional
mistakes  in  policy design  have produced avoidable socially  regressive  outcomes that  adversely
impacted public acceptance, which likewise is a matter of technocratic crafts(wo)manship – those
outcomes could be avoided through a “pro-poor approach,” ostensibly a surrogate politics not of but
for “the poor,” conducted by policy elites. 
Third, in the wake of the first Global Forum on Just Transition in 2017 (UNFCCC & ILO,
2017), in which the trade-unionist Just Transition concept received official recognition, at the 2018
GGSD the GE actors appeared determined to enter the hegemonic struggle over its definition. In its
original  formulation developed in environmental  and labor  movements,  the concept  insisted on
comprehensive measures to prevent workers from falling victim to the creative destruction involved
in a “green” transition.269 While a union representative remarked at the outset that Just Transition
now “means a lot of things for different players”270 and lamented the lack of political ambition and
legally  binding measures,  several  employers’ representatives  subtly  replied  that  despite  general
business commitment to a Just Transition, the concept should be no vehicle for social democracy. 
All of this demonstrates how the recognition of the importance of political economy to the
Green Economy agenda remains hesitant, and the parameters of the debate continue to be set by the
same technocratic paradigm from which the GE emerged in the first place. The role of political-
268 Better communication was ultimately foregrounded as the “key” to political-economic concerns in OECD Deputy 
Secretary-General Masamichi Kono’s summary of the conference findings at the closing session, Nov 29, 2018. 
269 While the concept itself is much older, the International Trade Union Confederation finally opened its Just 
Transition Centre in 2016. It holds that “[a] plan for Just Transition provides and guarantees better and decent jobs, 
social protection, more training opportunities and greater job security for all workers affected by global warming 
and climate change policies.” (ITUC, n.d.) Much like the GE institutions, meanwhile, ITUC’s strategy emphasizes 
“social dialogue” rather than confrontation, asking explicitly for a “seat at the table” for labor interests (ibid.).
270 The proceedings of the 2017 Global Forum (UNFCCC & ILO, 2017) attest to this. 
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economic relations as major determinants of the policy space available to “policymakers” (and of
their political identity) is generally ignored. In the GE discourse, the state is mostly understood as a
politically neutral entity, standing apart from social power relations rather than constituting their
institutional expression  (for the latter position, proposed by historical-materialist state theory, see
Poulantzas,  1978).  To a  certain extent,  this  “neutrality  bias” is  certainly inherent  in  any policy
consulting directed at governments, which one may argue is a technocratic enterprise by definition.
But it is worth noting that this bias results in a distorted picture of the political process, and in an
underestimation of political resistance to policy implementation.
It thus appears that at the end of the 2010s, the predominant Green Economy strategy is still
to cling to the passive revolution path outlined above, with refined attempts to educate “the public”
in order to secure acceptance for implementation of the same policies that formed the GE toolkit at
the outset of the decade, with as few concessions as possible. After a decade of experience with
implementation attempts,  the fundamental disjuncture between abstract transformational rhetoric
and incremental, soft concrete policy proposals remains.271 It is not clear how this parsimoniously
adjusted minimal passive revolution strategy should suddenly enable green-capitalist interests to
dislodge the incumbent powers in the current global political economy, which they have so far not
been able to  accomplish.  Such hopes  are  further  diminished by the recent  right-wing backlash
against both neoliberal hegemony and environmentalism, to which we will now turn.
8.4 The present conjuncture
Thesis 8.4: In the second half of the 2010s, the right-wing assault on neoliberal hegemony initially
seemed to reinforce the Green Economy agenda as the dominant liberal, “science-based” response
to environmental crises and resource depletion – while further weakening its political chances of
success by strengthening fossil capital. Now, at the end of the decade, the question of “green”
transformation is witnessing a re-politicization from a progressive angle.
In the late 2010s, the mounting contradictions of neoliberal capitalism have produced increasingly
dramatic effects. In one of the most celebrated passages of the  Prison Notebooks, Gramsci wrote
about a situation in which hegemony crumbles and the ruling stratum is still dominant but no longer
271 A recent joint publication by all three GE institutions captures this nicely. While it begins by proclaiming that 
“current policies continue to foster an incremental approach to climate,” whereas “[d]eeper efforts are needed to 
drive systemic change,” including measures to “reset” the financial system (OECD et al., 2018, p. 1), the ensuing 
policy recommendations remain within the familiar framework. Private finance is to be mobilized, and thus the 
order of priorities is as follows: “First, governments should make greater efforts to improve the overall business 
environment and investment climate,” and second, they should see to an adequate climate policy framework (ibid., 
p. 3). For technology diffusion, free-trade policies remain the cornerstone of the agenda; in order to decarbonize 
heavy industry, collaborative network meetings to share best-practice ideas are the first response; finally, the “reset”
to the global financial system is confined to an increase in transparency about physical and political-economic risks
associated with carbon-heavy assets, allowing investors to make “wiser” choices (ibid., pp. 8, 9, 13-15). 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 241
leading vis-à-vis a significant coalition of forces: “[T]he old is dying and the new cannot be born; in
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276) A few years
back, neo-Gramscian observers including Mario Candeias applied this description to the crisis of
neoliberal hegemony after the financial crisis  (Candeias, 2014, pp. 303–304). Candeias discussed
variants  of  “green”  capitalism that  could  succeed the  regime,  but  he  also  envisioned a  further
authoritarian advance under neoliberal precepts. 
At  the  end  of  the  decade,  the  latter  scenario  proves  to  have  been  the  most  prescient:
Neoliberalism weathered the financial crisis through austerity narratives and practices, only to be
faced with a widespread right-wing insurgency that seeks to take its free-market agenda to new
extremes while fiercely rejecting the official culture of cosmopolitan tolerance that characterized
the neoliberal period. The regressive facets of neoliberal hegemony, which largely coincide with the
moment of force, are amplified while the progressive aspects – relating more to the cultural realm –
are  undermined.  “Morbid  symptoms” abound indeed,  but  if  we are  to  accept  the  notion  of  an
interregnum for the present conjuncture, at this point few would assume that it will, with historical
hindsight,  denote  the  period  between  the  era  of  “conventional”  neoliberal  globalization  and  a
succeeding era of market-driven “inclusive green growth.” What is the role of the green-capitalist
project within this constellation?
8.4.1 The Right’s ascendancy
The  authoritarian-neoliberal  scenario  sketched  out  by  Candeias  resembles  a  scenario  dubbed
Climate Behemoth by Wainwright and Mann (2018, pp. 44–46), in which the response to the climate
crisis  is  determined  by  reactionary  national  governments  with  little  international  coordination,
within the wider context of an increasingly destructive global capitalism. “[T]he backers of Climate
Behemoth,”  as summarized in Alyssa Battistoni’s  review  (2018, n.p.),  “are a mix of fossil-fuel
capitalists,  petit-bourgeois  reactionaries,  and  disillusioned  working-class  people”  forming  a
“contradictory but potent mix of ethno-nationalism, religion,  masculinity,  and scientific denial.”
Indeed, climate change denial has been a cornerstone of the agenda formed by right-wing think
tanks  for  decades  (Jacques,  Dunlap,  & Freeman,  2008;  Klein,  2014,  Chapter  1).  Along with a
general  fierce  anti-environmentalism,  it  has  long  since  become  firmly  enmeshed  in  the  belief
systems of broader right-wing constituencies. A host of empirical studies found that “[s]upport for
existing social hierarchies strongly predisposes people to [anthropogenic climate change] denial. So
does approval of capitalism.” (Malm, 2018, p. 134) Malm argues that in the U.S., these tendencies
culminated  in  the  election  of  Donald  Trump,  who  “has  performed  a  public  merger  of  white
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supremacy with fossil  capital.” (Ibid.,  p.  140) Battistoni’s description of the  Climate Behemoth
faction, after all, arguably is a fairly precise outline of Trump’s electoral coalition.
Several related elements of this constellation are relevant to the fate of “green” capitalism:
the  resurgence  of  fossil  capital,  the  “truth  wars”  taking  place  around  the  validity  of  scientific
findings per se – and the identification of environmentalism with (neo)liberalism. The former aspect
has been discussed here in terms of a  Third Carbon Age  characterized by increasingly extreme
forms of fossil  extractivism (cf.  section 6.3).  Obviously,  the resurgent popular support for anti-
environmentalist political platforms shifts the balance of forces in the struggle over hegemony and
facilitates  the  prolongation  of  this  era  of  “unconventional”  fossil  fuels,  as  well  as  helping
“conventional” fossil fuels to persist: Within its first year, the Trump administration not only pulled
out of the Paris Agreement in a much-publicized but largely symbolic maneuver, it  also all but
dismantled the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, announced the repeal of Obama-era rules for
coal power plant emissions and approved controversial pipeline projects for tar sands and shale oil
which the previous administration had blocked or delayed (L. Friedman & Plumer, 2017; Hansler,
2017; Popovich & Schlossberg, 2017). The quest to extend fossil fuel supply by any means went so
far  that  observers  began  to  argue  it  may  ironically  end  up  hurting  entire  fossil  industries  by
depressing prices so heavily as to undermine their competitiveness, while “only carbon as a whole
will benefit.” (Klare, 2016) 272 Elsewhere, the right-wing ascendancy has likewise reinforced extrac-
tivist patterns: In Brazil, rain forest clear-cutting spiked upward after Jair Bolsonaro took office and
dismantled protections  (Watts, 2019) as part of the new regime’s strategy of pushing commodity
frontiers outward to feed global resource demands – including for cheap soy (Cunha, 2019).  
Regarding “truth wars,” climate change denial,  long manufactured by industrial  interests
(Jacques et al., 2008), is a cornerstone of the new right’s anti-scientific, post-truth platform. In this
context, it is perhaps one of the pitfalls of technocracy that the baby of serious scientific work (on
the physics of climate change, that is) runs the risk of getting thrown out with the bathwater of
expert rule. The Green Economy, like much of the ecological modernization tradition from which it
emerged, takes  a  decidedly  technocratic,  top-down policy  approach  full  of  complex regulatory
schemes with dubious distributive effects, and from the perspective of the right-wing brand of anti-
elitism and anti-intellectualism,  it  apparently matters  little  whether  or  not  the  crises  the  Green
Economy seeks to amend happen to be ideological artifacts  or real phenomena.  Indeed,  OECD
representatives  themselves  have  complained  that  the  idea  of  a  “post-truth  world”  heralds  an
“existential crisis” for the organization and its preferred mode of operation, in which “objective”
272 On this occasion, Klare (2016, n.p.) opined that Trump’s energy strategy “will undoubtedly prove to be an enigma 
wrapped in a conundrum inside a roiling set of contradictions.”
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facts  presumably  enable  authoritative  cost-benefit  analyses.273 This  does  not  mean  that  GE
approaches  do  not  continue  to  inform  administrators  and  policymakers  experimenting  with
environmental “solutions” in institutions at various scales where Trump-style anti-environmental
clear-cutting has not yet taken place. But it renders the slim chances for a consistent, large-scale
implementation  of  a  Green Economy  framework with  strong legislative  backing  even slimmer.
Assuming  from a  “climate  realist”  perspective  (cf.  Malm,  2018) that  the  global  atmosphere  is
largely impervious, in any immediate sense,  to the outcome of the truth wars over science, the
possibility space for such implementation continues to shrink every year. 
8.4.2 The Center’s meandering
To  address  the  final  point,  for  the  Right,  environmentalism  has  become  identified  with  the
progressive face of (neo)liberalism to the point where a rejection of the latter implies a rejection of
the former. Accordingly, Trump “positioned himself as the antithesis of liberal political discourse in
American politics. His attack on the climate change agenda is just one component of his overall
attack on the liberal camp.” (Causevic, Bezci, & Borroz, 2018, n.p.) Unsurprisingly, the antithesis
reflects back upon the thesis. Climate change in particular has become a focal point of the broader
antagonism in U.S. politics at least. A Republican “strategist” is quoted as saying that  “the entire
climate change debate has now been caught up in the broader polarization of American politics …
yet  another  of  the  long list  of  litmus test  issues  that  determine  whether  or  not  you’re  a  good
Republican.”  (Davenport & Lipton, 2018, n.p.)  274 Liberal opponents of the Trump administration
have paid increasing attention to the issue since the 2016 election – on the occasion of Trump’s
100th day in office, large crowds turned out for People’s Climate Marches in Washington D.C. and
elsewhere (Fandos, 2017).275 Arguably, even better than most other contentious issues, the climate
issue crystallizes the malignity and stubborn backwardness, from a liberal perspective, of the new
president’s platform. The battle lines are particularly clear here, or at least they appear so at first
sight. More than any “hard” policy, however, Trump’s climate skepticism and his decision to pull
out  of  the non-binding Paris  Agreement  are  convenient  targets  from a  Democratic  perspective:
273 Oral statements by Roger Dungan and Anthony Cox at the GGSD Forum, Paris, November 29, 2018. See section 
7.2.2 for a critique of such claims.
274 According to the same article, Obama’s Clean Power Plan, one of his most important environmental policy projects
subject to repeal under Trump, “exemplified everything they opposed about Mr. Obama: He seemed to them 
imperious, heavy-handed, pleasing to the elites on the East and West Coasts and in the capitals of Europe, but 
callous to the blue-collar workers of coal and oil country.”
275 “The demonstration was also being used to gauge what Democrats hope is a blossoming opposition movement to 
Mr. Trump that they can parlay into lasting political power,” commented the New York Times (Fandos, 2017), 
suggesting both the possibility of reinvigorated resistance and the possibility that this may have been primarily a 
partisan move which is not necessarily connected to any coherent policy agenda on climate change.
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Instead of talking about actual policy records – which are far from impressive for either party276 –
the climate issue can be fitted nicely into the culture war over science, truth, and “alternative facts.”
Meanwhile, to the degree that “hard” policies  were discussed in the mid-to-late 2010s, the
dominance of  Green Economy-style solutions within these debates tended to be reinforced. The
default opposite of the right-wing position – no taxes, no regulations – seemed to involve the type
of market-based and technologically focused policies advanced by the Green Economy project. In
December 2017, the governors of relatively progressive U.S. states signed the Paris Declaration on
Carbon Pricing in the Americas, expressing their “commitment to [i]mplement carbon pricing as a
central economic and environmental policy instrument for ambitious climate change action” and
explicitly “inviting the support from the World Bank” in implementation efforts (Paris Declaration
on Carbon Pricing in the Americas, 2017, pp. 1–2). Former Democratic Secretary of State John
Kerry urged the American public in a New York Times editorial to “forget Trump” as “we all must
act on climate change.” The solutions he proposed, besides mourning the carbon trading scheme
that had died in Congress a decade earlier, consisted of a series of green-tech fixes (Kerry, 2018).
Towards the end of a much-noted piece that filled an entire 2018 issue of the  New York Times
Magazine  with a  detailed reconstruction of  scientists’,  politicians’ and activists’ efforts  to  raise
awareness about climate change in the 1980s, apparently intended to counter the Trumpist rejection
of climate science, the author concluded that “it will take a revolution” to halt climate change. But
conveniently, the same paragraph noted that “[w]e have a solution in hand: carbon taxes, increased
investment in renewable and nuclear energy and decarbonization technology. ... We can trust the
technology and the economics. It’s harder to trust human nature.” (Rich, 2018, n.p.) 
This  deflection  of  political-economic  conflict  onto  abstract  “human nature”  awaiting  its
circumvention by technocratic cunning promptly earned the author the scorn of Naomi Klein, who
insisted  upon blaming  the  neoliberal  turn  for  decades  of  virtual  non-action  on  climate  change
instead  (2018a).  Emissions  trading,  after  all,  historically  emerged  as  a  Reaganite  response  to
environmental problems (Davenport & Lipton, 2018) before it was enthusiastically taken up as an
innovative,  potentially bipartisan climate solution by neoliberalized Democrats. It  is a historical
irony that the political climate has shifted so far to the right in the meantime that even market-based
276 In terms of energy policy, in any case, the previous years had already seen a reversal of the hesitant steps towards 
renewable energy under the early Obama administration while any semblance of comprehensive climate legislation 
had long died a painful death in Congress. The rollback of climate policy – if this is even the right term – was 
certainly not initiated by the Trump campaign. Much of this, of course, was conditioned by the lack of a Democratic
Congressional majority after 2010. But the Obama administration’s “all-of-the-above” energy strategy (Furman & 
Stock, 2014) certainly prioritized energy security over environmental and climate concerns. As a writer for the 
Sierra Club summarized, in view of Republican denialism, “the Democratic Party has largely won the climate battle
by default” while clinging “to the status quo of an all-of-the-above energy platform and a conception of climate 
action that seems to begin and end with market-based solutions like a carbon tax.” (Geiling, 2018, n.p.; cf. also 
Hance, 2017) This complacency, one critic argued, has had an effect akin to climate change denial (Marcetic, 2019).
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regulation  is  too  much  regulation  for  Republicans  now.  Even  amidst  “polarized”  politics,
meanwhile, the liberal desire for easy, technology-based and ideally “bipartisan” solutions overrode
critical reflection on the limitations of such strategies. 
Another case in point is France, where the neoliberal Macron government, in contrast to the
American case, narrowly defeated the right-wing populist platform in 2017. When the government
scheduled massive increases in carbon taxes in 2018 with reference to the necessity of achieving
emissions reductions – a quintessential GE-type approach –, a popular revolt ensued (see section
3.2.1).  While  the  backlash  had  a  very  material  basis  –  commuters  would  be  impacted
disproportionately, and the reform was preceded by tax cuts for the rich –, its intensity revealed a
broader cultural discontent with the neoliberal political establishment.277 
While parts of the organized Left eventually joined the protests in opposition to Macron’s
regressive fiscal policies, the horizontally organized “Yellow Vests” were originally predominantly
received as a right-wing movement against taxation per se, displaying the common irony of right-
wing  anti-neoliberal  platforms  with  radicalized  proto-neoliberal  tenets.  In  a  sense,  reactionary
protests  appear  to  suit  the  overall  political  agenda  of  GE  institutions  better  than  progressive
resistance. In a perfect ping-pong game, OECD economist Alain de Serres invoked the case shortly
after the protests erupted to admonish that “green” fiscal reforms should be revenue-neutral instead
of adding to the tax base – a lean-state strategy was the only option to avoid popular revolts!278
While protesters’ motives were mixed (and perhaps politically incoherent), their opposition was
thus conveniently interpreted to constitute a demand for  more stringently implemented neoliberal
orthodoxy. But part of the legacy of three to four decades of neoliberal dominance is that broad
social mobilization tends to work against the Green Economy whenever it entails further short-term
burdens  on  already  strained  working  classes  –  which  is  usually  the  case  with  market-based
solutions.  Interestingly,  part  of  the  concessions  made  to  the  protesters  was  the  promise  for
substantial rebates for purchases of hybrid vehicles, a more Keynesian green-capitalist strategy –
but one whose target constituency is not lower-middle-class commuters (cf. section 3.2.1).
All this evidence suggests that in an important sense, neoliberal approaches to climate and
environmental policy no longer have the political advantage of concurring with the zeitgeist, which
may have been a “realist” justification underpinning the GE’s bid for hegemony in the pre-crisis
277 The Washington Post noted that “beyond the diesel issue, many turned out Saturday to voice any number of other 
frustrations with the ‘president for the rich,’ who is seen as increasingly removed from ordinary people’s concerns.”
(McAuley, 2018) A renowned French political scientist was cited as commenting that “strident, systematic criticism 
of Macron is often ‘not deserved’ but that the president nonetheless ‘asks for it’ by carelessly offending voters.” 
(Matamoros, 2018)
278 Talk at the 2018 Green Growth and Sustainable Development conference, Paris, November 27, 2018.
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2000s, before the reports were released. In Gramscian terms, the GE may be an expression of the
post-crisis restoration of neoliberal dominance, but no longer of broadly anchored leadership. 
We are  presently  witnessing  the  cultural  decline  of  neoliberal  hegemony,  whereas  clear
continuities are visible with regard to the moment of force. The free-market agenda (minus the
enthusiasm for “free” trade), the austerity politics and the punitive state only seem to be reinforced
under  rising  right-wing  dominance;  market-based  policies  generally  retain  a  sort  of  negative
hegemony, evoking “grudging acquiescence” or “disaffected consent” in the words of Clarke and
Newman (2012, pp. 307, 309), at best offering some grim satisfaction with the fact that at least they
involve no hand-outs to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.279 The Green Economy, for the
most part, had barely managed to penetrate the cultural realm: It attempted to capture the neoliberal
imaginary  in  the  very  moment  that  neoliberal  hegemony  began  to  crumble.  Its  realization  in
material infrastructures and enforceable “hard” policies remained severely limited. It is precisely
this happy imaginary of “efficient” win-win-win solutions that, as part and parcel of the broader
neoliberal ideascape, now faces its undoing at the hands of the reactionaries who have little use for
such niceties.280 Within the field of struggles over  “green” transformations outlined in the final
section of this chapter, this development benefits the gray-capitalist project more than any other. 
8.4.3 The Left’s reawakening
The original draft of this section, written at the end of 2018, ended on this gloomy note. As I revised
the  text  six  months  later,  political  relations  of  force  in  this  field  had  suddenly  and  markedly
changed.  Sparked  by  an  unlikely  teenage  heroine  from Sweden,  a  mass  youth  movement  had
suddenly exploded, skipping school to take to the streets for climate protection and climate justice.
By mid-March of 2019, the mobilization involved upwards of one million pupils across more than
100  countries,  all  on  the  same  day  (Carrington,  2019a).  Simultaneously,  in  response  to  the
perception of mounting ecological crises, the transnational  Extinction Rebellion  network emerged
practically overnight, recruiting thousands of new activists from outside established leftist circles
and blocking, among many other places, parts of the City of London for several days on end in the
279 In Europe in particular, the redefinition of the financial crisis as a public debt crisis has been understood as a key 
moment in neoliberalism’s survival struggle (see discussion of the “European consolidation state” in Streeck, 2017, 
Chapter 4; cf. J. Clarke & Newman, 2012). This, of course, amounts to an inverted interpretation which suggests 
classical neoliberal remedies (cuts in public spending) rather than strengthened regulation. With its chauvinist and 
racist undertones, this path certainly resonates with far-right platforms even as its negative material impacts extend 
to far-right constituencies. In this sense, the survival of neoliberal hegemony may be attributed in part to this 
tendential alignment with the rising Right, which left the Left helpless.
280 In Brand and Wissen’s (2018, Chapter 1) reading, the success of right-populist platforms can be attributed precisely 
to the promise of defending the “imperial mode of living” – the lifestyles of overconsumption practiced by the 
global middle and upper classes – against the competing demands posed by ecological constraints and the aspiration
of the global poor to adopt the same standard of living. This social-Darwinist strategy stands in marked contrast to 
the promise that in a Green Economy, everybody will be better off even while respecting ecological constraints. 
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spring  of  2019  (Matthew Taylor,  Gayle,  & Brooks,  2019).  Pundits  agreed that  climate  change
dominated the European elections in May 2019, which saw Green parties at an all-time high, and
finally, a progressively framed issue was able to break the dominance of public debates driven by
the Right (Rathi, 2019; Tharoor, 2019). 
Meanwhile,  in  the  U.S.,  young  Representative  Alexandria  Ocasio-Cortez  hijacked  the
mainstream  political  discourse  with  a  revitalized  Green  New  Deal  proposal  (Klein,  2018b;
McConnell, 2019). While the bill itself, co-sponsored by most Democratic presidential hopefuls,
was hopelessly defeated in Congress after Republicans had short-circuited the process by bringing it
up to a fast vote (even the bill’s sponsors eventually abstained; Carney & Green, 2019), it clearly
shifted the political debate. U.S. Congresspeople, notably those with greater career ambitions, here
proposed “global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 percent
from 2010 levels by 2030” and “net-zero global emissions by 2050” (McConnell, 2019), demands
that appear tremendously radical against the backdrop of the previous decade’s politics. The bill
further  held that due to historical responsibility  and present technological  capacity,  “the United
States must take a leading role in reducing emissions through economic transformation” (ibid.), and
pointed to the present political reality of dramatic social inequality and environmental injustice, all
of which should be fought jointly through a “10-year national mobilization” (ibid.) with investments
in resilient and low-carbon infrastructures, clean-tech manufacturing, low-impact agriculture and
ecosystem restoration.  A team of Yale researchers  even found strong bipartisan support  for  the
central demands associated with the GND – at least as long as respondents were not made aware of
its partisan origin (Gustafson et al., 2018).  
After a decade of relative obscurity, the  Green New Deal  project is suddenly back in the
game, this time not just as a quick stimulus fix but as a cornerstone of a more comprehensive
progressive political  platform, linked to social  justice concerns  that reached beyond a narrowly
understood (White) industrial workforce, with millennials as an obvious demographic base. The
funding of such an undertaking was further linked to a parallel proposal, which envisioned marginal
income tax rates  to  return to  pre-Reagan levels  (albeit  with higher  income thresholds;  Kessler,
2019), thereby suggesting a reversal of a forty-year U.S. trend towards more regressive taxation.
Parts of the more radical Left in the U.S. welcomed the political opening provided by these devel-
opments (Aronoff, Battistoni, Cohen, & Riofrancos, 2019; Bhattacharya, 2019; Riofrancos, 2019b),
whereas others highlighted the obvious ecological and economic limitations of growth-dependent
Keynesian responses, and the social re-externalizations that were likely to accompany nationally
framed green-tech megaprojects (Ajl, 2018; Bernes, 2019; Clover, 2019; cf. section 10.2). 
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While  it  is  uncertain  where  this  may  lead,  the  GND’s  sudden  comeback  reaffirms  my
assessment in section 8.3: If it  is to develop any serious political mobilization potential against
gray-capitalist hegemony, a green-capitalist project needs to try for greater inclusivity and propose a
credible path that, at the very least, leads beyond the neoliberal regime. In the light of these recent
developments, the hesitant, technocratic politics of the Green Economy appear even more comically
inadequate. It is almost as if serious political debate about a “green” transformation was muted,
even interrupted, during the period when the GE approach seemed dominant. (This is no statement
concerning the direction of causality.) Once the issue, predictably re-politicized in terms of a Green
New Deal, re-surfaced in mainstream debates, the pale technocratic model of the Green Economy
immediately faded into the background, and discussion turned to the really substantive questions of
justice and distribution that the GE discourse had tiptoed around. But the background, of course, is
where technocratic politics happens, and the Green Economy “toolkit” is likely to continue to exert
significant influence on regulatory design when it comes to the implementation of policies that are
now debated with more grandiose vocabulary.
8.5 Mapping struggles for hegemony
Thesis  8.5:  To improve the political  fortunes  of  a  green-capitalist  project,  the  Green Economy
would need to extend its hegemonic reach by addressing the constituencies that now tend towards
the Green New Deal project, and perhaps fuse with the latter.
The illustrations  provided here  form an attempt  to  map the  complex struggles  over  hegemony
detailed in this chapter. As any mapping exercise for heuristic purposes, this involve some degree of
reduction. Nevertheless, these visualizations retain considerable complexity. This section provides
some explanations and suggests possibilities to interpret the political implications, some of which
only occurred to the author in all their clarity when studying his own map.
From this perspective, the struggle for hegemony, rather than primarily pitting “green” and
“gray” interests against each other, features a dominant bloc led by a class-based coalition in which
“green” and “gray” capital interests negotiate a minimal passive revolution strategy that sidelines
both  social  and  environmental  concerns  and  those  who  represent  them.  The  two-dimensional
struggle  over  hegemony  then  collapses  into  the  “traditional”  vertical  dimension,  with  capital
interests defending the social status quo against the subaltern who tend to be more immediately
threatened by ecological degradation. Since the global “subaltern” are clearly internally stratified,
this can take place with the tacit support of privileged – and less ecologically threatened – Northern
labor constituencies, who may thus continue to partake in what has been called the “imperial mode
of living”  (Brand & Wissen, 2018), enabled by “gray” capital. In this constellation, however, the
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passive revolution remains  so  passive that hardly any “revolutionary” – in the modest sense of
technologically transformative – effects materialize.  The result  is the contradictory  Economy of
Additionality  (see  section  9.3).  But  as  ecological  constraints  are  impervious  to  such  subtle
hegemonic  shifts,  the  challenge  to  capitalist  hegemony  in  this  historical  case  is  not  “merely”
political: The “objectively” needed ecological modernization of capitalism thus falls flat.
ILLUSTRATION 1: HEGEMONIC PROJECTS
In  Illustration  1,  the  spectrum  that  visualizes  the  struggles  over  social-ecological  transformations  of
capitalism is organized in a  series of hegemonic projects  and corresponding  strategic interests.  The
strategic interests describe the position of the actors involved vis-à-vis the (capitalist) status quo, from
broadly supportive (“hegemony”) to increasingly antagonistic (“counter-hegemony,” broadly understood).
The projects are the concrete materializations of these strategies on the part of these historical actors. The
“gray” project  stands apart  in  that,  although heavily involved in  the  hegemonic  struggle,  it  is  largely
outside of the discourse on “green” transformation itself, except as a foil and, to the degree that it is forced
into that discourse, in the role of “greenwashers.” (This allows for the argument that the GE is in a relative
position of dominance within “green” discourse.) 
The  dominant bloc –  an attempt to delineate the hegemonic reach of neoliberalism – extends from the
“gray” project to the Green Economy. This points to the unity of interests here, which, as noted throughout
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this  chapter,  prevents  a  confrontational  strategy  on  the  part  of  the  GE institutions  vis-à-vis  its  gray-
capitalist  allies  (the  fact  that  both the OECD and the World Bank are  heavily invested in  the  “gray”
economy of  course  also  plays  a  part  here).  At  the  same time,  this  unity  is  undermined not  only  by
differences in long-term perspectives on how to preserve capitalist relations but also by a more profane
struggle for differential accumulation opportunities between various capital factions – “green” gains here
signify, by tendency, “gray” losses. 
The broad category of “green” capitalism likewise extends modestly into “gray” territory and considerably
into progressive territory, encompassing almost the entire  Green New Deal  project along with the Green
Economy. The boundary on the transformative end is relatively blurry. 
Social  forces have been identified with projects/strategies or located between them, depending on the
author’s judgment of their respective political orientation. The borders between these projects are certainly
porous, and some actors’ loyalties may be split. Countless further actors could be filled in; with regard to
the most recent political dynamics, for example, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s platform in the U.S. exerts
leadership in the revitalized Green New Deal camp, while the emerging youth strike movements that have
been shaking the political establishment throughout the European Union and beyond are more diverse, and
the  loyalties  of  various  factions  within  these  movements  may  yet  shift  among  the  more  progressive
projects.
The mapping of the strategies/projects along a political spectrum from conservative (of the status quo) to
oppositional (towards the status quo) largely coincides with the distribution of political-economic power
(defined by access to political power and the availability of economic power and resources) associated with
the social forces involved. In other words, a strong class dimension is reflected in the strategic outlook that
unites each project.281 Here, the relative lack of power behind the GE despite its endorsement by ostensibly
relatively dominant actors is a notable anomaly that deserves explanation. This chapter sought to deliver
such explanation in terms of the inadequate leadership – in a Gramscian sense – provided by the GE
institutions.  (Structural  factors,  of  course,  also play a role,  such as the dominance gradient  within the
dominant bloc depicted in Illustration 2, between “gray” and (subordinate) “green” capital interests.) 
While involving inter- and transnational actors, this visualization does not cover the international (in the
sense of  inter-state)  dimension to  be  discussed  in  chapter  11.  To trace the conflict  constellations  in
international  negotiations  including  those  under  the  UNFCCC,  mapping  states  according  to  a  similar
matrix in future research may be worthwhile. Of course, such efforts tend to black-box the nation-state and
its  “national  interest,” obscuring domestic political  conflicts  regarding “green” transformations  (on the
281 It should be noted, however, that position in the class hierarchy does not fully determine political power. “Access to
political power,” after all, is also a question of political organization – hence the contingency of political-economic 
struggles. This is the key to the GE’s weakness as seen from another angle. In the longer run, of course, any group’s
successful organization tends to improve its economic fortunes, such that it is fair to claim that class position and 
effective power remain closely associated.
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 251
intricate dynamics of such “two-level games,” see e.g. Putnam, 1988). But mapping, in addition, the
relative position of the state’s dominant domestic political forces in the international realm may in turn
offer a valuable contextualization to understand such domestic conflicts.
TABLE 1: HEGEMONIC PROJECTS




Excessive “greening” undermines growth and employment and 






Greening is necessary, but – according to expert calculations – 
only feasible when capital-friendly; in this case, everyone will 
benefit.
Green New Deal Sustainability/Stability
Shared prosperity/ 
employment






Radical greening is necessary in order to avoid ecological 
collapse, but the systemic greening of capitalism is inherently 
unrealistic and capitalist relations are incompatible with social 
justice.




Short-run steps towards a greening of the capitalist economy 
must be coupled with a longer-term shift in power relations so 
as to overcome this contradictory mode of production before it 
leads to collapse.
For each project, the driving forces attempt to exert leadership through a series of problem definitions,
objectives and promised solutions (here summarized as frames). These culminate in a particular  claim to
political realism, which in turn attempts to relate, in Gramscian terms, the “ethico-political” dimension to
the “economic-corporate” interests of other groups. In order to improve the political fortunes of any given
project,  there  is  a  need to  expand its  hegemonic  reach (the horizontal  dimension of  Illustration 1)  by
appealing to a larger subset of the social spectrum. Such strategies are obviously limited by the presence of
antagonistic  interests  (e.g.,  postcapitalist  frames  are  unlikely  to  win  over  capital  interests  whose  very
existence they question).
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ILLUSTRATION 3: HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES AND PROJECTS
Illustration  2  visualizes  the  two-dimensional  struggles  over  hegemony  within  the  context  of  “green”
transformation debates. The vertical – class – dimension is closely associated with the relative dominance
ILLUSTRATION 2: HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES
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of the actors and groups involved; it relates to the material power relations between them, but also to their
political alignments (middle-class-based ENGOs may not be dominant vis-à-vis organized labor, but the
class content of their politics here leads to a positioning slightly above labor). This covers one part of the
substance of the conflict, namely distributional concerns. The horizontal dimension captures another part of
the substance, the specific “greening”-related content. The relative size of boxes derives from the span of
positions  within  the  group;  it  is  an  indicator  of  internal  diversity  rather  than  strength  in  numbers  or
resources of the groups involved (although a lack of internal diversity, of course, is usually not a sign of
strength for a hegemonic project as it suggests a relatively narrow social base).
In Illustration 3, this is represented in the shape of the  dashed diagonal, which follows the sequence of
hegemonic  projects  depicted  in  Illustration  1.  A map  of  these  projects  is  superimposed  for  reference
purposes.  The  fact  that  these  projects  can  be  placed  along  the  diagonal  in  their  original  sequence
demonstrates  a  negative  correlation  between  the  two  dimensions  plotted  here,  class  position  and
“greenness.” This attests to the high dependence of the “gray” project – and of capitalist relations per se –
on ecological degradation and resource depletion.
To avoid overload,  not  all  actors listed in Illustration 1 and Table 1 are depicted;  political  parties,  for
example, are omitted. 
8.5.1 Elusive leadership
In each case,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  a  single “leading”  group or  class.  In  particular  national
contexts such as the U.S., fossil industries arguably are in a leading position within the dominant
“gray”  spectrum282,  as  they  offer  a  social  model  heavy  on  fossil-fueled  mobility,  industrial
development  and,  consequently,  urban  form which  enjoys  considerable  popular  support  and  is
linked up with the immediate “economic-corporate” interests of various groups. While it may not be
in the long-term interest of working-class constituencies to side with “gray” capital (nor in capital’s
long-term interest  to  undermine  its  conditions  of  reproduction  through ecological  degradation),
there is a reasonable short-term (and even medium-term) case for doing so: Full ecological pricing,
after all, threatens to undermine both their purchasing power and employment opportunities. Under
such conditions,  the distributive struggle between labor  and capital  would intensify.  Within the
political-economic  parameters  of  the  system,  the  “general  interest”  uniting  both  classes  –
particularly at the national level – is in avoiding such constraints. This is the key to the hegemonic
282 The notion of a “gray” project may be subject to contestation. Nobody openly advocates a “gray economy.” The 
strategic unity here may be seen as an unintended aggregate product of the intentional survival strategies of the 
economic actors involved in a struggle over differential accumulation opportunities. Other actors involved, such as 
political parties and think tanks, may also be motivated by the – not quite unreasonable – conviction that a serious 
“greening” of capitalism undermines the system’s economic functioning and thus runs counter to the “general” 
interest of the entire capitalist class (an argument to this effect is highlighted by Klein, 2014). 
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strength of the “gray” camp, linking the ideological and the material  dimension, with the latter
exerting considerable influence on the former. Generally, it is worth noting that the collective action
problem of ecological degradation is aggravated by such class antagonisms.283 The recent right-wing
challenge to neoliberal hegemony, as discussed in section 8.4, served further to shift the balance of
forces within the dominant neoliberal bloc towards the “gray” project. In the U.S. context, these
industries’ traditionally close ties to the Republican Party, which should also be understood as a
leading force in this context, were further reinforced over the past few years.284
For the Green Economy, leadership is currently assumed by international institutions. These,
however, have no independent class base but represent a coalition of dominant groups, many of
which are deeply invested in the “gray” economy. As frequently emphasized throughout this work,
the OECD and the World Bank both appear schizophrenic in their simultaneous pursuit of “green”
and “gray” projects. Besides the absence of an unequivocal leading force, the lack of subordinate
social forces united behind the project – those who rally to the leadership’s calls – is particularly
striking.285 Even the groups often counted among the Green Economy constituency in fact tend to
hover between the GE project and the neighboring parts of the spectrum on both sides (“agnostic”
capital factions, international institutions and liberal parties between “gray” and “green” capitalism,
and “green” capital factions, green parties and socially or environmentally focused NGOs between
the GE and the more social-democratic Green New Deal section of the spectrum). 
Of course, there are also structural reasons for this weakness. A chicken-and-egg problem
clearly exists, and it is not confined to the GE’s politics but applicable to “green” capitalism more
generally: Regulation creates markets, which create constituencies (as demonstrated for the case of
California by Brownstein, 2009) – but in the absence of these constituencies, meaningful regulation
is difficult to achieve. Similarly, Ciplet et al.  (2015, p. 231) point to the political importance of
creating a sizeable “green” workforce, which in turn could constitute one such constituency but,
again, presupposes effective “green” regulation. In this respect, it is telling that the current tectonic
283 In this context, it is also interesting to note a particular asymmetry in the mutual interdependence between capital 
and labor: Whereas the short-term interests of labor are tied to the “well-being” of capital, only the long-term 
interest of capital is tied to labor’s welfare (as far as questions of public health etc. are concerned; in terms of purely
economic welfare, the need for effective demand of course provides a short-term coupling of class interests).
284 The dilemma of the Democratic Party in this field is that its representatives and supporters are obviously split 
across three of the four projects listed here, from the “gray” camp to the Green Economy to the Green New Deal. It 
is thus hard-pressed to exert consistent leadership in any direction.
285 This constellation suggests another link to Gramsci’s historical work on the Risorgimento. One of the deficits 
Gramsci identified in this passive revolution was the circumstance that leadership was assumed not by a class but 
by a state within the still-fragmented Italy, namely Piedmont (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 104–106). This led to 
“‘domination’ without … ‘leadership’” (ibid., p. 106) as the immediate need to unite a broader class base in order to
further the (not-quite-)revolutionary agenda was reduced. It may be argued that the quasi-governmental 
organizations behind the GE face a similar constraint. In such cases, in Gramsci’s words, “hegemony will be 
exercised by a part of the social group over the entire group, and not by the latter over other forces, in order to give 
power to the movement” (ibid.) – the additional problem being, of course, that the GE project is far from attaining 
hegemony even among the “entire group” of capital interests.
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shift in the debate over “green” transformations, as recounted in section 8.4.3, is crucially driven by
existential hopes and fears rather than short-to-medium-term economic considerations. Perhaps it is
only on this higher plane that the chicken-and-egg dynamics that continue to dominate the more
profane political-economic struggles can be circumvented.
On  the  counter-hegemonic  part  of  the  spectrum,  meanwhile,  the  question  of  leadership
within and broader allegiance to the corresponding projects is not unproblematic either. Indeed, not
all  forces  within this  spectrum actively pursue counter-hegemonic strategies;  some oppositional
movements,  in  their  insistence on decentralized and localized politics,  may be considered anti-
hegemonic rather than counter-hegemonic (on resistance against the “hegemony of hegemony,” see
Day, 2005; cf. discussions in Rousselle & Evren, 2011).286 At the very least, there is a widespread,
conscious rejection of (hierarchical) leadership  per se.  Within the moderate part of this spectrum,
the U.S. Green New Deal Democrats have recently emerged as a notable leading force, formulating
an  agenda  that  is  clearly  targeted  towards  a  broadening  of  the  hegemonic  reach  to  broader
constituencies (cf. section 8.4.3).
The inclusion of various sub-projects within this half of the spectrum in Illustration 1 attests
to such fragmentation. Progressive “transformative” positions straddle the line between “reformist”
and  “revolutionary”  approaches  and  actively  seek  to  overcome the  gulf  between  the  two.  Not
incidentally,  this  bubble  tends  to  be  heavily  populated  by  neo-Gramscians  who  insist  on  the
importance of forming explicit  counter-hegemonic projects  capable of intervening effectively in
“conjunctural”  politics (as the GND camp seeks to  do,  but  “revolutionary” movements are  not
always  able  or  willing  to)  while  embedding  such  interventions  in  long-term  transformative
strategies that seek to overcome capitalist relations and, with a particular view to the ecological
dimension, the accumulation imperative at the heart of capitalism (which many New Dealers are
unwilling to confront and “revolutionaries” are eager to confront immediately). (For examples, see
Dellheim & Wolf, 2009; Schachtschneider, 2009; Candeias, 2014; Riofrancos, 2019b.)
The visualization provided here suggests more lessons: In terms of social forces and the
need for coalition building, the gaping hole in the foundations of the  Green Economy  has been
noted above.  Here,  the absence of  (organized)  labor  is  particularly striking.  It  appears that  the
projects to both sides – “gray” capitalism and the GND – each are more attractive for (various
286 With respect to ecological struggles, the degrowth movement with its penchant for localism is a case in point (see 
e.g. Paech, 2012). Some within the movement have expressed counter-hegemonic desires, however: The editors of 
an anthology emerging from the movement admonished that “more comprehensive counter-hegemonic narratives 
are necessary.” (D’Alisa et al., 2015, p. xx) The Latin American – partly indigenous – Buen Vivir movement’s 
stance is similarly ambivalent: It highlights plurality and decentralized, bottom-up modes of governing as a 
negative reaction to a succession of hegemonic visions of development imposed on local communities, but in some 
countries its principles have attained constitutional status – and restructuring the state in line with these principles 
appears to be one of the movement’s priorities (cf. Prada Alcoreza, 2013; see also Gudynas, 2013, p. 35).
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segments of) organized labor. The prospects for benefit sharing on each side appear brighter, due to
the more unrestrained growth dynamic promised by the “gray” project and the greater redistributive
emphasis of the GND, respectively.287 This visualizes the argument of section 8.3: The GE’s lack of
social concessions weakens its mobilizational capacity. In line with the theory of hegemonic shifts
suggested in this work, the success of this hegemonic project depends on its ability to win over such
constituencies and thus expand its  reach within the overall  spectrum in both directions. This is
particularly essential for the GE project, which continues to face an unfavorable material power
differential vis-à-vis the “gray” project. Hence, only by ceding some ground, content-wise, to the
GND could the GE institutions hope to build a more solid green-capitalist project. This point will be
taken up again in bloc V. But first, the fourth bloc of this dissertation will be wrapped up by an
interim conclusion in the following chapter.
287 The relative gains for labor under the neoliberal “gray” regime, of course, appear slim. But it should be noted that 
fossil industries tend to be strongholds of organized labor whereas the nascent “green” sectors carry the imprint of 
the neoliberal era’s anti-union climate (see section 6.1.3, cf. also Thiele, 2019). Besides, the opportunities for gray-
capitalist interests to co-opt subaltern demands by deploying the argument that “green” transformations are job 
killers remains great, regardless of the macroeconomic accuracy of such claims.
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9. Interim conclusion: The Green Economy as an 
Economy of Additionality
In chapter  4,  three  conditions  and four  conceivable  accumulation  strategies  were listed for  the
realization of “green” capitalism. The conditions that need to be fulfilled are a “light green” shade
of  ecological  sustainability  (the  ecological  “pillar”  of  sustainable  development),  infinite  capital
accumulation (the economic pillar) and social reproduction with limited externalization of social
costs (the social pillar). The strategies among which to choose include absolute decoupling through
technological  advances,  new  Landnahmen (seizures)  of economic territory that  outweigh losses
through sustainability constraints, a “downsizing” process of “green” creative destruction and the
appropriation of Cheap Nature through various forms of cost re-externalization. 
How  does  the  Green  Economy  approach  fare  according  to  this  framework,  and  which
strategies does it rely on? This evaluation summarizes the evidence gathered thus far and therefore
relates both to policy recommendations “on paper” and various implementation efforts.288 It begins
with the choice of accumulation strategies, as this choice has profound implications for the GE’s
ability to fulfill the three conditions, which will be discussed in the second section.289 The final
section concludes that the GE should be understood as an Economy of Additionality which could at
best achieve a partial and unsustainable “greening” of the global economy.
9.1 The Green Economy’s combination of accumulation strategies
Thesis  9.1:  In  theory  and  practice,  the  Green  Economy  makes  uneven  use  of  the  available
accumulation  strategies.  Officially,  it  privileges  absolute  decoupling  and  productive  “green”
Landnahmen,  but  these  offer  limited  opportunities;  instead,  observable  Landnahmen  involve
accumulation by dispossession and lead to sundry re-externalizations. “Green” creative destruction
only occurs in stunted forms, e.g. through modest emissions pricing.
288 While this appears to run the risk of confusing “theory” and “practice,” in fact there is no neat division between the 
two (see also section 1.1). The GE reports rely extensively on (more or less selectively chosen) practical experience
with usually very partial and imperfect policy experiments for their theory. In turn, implementation of GE-style 
policies after the reports has been equally fragmented and not “true to theory” partly because that theory always 
underestimated the potential of political-economic factors to distort “optimal” policy outcomes, as argued 
throughout chapter 8. More generally, “mature” neoliberal practice involves pragmatic adaptation of policy 
templates to specific local and historical contexts, often already anticipated in these templates (see section 2.4).
Obviously, it is often difficult to trace real-world policies causally to GE advocacy. Nevertheless, the three 
institutions have been actively involved in developing international policy schemes and accounting standards that 
widely influence real-world environmental policymaking. The latter now largely takes place within the broader 
framework outlined in the GE reports, even as most building blocks of this framework pre-existed the GE model as 
such. GE institutions’ advocacy and consulting work thus constitutes theory and practice at once. I would argue that
an effective critique in this case requires both theoretical and empirical substantiation. 
289 The three empirically derived macro-strategies will not be assessed as such here but rather mapped, in the course of 
this evaluation, onto the two other sets of categories (the conditions for and potential strategies of “green” 
capitalism). The results are summarized once more in the conclusion (chapter 12).
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This first section evaluates the relative importance of the four available “green” systemic accumula-
tion  strategies  (GSASs)  to  the  GE model  and  its  translation  into  observable  implementation
attempts during the 2010s, with a view to broader green-capitalist potential as discussed in bloc V.
9.1.1 Absolute decoupling
The official path pursued by the Green Economy points towards a decarbonization through incre-
mental efficiency gains and a shift to renewable energy sources (and, to a lesser extent, other renew-
able raw materials). These strategies are fairly obvious in principle, given that economic activity
across all sectors currently depends on fossil inputs which will be exhausted in the long run and
have already become environmentally unaffordable due to the exhaustion of GHG sink capacities.
Furthermore, on the face of it, techno-fixes appear to constitute the only “win-win-win” option for,
speaking in simplified terms, capital, society  and nature (the economic, social and environmental
dimensions  discussed  above).290 Unsurprisingly,  therefore,  this  technology-focused  strategy  of
accumulation by decoupling finds expression in the GE macro-strategy discussed here as the gospel
of eco-efficiency, although this suggests a certain narrowing in favor of more incremental efficiency
rather than more transformative consistency efforts (section 5.1.3). While not all of this signals net
positive accumulation potential relative to previous capitalist regimes (see sections 4.4 and 5.2.3), it
certainly appears to be the most “productive” way, for capital, of dealing with ecological constraints
– in combination with new Landnahmen and appropriations of Cheap Nature (see below).
But there are countless other reasons for skepticism. Judging by the numbers presented in
the previous chapters, achieving green growth to sustain capitalist accumulation in the longer term
already  appears  extremely  challenging  on  purely  mathematical  grounds,  as  it  would  require
unprecedented levels of economy-wide efficiency gains that would need to be sustained indefinitely,
year  after  year  (section  5.1.1).  Further  (mostly  economic,  but  also  political)  constraints  to
technological change and its diffusion have been discussed at length in section 5.2. Under capitalist
conditions, advances in “green” technology will not be geared to optimize ecological benefits but to
guarantee accumulation and optimize economic gains while, ideally, meeting specified ecological
minimum standards. Efficiency-improving measures are subject to rebound effects, and intellectual
property rights restrict technology diffusion. What is needed is not just any green-tech miracle, but
one  that  is  compatible  with  (ideally  smooth)  accumulation.  From a  capitalist  standpoint,  it  is
enticing to pick and choose, deploying those measures that indeed promise economic advantages
while blocking other – perhaps equally necessary – measures that do not.291
290 As suggested in section 5.2.1, the caveat here is the potential reinforcement of technological unemployment.
291 The modeling presented by UNEP’s International Resource Panel (Ekins & Hughes, 2017; Hatfield-Dodds et al., 
2017; International Resource Panel, 2017; Schandl et al., 2016) is instructive in this regard: According to its 
optimistic calculations, the global application of available resource efficiency-enhancing measures could boost 
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Beyond  these  theoretical  problems,  we  also  find  very  limited  empirical  evidence  of
decoupling,  which  suggests  that  the  kind  of  green-tech  miracle  that  could  enable  “all-green”
accumulation indeed has not yet materialized. While in many regions and sectors, slow  relative
decoupling is  evident,  GE institutions’ references to successful cases of  absolute decoupling of
economic  growth  from resource  use  and  pollution  involve  spurious  claims.  These  are  usually
spatially selective and altogether untrue at the global level (cf. section 2.1.2). Absolute consumption
and pollution levels remain unsustainably high, and for most indicators, there is no unequivocal
downward trend. Quite the contrary, the negative environmental by-effects of raw materials and
energy extraction continue to rise along with extraction effort. As a recent, comprehensive review of
studies  on  decoupling  for  a  variety  of  environmental  indicators  concluded,  “the  decoupling
literature is a haystack without a needle.” (Parrique et al., 2019, p. 57)
Of  course,  there  is  no  definitive  mathematical  answer  to  the  question  of  a  green-tech
solution for global capitalism. The technical possibility of a fully realized “green” capitalism with a
smooth trajectory of systemic accumulation cannot be entirely ruled out in theory. Historic break-
throughs may still happen. But this possibility remains an unsubstantiated claim. Already posited in
the 1990s, it has not been borne out by historical developments, and there is a compelling set of
theoretical explanations to account for this failure even before turning to the additional constraints
imposed by political-economic resistance to such a “green” transformation from vested interests, as
addressed in chapter 8. The latter frequently translates into targeted opposition to particular new
technologies, thus further reinforcing economic and technical constraints. Technology alone, for all
these reasons, clearly cannot be relied upon to achieve a “green” transformation by itself.
9.1.2 Landnahmen
The relative weight of this strategy is difficult to assess, given that it potentially extends beyond the
scope  of  policies  discussed  in  Green  Economy  reports.  Important  sectors  include  health  and
education,  and these are only discussed tangentially  in the GE reports  with regard to pollution
impacts  or  skills  requirements,  without  consideration  of  institutional  forms  or  macroeconomic
dynamics. The theoretical argument here, to be more fully developed in section 10.1.2, is that GE-
imposed constraints on capital accumulation in other sectors would, in the long run, reinforce the
already significant pressures towards privatization and commodification of ever more previously
public  goods  (intensive  Landnahmen).  This  hypothesis  could  only  be  fully  evaluated  with  the
global GDP growth by 2050 relative to “existing trends.” When combined with relatively stringent carbon pricing, 
the projected positive ecological effect is much greater (as the carbon price counters the rebound effect from 
increased resource efficiency), but the economic gain is almost neutralized. From a capitalist standpoint, therefore, 
it would be an entirely reasonable medium-term (!) strategy to take “greening” exactly as far as it pays by applying 
these resource efficiency techniques, ignoring the climate policy component, enjoying the extra profit and accepting
the ecological rebound.
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benefit of historical hindsight. Seeing as the GE institutions seek to embed the GE more or less
seamlessly into an overall neoliberal policy framework, however, there is little reason to doubt that
the continuation of such active marketization efforts is very much on the table. 
But there are also more immediate  Landnahmen  on the  Green Economy  agenda. Some of
these straddle the line between intensive and extensive Landnahmen as originally defined, and many
are,  according  to  the  definitions  provided  in  section  4.6,  properly  classified  as  Cheap  Nature
strategies rather than Landnahmen (see section 9.1.4). Certain methods of getting the prices right,
however, fall right under the definition of Landnahmen: Basic public goods such as water, which in
many places have been partially exempted from market logic for a long time, are now increasingly
priced according to their function as natural capital, which is often tied to privatizations (see also
discussion in sections 4.4 and 7.2.1). But financialization and commodification of social and natural
commons  is,  economically  speaking,  for  the  most  part  not  a  productive but  a  redistributive
undertaking with limited potential to boost systemic accumulation (see section 4.4 again).
While  these  predominantly  intensive activities  may  not  present  sizable  systemic
accumulation opportunities and thus do not constitute  Landnahmen from the standpoint of global
capital, they do offer an important motivation for those economic actors involved, and they have
become  a  recurring  feature  in  the  GE  landscape.  Various  capital  factions  have  an  interest  in
lobbying for environmental regulations to assume these particular forms: “Green” capital can thus
carve out a space for itself in co-existence with “gray” capital, partaking in the latter’s surplus (in
addition  to  its  appropriation  of  erstwhile  commons),  while  “gray”  capital  may  find  this  an
acceptable price to pay for the avoidance of more constraining regulations.
Finally,  how  about  extensive Landnahmen  in  the  immediately  productive  sense  –  the
opening up of new markets in “green” products and services, beyond those that have a merely
reparative function (and are therefore redistributive)? Most “green” products are conceptualized as
direct substitutes for established “gray” counterparts (cf. section 10.2). Consequently, as long as the
latter are not consistently thwarted by political intervention (see the “green” creative destruction
strategy), new “green” contenders have to compete directly in the same markets. To the degree that
the “green” contenders succeed, these markets in many cases may be expected to experience a
contraction in terms of absolute volumes – such as when widespread car sharing leads to a reduction
in overall car sales or expanded public transportation shrinks the private mobility market altogether
(see  section  10.2  again).  The  same  pattern  is  frequently  observable  as  entire  sectors  undergo
digitization processes (see section 11.6.1). Cynically speaking, the capitalist manufacturing of wants
and needs appears to have been so exhaustive that it now seems difficult to develop genuinely new
“green” commercial desires that do not simply represent “greened” variants of the existing product
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range. As defined in section 4.6, such substitutions should not be considered Landnahmen, which
imply the development of genuinely  new markets. These are arguably few and far between.292 At
best, certain market segments grow if “green” products command price premia. 
Are there other contenders for entirely new fields of “green” accumulation? The wider field
of  the  bioeconomy, besides  those  biotech  sectors  that  have nothing to  do with  “greening” (see
section 11.6.1), encompasses, first, a set of activities that essentially depend on “green” subsidies
and regulations for their economic viability – i.e, activities that are unproductive of surplus value
such as “maintenance” of ecosystem services,  –, and, second, a set of long-established primary
production branches which are likewise (supposedly) “greened” through political intervention. The
latter group usually produces those inputs that capital depends on as Cheap Natures, including food,
raw materials and energy. The “greening” intervention – whether as regulations enforcing changes
to production processes of conventional products, as in agriculture, or as support for alternatives to
conventional products, as in biofuels – tends to render these inputs more expensive relative to their
conventional  production (which in  many cases  incurs  increasing costs  as  well,  or  is  no longer
feasible at all). Excluding for the moment the ambivalent ecological effects and re-externalizations
associated with these strategies, in economic terms they are second-best solutions prompted by the
decreasing availability of resources and sinks (see also discussions in section 4.4). 
All in all, “green” Landnahmen constitute a relevant accumulation strategy within the Green
Economy framework, but one that is structurally limited in terms of net accumulation opportunities
–  in  both  its  intensive  and  extensive  forms.  Beyond  mere  inter-capitalist  redistribution,  the
accumulation potential that is unlocked here mainly involves accumulation by dispossession rather
than by expanded reproduction (cf. differentiation in section 4.5.1), thus signaling new externali-
zations and a lack of sustainability (in the literal sense) as many of these Landnahmen are once-only
appropriations that, to make matters worse, often undermine effective demand. This evokes, once
more,  the  conclusion  derived with  regard  to  absolute  decoupling  above:  Recipes  for  expanded
reproduction that do not entail expanded environmental consumption have not been found.
9.1.3 “Green” creative destruction
A  radical  version  of  “green”  creative  destruction  which  would  amount  to  a  systematic
“downsizing” of global capital is, of course, a far cry from the intentions of the Green Economy.
The OECD envisions creative destruction only as the purely positive dynamic of a “a smooth and
just  transition”  which  “reconcile[s]  the  vigorous  process  of  ‘creative  destruction’ required  to
292 Again, this category does not include eco-auditing companies and the like, which may offer services that can be 
considered both genuinely new and “green” but whose revenues are simply subtracted from the balance sheets of 
the “productive” companies – or  even similarly “unproductive” ones – that contract them (section 4.4).
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achieve green growth with a high level of employment and shared prosperity.” (OECD, 2011b, p.
95, emphases in original) This deeply paradoxical formulation sums up the GE position rather well.
Deliberate  large-scale  destruction of  capital  assets,  not  to  speak of  expropriations,  is  obviously
absolute anathema to capitalists as a class, many of whom would face immediate losses in this
scenario, and all of whom should feel politically threatened by this prospect. If the relations of
political force were ever sufficient to impose this course of action, after all, the majority at that
point may prefer to dispose of private capital altogether. Otherwise, full compensation of heretofore
well-endowed losers would be extremely costly.293
Moreover, absent an overarching power, the interstate system is unlikely to be capable of
imposing these solutions, given the massive economic spoils in prospect for each deviant state (see
section 11.4). Unlike previous cycles of creative destruction, this one would have to play out at the
global scale, and it could not primarily work through economic competition. “Gray” capital needs to
be defeated  politically as “green” rivals cannot disrupt its power on purely economic grounds.294
(These considerations of world-scale political power, institutions and state—market relations will be
taken up again in bloc V.) 
Instead of harsh input limits that would devalue sunk investments and resource claims, the
Green Economy tends towards more “flexible” mechanisms of resource and emissions pricing, both
in  theory  and  in  practice.  In  principle,  these  are  more  modest  attempts  to  privilege  “green”
development over “gray.” As section 3.2.1 shows with regard to GHG emissions pricing, implemen-
tation has been uneven and price levels generally inadequate to contain the “gray” economy, which
has been enabled to preserve its business models at the manageable expense of cheap (and dubious)
offset  certificates.  As  long  as  such  half-hearted  measures  form  the  apex  of  “green”  creative
destruction efforts in practice, the playing field cannot be tilted in favor of “green” alternatives. Not
only  the  creative component  is  stymied,  but  more  catastrophically,  the  ecologically  crucial
destructive aspect is cut short and the fulfillment of “green” capitalism’s ecological ambitions made
even more unlikely. (On the limitations of pricing strategies per se, see section 10.1.)
293 Nevertheless, this course of action has been suggested, with proponents arguing that governments could use their 
monetary policy privileges to fund a massive buyout in a targeted instance of quantitative easing, a “knockout blow 
to get the fossil-fuel industry out of the way, both economically and politically.” (Alperovitz, Guinan, & Hanna, 
2017, n.p.) But of course the “gray” economy reaches far beyond a narrowly defined fossil fuel industry: After 
buying out all oil, coal and gas companies, power utilities and car makers would be the next in line to receive 
compensation, and so on. (And then, as noted in section 4.6.3, the ensuing flood of liquid capital would likely cause
massive speculative bubbles.)
294 It may be argued that because the largest share of oil reserves, perhaps the most crucial “gray” asset category, is 
now state-owned (Di Muzio, 2015, pp. 117–121), the defeat of “gray” capital may be more feasible in legal terms. 
But this constellation only raises the geopolitical stakes for a “green” transformation: The governments in question 
tend to be almost entirely dependent on the fossil fuel sector for their own budget, for their geopolitical standing 
and for the general prosperity of their domestic economies. For these states, the liquidation of their fossil 
enterprises may amount to self-liquidation.
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9.1.4 Cheap Nature
The analysis in chapter 6 revealed the extent of the global economy’s reliance on cost externali-
zations. The need to compensate for the internalization of such costs in a Green Economy scenario
leads  to  all  manner  of  new externalizations,  reproducing  the  dilemma identified  at  the  outset:
“Green” accumulation that relies on the re-externalization of social and environmental costs violates
the GE’s normative aspirations. Various manifestations of this final strategy were discussed in bloc
III.  As  anticipated,  most  of  the  GE’s  Cheap  Nature  strategies  involve  cost  externalizations,
including  both  supposedly  “green”  technologies  and  many  strategies  for  the  rationalized
management of  natural capital.  Only very limited potential for “green” appropriations of  Cheap
Nature was found. 
Where the dependence of livelihoods on natural capital is highest, its conceptualization as
capital and the attendant commodification tendencies are most threatening to these livelihoods, as
the REDD+ case demonstrates. In the GE’s  ontology of natural capital, this argument appears in
inverted form, with  natural capital  strategies portrayed as a means to  protect livelihoods.295 But
nature obviously comes cheapest where populations can be dispossessed at low cost, and the need to
protect the global environment has here become a source of legitimation for local “green” land
grabs. Through this particular linkage of scales, the bulk of potential negative side-effects can be
safely  externalized  to  places  with  little  purchasing  power,  and  the  envisioned  technological
solutions threaten to further disenfranchise Southern rural populations in particular. 
Global relations of power and control will be discussed further in chapter 11, which also
engages  with  current  geopolitical  power shifts  away from the  old  Northern core zones.  These,
however, do not necessarily serve to empower those marginalized, often rural and often indigenous,
populations which are most directly affected by Green Economy policies. Against this background,
the relatively marginal gains that Northern capital can expect from GE-facilitated appropriations in
the  global  South  seem  to  fade  in  geopolitical  relevance  –  but  this  does  not  lessen  the
disproportionate negative impacts on affected communities. 
In  a  similar  vein,  many  “green”  technologies  involve  a  directly  material  dimension  of
externalization,  in  which  low  levels  of  pollution  in  more  privileged  zones  of  consumption  –
rewarded by policies of cost internalization – are realized on the basis of highly polluting mining
enterprises with low to non-existing worker safety standards in less privileged zones of extraction,
as described in chapters 5 through 7. Electric vehicles are an important case in point, but all manner
of “smart” digital solutions that increase energy efficiency at the point of consumption are enabled
295 “Natural capital comprises as much as 25% of the total per capita wealth in low income countries, and as such the 
sustainable and productive use of this natural capital can be a central part of green growth in these countries and 
ensuring sustainable livelihoods for poor people.” (OECD, 2011b, p. 103)
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by the exploitation of cheap labor and low environmental standards elsewhere. It is hard to assess
what would become of these “green” alternatives in the case of an actual full internalization of
social and environmental costs. On a truly level playing field that forced all sides to internalize the
costs of their products, if this were conceivable at all, some “green” contenders would certainly beat
incumbent technologies. Others, such as biofuels from food crops, may not. But what if neither of
these alternatives were commercially viable under these conditions? 
A further prevalent type of externalization is the intergenerational cost shift: Since much of
the necessary climate change mitigation is delayed in Green Economy scenarios until such time as
science-fiction  technologies  become available,  the  further  exploitation  of  Cheap  Nature in  the
present  (in  the  form of  the  excessively  cheap  or  free  use  of  atmospheric  sinks)  is  effectively
warranted at the expense of future generations who may find themselves without recourse to these
speculative high-tech remedies (see section 7.3). 
The  ontology of natural capital  may also be interpreted as a  Cheap Nature  strategy (cf.
section 7.1).  Here,  abstract  social  nature  is  construed so as  to  fall  in  alignment  with  capital’s
managerial attitude. Nature is reduced to its function as a condition of further accumulation, and
capital seeks both to avoid the costs of degradation and rationalize the costs of compliance. In this
sense,  natural capital  management constitutes an accumulation strategy. At the same time, this is
quite a stretch from the original notion of  Cheap Nature: It involves the  capitalization  of nature
more than its free appropriation, in a last-resort strategy to reduce capital’s costs of adaptation to a
“full” world. Many central GE policies derived from the ontology of natural capital – such as PES
schemes or carbon pricing – are not readily subsumable under any of the four GSASs. They may be
understood as negative accumulation strategies – attempts to minimize the  drag on (the conditions
for) future systemic accumulation exerted by increasingly pressing ecological constraints, by means
of  introducing  –  theoretically  –  economically  efficient  mechanisms  to  allocate  mitigation  and
adaptation burdens. They thus combine elements of the GSASs “green” creative destruction  and
Cheap Nature: Through resource and pollution pricing, they seek to tip the balance of forces in
favor  of  “green”  firms  and activities,  and by streamlining  of  compliance  costs  and sundry  re-
externalization mechanisms,  they  attempt to  maintain resources  and sinks  as  cheap as  possible
(albeit by relatively highly capitalized means).296 If it worked, thus, the ontology of natural capital
would serve to maintain accumulation within an increasingly “full” world, even if this still meant
net costs relative to previous eras of relatively worry-free accumulation in an “emptier” world. 
296 In the world-ecology vocabulary, this may be understood as a cost-effective (ideally, at least) reduction of the 
ecological negative-value amassed by capital (Moore, 2015, pp. 274–286). 
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9.2 The Green Economy: A win-win-win scenario?
Thesis 9.2: The  Green Economy  treats the three proposed sets of conditions very unevenly:  The
economic dimension,  systemic  accumulation,  is  consistently  prioritized  over  the  ecological  and
social dimensions, both of which are heavily compromised.  Despite all rhetoric to this effect, no
plausible win-win-win scenario that balances all three is offered. 
This section turns to the tripartite set of criteria proposed in section 4.5, discussing the ecological,
economic and social “performance” of the Green Economy as assessed in blocs I through IV.
9.2.1 Economic conditions
The economic dimension is clearly prioritized, as expressed in the World Bank’s and the OECD’s
preference for the term green growth. The timidity of the Green Economy approach on the other two
counts  is  largely  a  consequence  of  this  prioritization  of  “smooth”  capital  accumulation.  As
highlighted throughout chapter 8, in the GE approach capital is never understood as the problem but
always  posited  as  the  solution  to  environmental  problems.  Processes  of  “green”  creative
destruction are highly circumscribed so as not to interfere with systemic accumulation (see section
9.1.3). This priority is, of course, perfectly understandable with regard to the imperative of systemic
accumulation for a  relatively smooth functioning of global capitalism. Through this prioritization,
the GE reinforces the discursive shift in the sustainability debate initiated by the three-pillars model
itself, which brought economic considerations to the foreground (cf. von Hauff & Kleine, 2009).
In fact, much of the modeling in the GE studies  begins with the assumption of ongoing
sectoral and overall GDP growth, which is treated almost as an exogenous factor, and then specifies
the efficiency gains that need to be realized in order to square these projections with ecological
limits. Likewise, strategy formulation, as spelled out by the World Bank, begins with economic
objectives and then moves on “to identify … the environmental improvements that are most likely
to  increase  [economic]  welfare”  in  order  to  privilege  these  (World  Bank,  2012,  pp.  158–159,
emphasis  added).  Whether  or  not  any  given  ecological  concern  makes  it  onto  the  GE agenda
apparently  depends  on  its  expected  economic  implications.  Within  this  framework,  the  WB
identifies “substantial scope for growing cleaner without growing slower” (World Bank, 2012, p. xi)
and promises that getting the prices right, understood in this work mainly as a strategy to reduce the
inevitable  drag on growth exerted by ecological constraints (see section 4.4), “is key to greening
growth without slowing it.” (Ibid.,  p. 45) By contrast,  UNEP provides concrete numbers. In its
scenarios,  the  Green  Economy  is  expected  to  deliver  lower  rates  of  economic  growth  than
experienced in 20th-century capitalism (see figures in section 2.3). In this scenario, the pressure to
accumulate by such “other means” is arguably reinforced. But this, of course, not only violates the
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social  conditions  for  “green”  capitalism;  it  also  undermines  the  stability  of  any  regime  of
accumulation: In wealthy economies, one can only dispossess broader segments of the population
so much before this strategy undermines effective demand, leading to those imbalances between the
departments  of  production  that  spell  crisis  for  smooth  accumulation.  Among  the  global  poor,
meanwhile, dispossession faces rather obvious absolute limits. 
It thus remains highly questionable that such green growth is realizable at a systemic level at
all.  Many proposed “greening” strategies are immediately macroeconomically counterproductive
(cf.  sections 4.4 and 9.1).  From a regulationist  perspective,  a functioning “green” accumulation
regime has not emerged – neither in theory nor in practice. With a view to the ubiquity of problem
shifting, this observation particularly apposite at the global scale. The global economy is not on
track to achieve the decoupling necessary to warrant a sustainable regime based on accumulation by
expanded  reproduction  within  ecological  constraints.  At  this  point,  the  full  internalization  of
ecological costs (which itself is not an objective category) not only faces relative, political limits –
its attempted implementation may fast hit the “absolute” floor, defined in capitalist economies by
the average rate of profit falling to zero or lower. “Absolute” is put in quotation marks here because
realities of differential accumulation somewhat relativize the function of the average rate of profit,
and  because  this  target  itself  is  always  moving.  Every  push  toward  cost  internalization  would
prompt new re-externalization attempts on the part of affected capital factions. The possibility and
reality of accumulation by dispossession expands the leeway for accumulation despite ecological
constraints – but within limits.
9.2.2 Ecological conditions
As to the ecological dimension, deficits are obvious at the global level, as demonstrated in section
2.1 and chapter  3.  Here,  the unbroken dynamic  of  capital  accumulation  has  continued to  push
through  ecological  boundaries,  whether  with  regard  to  climate  change,  biodiversity  or  natural
capital “stocks” such as rain forests. These global indicators show little tolerance for meddling and
reinterpretation: While the social  impacts of climate change can be shifted among social groups,
climatic stability as such, for example, is ultimately non-shiftable – as acknowledged in principle in
the GE’s macroeconomic perspective. Here, the shortcomings of Green Economy strategies are less
ambiguous and can be read more directly off global statistics. Section 3.2 suggests that no turna-
round has taken place on either of these counts in practice. Even in theory, meanwhile, the targets
proposed in the GE models are critically insufficient to contain climate change (see section 3.1).
This holds true for other dimensions of ecological crisis as well: In UNEP’s G2 scenario, the most
specific  projection  of  a  future  Green  Economy,  by  2050  the  global  economy’s  environmental
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footprint is still expected to equal 1.2 times Earth system capacity (UNEP, 2011, p. 518). Most tech-
nological fixes considered, meanwhile, involve new environmental externalizations (see bloc III).
It is somewhat easier to deal successfully with  local forms of pollution in  green growth
approaches. These often can be traced to specific sources for which regulatory and technological
remedies are available, whereas the climate issue affects the entire economic infrastructure. For
local pollution issues, benefits also accrue at the local level, which facilitates the internalization of
costs.297 Perhaps more importantly, such efforts also fit better into a competitive framework, given
that many “locally dirty” activities can in principle be shifted to other locations and their costs thus
re-externalized (or, in the case of extractive activities, they remain restricted to certain locations
while  generally  leaving others  unaffected).  Such uneven development  is  evident:  According  to
World Bank (2019g) data, exposure to air pollution (PM 2.5) sank considerably across high-income
countries throughout the 2010s while remaining at  excessively high levels in all  other country-
income groups; likewise, the OECD (n.d.) notes that mortality from this exposure went down in the
OECD area over the same period while tending slightly upwards globally.298 More dramatically,
“green” tech’s dependence on raw materials whose extraction involves highly polluting techniques
couples  the  emergence  of  clean-tech  enclaves  to  the  ongoing  proliferation  of  sacrifice  zones
elsewhere (see section 6.4). Consequently, local and regional green growth success stories go hand
in hand with such sacrifice zones – and even with aggregate declines in environmental “quality.” As
outlined in section 4.5.2, however, even local sacrifice zones – to which social and environmental
costs are (re-)externalized – violate the normative principles suggested in the GE literature and thus
should be avoided altogether in a Green Economy. 
For the so-called emerging economies, which receive much attention in the GE literature due
to the enormous impact of their rapid growth on global environmental indicators, a recent OECD
paper finds “little progress in non-energy material use productivity …. Air pollution has also been
getting worse … Water scarcity is a growing issue … Performance on deforestation is mixed.”
(Capozza & Samson, 2019, p. 9) Nevertheless, in the familiar mindset of governance optimism, all
countries included in the study are found to be “making progress towards green growth, with new
strategies, policies and governance structures.” (Ibid., p. 11) The GE institutions generally tend to
downplay the extent of environmental damage, as exemplified by UNEP’s Inclusive Wealth Index,
297 With regard to fossil fuels, some researchers estimate these local externalities to exceed global (warming) 
externalities by a large margin; see note 193.
298 The World Bank indicator measures the share of population exposed to levels of PM2.5 that exceed the WHO 
guideline value. This share went down from 74% to 55% across high-income countries from 2010–2017, whereas 
despite slight downward trends, figures for all other country-income groups remained at above 96%. The OECD 
notes intra-OECD mortality rates from PM2.5 exposure of 351 (per 1 million inhabitants) for 2010, down to 326 for
2017; globally, the mortality rate went up from 378 (2010) to 389 (2017).
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which, in the tradition of “weak” sustainability concepts, justifies quite dramatic  natural capital
depletion with reference to the ongoing build-up of “gray” capital (UNEP, 2018b).
Finally,  the  future  scenarios  sketched  out  by  the  OECD  and  UNEP  rely  heavily  on
technologies such as nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS) to meet climate targets.
These  should  be  considered  high-risk  technologies  ripe  with  potentially  large-scale  negative
consequences for ecosystems and human populations – thus, they do not satisfy the precautionary
principle.  A  Green  Economy  that  can  only  come near  achieving  its  targets  in  one  department
(climate) with recourse to technologies that endanger its commitments in others is clearly deficient. 
9.2.3 Social conditions
Social externalizations persist in the uneven application of Green Economy policies. Whether in the
case  of  forest  conservation  programs  or  fossil  fuel  consumer  subsidy  reforms,  the  aspect  of
compensation – included in neoclassical environmental economics as a central mechanism (in the
payments for ecosystem services case) or a theoretical afterthought (in the subsidy case) – is rarely
implemented with consistency. Three of the four “green” systemic accumulation strategies involve
social externalizations: The appropriation of Cheap Natures is almost nothing but an externalization
strategy, and adverse health impacts in zones of extraction in particular have been documented in
bloc III. New Landnahmen  are likely to deepen social inequalities. Even technological advances,
preferred for their win-win potential, tend to have the same effect over time, by displacing labor
from the production process and increasing the relative weight of privately owned assets across the
economy.299 (The problem of “green” technological unemployment, of course, remains hypothetical
as  long  as  green-tech  development  proceeds  at  a  modest  pace.)  And  the  fourth  option,  the
“downsizing” strategy in which costs are shifted to capital instead, is politically off the table. 
Generally,  of  course,  as  previously  emphasized,  social  cost  externalizations  are
fundamentally enabled by power asymmetries: More powerful groups are able to externalize costs
to  less  powerful  groups  through  favorable  policy  decisions  and  non-decisions.  More  powerful
groups are also more likely to be able to successfully claim compensation for any losses connected
to  environmental  policies,  while  for  less  powerful  groups these  often  fall  by the  wayside  (see
section 8.2.3). REDD+ is a salient case in point among Green Economy schemes (see sections 3.2.4
and 7.4): The forestry program offers a cheap opportunity for Northern actors – state and private –
to maintain their carbon-intensive infrastructures, mostly through deals with Southern governments,
which then tend to re-externalize the costs to already marginalized forest-dependent communities.
299 The latter thought is indebted to a remark in a UNEP study (2018b, p. 11), pointing out that as the relative share of 
“produced” capital in overall social wealth is rising at the expense of “natural” capital (and this is the case with 
economic growth even if natural capital is preserved in absolute terms), by tendency, an asset category that is 
mostly privately owned is crowding out another that, to a larger extent, consists of commons.
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These  communities,  the  weakest  forest  users  socio-economically,  are  penalized  through  access
restrictions while receiving few of the benefits that should, in theory, compensate for these losses.
In the GE framework, such asymmetries are for the most part downplayed, if not outright ignored. 
Even as a leading OECD official recently admitted to having treated the social dimension as
an afterthought and promised to catch up, the organization’s output around its 2018 Green Growth
and  Sustainable  Development  conference  reproduced  a  depoliticized  perspective  in  which  cost
externalizations appear as mere design faults to be corrected by “better” and more “well-targeted”
policies (see section 8.3.5).300 But obviously, the profound political-economic asymmetries between
the social groups involved are already inscribed in the policy “design” process, which is undertaken
by powerful Northern actors with varying degrees of “stakeholder consultation” in the South. An
“uneven” application of such policies, therefore, is inherent to capitalist power relations. 
This externalization-heavy approach, of course, has political implications for the implemen-
tation of the GE agenda. Whether biopiracy, mineral extraction and large hydropower projects in the
global South or GMOs credited with “sustainable intensification” and large-scale renewable energy
projects  in  the  North:  Instead  of  a  renewed  class  compromise,  endless  conflict  over  particular
technologies and projects ensues, slowing progress even towards this unevenly “green” economy.
Another aspect of the definition of social conditions for “green” capitalism in section 4.5.3
has not received as much attention since: The question of social reproduction, which certainly goes
beyond public health questions to include the crucial role of reproductive or care work. But the GE
reports are remarkably silent about this, and the care crisis under capitalism today with its heavily
gendered patterns of cost  externalization is  not  addressed at  all.  While  the care crisis  may not
immediately (i.e., in the short run) translate into a deep macro-level functional problem for capital,
this omission certainly violates the normative criteria proposed here. Even a subsequent, substantive
scoping study to address “women’s participation in green growth”  (von Hagen & Willems, 2012)
narrowly  frames  such  “participation”  in  terms  of  labor  market  integration  and  female
entrepreneurship. Despite passing references to the necessary inclusion of men in these debates and
to the provision of child care facilities, the main thrust of the study in terms of women’s domestic
situation is that “family-friendly practices” to facilitate formal employment are to be developed,
including “flexible” work schedules  and “home-based work” – as already “established in some
developed  countries.”  (Ibid.,  p.  19)  In  other  words,  instead  of  a  more  systematic,  equitable
redistribution  of  reproductive  work,  women’s  “triple  burden”  of  paid  work,  care  work  and
300 The reference is to a statement by Kumi Kitamori, Head of the Green Growth and Global Relations division at the 
OECD, at the conference’s closing session, Paris, November 29, 2018. 
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household  work (ibid.,  p.  47)  is  simply  to  be  organized  more  efficiently.  Many capitalist  core
countries, in this understanding, have already realized this vision of “green” gender justice. 
Returning  to  regulationist  vocabulary  once  more,  the  Green  Economy  lacks  even  the
rudiments of a mode of regulation that could contain all of these latent political-economic conflicts
and stabilize “green” accumulation. With, on the one hand, compensatory mechanisms for broader
populations  existing  mostly  in  theory,  workers’  rights  sidelined  and  mediating  institutions
underdeveloped while, on the other, capital is still faced with the unattractive prospect of partial
cost  internalization,  the  Green  Economy  does  not  seem  to  offer  much  to  any significant
constituency. As highlighted in chapter 8, this makes political mobilization for this project almost
impossible. (This thread will be picked up again in chapter 10.)
9.3 The Economy of Additionality
Thesis 9.3: Partly due to its insistence on incrementality, the “actually emerging” Green Economy
takes shape as an  Economy of Additionality that leaves the fossil-fueled infrastructure of global
capitalism in place and develops little transformative power. 
The summary of the evidence gathered throughout the previous chapters, as summarized in the first
two sections above, suggests that the “actually emerging” Green Economy is far from matching the
basic criteria formulated in section 4.5. This even applies, to a large extent, to the GE  models on
paper.  Yet,  real-world  efforts  that  point  vaguely  in  the  direction  of  a  “green”  transformation
undeniably exist, and they have been subject to intensive debates. In this section, it will be argued
that these developments take the shape of an Economy of Additionality (EoA) which co-exists with
the familiar infrastructures and dynamics of “gray” capitalism. The “green” transformation is thus
truncated, with only those moments immediately beneficial to capital managing to flourish.
The  notion  of  an  Economy  of  Additionality301 encompasses  many  of  the  developments
discussed across the previous chapters. In one sense, it  mirrors the logic of the  energy security
discourse  that  is  dominant  vis-à-vis  “green”  discourses  (see  section  2.2):  In  “all-of-the-above”
energy strategies  (Furman & Stock, 2014), renewable energy is needed to satisfy growing overall
energy demand and reduce dependence on energy imports, following geopolitical considerations.
This strategy by no means implies a dramatic reduction in the use of fossil energy  per se. On a
related note, if renewable energy becomes increasingly cost-competitive in marginal terms, this by
301 This term is a deliberate inversion of the positive notion of “additionality” in a green-capitalist context: In 
certification procedures for carbon markets, additionality refers to carbon emissions savings a given “green” project
claims to realize beyond the baseline provided by regulatory standards and/or business-as-usual technologies; it is 
notoriously difficult to measure and has been subject to widespread fraud and manipulation (see section 3.2.3). In 
the inverted, negative meaning implied here, additionality refers to a “green” economy emerging in addition to the 
“gray” rather than, as commonly claimed, supplanting the latter. It highlights the ironic consequences of complex 
market-based policies that fetishize economic efficiency while failing to achieve an effective transformation. 
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no means implies that the infrastructural conditions for an energy system that relies more or less
exclusively on renewables are fulfilled – or economically fulfillable (see section 6.3.2). This holds
true on the production side,  with the problem of highly fluctuating power generation becoming
more dramatic as the share of renewable energy increases, as well as on the consumption side, with
electricity consumption highly concentrated in industrial core zones and many infrastructures in
sectors such as transportation neither technically electrifiable nor currently operable with biofuels
for both technical and supply reasons. Such infrastructural factors facilitate the EoA outcome.
In the transportation sector, where official policy tends to measure its success in terms of
reduced emissions increases relative to a hypothetical “business as usual” case instead of absolute
reductions, the trajectory is particularly alarming. A salient case in point is the global agreement to
reduce emissions from aviation, which aims at a neutralization of the expected massive emissions
increases in the next decades through offset schemes which are expected to dampen the post-2020
increase by 80% (European Commission, 2016a; see also section 3.2.3). The usual caveats to the
“carbon neutrality” achieved through such offset measures of course apply, but even if all offsets
were genuine, the sector would continue to register net emissions growth, with no peak in sight.
From the perspective offered here, the term preferred by both OECD and World Bank, green
growth  rather than  Green Economy, may be understood to contain an ironically distinct meaning
after all: It is primarily the  additions  to the global infrastructure – in the expanding cities of the
global South in particular – for which some measure of “greening” is being pursued. In a literal
sense, thus, growth itself is incrementally “greened” while the infrastructural base of the global
economy remains dependent on fossil fuels and massive resource consumption.302 In an important
sense,  then,  even  this  “greened”  growth  may  be  said  to  still  be  coupled  to  the  unsustainable
infrastructural basis – even if the environmental footprint no longer follows the exponential GDP
growth  path  and  some relative  decoupling  is  achieved.  As  the  concept  of  decoupling  is  often
understood  on a  purely  statistical  basis,  it  tends  to  obscure  this  enduring  relationship  between
concrete material infrastructures and abstract economic growth.
But this Economy of Additionality is not only insufficient to prevent ecological degradation,
it also belies the more expansive understanding advanced by the OECD which originally led me,
like many other observes, to conflate the concepts of  Green Economy  and  green growth:  “Green
growth  implies  transforming  current  modes  of  production  and  consumption  across  the  entire
economy at a global scale.” (OECD, 2015a, p. 3) This transformation, for structural- and political-
economic reasons, remains absent from the political horizon. Instead, the  EoA’s pick-and-choose
302 Worse, in parts of the green growth literature ecological concerns are still effectively treated as completely 
exogenous to the economic process. In the words of a study published by a state-run development organization, 
green growth is about “adding an ecological dimension to growth.” (von Hagen & Willems, 2012, p. 10)
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approach to “greening” seeks to turn the value-theoretical  implications discussed in section 4.4
upside  down,  refusing  to  internalize  costs  consistently  while  trying  to  capture  the  expansive
potential that green-tech development offers.  
The EoA, it should be noted, is literally prefigured in the GE model: In their initial critique
of UNEP’s model, Victor and Jackson (2012) posed the trenchant question why the basic defining
parameter of the “green” scenarios is the  additional  “green” investment undertaken (1 and 2% of
global GDP, respectively), instead of a consistent reallocation from “gray” to “green” investment.
With this incremental approach to ecological modernization,  Green Economy policies may reduce
local forms of pollution, particularly in rapidly urbanizing “emerging” economies. But this carries
little news value, given that traditional “command and control” environmental policies achieved
such outcomes in many parts of the global North beginning in the 1970s. This failure to achieve
transformative change is not just a question of insufficient political assertiveness; it is rooted in the
very policy strategies chosen for the “green” transition. Market-based governance, usually chosen
for  its  non-disruptive  and  non-confrontational  character,  lends  itself  to  incremental  rather  than
transformative processes of adaptation (cf. section 10.1).
The empirical investigations throughout the previous blocs have led to this – inductively
inferred – notion of an  Economy of Additionality. The final bloc V will now consider the future
prospects of systemic “greening,” asking not least whether, from a theoretical perspective, “green”
capitalism inevitably takes the form of an EoA.
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BLOC V:
 BEYOND THE GREEN ECONOMY:
“GREEN” SYSTEMIC ACCUMULATION IN
THE 21st CENTURY
It is now time to turn to the final question proposed at the outset:  Beyond the
Green Economy  model, what are the prospective limits to the “greening” of
capitalism? Building on the discussion of the previous bloc, this means asking
whether or not “green” capitalism inevitably takes the form of an Economy of
Additionality. Are these problems specific to the GE approach? Could “green”
capitalism, in principle, do better? 
 In  this  vein,  chapter  10  explores  the  potential  and  limitations  of
alternative  green-capitalist  scenarios  such as  a  Green New Deal,  contrasting
these  to  the  Green  Economy. Chapter  11  then  turns  to  the  global  level,
considering  the  all-but-impossible  political-institutional  requirements  of  a
globalized “green” cycle of capital accumulation.  
All of this suggests that the Economy of Additionality conceptualized in
the  previous  bloc,  rather  than  being  only  a  product  of  unfortunate  –  but
amendable – strategic decisions, must also be understood as an expression of
the structural contradictions between capital and ecology detailed in chapter 4,
and ultimately no green-capitalist strategy appears capable of overcoming these
contradictions.
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10. Green-capitalist alternatives
Is the Economy of Additionality the only shape that a supposedly “green” capitalism could assume?
This chapter explores contrasting modes of “green” governance and the potential of a Green New
Deal project to realize the environmental, economic and social promises of “green” capitalism. The
discussion,  assuming  for  a  moment  that  political-economic  constraints  to  “greening”  can  be
overcome, seeks to clarify the extent of the historical variability of capitalism – and to identify the
barriers posed by structural-economic constraints, the more or less transhistorical “essence” of the
accumulation process.
10.1 Industrial policy and modes of “green” governance 
Thesis 10.1: The Green Economy’s preference for “soft,” market- and incentive-based governance
mechanisms – theoretically consistent with a general intensification of neoliberalization processes
that is  expectable under ecological constraints – stands in marked contradiction to patterns of
“actually  emerging  green  economies,”  which  generally  involve  much  greater  degrees  of  state
intervention and public investment.
Unsurprisingly,  in  view of  the  difficulties  of  effecting  a  transition  that  enables  future  “green”
systemic accumulation, the role of the (national) state in a potential green-capitalist transition is
intensely contested. As outlined in chapter 2, the  Green Economy  takes a more market-oriented
approach, while green-Keynesian proposals involve more state-directed strategies. 
Carl Death instead argues that “the green economy is a firmly statist concept” (Death, 2015,
p. 2208) that embodies a “post-Washington Consensus” favoring greater state regulation compared
to neoliberal orthodoxy (ibid., p. 2210). But even so, he identifies the notion of statehood involved
here as a neoliberal, market-oriented one (ibid., p. 2219), and as emphasized in section 2.4, I would
concur  with  the  latter  assessment.  Neoliberal  political  practice  never  really  was  about  the
withdrawal  of  the  state  but  about  a  restructuring  of  its  functions  (Brenner  & Theodore,  2007;
Mirowski,  2013;  Peck  &  Tickell,  2002).  While  the  GE reports  may  envision  a  tightening  of
environmental regulations and a very tentative intensification of industrial interventionism in the
sense of a somewhat “ecologically enlightened” neoliberalism, the primary tasks of the state that
emerge from these texts include the fixing of market failures, the tendential commodification of
natural capital and the mobilization of (mostly) private finance for a “green” transition. Again, the
state is conceptualized as a partner or enabler of capital, not as a necessary counterweight. 
This is firmly in line with the broader neoliberal conception of the state. The “neoliberali-
zation” of nature – in the sense of its valorization and financialization, to the degree that it has
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occurred so far – has been enabled by a panoply of state interventions (Brand & Wissen, 2018, pp.
63–64;  Castree,  2008;  Heynen  &  Robbins,  2005).  Parallel  processes  of  securitization  that
characterize the (quite extensive) activities of real-world neoliberal statehood in times of mounting
social inequality, geopolitical conflict and ecological crisis, meanwhile, are not discussed in the GE
literature (for grim perspectives on securitization with regard to ecological crisis, see Chaturvedi &
Doyle, 2015; Wainwright & Mann, 2018; cf. section 12.3). To return to Death’s claim: It is in the
nature of policy consulting to address, first and foremost, state agents. But the diagnosis of “firm
statism” as a departure from neoliberal politics implies something else altogether – a qualitative and
quantitative leap in the form and extent of state interventions in socio-economic processes. This, I
would argue, is not evident in the GE models discussed here. 
At the same time, and this returns the discussion to the contradiction analyzed throughout
this chapter, Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen correctly argue that given their ambition to effect a
“green” transition of the entire global economy, “the green economy concepts presuppose a strong
political steering capacity of the state, or of governance.” (Brand & Wissen, 2018, p. 44) Can such
capacity be realized “at a distance,” through market-mediated policies?
10.1.1 The Green Economy as market-based governance
As emphasized in section 2.4, to say that the GE relies on market-based governance is  not  to say
that it  is an expression of market purism. It  is  to say that there is a strong preference for both
voluntary  and  incentive-based  policies over mandatory or “command-and-control”  regulation of
environmental matters. This includes all manner of “soft” policies intended to encourage and nudge
private actors rather than to impose certain behaviors, in addition to “harder” but also market-based
policies such as taxes and carbon trading schemes. The OECD, for example, declared it “important
to communicate clearly that command-and-control measures are second-best solutions compared to
well-designed pricing instruments”; the former should only be “used as a complement” to the latter
(OECD, 2013, p. 10). In addition, this governance strategy involves a commodification-oriented
approach  to  social  policy  that  prioritizes  (labor)  market  “inclusion”  over  redistributional
mechanisms, while mainly seeking to enhance labor market “opportunities” (read: jobs) by indirect
means, through the creation of “business-friendly environments.” 
Finally, the GE links environmental policies to broader strategies of market liberalization
and neoliberal  governance,  for example with regard to labor markets  (cf.  Thiele,  2019; section
6.1.2) and energy and water markets (OECD, 2013, p. 10). In fact, as previously quoted, following
several decades of neoliberal policy consulting the OECD (2011b, p. 125) made it very clear that
“[g]reen  growth should  be conceived as  a  strategic  complement  to  existing  environmental  and
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economic policy reform priorities,” and that “green” strategies should best be crafted by focusing
on the synergies between these two: The removal of market distortions remained the high road to
green  growth (ibid.,  pp.  126–31),  and  “apparent trade-offs  between  strengthening  the  market
economy and pursuing green growth … should be scrutinised for  false  trade-offs.” (Ibid., p. 130,
emphases  added)  Where  the  two  come  into  undeniable  conflict,  such  as  when  “systemic
environmental risks” require greater intervention, the OECD actually recommended, if possible, to
avoid such hard choices by prioritizing measures in other sectors (ibid., pp. 130–131). 
The  World  Bank  report  (2012) is  a  good  indicator  of  the  relative  weight  attributed  to
different policy approaches in the Green Economy: Its second chapter, which is dedicated to ways of
“[i]nfluencing firms, consumers and policy makers,” dedicates five pages to market mechanisms,
six to strategies of “informing and nudging” and one to “hard” regulations. As it seems, the latter
are included mostly because they can be “more efficient” (ibid., p. 58) in some supposedly excep-
tional cases of market failure. Efficiency thus remains the yardstick, whereas policy effectiveness is
taken for granted, or, astonishingly, bracketed. But beyond related distributive questions, what are
the implications of this approach for the effective “greening” of capitalist economies?
Carbon trading is perhaps the quintessential market-based green-capitalist mechanism. It has
been the favorite regulatory mechanism on the part of industry representatives wherever they found
themselves forced to agree to  some  kind of regulation. In practice, where implemented,  cap and
trade has been accompanied by massive fraud and/or ineffective in reducing emissions significantly,
partly  because  of  the  massive  opportunities  it  offers  for  industry  influence  on  emissions  caps,
allocation  of  credits  and  offsetting  mechanisms  (see  section  3.2.1).  Even  UNEP  frankly
acknowledged that  emissions trading “has been recurrently tainted by cases of fraud and bribery,
abuses of power, and other conventional forms of corruption.” (UNEP Global Environmental Alert
Service, 2013, p. 2) As Kathleen McAfee rightly notes,  “[i]n any cap-and-trade system, it is the
regulatory  cap—what  neoliberals  might  dub  the  ‘command  and  control’ part—that  ultimately
matters.”  (2016, p. 345) By securing sufficiently lax emissions caps, exemptions and loopholes,
lobby groups have prevented this ostensibly “hard” component from interfering with accumulation,
knowing full well that despite all the talk about market  opportunities, emissions trading systems
crucially represent mechanisms to adjust to politically imposed constraints (see section 4.4.3). 
The widespread impression that capital’s preference for this market-based regulation is a
strategic attempt to buy time and keep “gray” economic infrastructures running without interference
as long as possible should hardly be understood as a conspiracy theory. It is precisely this time that
is stolen from any serious efforts to solve the climate problem. Ciplet et al.  (2015, pp. 135, 147,
emphases in original) here speak of the “carbon trading diversion,” which strategically “enabled a
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debate focused on sustainable projects, while leaving powerful interests largely untouched,” leading
the authors to wonder about the associated “opportunity costs of not pursuing other political or
technical strategies.” Boyd et al. (2011, p. 6) cite a Merrill Lynch executive who acknowledged that
“not even the most ardent market proponents are under any illusion that markets will solve the
problem.” The GE’s free-trade agenda is the international extension of this strategic outlook. 
The diversion works on different levels. Much emerging “green” business activity has been
in  accounting,  administration  and  (creative)  certification  for  such  policy  mechanisms  with
questionable effects, which neither contribute directly to material “green” transformation efforts nor
offer  systemic  accumulation  opportunities  (see  section  4.4.3  again).  In  fact,  financialization
mechanisms including carbon offsets are undermining the prospects for such actual transformation,
offering compliance workarounds for companies with “gray” infrastructures instead of promoting
the development and deployment of more sustainable technologies. With effective carbon prices in a
very low range (see section 3.2.1), the resulting incentives to innovate – presented as a central
justification for such “smart” regulatory mechanisms – are extremely limited,  and the expected
returns on money invested in regulatory lobbying at the fine-print scale are greater than those on
green-tech investments.
Technological innovation then tends to occur on the margins, incrementally, rather than in
the shape of deep transformations of industrial infrastructures – even if the GE institutions very
explicitly argue that they envision the latter rather than the former  (OECD et al., 2018). Market
incentives  privilege  short-term fixes  and  workarounds  over  (infra)structural  transformations.  In
keeping with the diversion theme, Larry Lohmann argues that the focus on emissions markets itself
distracts from the real issue: “[S]hort-term actions can be assessed for their climatic effectiveness
only by determining the part they play in a longer-term shift away from reliance on fossil fuels”
(Lohmann, 2009a, p. 28), whereas credits in carbon markets are established on the basis of (often
hypothetical) short-term emissions effects. In this incentive structure, a filter added to a coal power
plant  provides  much  more  reliable  rewards  than  longer-term  investments  in  renewable  energy
infrastructure.  As  Lohmann’s  examples  demonstrate,  offset  schemes  in  the  context  of  carbon
markets even effectively support new fossil-fuel developments, provided they incorporate the latest
mitigation techniques. For this, the baseline – the counterfactual scenario relative to which emission
savings are calculated – simply needs to involve the same plant without filter technologies.
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme discussed in section 3.2.1 is an illustrative case. A host
of problems have been diagnosed with regard to “the unmanaged effects of overlapping climate
policies” (Marcu et al., 2018, p. 9), which is partly due to the scheme’s international coverage but
also exemplifies a larger problem with emissions trading, namely that it leads to constant tension
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with other climate policies, including comparably efficacious command-and-control regulations that
interfere with the workings of the carbon market and “distort” prices. As Marcu et al. state, “it is not
clear to which extent these emission reductions [achieved by European industries throughout the
2010s] were driven by the EU ETS,” and to which extent other factors and policies were to be
credited  (ibid.,  p.  16).  The  EU currently  even  considers  giving  up  its  principle  of  technology
neutrality  (the  refusal  to  pick  winners  among  competing  technologies  politically;  ibid.,  p.  10),
which again would hamper the market’s functioning, centrally premised on the “neutral” competi-
tion among technologies for the most cost-effective emission savings. Such dilemmas indicate the
limited ability of market-based solutions to produce transformative – rather than only incremental –
effects:  In  order  to  safeguard the  market’s  efficient  functioning,  states  must  refrain from badly
needed additional efforts to guarantee effective goal compliance, and vice versa (cf. section 5.1.4).
The barriers to market-based transformation are equally palpable in the case of offsetting
schemes such as the  Clean Development Mechanism, and even an OECD-sponsored paper notes
that “CDM methodologies ... prove ill-suited to complex projects” like the transformation of public
infrastructures (Glachant, 2013, p. 12). Market-based regulatory schemes seek to elicit large-scale
investments in entirely new “green” infrastructures, but for market actors, such investments would
be an inappropriate response to the incentive structure that they are presented with. 
The  OECD  directly  expresses  the  irony  in  a  paper  reflecting  on  early  implementation
attempts of  green growth policies, first claiming that “a well-designed emissions trading system
could sharply reduce GHG emissions while allowing GDP to keep growing (albeit  at a slightly
lower rate)” before going on to admonish that “it is crucial to provide predictable and long-term
policy signals to foster private investment.” (OECD, 2013, pp. 4, 15) While it may be possible in
theory to stabilize carbon market prices somewhat through clear “policy signals,” the mechanism is
desired precisely for its flexibility. Wild price fluctuations resulting from economic cycles as well as
from a host of other essentially unpredictable factors are difficult to regulate away if the market is to
function as such at all. This lack of predictability deters longer-term, larger-scale investments in
“greening” efforts. Recently, for example, the OECD (2018e, p. 24) warned that the “current low oil
price  regime  could  render  investment  in  new,  cleaner  technologies  less  profitable.”  Oil  prices
depend on a set of exogenous factors that include complex geopolitical developments. Investment
patterns both in energy-extracting and energy-consuming industries are fraught with uncertainties
regarding the complex interplay of supply and demand. How is it possible to get carbon prices
“right” against  this  backdrop? A price floor is conceivable,  but this  compromises the “flexible”
functioning of the market. (On the impossibility of objectively “right” prices see also section 7.2.2.)
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Ultimately, sectoral evidence produced by the OECD (2018a) itself fundamentally questions
the transformative effect of prices, suggesting that effective carbon pricing is at  times  inversely
correlated with effective “greening.” According to the study, it is the transport sector which prices
carbon most effectively across OECD and G20 countries – here, actual prices only fall short of the
€30 threshold (used as the carbon pricing benchmark in this case) by 21%, whereas the gap in the
electricity sector is found to exceed 80%. It is generally acknowledged, however, as outlined in the
previous  chapters,  that  “greening”  has  advanced  furthest  in  the  electricity  sector,  whereas
transportation emissions are projected to continue rising. Assuming prices were the main driver of
greening processes, one would expect a reverse outcome. 
10.1.2 Hypothesis: The Green Economy as intensified neoliberalization
One of the “green” accumulation strategies outlined in section 4.6 is that of new  Landnahmen  –
seizures of territory for capitalist accumulation. It relates both to the specific policy set of the Green
Economy and to capitalist development opportunities under ecological constraints in general. The
argument in this section refers not so much to the extensive dimension of Landnahmen in “green”
scenarios – the development of new “green” products and services – but to the intensive dimension
that  extends far beyond those resource-intensive sectors  predominantly targeted for “greening”:
Privatization and marketization of public services may occur as a result of valorization pressures.
Considering first those sectors primarily targeted in the Green Economy approach, the logic
of privatization is already inscribed here. The GE centrally relies on the “mobilization” of private
finance for investments in “greening.” This involves mandatory measures such as carbon pricing to
stimulate investments, but much of this “mobilization” is envisioned on a voluntary basis (for recent
evidence, see OECD et al., 2018). Willingness on the part of private finance, of course, hinges on
the perception of more or less immediate profitability, or “bankability” in investment jargon. If
public  subsidies  are  limited,  private-sector  “green”  investments  not  self-sustaining  (because
economically less attractive than conventional alternatives) and the need for attractive investment
opportunities great, an obvious solution is to grant capital access to public infrastructures which
relate to environmental consumption and pollution, such as water utilities and waste management.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) constitute one popular form of partial privatization to “mobilize”
private finance suggested by the World Bank (2012, pp. 21, 76) and the OECD (2011b, pp. 12, 71).
UNEP also  mentions  this  strategy  in  several  places,  but  acknowledges  the  controversial  social
impacts of privatization with regard to water (2011, pp. 144–145). The Bank frankly acknowledges
that this often requires “full cost recovery” for previously subsidized basic goods and services; the
imperative of getting the prices right is thus intimately linked to the possibility of privatization (see
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sections 4.4 and 7.2.1). Both WB and OECD also envision PPPs to stimulate innovation and tech-
nology diffusion by mitigating risk for private investors, in a pattern that suggests the privatization
of profits whereas public funds will cover most of the losses if the ventures should fail. 
According to the World Bank, “the need for innovation, efficiency, and ‘smart investments’
(smart grids, smart transportation, and smart houses) makes the role of the private sector even more
critical in green growth policies than it already is in traditional infrastructure finance.” (2012, p. 21)
PPPs, one of the most controversial phenomena of the neoliberal era, thus receive a new ecological
legitimation,  which  functions  according  to  the  same  rationale  that  always  accompanied  these
enterprises: Empty public coffers – incidentally hollowed out by austerity measures – are not able to
provide  the  urgently  needed  infrastructural  investments  (not  if  the  neoliberal  imperative  of
“balanced  budgets”  is  observed),  therefore  private  capital  –  floating  around  in  overabundance,
bolstered by the tax cuts that accompanied the same austerity measures – must fill in. The effect has
been, frequently, to reproduce and reinforce the bifurcation of private wealth and public squalor. It
is  not  least  the  GE preference  for  such approaches  to  resource  management  that  make further
Landnahmen in other sectors appear so realistic in a Green Economy scenario.
Let us now turn to these “other” sectors.  If  the expansion of “gray” infrastructures and
consumer  goods  is  limited  through  ecological  constraints  and  this  restriction  cannot  be  fully
compensated for with “green” alternatives, this is likely to increase the push for surplus capital to
move inwards by flowing into reproductive sectors whose degree of commodification has been
limited, including health and education, as well as other aspects of everyday life, as embodied in the
sharing economy  (see  section 10.2.2).  Even if  these  sectors  may involve  significant  ecological
footprints  of  their  own (cf.  section  5.1.2),  arguments  may be  constructed  that  present  them as
indispensable fields of relatively “green” accumulation in 21st-century service economies. Stringent
environmental regulation and pricing are likely to bring forward these effects,  which otherwise
would make themselves felt in the longer term with slowly rising costs of reproduction in the face
of environmental degradation and resource depletion.  In both cases,  these developments should
reinforce the neoliberalization processes which have worked towards re-commodification in these
sectors for decades, for both structural-economic and class-political reasons. The need to absorb and
employ productively ever greater amounts of capital  implies ever heightening pressures for the
commodification of the life-world (D. Harvey, 2015, Chapters 15–16; Huws, 2014, Chapter 6). 
The neoliberal character of the Green Economy is, thus, not restricted to the preference for
market-based  and “soft”  environmental  governance  and  the  insistence  on  “free”  trade  but  also
extends to the broader realm of domestic policymaking. It is, of course, also a matter of inheritance,
given that the proclaimed era of “green” capitalism is destined to succeed the established neoliberal
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 281
regime historically and, consequently, faced with the structural preconditions shaped by the latter.
But  the  OECD’s  previously  quoted  acknowledgment  that  green  growth  is  supposed  to  be  a
“strategic complement” to these “existing reform priorities” confirms that the GE, conceptualized
not  as  a  successor  to  but  as  a  continuation  of  neoliberal  hegemony,  is  consciously  driven  in
precisely this direction.
Here,  the  contradiction  does  not  seem  to  follow  straightforwardly  the  world-ecology
argument in which commodification processes generally raise the costs of reproduction for capital
and are thus a sign of crisis. The relative decommodification of health and (higher) education in the
20th century were gains won in struggles following Polanyi’s  (1965) double movement logic, much
of which capital had to pay for already through taxation and social security contributions deducted
from its surplus.303 The reversal of these historical gains is one of the mechanisms of accumulation
by dispossession underpinning the neoliberal regime’s economic success. By recommodifying these
fields, surplus capital can find outlets in fields with relatively inelastic demand (for the individual,
health and education expenses are usually not considered discretionary spending), relatively high
labor intensity and a relatively low environmental footprint per unit of revenue. In practice, this
entails a certain redistribution of income between classes (and certainly towards particular factions
of capital invested in these fields and lobbying for commodification that allows rent extraction) and
is thus economically attractive. Of course, it stands in marked contradiction to the social criteria for
“green” capitalism, which imply limits on the commodification of social reproduction.
At the same time, this strategy is limited in two respects: First, commodification of these
basic services tends to undermine the reproduction of a healthy and skilled workforce; second, from
a class perspective, spending in these sectors is still “unproductive” in the sense that profits made
here still drain the relative surplus available to capital (see section 4.4) – if no longer by state-
enforced taxation, then by raising effective labor costs to the degree that workers and employers
both attempt to counteract the first tendency. Exploding health care costs rooted in the extraction of
generous profits by private service providers, as in the U.S., are macroeconomically problematic
rather than a source of sustainable economic growth. Thus, the argument ultimately does validate
the world-ecology claim: The commodification of basic reproductive services is a prime example of
neoliberalism’s propensity for “taking” rather than “making”  (Moore,  2010, p. 390), which can
deliver  short-term gains  for  capital  in  distributive  struggles  – making the  Green Economy  and
303 In the case of the privatization and commodification of public services, the world-ecology distinction between 
appropriation and capitalization (or commodification) becomes complicated. It may be argued that the moment of 
costly internalization (which the capitalization category primarily refers to within this theoretical framework) 
already came when tax-based public services (and those otherwise co-financed by capital) were first established and
expanded; there is then a moment of appropriation in the politically enforced privatization of these services, but the 
“cheapening” effect from the standpoint of capital as a whole is dubious here (see also discussions of privatization 
in sections 4.4 and 7.2.1). 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 282
“green” capitalism more broadly so much less attractive from a working- and even middle-class
perspective – but is an overall sign of structural exhaustion at the macroeconomic level. 
10.1.3 Antithesis: “Green” capitalism as active industrial policy
The Green Economy is clearly market-focused (section 10.1.1), and as with “green” capitalism more
generally, its implementation is expected to trigger or reinforce further commodification processes
(section 10.1.2). But as we consider “actually emerging” green-capitalist developments, there is also
a strikingly antithetical development at play: Wherever “green” capitalism has made inroads with
some limited but comparably impressive transformative effects, these effects tend to be the product
of active, interventionist industrial policy rather than hands-off market governance. As regulationist
and Gramscian perspectives would predict, these strategies tend to be relatively successful not least
because they involve consent-building efforts and some degree of mediation between capital, labor
and environmental interests.
While such approaches depart from the prescriptions of the Green Economy reports, certain
overlaps remain: The state likewise appears as an enabler of capital – here one with a bigger purse –
rather than a constraining force. This leads directly to the limitations of these empirical tendencies:
In order to tip the balance of power towards “green” capital,  state interventions would have to
actively  impede  “gray”  industries  and  firms  so  as  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  “green”
challengers  and  engage  in  what  I  have  termed  “green”  creative  destruction,  elsewhere
conceptualized in less radical terms as disruptive green industrial policy (Cosbey, Wooders, Bridle,
& Casier, 2017). The power dynamics traced in chapter 8 have prevented this from happening at the
required scale. The path of state-enforced “green” creative destruction sketched out in section 4.6.3
remains blocked; instead,  green-capitalist  tendencies have been taking shape as an  Economy of
Additionality  (see section 9.3). While the EoA phenomenon is ultimately inevitable (see section
10.2), I will argue here that greater interventionism – the “managerial assault” invoked by Brand
and Wissen (2018) – could somewhat brighten the prospects for green-capitalist development.
One example is the large-scale application of feed-in tariffs for renewable energy applied in
Germany  (Pegels,  2017).  While  technically  a  market-based  mechanism,  paid  for  by  consumer
surcharges (large industrial energy users have been increasingly exempted) that are redirected to
producers in the electricity market, they involve politically determined rates for different types of
renewable energy, violating the holy green-neoliberal imperative of “technology neutrality”  (see
section 2.3). While eventually undermined by Chinese competition, these measures created a large
political  constituency by sharply increasing employment in the production of renewable energy
technologies by medium-sized businesses; by contrast, similar measures in the UK mostly benefited
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large energy companies (Lockwood, 2015). State-led approaches have also fostered green-industrial
developments in China and Brazil (Scoones, Leach, & Newell, 2015), although particularly in the
former case, this has been outweighed in its ecological effects by the enormous aggregate growth
rate (see section 11.5). The Korean Green New Deal, much celebrated among GE institutions (see
section  10.2.2),  was  based  on  active  state  planning  and  fiscal  policy,  partly  motivated  by  the
country’s extreme energy import dependency of 97% (Choi, 2015).304 Even the IPCC (2014, p. 28)
noted that despite the ostensibly greater cost-effectiveness of straightforward price-based regulation,
“[s]ector-specific policies have been more widely used than economy-wide policies.” 
As Mazzucato (2015) argues, “big push” efforts – funded, for example, through state-owned
banks  as  in  China  and  Germany  –  are  indispensable  for  large-scale  green-technological
development;  in her view, “[s]tates have a role to play throughout the entire innovation chain”
(ibid.,  p.  135),  whereas  venture  capital  is  much  too  impatient  and  risk-averse.  Mazzucato
understands this to contribute to the relatively subordinated role of the U.S. in “green” industrial
transformation,  much  in  line  with  Goldstein’s  (2018) extensive  analysis  of  U.S.  cleantech
entrepreneurialism detailed in section 5.2.1. She presents a similar case with regard to the UK’s
market-based  strategy,  arguing  that  private  investment  tends  to  be  geared  towards  short-term,
incremental improvements, not transformative technologies (Mazzucato, 2011). 
One illustrative case is provided by perhaps the most radical restructuring of the economy
envisioned in green-capitalist thought, the idea of a  circular economy  with long-lasting products
and almost-closed material loops enabled by extensive recycling, repairing and remanufacturing of
goods that was also promoted in UNEP’s GE report (2011, chapters on manufacturing and waste; cf.
Matsumoto & Nasr, 2016; Stahel, 2016; Spring & Araujo, 2017): “The main objective must be to
make manufactured goods last longer.”  (UNEP, 2011, p. 282) UNEP here obviously proposes the
complete inverse of capital’s  long-established practices of planned obsolescence (decreasing the
lifespan of  products  in  order  to  increase  turnover305)  without  explaining  convincingly  how this
fundamental  inversion  should  be  effected.  While  recognizing  that  these  strategies  will  only  be
deployed at the microeconomic level to the extent that they are individually profitable (ibid., pp.
260–261), it offers no “hard” policy plan to change market structures. Meanwhile, physical limits to
circularity persist, as emphasized in sections 4.2 and 6.4.3. There are also economic limits: Whether
304 Such motivations have been instrumental elsewhere, too: With 95% energy import dependency, the Moroccan 
government decided to invest heavily in “green” energy development (Vidican Auktor, 2017). While Vidican 
Auktor argues that the domestic economic development benefits have been limited so far, Morocco is now 
considered one of two countries with a climate policy that conforms to the Paris goal of limiting global warming to 
1.5 °C (Haberkorn, 2018).  
305 Although the popularity of the term may have increased recently, the “invention” of planned obsolescence as a 
conscious (macroeconomic) strategy dates back to the 1950s (Schmelzer, 2016, p. 154). Critical observers were 
already quite familiar with the concept by the mid-1960s (Marcuse, 1989, p. 280).
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a  capitalist  circular  economy based  on  “servitized,”306 shared,  made-to-last  products  could  be
profitable is highly dubious; whether it offered enough long-term accumulation opportunities to
avoid crises is yet more dubious.307 It is arguably far more difficult to warrant market growth if the
simple logic of maximized physical product sales is abandoned (see comments in section 10.2.2). 
But regarding governance mechanisms, proponents see the  circular economy  as a classic
case  for  industrial  policy:  “[T]he  transition  to  a  circular  economy  requires  a  whole  systemic
change,” and for this “the concept needs active government effort and strong coordination across
various  stakeholders.”  (Balke,  Evans,  Rabbiosi,  & Averous Monnery,  2017,  pp.  122,  126) It  is
extremely unlikely for such coordination among economic actors with partly overlapping and partly
competing or opposing interests to emerge organically and spontaneously in response to mere “price
signals.” In order to eliminate such practices as planned obsolescence, any effective “price” signal
would have to be so prohibitive as to amount to an outright ban. 
As  this  example  demonstrates,  and  unlike  market  rhetoric  suggests,  the  “greening”  of
industrial  infrastructures  is  not  just  a  matter  of  product  design,  production  technologies  and
competition in product markets. There is an inherently collective – and thus even more immediately
political – dimension to such developments. Transportation infrastructures, as highlighted through-
out this chapter, are another case in point: Where a narrow perspective points to the substitution of
electric  vehicles  for  combustion  engines,  which  not  incidentally  involves  significant  re-
externalizations, a broader perspective takes into account the vast collective – public and quasi-
public  –  infrastructures  that  condition  (even  necessitate)  and  enable  individual  mobility.
Transforming  these  requires  political  deliberation,  public  regulation  and  large-scale  investment
decisions that private actors are unable and/or unwilling to take. Price signals alone, once more, are
clearly insufficient.308 
306 Servitization has been defined as “[t]he transformational processes whereby a company shifts from a product-
centric to a service-centric business model and logic.” (Kowalkowski, Gebauer, Kamp, & Parry, 2017, p. 8) The 
concept has been found to be “converging rapidly” with the circular economy (Spring & Araujo, 2017, p. 134).
307 One long-standing advocate emphasizes that a circular economy “would change economic logic because it replaces 
production with sufficiency,” noting that “[t]he concept grew out of the idea of substituting manpower [sic] for 
energy.” (Stahel, 2016, p. 435) Both are obviously direct contradictions of basic capitalist logic – not only is 
sufficiency anathema, but the reduction of overall labor productivity in favor of greater resource productivity 
reduces the rate of surplus value (see section 5.2.1). While Stahel argues that “stewardship should overrule 
ownership and its right to destroy” (ibid., p. 437), he never discusses the economic context in which this is 
supposed to take place; he identifies the reasons for the slow uptake of circular economy practices in a lack of 
research caused by psychological factors such as “a lack of familiarity and fear of the unknown.” (Ibid., p. 436)
308 At times, the GE institutions seem to concur: The World Bank’s High-Level Commission on Carbon Pricing (2017, 
p. 5) admonishes that pricing mechanisms need to be combined with other measures to set off transformative 
changes “at the pace and on the scale required for the Paris target to be met.” Even the OECD (2011a) 
acknowledges that price signals work only where “green” alternatives are close to market or directly competitive 
with incumbent technologies; otherwise, research and development or performance standards are needed. 
Nevertheless, such occasional concessions tend to be downplayed in the overall policy framework, particularly 
regarding the scale and depth at which such interventions are required. Elsewhere, it is argued that “too many 
stringent and interacting targets … may go against the principle of seeking least-cost abatement options” (OECD, 
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This  reinforces  the  point  that private  green-tech  innovation depends on broader  societal
infrastructures if it is to develop any economic and ecological significance. This complexity had
been acknowledged in earlier  ecological modernization  theory  (Jänicke, 1988; Spaargaren, 2000)
but appears to have fallen victim to the neoliberal zeitgeist, not only within but also beyond the
Green Economy  institutions.309 The distinction and empirical discrepancy between  efficiency  and
consistency approaches as discussed in section 5.1.3 likewise attests to this bias: The GE with its
market-based mechanisms remains geared, to a large degree, towards incremental and structurally
conservative  efficiency  strategies  (the  example  of  coal  power  plant  retrofits,  again,  is  fitting).
Consistency approaches that transform the material base of the economy require more far-reaching
intervention and coordination, and they have been relatively neglected.
Ironically,  this need for more interventionist  industrial  policy has been acknowledged in
work published by UNEP both before and after its GE report. In a 2010 brochure with GE “success
stories” in “developing” countries (UNEP, 2010a), China was portrayed as a poster child, but it was
not unique in its state-directed GE efforts: In every case presented in the study, it was a set of
interventionist and mostly non-market policies that earned UNEP’s praise. In its later study of Latin
American development strategies and their relation to the GE, discussed at length in section 7.4.5,
UNEP  (2013) even  repeatedly  cited  Cuba  as  a  leading  example  of  sustainable  development.
Meanwhile, several contributions to a recent volume on  Green Industrial Policy  co-published by
UNEP (Altenburg & Assmann, 2017), some of which have been cited in this section, argued for the
need to engage in active and, at times, even confrontational industrial policy. While UNEP’s overall
GE framework may be less orthodox and more diverse than the OECD’s to begin with, the tone in
these specific publications is notably different from the win-win-win rhetoric that dominates the
public  presentations  of  the  Green Economy.  In  the 2011/12 GE reports  themselves,  meanwhile
(UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2012 in particular), Chinese examples were frequently cited as case
studies of successful “green” interventions without acknowledging the latent contradiction between
China’s state-capitalist approach and the GE’s preference for market-based solutions. The OECD
now nevertheless advises China to pursue more market-oriented approaches to the “greening” of its
industrial sector (DRC & OECD, 2017).310
2013, pp. 7–8), and a unified carbon market solution is again preferred for its supposedly superior efficiency.
309 One intriguing example for this marginalization of the role of public investment is the International Renewable 
Energy Agency’s 2018 annual report (IRENA & Climate Policy Initiative, 2018; cf. IRENA, 2018b), which 
foregrounds the message that more than 90% of investment in renewable energy stems from private sources. If one 
reads further, it becomes clear that this figure is systematically overstated; voluminous subsidies such as feed-in 
tariffs are not counted, and state-owned enterprises are listed as “private financial intermediaries.” 
310 Part of this argument refers to generic market-based environmental policies in a narrow sense. Another, more 
specific part involves a market-based elimination of overcapacity in resource-intensive sectors such as steel and 
cement (ibid., p. 13).  Much of this overcapacity, it is argued, has been sustained through subsidies to so-called 
“zombie enterprises” (ibid., p. 2) – in this specific context, of course, the market argument gains more traction.
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The  Green Industrial Policy  volume cited above even noted the tensions between active
industrial  policy approaches  and the  global  architecture of  “free”-trade  agreements;  almost  any
effort  to  foster  domestic  industries  thus  becomes  legally  problematic  (Cosbey,  2017).  This  is
striking  from the  perspective  taken  in  this  section:  It  is  precisely  the  attempt  to  link  “green”
development with provisions (labor-related, for example) that could garner public consent that is
more or less outlawed by international trade and investment law.311 “Green” industrial policy, after
all,  generally  seeks  to  combine  environmental  with  “a  complex  set  of  economic  and  social
objectives.” (Pegels, 2017, p. 167) Where paths to “green” regulation that threaten to cost jobs are
politically forestalled, paths that seek to compensate for such losses are blocked through “free”-
trade  treaties,  due  to  their  “discriminatory”  effects.312 Defending  the  orthodoxy,  OECD  staff
reviewing the performance of “emerging economies” noted that “Brazil’s local content requirements
(LCRs) have helped to develop a domestic wind power industry, but may limit industry productivity
and financing capacity in the long term.” (Capozza & Samson, 2019, p. 29, emphases added) Even
where (Southern) governments’ industrial policies have been effective, they are reprimanded for
deviating from “free”-trade orthodoxy with ominous reference to potential  future repercussions.
From a regulation as well as a Gramscian perspective, this does not bode well for the prospects of
“green”  capitalism:  When  forced  to  decide  between  market-friendly  greening  policies  and  no
serious greening policies, many jurisdictions find themselves forced to choose the latter.
When shifting our view from industrial policy to market-based conservation mechanisms, a
similar picture emerges. The promised benefits to local communities from payments for ecosystem
services  (PES) schemes were found to materialize precisely in those cases  in  which regulatory
design  departed  from market  logic  to ensure benefit  sharing.  Market buyers privilege the most
“efficient”  providers  of  such  services,  which  often  excludes  smallholders  whose  participation
entails  higher  transaction  costs  (McAfee,  2016) –  if  they  are  treated  as  full  and  autonomous
participants, which, as emphasized in chapter 7, is consequently often not the case. But precisely for
such reasons of “inefficiency” and lack of control on the part of capital, large-scale non-market PES
311 Morocco, one of the previously cited cases, has not signed the WTO agreement on Government Procurement and 
thus would have more leeway for local content requirements in its renewable energy programs; these, however, 
have been prevented by “multilateral financial institutions” (Vidican Auktor, 2017, p. 161) – one of the financial 
institutions cited here as being most involved in Morocco’s “greening” efforts, unsurprisingly, is the World Bank.
312 It bears emphasizing that this problem is not restricted to “green” industrial development; the international 
architecture of “free”-trade institutions has effectively outlawed those industrial development strategies that have 
been relatively successfully deployed by a number of Asian countries over the previous decades, all of which put 
limits on world market integration (Rodrik, 2001). In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea (the latter now being 
celebrated as a green growth poster child), these included “high levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, public 
ownership of large segments of banking and industry, export subsidies, domestic-content requirements, patent and 
copyright infringements, and restrictions on capital flows.” (Ibid., p. 59)
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mechanisms have had a hard time attracting private investment, as exemplified in the case of the
Yasuní-ITT project, briefly introduced in section 7.4.5.
From a  regulationist  perspective,  this  divergence  between  neoliberal  theory  and  (albeit
limited) evidence for actually successful practice with regard to processes of “green” industrial
transformation  and  “green”  regulation  more  generally  is  not  surprising. As  emphasized  above,
efforts  to  develop  an  active  “green”  industrial  policy  tend  to  seek  a  greater  balance  between
economic  (here  equated  with  capitalist  interests),  social  (here  including  labor  interests)  and
environmental objectives compared to the neoliberal policy prescriptions of the  Green Economy.
This facilitates political success – in Gramscian terms, it is a step towards hegemonic coalition
building. In regulation vocabulary, it encapsulates the foundations of a “green” mode of regulation. 
As diagnosed in section 9.2.3, such a mode of regulation is importantly lacking in the GE.
Vague references to “labor market implications,” “stakeholder engagement” or “compensation of
losers” – cited abundantly throughout chapter 8 – cannot substitute for the relatively robust institu-
tional  framework  that  enabled  systemic  accumulation  in  the  Fordist  era  (including  welfare
mechanisms and corporatist negotiation of benefit sharing). The succeeding post-Fordist, neoliberal
regime  is  certainly  shakier,  reliant  as  it  has  been  on  unsustainable  “privatized”  or  “negative”
Keynesianism of consumer debt  for  social  peace and effective demand  (Araghi,  2010; Crouch,
2008; cf. Streeck, 2017). While this regime could hardly provide a sustainable foundation for a
“green” mode of regulation, the GE has not offered any new mechanisms to take its place.313 Its
social  promises  consist  of a combination of  business  as  usual in  the North – for which social
consent has been eroding (see section 8.4) – and vague promises to combat poverty in the global
South through “inclusive green growth,” with mechanisms that have been part of the neoliberal de-
velopment policy playbook for decades. But over this period, poverty reduction has been achieved
mainly in the more state-directed economic contexts of East Asia (Arrighi, 2008; Rodrik, 2001). 
Such musings about modes of regulation easily run the risk of reifying complex historical
developments. Of course, an accumulation regime and a corresponding mode of regulation cannot
be  devised  in  theory;  to  assume  otherwise  implies  a  technocratic  fallacy.  Historical  modes  of
regulation have only become apparent after the fact. But a hegemonic project can nevertheless be
expected to contain the seeds of a mode of regulation; at the very least, basic sketches of mediation
between class interests  that  could underpin such regulation should be detectable.  Within  Green
Economy thought, as extensively demonstrated, this is a notable and potentially fateful absence.
313 It may be argued that a neoliberal Green Economy, if it involved further dispossessions in sectors such as health 
care and education, would be even more dependent on cheap goods and readily available consumer credit to 
maintain relative social cohesion. These mechanisms, of course, are difficult to reconcile with the social and 
ecological criteria for “greenness,” based as they have been on social, environmental and temporal 
(re-)externalizations.
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10.2 On green-Keynesian approaches
Thesis 10.2: Keynesian approaches to the “greening” of capitalism may stabilize accumulation,
increase  redistribution  and  facilitate  larger-scale  infrastructural  transformations,  but  they
ultimately  reproduce  the  economic  and  ecological  contradictions  of  capital  by  reinforcing
capitalism’s dependence on growth. The  Economy of Additionality  thus comes to be seen as the
logical corollary of a still-very-material economic system dependent on infinite expansion. 
If  market-based  approaches  fail  to  bring  about  a  green-tech  revolution,  could  a  more  state-
interventionist mode of  green governance  push the global economy to a “greener” equilibrium?
This section will, in turn, consider two neo-Keynesian arguments for the “greening” of capitalism.
10.2.1 Stabilizing accumulation through an environmental fix?
Many of the arguments in section 4.4 revolved around the role of “green” measures in stabilizing
the ecological conditions of capitalist (re)production. The overall argument, again, was that while
“greening” is less convenient than not having to deal with ecological constraints in the first place, it
may still be preferable to running into an unmitigated disaster. The rate of accumulation would thus
be reduced: the price of capitalist survival. This prospect of extended, albeit not indefinite, survival
may be the kernel of truth in the  Green Economy’s claims of the ultimate superiority of “green”
over  “gray”  strategies.  On the  other  hand,  this  scenario’s  compatibility  with  ongoing  systemic
accumulation – required for its feasibility under specifically capitalist conditions – is uncertain.
But  there  may  be  an  important  economic  co-benefit  to  this  compromise.  The  capitalist
reproduction and accumulation process, as outlined in section 4.5.1, hinges on a precarious balance
between the two “departments” of the economy – the production of means of production and that of
means of consumption, which in turn has to do with the distribution of revenue between labor and
capital (and the proportion of profits used for consumption and reinvestment, respectively). This
insight of Marxist economics is central to the entire regulation school, which is concerned with
capitalist strategies, conscious or not, to achieve and maintain such balance. A typical imbalance
between these departments results  in an  overaccumulation crisis,  in which capital  accumulation
proceeds so rapidly that profitable investment opportunities can no longer be found: If too much of
the annual surplus is captured by capital for reinvestment rather than spent on consumer goods,
there is no longer sufficient demand to realize further expansions of supply.314 
314 There is much conceptual and terminological confusion and controversy in Marxist crisis theory (see e.g. Proyect, 
2008), involving differences over whether falling profit rates are cause or consequence of 
overproduction/overaccumulation (S. Clarke, 1990). But, as Clarke argues, most of these ultimately present a 
disproportionality theory of crisis, rooted in the basic contradiction between the expansive forces of capital, which 
require ever greater demand to realize profits, and the tendency to increase short-term or individual profits by 
reducing the wage share of the overall product (this corresponds to the “first” contradiction of capitalism, in 
opposition to which the “second contradiction” hypothesis was formulated; see J. O’Connor, 1988, 1998c).
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In such situations, state intervention may be needed to provide a “spatio-temporal fix” (D.
Harvey,  2004) that  defers capitalist  crises by forcibly absorbing surplus capital  and stimulating
demand, thus effectively stabilizing the accumulation process by slowing it down, all  the while
improving  the  general  conditions  for  further  accumulation,  for  example  through  state-funded
infrastructures. In principle, an environmental fix is conceivable for this purpose. Restorative activi-
ties and mechanisms to valorize nature have thus been interpreted as ways to absorb excess capital
(J. O’Connor, 1988, pp. 27–28, 1998c, p. 170; Brand & Wissen, 2018, p. 48). Conceptualized here
by Marxists, this would in fact be a typical green-Keynesian approach to environmental-economic
policy. Such a fix, perhaps implemented through increased environmental taxation, may be more
conducive to systemic stability than some alternative outlets such as the speculative bubbles that
tend to grow with overaccumulation; the latter also tend to be more environmentally destructive. 
But only if these investments were directly profitable in the long run or at least enabled the
systemic  expansion of  production –  which  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  for  restoration  and
conservation or sink capitalization measures – could they provide a longer-term positive boost for
systemic  accumulation  itself,  as  did  the  New  Deal-era  large-scale  investments  in  public
infrastructure, which provided the basis of post-war U.S. economic growth (see discussion below).
Otherwise,  this  fix  simply  remains  a  costly  measure  that,  ideally,  stabilizes  the  conditions  for
accumulation both in the short run (by generating demand) and in the long run (by mitigating the
destabilization of the ecosphere). This may be a quite sensible survival strategy from a capitalist
standpoint, but again, an inconvenience compared to an “empty world” situation: In the absence of
ecological  constraints,  “traditional”  infrastructure  investments  capable  of  furthering  systemic
accumulation would still constitute an alternative “fix” preferable to conservation and “clean-ups.”
10.2.2 Accumulation by Green New Deal?
This, finally, leads us to a reconsideration of the Green New Deal. Chapter 5 ended in an impasse
for the Green Economy’s hope for technological salvation. But in view of the argument presented in
section  10.1,  this  picture  remains  fundamentally  incomplete  from  a  broader  green-capitalist
standpoint, focused as it still is on microeconomic innovation. A structural transformation needs to
overcome  the  barriers  to  market  disruption  associated  with  quasi-monopolies  –  this  is  both  a
Keynesian and a Schumpeterian argument. 
A complete  reorganization  of  transportation  infrastructures,  for  example,  is  impossible
without political coordination. Renewable energy, despite all the caveats outlined in section 6.3.2,
may at some point become economically superior to fossil energy after all (which still does not
mean that it  provides  Cheap Energy  in a world-ecological sense),  but without targeted political
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support it would not have become even marginally competitive, and without a coordinated public
policy effort to overhaul the entire grid infrastructure and electrify further sectors, it will not be able
to displace fossils across the economy. As argued in section 10.1, the market-based Green Economy
approach to green-tech development falls short in terms of revolutionary effects because it favors
incremental  rather  than  structurally  transformative  innovations;  hence  the  need  for  a  more
interventionist “green” industrial policy. 
Green-Keynesian approaches propose that large-scale, politically coordinated investments in
the  “greening”  of  economic  infrastructures  could  fire  up  systemic  accumulation  while  also
redistributing gains to the broader population. This is the win-win-win promise of the Green New
Deal,  whose relative political  appeal as an alternative hegemonic project has been discussed in
chapter 8. What concerns us here are this project’s ecological and economic effects. As a short-term
fix,  “green”  stimuli  may  indeed  revive  economic  growth,  following  the  logic  laid  out  in  the
previous section. This was the more modest green-Keynesian claim made circa 2008 (Bowen et al.,
2009; Pollin et al., 2008). But what about the longer-term systemic implications of a “real” GND? 
Historically, waves of accumulation have been enabled by structural transformations of the
economy  that  through  their  direct  and  indirect  effects  unlocked  entire  new  fields  for  capital
accumulation, such as railroads or electricity  (Gordon, 2012). As Gordon has forcefully argued,
however,  even  the  last  round  of  infrastructure  improvements  –  relating  to  the  “revolution”  in
information  and  communications  technologies  (ICTs)  –  has  not  had  an  effect  on  systemic
accumulation anywhere near  the historical  impacts of electrification,  telephony or the interstate
highway system. Besides, certainly many such basic infrastructures – in the U.S. and elsewhere –
are in disrepair and in dire need of replacement, but while these modernization investments may
stimulate construction industries in the short term, their longer-term effect would, once more, be to
maintain the conditions  of  accumulation.  This may involve some upgrades,  but  probably not a
dramatic improvement comparable to the original establishment of a railroad or highway system.
(Regionally, of course, such original build-out is still possible; cf. section 11.7).
 Could a “green” transformation provide such impetus instead? As Blackwater (2012) points
out,  in GND scenarios, “green” investments generally only functionally  replace existing “gray”
infrastructures. Improved public transit partly replaces the mobility services provided by privatized
automobility,  renewable electricity replaces fossil  and so on.  Unlike the highway system of the
1930s or the previous investments in “original” electrification, this does not unlock entirely new
territory for capital accumulation (in the vocabulary of this work, it does not allow for  extensive
Landnahmen)  –  a  modernization  with  some  environmental  co-benefits,  perhaps,  but  not  a
productivity  revolution.  In  a  reenactment  of  the  drama  of  section  4.4,  Blackwater  argues  that
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 291
“environmental  Keynesian  arguments  … conflate  avoiding  future  costs  with  the  generation  of
profits” and growth (ibid., p. 65). The need for such investments, under a positive capitalist growth
scenario (which is of course generally assumed in Keynesian models), to pay off in the long run
further implies increases in consumption, and thus Blackwater emphasizes the deep-running tension
between the environmental and the economic functioning of green-Keynesian spending: “Green
investments can either be green or pay off as conventional investments, but they can’t do both.”
(Ibid.,  p.  66)  Attempts  to  square  the  two  tend  to  lead  down  the  contradictory  Economy  of
Additionality path on which existing infrastructures are complemented with “greener” additions. 
Consider, for example, mobility: Through large-scale public and/or private investments and
appropriate regulation, innovative public transit and intermodal mobility systems could increasingly
replace  fossil-heavy  individual  mobility.  Mobility  plays  a  crucial  role  both  in  the  sphere  of
production and in that of consumption. Regarding its role in production, mass public transportation
could  cheapen  mobility as a factor of production and thus facilitate greater economic output (the
associated ecological rebound, of course, could undermine any “greening” effect here). At the same
time, it could negatively affect labor productivity, in that even very efficient public transit systems
may increase travel times for busy workers during their workday; in this sense, it could act as a drag
on accumulation. This is most wasteful economically in the case of high-wage workers, unless – as
good  digital  citizens  –  they  can  use  the  time  spent  in  transit  for  productive  activities.  For
transportation to and from consumption activities, the same pattern as above holds: Cheap transport
could  boost  consumption  (also  by  freeing  up  income  to  be  spent  otherwise,  which  by  itself,
however,  is  a macroeconomic zero-sum game),  perhaps producing an ecological rebound; more
time spent traveling could constrain it. 
In addition, mobility itself is an important realm of consumption, particularly in car-centric
societies. Here, it is still difficult to see how “smart” mobility systems could outweigh the economic
losses  associated  with a  potential  abandonment  of  mass  individual  automobility.  The economic
importance  of  the  German  car  industry  –  much  of  which  produces  premium-class  vehicles
internationally popular for reasons other than pure functionality as a means of transportation – is a
major reason for the climate-political foot-dragging of the alleged “green” leader state of Germany
(section 11.4.1). The reluctance of major car makers to dedicate themselves to “smart” mobility
systems based on car sharing  (cf.  Knie,  2018) may have to  do with the sober  insight  that this
business model,  even if  the market  were fully  captured by the old industry leaders,  offers less
aggregate potential than one based on the production and sale of a maximum number of individual
vehicles  at  the  shortest  possible  intervals  (with  planned  obsolescence  culturally  reinforced  by
fashion industry practices) – more than with cultural conservatism or risk-averse executives wary of
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entering  into  uncharted  territory.  Industry-oriented  research  confirms  this  (Bellos,  Ferguson,  &
Toktay,  2017).315 If  they venture into car  sharing,  the preference tends to  be for “free-floating”
systems which most customers use as a complement to their own vehicle (Lange & Santarius, 2018,
Chapter 3) – a typical  Economy of Additionality  outcome, and one that may only enable market
growth by shifting  a  portion  of  individual  trips  within cities  from public  transit  or  walking to
individual  automobility  –  in  other  words,  conventional  growth  with  a  negative  environmental
impact.316 (This trade-off between “greening” and growth is emblematic of the so-called  sharing
economy in general, at least in its commercial applications that represent another locus of green-
capitalist hope: If production levels really trend downward due to sharing-induced optimization of
product  utilization,  profits  will  be negatively affected.317)  Currently,  many car  makers prefer  to
pursue ecologically questionable strategies centered on individual mobility through self-driving cars
(ibid.),  another form of “smartness.” State intervention in this field could have environmentally
progressive  effects,  but  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  these  would  be  conducive  to  systemic
accumulation. 
315 Bellos et al. find that car sharing is indeed environmentally ambivalent, given that it is most attractive for car 
makers if they sense the opportunity to expand their market to customers who would otherwise choose other modes 
of transportation. In the lower-price segment, it tends to raise fuel efficiency (which is now in the interest of the 
provider, who makes large-scale decisions on fleet design) and overall environmental impact, but also implies 
losses in vehicle sales. In the high-price segment, it is argued that the conversion of the lower-price segment to car 
sharing models could enable higher profits by separating market segments more clearly – because among wealthier 
consumers with a taste for fast cars, the now even more fuel-efficient and “smart” models used in the sharing 
scheme no longer compete with the high-powered gas guzzlers in the sales market. This largely confirms the notion 
of a persistent trade-off between economic and environmental outcomes. 
According to another study, which considers a variety of “servicizing” business models but excludes the 
impact of competition, economic and environmental impacts depend on a number of variables (pricing models, 
whether a sales option is still available, the degree of product pooling, whether products’ environmental impact 
occurs mostly at the production or the use phase etc.); while not finding the two consistently opposed, the study 
confirms a number of conflictual constellations (Agrawal & Bellos, 2017).
316 Two major German car makers, Daimler and BMW, recently fused their “smart” and sharing activities into a joint 
venture as each has been unable to develop a solid standing in these branches on its own (Tatje, 2019), which is 
another indicator of the industry’s weakening through precisely those modernization processes which green-
capitalist enthusiasts hail as a form of ecological modernization. For these car makers, the money is clearly still in 
their traditional combustion engine business: The “smart” joint venture has a total volume of one billion euros, 
which amounts to about one per cent of the annual revenue of the smaller of the two firms, BMW (ibid.). A 
transformational investment strategy would arguably look much different. 
The question of whether or not a business model based on car sharing and “smart mobility” can possibly be an 
attractive substitute for traditional sales-based models appears to make car companies uncomfortable. When a 
journalist insisted on an answer to this question in an interview with the CEO of a Daimler “smart mobility” 
subsidiary, the evasive responses made for a comical dialogue (Gerd tom Markotten, 2018).
317 The sharing economy has been praised for its “greening” potential (Heinrichs, 2013). If car sharing were to become 
dominant vis-à-vis individual ownership in cities and could thus reduce the overall number of cars produced (and 
the parking space required for idle vehicles), this could indeed entail considerable environmental benefits. But this 
efficiency optimization would hurt overall sales, and while “servitization” (automobility as a worry-free service) 
certainly is a business model, it mostly bundles services that would otherwise be purchased by individual owners of
a much greater fleet – the overall automobility market would still shrink. It is thus clear why car makers prefer to 
market car sharing as an additional mobility option for travelers. This dynamic – more efficient utilization of 
infrastructures that, if really universalized, ultimately shrinks markets – is pertinent to other sectors as well (e.g. 
tourist accommodation). The systemic accumulation perspective tends to be overlooked in the literature that 
foregrounds (micro- and meso-scale) business opportunities (e.g. Puschmann & Alt, 2016). 
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Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  all  of  these  considerations  apply  to  local  and  regional,
depending on the country perhaps also national-scale mobility. None of this provides any ecological
solution to the long-distance transportation dilemma discussed in section 3.2.3: No commercial-
scale techno-fix at all is in sight for shipping and aviation, and a complete re-regionalization of
transportation remains anathema to global capitalism. “Green” Keynesianism provides no better
answers to these bigger-picture questions than the Green Economy. 
Let us now assume that with sufficient political momentum a Green New Deal could push
global  capitalism  beyond  the  narrower  political-economic  constraints  that  currently  plague  the
Green Economy projects, and closer towards the green-tech frontier. What would be the longer-term
consequences? An obvious obstacle, from an ecological perspective, to the realization of win-win-
win  scenarios  through  sheer  technological  brilliance  is  the  rebound  effect  upon  which  these
trajectories are premised, as outlined in section 4.5.1: Ultimately, “green” accumulation can only be
upheld if it realizes ever-growing amounts of capital. If goods simultaneously become cheaper and
greener (per unit produced) and thus fulfill the twofold condition for green growth in principle (i.e.,
both labor and resource productivity are increased), the system nevertheless depends on an ever-
growing  and ever-accelerating turnover of these goods. Further, due to the exponential logic of
compound growth, absolute annual GDP growth would increase even with slightly declining growth
rates as projected in UNEP’s scenario. This fundamental ecological contradiction of capital is in no
way resolved through a Green New Deal. As the latter promises somewhat more credibly to reduce
social inequities and practices of accumulation by dispossession, in fact, the ecological pressures
associated with expanded reproduction are even  reinforced. Even if the GND emancipates itself
from the more orthodox implications of the ontology of natural capital, its fate hinges all the more
on the dubious  gospel  of  eco-efficiency.  As the market  fixation is  attenuated,  the technological
fixation is even more crucial to this variant of “green” capitalism. 
A  green-Keynesian  economy  in  which  capital  remains  a  political  player  and  social
reproduction ultimately still depends on capital’s wellbeing – which, from a systemic perspective,
remains the case if a welfare state is fitted in to cushion the blows for socially vulnerable groups –
is as unable to respect ecological barriers to accumulation as a green-neoliberal economy. Need
satisfaction, even if technologically optimized, here remains contingent upon the extraction of ever-
growing  amounts  of  surplus  value  (implying  continually  expanding  commodity  production
irrespective of social needs) and, consequently, upon the vague possibility of absolute decoupling.
To  put  it  another  way:  Even  if  the  GND  were  to  fulfill  its  mission  of  technologically  and
infrastructurally  enabling  lifestyles  that  are  both  culturally  acceptable  and (more)  ecologically
sustainable,  “green”  capitalism could  never  stop  there.  To work with  UNEP’s  figures  cited  in
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section 2.3, if the global economy continued to grow at roughly 2% per capita per year from 2050 to
2100, with no further population growth, it would move from a GDP of US$ 200 trillion to 536
trillion over this period. If the capitalist economy were to function, there would still  be limited
leeway  to  adapt  growth  to  ecological  constraints;  instead,  in  most  cases  ecological  constraints
would effectively need to be made to adapt to this growth rate.
These assumptions are borne out by empirical evidence, with regard to both enacted and
proposed policies. The only relevant empirical case of a large-scale GND strategy is South Korea, a
country which was not only unique in its extreme dependence on energy imports (97%) and its
above-normal climate change record (1.7 °C of warming by 2008; both figures from Choi, 2015)
but whose industrial policy had also been more state-centered in previous decades (Rodrik, 2001).
In 2009, the government devised a national strategy for “green growth” with a stimulus package
consisting  almost  exclusively  of  “green”  spending.  Writing  for  the  World  Bank,  Choi  (2015)
describes the Korean case as a  success story with revived growth and improved air  and water
quality.  But  critics  have  noted  that  the  strategy  centrally  included  the  top-down imposition  of
controversial large-scale projects with massive adverse effects externalized to local populations –
including hydropower and nuclear energy infrastructure – and ultimately led to a political backlash
that forced the government to revise its “green growth” goals downwards (Bluemling & Yun, 2016).
International institutions including the OECD and UN agencies were credited with providing an
“uncritical form of external legitimacy” to these projects (ibid, p. 127). Meanwhile, illustrating the
GND dilemma, one highlighted “green” industrial success in Korea was the “first mass production
of 40-inch LED TVs in the world.” (Choi, 2015, p. 7) 
As for economic plausibility, Wainwright and Mann (2018, pp. 116–121) rightly argue that
the historical conditions under which Keynesian policies functioned – national fiscal sovereignty,
relative global financial stability, abundant nature to be consumed – no longer hold. The short-term
propositions of UNEP’s  Global Green New Deal  (Barbier, 2009; UNEP, 2009) still are national-
level  spending  policies  complemented  by initiatives  aimed  at  “[i]mproving global  governance”
(Barbier, 2009, p. 17), mainly through largely informal fora such as the G20, and by the call for a
diversion of a tiny share of stimulus funds to vulnerable regions of the world (UNEP, 2009, p. 27
suggests 0.7%, following a World Bank proposal).  The signifier  “global” does not suggest  any
transformation  of  asymmetrical  international  relations  here,  or  any  solutions  to  dysfunctional
environmental politics. Against this background, many critics agree that a GND cannot ultimately
solve either the social or the environmental crisis of capitalism (Ajl, 2018; Altvater, 2009; Bernes,
2019;  Blackwater,  2012;  Clover,  2019;  Kaufmann  &  Müller,  2009).  Bernes’s  quite  elaborate
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critique  is  succinctly  summarized  in  the  plain  formula  “the  Green  New  Deal  fails  because
capitalism.” (2019, n.p.)
10.2.3 The inevitability of the Economy of Additionality
What does this tell us about the fate of “green” capitalism? In section 9.3, the notion of the “actually
emerging” GE as an Economy of Additionality (EoA) was introduced. From the political-economic
perspective of chapter 8, the EoA is the result of a feeble passive revolution strategy: Unable and/or
unwilling to confront “gray” capitalism, the Green Economy seeks to nestle somewhere beside the
latter. From the GE institutions’ perspective, the transition is a technical challenge hinging on the
question of financing (cf. section 8.3.2). If “green” infrastructural investments are lacking, they
need to be ramped up, drawing from the generous amounts of capital floating around in search of
outlets. The green-Keynesian alternative, which of course presupposes a more solid political will in
favor of intervention, proposes a more robust solution here. With greater state involvement, so the
valid  argument  goes,  not  every  investment  is  contingent  upon immediate  profitability,  and  the
obvious limits to the mobilization of voluntary private finance can be overcome.
But both camps ultimately pose the investment problem the wrong way around. Taking a
longer temporal view, causality really runs in the reverse direction: Capitalist reproduction – and
therefore  accumulation  –  certainly  depends  on  vast  and  growing  infrastructures  of  production,
circulation and consumption, but all of these are artifacts of this reproduction/accumulation process
as  much as they are  enablers.  They are important  not  just  as use values  that  facilitate  general
economic  activity  and  capital  accumulation,  although  this  is  an  indispensable  function;  taken
together, they constitute  general economic activity and accumulation. Supply is not simply driven
by demand but constantly needs to create demand if accumulation is to proceed. Not only consumer
goods are concerned; even the depreciation of large-scale infrastructures is not just determined by
their gradually eroding use values but also by the dynamics of competition, which often dictate
premature replacement. These are the structural-economic origins of the EoA. 
In the long run and from a macroeconomic perspective, to put it differently, the toughest
question with regard to the possibility of a green-capitalist transformation is certainly not “Is there
enough capital  for  ‘green’ infrastructure?” (This  is  the problem for  which the green-Keynesian
project offers a better solution than the GE.) It is not even exactly “Can we build enough ‘green’
infrastructure to serve a growing economy?,” although this is a vital and fundamentally unresolved
question. (This is the use-value angle, the engineer’s challenge and the ecologist’s or physicist’s
worry.) The real crux is clarified in a reformulation of the second question: “Can there possibly be
enough ‘green’ infrastructure to absorb and realize ever-growing amounts of capital in circulation?”
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The need for  constant  “additions,”  after  all,  is  inscribed in  the very logic of  the  accumulation
process; this process, so far, cannot be fed with “green” feedstocks only, and the prospects for this
to change anytime soon, or ever, remain speculative. As Joel Kovel put it, “the real problem … is
the whole mass of globally accumulated capital.” (2007, p. 153, emphasis in original) This way of
phrasing the problem – the engineer’s challenge aggravated by the political economist’s admonition,
if you will – reveals the  Green Economy’s materialization qua Economy of Additionality  as the
logical corollary of a still-very-material economic system dependent on infinite expansion. 
Ultimately, we are left with a grim picture: A market-oriented and governance-based green-capitalist
transition, as preferred by the  Green Economy  institutions, is unlikely to get off the ground and
produce structurally transformative and environmental effects, given that it is undermined by its
attachment  to  a  global  framework  of  trade  and  investment  law and  politically  unattractive  for
broader constituencies. A more state-directed variant – along the lines of a Green New Deal – could
garner  popular  support  and  induce  the  transformation  of  large-scale  infrastructures,  but  the
institutional transition is all but illegalized by trade and investment law, and elites are unwilling to
make social-democratic concessions. Such a speed-up of green-tech transformation would other-
wise be helpful in principle, but not enough to solve the fundamental ecological contradictions of
capitalism – the Economy of Additionality theorem holds either way. Eventually, it remains highly
dubious whether “green” systemic accumulation would be viable under either regime, and for how
long. Meanwhile, the pressure to commodify ever more social infrastructures is likely to escalate as
ecological constraints successively reduce the room for accumulation by material expansion.
This,  however,  does  not  exhaust  the  series  of  constraints  for  a  green-capitalist
transformation.  Chapters  8  and  10 implicitly  privileged  the  national  scale.  The  level  of  global
politics, to which the next chapter will turn, presents further barriers.
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11. Planetary management: A world-systems view
The previous chapter began a discussion of political and institutional forms and modes of “green
governance”  at  the  domestic  level,  arguing that  most  progress  in  terms of  a  “green” industrial
transformation has been achieved through interventionist industrial policy rather than market-based
governance, even as the former faces structural limits as a “green” transformation strategy. In this
chapter, this broadly regulationist perspective will be complemented with a world-systems view of
the international dimension, which holds yet further political-economic constraints. Green Economy
thought posits the need for “planetary management” while avoiding any commitment to institutions
that could exercise it (section 11.1). “Green” capitalism here faces an enforcement dilemma: Its
realization depends on a planetary authority that would effectively undermine the agility of capital
(section 11.2) – or else on the emergence of a powerful “green” hegemon, which is structurally
improbable  (from section  11.3 onward).  Meanwhile,  parallel  technological  trends  within  global
capitalism are similarly ambivalent for capital – and reveal tensions with the imperative of greening
(section 11.6). The conclusion, from a world-systems perspective, in section 11.7 ultimately finds a
“green” systemic cycle of accumulation to be an unlikely 21st-century future.
11.1 Planetary management and global governance
Thesis  11.1:  The  Green  Economy  encapsulates  a  paradoxical  approach  to  “planetary
management,” characterized by a disjuncture between top-down biopolitical knowledge production
and decentralized, “soft” governance mechanisms.
Building on Moore’s definition of capitalism as a “way of organizing nature”  (2015, p. 2), it  is
worth considering the political  forms that  the organization of global  nature takes  in  the  Green
Economy framework. It is fair to say that the GE generally takes a managerial approach: According
to UNEP, “the natural environment … and must be managed as a source of growth, prosperity and
well-being,” and a key task is to figure out “[h]ow to manage a smooth and fair transition from a
brown economy to a green one at global level.” (UNEP, 2011, p. 628) The World Bank report (2012,
p. xi) already notes the “imperative of a better managed environment” in the foreword and goes on
to make 34 references to  management  just in the 25 pages of its overview chapter. The OECD
admonishes that  “[s]trengthening arrangements for  managing global  public  goods,  especially  in
biodiversity and climate” are key to facilitating international cooperation, and its problem definition
highlights the (mis)management of  natural capital as a crucial policy dimension  (OECD, 2011b,
pp. 13, 17). But what arrangements are these? 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 298
In  a  sense,  the  GE may be  understood as  an  extreme,  globalized  form of  Foucauldian
biopolitics: strategies to manage populations – indeed, life as such – underpinned by the particular
rationality that characterizes modern statehood, by governmentality (Foucault, 1991, 2013a, 2013b).
While Foucault in his historical work focused on the construction of national populations by state-
managerial practices at the national level, he already hinted at the ultimate globality of biopolitics
(Foucault,  2013b,  p.  64).  The  “essential  issue  in  the  establishment  of  the  art  of  government,”
according to Foucault (1991, p. 92), was the “introduction of economy into political practice.” This
centrally involved the systematized production of knowledge about population and territory: “The
theory of the art of government was … connected to a set of analyses and forms of knowledges
which …. were termed precisely ‘statistics’, meaning the science of the state.” (Ibid., p. 96) 
Indeed, as highlighted in section 2.5, the production of such – frequently statistical, almost
invariably statistics-based – knowledge is one of the key functions of all  three GE institutions,
which are largely unable to govern through direct executive authority. Throughout the GE reports,
the need for further research and knowledge production is continually highlighted; the OECD in
particular is highly focused on the development of statistical indicators to capture progress (OECD,
2015a) and maintains an online database of  Green Growth Indicators  (OECD, n.d.).  The World
Bank’s open database, frequently cited here, similarly involves a broad range of environmentally
relevant indicators. Biopolitical practices are thus extended to the global level, to the ecological
conditions for human life at this level, and to non-human life. This, of course, is not entirely new:
The Club of Rome attempted similar global-level modeling in the 1970s (Meadows, 1972); global
environmental  managerialism  –  including  the  World  Bank’s  and  the  OECD’s  activities  –  was
already subject to critical debate in the 1990s  (Sachs, 1998; Schellnhuber, 1998), and the entire
academic discipline of  Earth System Science  (Ehlers & Krafft,  2006; Lenton, 2016) attempts to
develop such knowledge systematically, with a focus more on purely biogeochemical data instead
of the economic statistics collected by the GE institutions. The  planetary boundaries framework
(Steffen et al., 2015) invoked earlier is perhaps the most popular outgrowth of this field.
This knowledge of global ecosystems is considered a prerequisite for successful planetary
management. But of course it is not identical with such management. The problem of the illusion of
control  over “unruly ecologies”  (Fairhead et  al.,  2012, p.  254;  cf.  section 4.2.3) is  particularly
pointed at the planetary level, for which no laboratory equivalent exists: When it comes to climate
change, the entire planet is one field case.  The deep, unintended human  influence on planetary
ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles, as captured in the  Anthropocene  concept, should not be
equated with the possibility of conscious control over these systems (Stirling, 2015; cf. Hamilton,
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2015). So, can this knowledge actually be translated into effective control over these ecosystems, or
at least over the global economy’s impact on their stability – and if so, how?  
It is frequently, and not incorrectly, argued that such planetary management approaches, of
which the GE is perhaps the latest incarnation, represent a global technocracy that produces socially
uneven  results:  an  attempt,  in  Wolfgang  Sachs’s  words,  to  “steer  the  Spaceship  Earth  without
particular regard for its passengers.”  (Sachs, 1998, p. 202, author’s translation; cf. Charkiewicz,
2009; Scoones et al.,  2015; Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, Chapter 1; for a longer history of such
planetary  management  strategies,  see  Katsikis,  2014) This  “astronaut’s  view,”  in  which  local
differences  disappear  under  global  statistical  indicators,  lends  itself  to  all  manner  of  social
externalizations.  These  tend  to  be  justified,  with  reference  to  global  ecological  constraints,  as
necessary  sacrifices  to  ecological  rationality,  thus  rendering  vast  social  inequities  invisible  (cf.
Leach, 2015). All of this is inscribed in the particular constructions of  abstract social nature in
green-capitalist thought and practice (see section 4.2.3). Geoengineering schemes (see section 7.3)
are perhaps the most extreme and literal examples of top-down planetary management.318 
The technocracy argument with regard to the GE has been made in some detail across the
previous chapters. But this is not the core of the planetary management problem as it presents itself
from a  green-capitalist  standpoint.  Paradoxically,  in  its  global  perspective  the  Green  Economy
approach largely restricts itself to knowledge-based techniques of government. Where the domestic
policy approach already privileges “soft” market-based regulation (cf. section 10.1), the approach to
international  politics  is  arguably  softer  still.  Little  attention  is  paid  here  to  the  mechanisms of
effective “management” to constrain human behavior that have been associated with the older mode
of power against which Foucault defines biopolitical power, namely  sovereignty.319 At the global
level, this should not come as a surprise: Despite all developments towards global governance, the
international  system  is  still  built  around  nationally  –  territorially  –  defined  sovereignty,  the
“inescapable territorial permeability of causes and effects in an ecologically interconnected world”
(M. Smith, 2009, p. 102) notwithstanding. Thus, as two proponents of ecological modernization
argued in the early 2000s, “contemporary environmental governance still is very much linked to the
effectiveness of nation-states.”  (Sonnenfeld & Mol,  2002, p. 1457) This has not changed much
since, and the GE reports admit this much, given that many of their policy recommendations relate
to the national level. How is global enforcement of “green” policies possible, then?
318 One company developing carbon dioxide removal technologies operates under the not-so-subtle name Global 
Thermostat (European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, 2018).
319 While biopolitics in the Foucauldian understanding is about the hierarchical control over populations, sovereignty 
relates to territorial control (cf. Foucault, 1991). Certainly, both of these remain relevant to an effective green-
capitalist politics.  
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In section 11.4, the GE’s strategies to foster “green” competition at the international level
will be critically examined, based on the assumption that binding international treaties to regulate,
among other things, greenhouse gas emissions are an indispensable cornerstone of a global Green
Economy. But while this assumption has been found to underlie the market-based GE framework at
least implicitly  (McAfee, 2016, p. 345), it is not consistently shared throughout the GE literature.
Whereas the GE approach to policy  formulation may be top-down – conducted by experts with
some “stakeholder  engagement”  and  based on extensive  knowledge production  activities  –,  its
implementation tends  to  be  envisioned  in  very  decentralized  terms,  without  any  overarching
enforcement  authority. This  is  in  line  with  the  paradoxical  neoliberal  tradition  of  governance
approaches: Denouncing top-down planetary management as “cockpit-ism”  (Hajer et  al.,  2015),
such positions emphasize the “need to connect to the logic of the business and finance community”
and to “inspire and challenge multiple agents of change.” (Ibid., pp. 1656, 1657) Here, the image of
capital as a positive force to be enabled and nudged (see chapter 8) finds its expression in political
form: With the aid of global data sets, expert policymakers – by “connecting” to the “logic of the
business and finance community,” which they seek to “inspire” rather than regulate – identify the
most economically efficient way to handle global ecological “challenges.” 
In such discussions  over  top-down steering  capacities,  the claim that  global  ecosystems
cannot be subjected to human control is conflated with the (often implicit) claim that there is no
point in attempting to control  capital’s impact on these ecosystems. Neoliberal policy regimes, as
Matthias Schmelzer argues with regard to the OECD, tend to be too short-termist to pursue any
“long-term and comprehensive  approach of  planetary  management.”  (Schmelzer,  2016,  p.  319)
Even more ironically, the capacity of many states to constrain capital and accomplish an effective
“green” transition has been weakened by the structural adjustment policies that were effectively
imposed  over  decades  by  the  World  Bank  in  conjunction  with  the  IMF  (Newell,  2015).  Two
important  components  of  the  neoliberal  policy  set  –  “hard”  austerity  and  “soft”  market-based
governance – thus reinforce each other.
At times, GE institutions seem to tilt wholly towards voluntary global governance. UNEP’s
Global Green New Deal  proposal originally recommended the entirely informal G20 meetings as
the proper policy forum to discuss implementation at the international level (UNEP, 2009, p. 16; cf.
Barbier, 2010). The Global Green Growth Institute’s Director General, meanwhile, applauded the
UN’s  non-binding  Sustainable  Development  Goals  –  a  belated  outcome  of  the  2012  Rio+20
conference (cf. Hajer et al., 2015) and, thus, heavily inspired by the Green Economy agenda – and
the  equally  non-binding  Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change,  describing  them as  providing  an
“excellent framework for the transition towards a green economy.” (Global Green Growth Institute,
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2017, p. 5) As quoted before, the OECD’s Secretary-General likewise praised the Paris deal for
“differ[ing]  fundamentally  from  previous  climate  accords  in  terms  of  ambition,  reach  and
commitment.”  (Gurría,  2017,  p.  14) Here,  the eventual  need for a  “hard” global  agreement  on
climate change – long considered essential within the green-capitalist camp – is denied altogether,
and  “soft”  governance  mechanisms are  assumed  to  suffice.  What  could  explain  this  refusal  of
supranational sovereignty despite the declared need for planetary management? 
11.2 The planetary sovereignty dilemma
Thesis 11.2: The idea of a global “green” capitalism faces a dilemma: Some form of planetary
sovereignty would be required to contain the global capitalist economy safely within “planetary
boundaries,” but this would likely undermine capital accumulation and capitalist social relations,
which have historically depended on the openings afforded by a fragmented interstate system.
This section will investigate the paradoxical attitude of green-capitalist advocates towards political
authority  from  a  world-systems  perspective.  It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  this  chapter  largely
assumes a green-capitalist standpoint, examining the implications of various forms of sovereignty
and governance for the prospects of a “green” transformation of capitalism. From an emancipatory
perspective, Mick Smith (2009, p. 113) is certainly right to issue a “stark warning about the dangers
inherent in turning to the Scylla of state sovereignty in order to avoid the all-consuming whirlpool
of global capital,” not least because the former is usually structurally bound to comply with the
demands of the latter to a significant extent.
In perhaps the most extensive exploration of questions of global ecological sovereignty, Joel
Wainwright and Geoff Mann (2018) propose the notion of Climate Leviathan, “a mode of capitalist
planetary governance” (ibid., p. 19):  “The drive to defend capitalist social relations will push the
world toward ‘Climate Leviathan,’ namely adaptation projects to allow capitalist elites to stabilize
their position amidst planetary crises.” (Ibid., p. 15) This “immanent logic of planetary sovereignty,
whether it ever realizes itself, is already at work, already shaping our world.” (Ibid., p. 14) While
“Leviathan essentially reflects the dream of a sustainable capitalist status quo,” they maintain that
“it is almost impossible to imagine that it will actually reverse climate change.” (Ibid., pp. 30, 34)
The Paris Agreement, for them, is a prefiguration of this mode of sovereignty (ibid., p. 38). They
emphasize  the  problem definition  as  a  “market  failure”  that  calls  forth  not  immediately  state-
directed management but only the state-enforced internalization of externalities (ibid., p. 103–108)
– in other words, their description of  Climate Leviathan  closely resembles the  Green Economy,
even as they attribute it to the “green Keynesianism” of GND proposals, which they  explicitly, and
regrettably,  treat  as  representative of  green-capitalist  thought  more generally  (ibid.,  Chapter  5).
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Mann and Wainwright acknowledge that instead of this truncated sovereignty, “capitalism needs a
planetary manager, a Keynesian world state” (ibid., p. 126) which is obstructed by elite reluctance,
leading  to  the  substitution  of  climate  summits  as  second-best  “green”  equivalents  of  what  the
Bretton Woods institutions were for the original Keynesian post-war order. (An alternative path, in
their  view,  involves  the  emergence  of  a  “green”  hegemon  powerful  enough  to  impose  global
solutions (ibid., p. 127) – this is the possibility investigated in sections 11.3 through 11.5 below.) 
Thus, the planetary management missions entrusted to the “Rio Institutions” (including, for
example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological
Diversity),  spawned  by  the  governance-oriented  multilateralism  of  the  1990s,  may  “imply  a
managerial  assault  on the imperial  mode of living,” but their  lack of enforcement mechanisms,
combined with insufficient political will among national governments, has led this “assault” to fall
flat  (Brand  &  Wissen,  2018,  pp.  16–17).  In  environmental  matters,  the  global  governance
architecture  is  fragmented,  and  outcomes  are  importantly  determined  by  institutions  without  a
significant environmental mandate, such as the WTO (Ciplet et al., 2015, pp. 31–34; cf. Biermann
et al., 2010). While national governments have ceded authority on trade matters to supranational
institutions,  with  potentially  negative  impacts  on  their  capacity  to  enforce  national-level
environmental  regulation,  they  have  been  unwilling  to  accept  supranational  environmental
authorities (see section 7.4.3). Indeed, as explained in section 2.5.3, even an upgrade of UNEP to
the  status  of  a  World  Environmental  Organization,  potentially  endowed with  somewhat  greater
authority, has often been proposed but remains politically unfeasible. The increased national-level
concern with energy security and the resulting competition for energy resources further undermines
aspirations  to  effective  planetary management  (see  section 2.2),  and the right-wing ascendancy
throughout  the  2010s  has  diminished  the  prospects  for  multilateral  solutions  even  further  (see
section  8.4).  The  global  climate  governance  regime,  beginning  with  the  UNFCCC,  wears  the
imprint of neoliberal hegemony, prioritizing market-based and technology-focused approaches over
strict enforcement mechanisms from the outset (Brunnengräber, 2009a, Chapters 18–23).
Confronted with such dilemmas, the scholarly mainstream remains puzzled. A decade-long
research project launched in an attempt to reconcile global governance theory with the top-down
logic  of  Earth  System  Science  diagnosed  that  it  remained  “unspecified”  how  “Earth  System
management” could be conducted in an “effective, efficient and equitable” manner (Biermann et al.,
2010, p. 278). Legal scholars’ attempts to construct market-based governance mechanisms for the
global commons that  effectively patrol the  planetary boundaries while  avoiding command-and-
control regulation and supranational sovereignty  (Magalhães, Aragão, Moreno Pires, Oliveira, &
Jacobs, 2013) appear similarly helpless and inconclusive. 
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While Wainwright and Mann (2018, p. 191) hold that “[p]lanetary sovereignty stands, as in
some ways it always has, as the completion of modernity,” Alyssa Battistoni rightly responds that
“planetary sovereignty seems like something of a red herring ... there is little to suggest that the
planetary  sovereign  is  waiting  in  the  wings.”  (Battistoni,  2018,  n.p.) In  principle,  of  course,
intermediate forms of political rule at the global level – between the extremes of world state and
voluntary  governance  –  are  quite  common.  Binding  international  law  with  varying  quality  of
enforcement mechanisms in fact historically precedes the notion of  global governance. A binding
international climate change agreement would be a prime example – but within the framework of
global capitalism,  such solutions have been prevented by the power asymmetries  and opposing
interests  among states.  An agreement  that  effectively levels  the playing field among states  and
ensures effective ecological protection is, ceteris paribus, not a realistic option. International trade
law may officially impose relatively uniform rules on all states, but in fact it  has left plenty of
opportunities for cost externalizations following persistent power inequalities (see section 7.4.3).
The global climate cannot be deceived this way. Likewise, certain options for environmental politics
at  the  national  level  that  involve  class  compromises  which  effectively  externalize  social  costs
beyond national borders – for example, green industrial policy strategies seeking to secure world
market  advantages  for  relatively  dominant  states  –  are  by  definition  not  applicable  at  the
international  level  and  in  fact  tend  to  undermine  international  agreements  (cf.  section  11.4).
Consequently,  whatever  other  implications  for  global  power  relations  they  may  carry,  the
intermediate forms of planetary sovereignty that have emerged are largely ineffective qua planetary
management mechanisms. If Climate Leviathan is indeed prefigured in the Paris Agreement, it must
be a pitiful incarnation of the monstrous figure portrayed in ancient narratives. 
Now, from a W-SA perspective, global “green” capitalism faces a dilemma: In its present
form, it is incapable of solving the climate crisis, and any chance to achieve global environmental
sustainability  within  a  capitalist  framework  arguably  depends  on  a  global  form  of  political
sovereignty – with the ability to pose an effective counterweight to capital’s ecological excesses –
that is not just momentarily politically unfeasible but indeed goes against the grain of the capitalist
world-system. As Immanuel Wallerstein  (2004, Chapter 2) has argued, capitalism has historically
thrived on the multiplicity of sovereign states, which allowed the deterritorialized forces of capital
to remain in a position of dominance vis-à-vis any given state with its territorially bounded form of
sovereignty. In a world-state, by contrast, the centralization of political power would make it likely
for much of the economic surplus to be appropriated by political power holders (Wallerstein, 2013,
pp. 14–15). The hyphenated world-economy is constituted by a hierarchical international division of
labor,  in  which  capital  and  its  products  enjoy  privileged  mobility  across  political  and  cultural
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boundaries. The system of formally equal but factually vastly unequal states is crucial to the organi-
zation of this division of labor. In each historical period of the capitalist world-economy, unlike in
previous world-systems, a pattern is repeated in which “[t]he most powerful state in the system acts
to block empire-formation” in the service of capital (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, p. 411, emphasis
added).320 The interstate system has thus served as the bedrock of the global capitalist order.321
Nevertheless, Chase-Dunn  (1990) identified a slow,  longue durée trend towards political
integration through various globalization processes, holding that “the transnationalization of capital,
growing international economic interdependence, and greater need for global economic and ecolo-
gical coordination would probably create a world state eventually.” (Ibid., p. 122, emphasis added)
While his argument about the near-term desirability of a world state focused on preventing nuclear
war and tends to drift into science-fiction speculation that appears curiously dated three decades on,
Chase-Dunn also noted that environmental disasters may function as an “internal” threat that could
“enhance global state formation.” (Ibid., p. 121, n. 14) The thusly created world state, however,
would in his view likely evolve towards socialism, given that it provided a unified pressure point
for various oppositional social movements while “capital’s avenues of escape will narrow.” (Ibid., p.
125) Translated into the conceptual language of this thesis, his argument suggests that a capitalist
world-state is both necessary to internalize ecological costs and would cause capitalism to run out
of steam because, in the absence of an outside, it tends to foreclose re-externalization possibilities.
From this angle, a primary function of the (modern interstate) world-system indeed is to provide a
framework that allows for spatial and socio-economic re-externalizations.   
In the same vein, Giovanni Arrighi’s theory of systemic cycles of accumulation (SCAs), used
in the rest of this chapter for my consideration of the prospects of a “green” 21 st-century cycle,
holds that the capitalist world-system is tendentially progressing towards world-state formation, and
that this is one of the possible resolutions of the dilemma presented by the decline of the U.S.-
dominated  cycle  of  accumulation.  As for  the  political  necessities  that  may drive  – particularly
Western – elites to develop a “world-empire,” Arrighi (1994, p. 354) cites “saving the planet from
ecological  self-destruction;  regulating the poor  of the world so as to  keep them in their  place;
creating the conditions of a more equitable use of the world’s resources; and so on” – in other
words, the GE’s main concerns. But in the act, Arrighi emphasizes, these elites would “terminate
320 Chase-Dunn (1990) further argued that the interstate system not only facilitated capital mobility and thus allowed 
capital to transcend state control, but that this very mobility also reinforced processes of hegemonic transition from 
one dominant state to the next. Instead of attempting to prop up a hegemon in decline, capital simply jumps ship as 
its transnationalized infrastructures “make it possible for the dominant capitalist groups within declining hegemons 
to spread their capital into those rising powers” (ibid., p. 119) which it otherwise would need to help fight against.
321 Historian of capitalism Ellen Meiksins Wood, while critical of other W-SA arguments, makes a similar case for 
“capitalism’s need, however contradictory, for a spatially fragmented political and legal order.” (Meiksins Wood, 
2017, p. 181, cf. 2005, Chapter 6)
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capitalist history” by shifting surplus appropriation entirely to (non-capitalist) methods of “force,
cunning, or persuasion” (ibid., p. 355) on the part of the newly emboldened state apparatus.
Even as they distance themselves explicitly from the modernist premises of world-systems
theory  and  reject  the  idea  of  a  hegemonic  state  within  the  system,  Hardt  and  Negri’s  (2003)
conception of Empire ultimately reaffirms the point of capital’s rule over national sovereignty: Their
“basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and
supranational  organisms  united  under  a  single  logic  of  rule.”  (Ibid.,  p.  xii)  The  institutions
protecting  “free”  trade  at  the  international  level  are  a  constitutive  element  of  this  elusive
infrastructure  of  global  governance.  Compared  to  national  governments,  which  face  more
immediate  pressures  from  broader  constituencies  (and  whose  particular  interests  at  any  given
moment may conflict with “free”-trade principles), international institutions – such as those behind
the Green Economy – are characterized by a “high degree of structural selectivity and a low degree
of relative autonomy vis-à-vis dominant interests.” (Brand & Wissen, 2018, p. 31) Sovereignty, in
Hardt and Negri’s conception, has been successfully globalized, but its postmodern form is a far cry
from  the  blunt  authority  of  the  early  modern  state.  This  decentered,  deterritorialized  form  of
sovereignty is tailored to the needs of global capital; Empire’s inability to control and subordinate
the latter is a fundamental part of its raison d’être. 
Global  “green”  capitalism,  as  we  follow  the  thrust  of  these  arguments,  becomes  an
increasingly paradoxical notion.  If capitalism is a way of organizing nature, the ability of these
institutions to regulate the nature—society relationship at the global level is highly circumscribed.
Voluntary mechanisms have been helpless. Globally authoritative institutions are off the table, and
even effective intermediate forms of sovereignty vis-à-vis capital – as in binding international laws
– remain elusive; witness the present impossibility to reach any substantial and binding agreement
in international climate politics. This only leaves the Arrighian model of a “green” hegemon to
restore order in the world-system and enforce the systemic internalization of capital’s reproduction
costs. But is this a plausible proposition?
11.3 Towards a “green” systemic cycle of accumulation?
In The Long Twentieth Century, Giovanni Arrighi (1994) outlined a longue durée periodization of
the capitalist world-economy based on  systemic cycles of accumulation  (SCAs), a concept which
unifies economic and political aspects of capitalist macro-development and thus enables a broader
analysis of the prospects for 21st-century “green” accumulation.
Following Arrighi’s argument, the capitalist world-system has been shaped by complex and
shifting articulations of two opposing logics of power: the territorially based logic of state power
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and  the  deterritorialized  logic  of  capital.  Here,  the  historical  development  of  capitalism  is
understood, fundamentally, as a question of power – importantly including extra-economic power –
and  specific,  situated  agency  which  “grounds”  the  anonymous  “force  field”  of  global  capital.
Historically, successive hegemonic states have been able to stabilize systemic capital accumulation
for an extended period of time, the first phase of which in each case saw a massive expansion of
production,  facilitated  by  new  technologies,  organizational  strategies  and  geopolitical
configurations (Arrighi terms this the MC phase, in analogy to Marx’s M-C-M’ formula). Once
these become exhausted, a second phase sets in (the CM’ phase), during which crisis phenomena
emerge and, amidst hegemonic decline,  rising insecurity  and overaccumulation,  capital  turns to
liquid assets, leading into a period of financialization. While this is associated with a brief revival in
the old hegemonic center, the financial power thus accumulated ultimately facilitates the rise of a
new  hegemon,  whose  superior  organizational  capabilities  allow  for  the  containment  of  crisis
dynamics and for a revitalization of systemic accumulation at an enlarged spatial scale by attracting
mobile surplus capital from the old center. Thus, capitalism went through a Genoese cycle (roughly
1460–1640),  followed  by  a  Dutch  cycle  (1640–1790),  then  a  British  (1790–1915)  and,  most
recently, a United States-led cycle  (for a graphic overview, see Arrighi, 1994, p. 364). The era of
neoliberal “globalization,” in this longer view, rather than constituting a historical rupture, simply
represents the usual financialization period at the end of each cycle, but, logically, at a larger scale. 
 The resulting debates over potential successor regimes to the declining U.S. hegemony can
be  linked  productively  to  debates  over  “green”  capitalism.  Arrighi  himself  at  least  laid  the
groundwork for such a link in the context of the particular governance challenges that each regime
historically faced during its formative period. In his account, while the Dutch regime succeeded in
internalizing  protection costs  through  its  charter  companies,  the  British  regime  internalized
production  costs, first turning capitalism into a mode of production rather than “just” a mode of
accumulation; the U.S. cycle was characterized by the internalization of transaction costs through
the vertical  integration of large corporations  (Arrighi, 1994, Chapters 2–4). The challenge for a
potential successor regime, as highlighted by Arrighi and Silver (2001), would be the internalization
of reproduction costs. While Arrighi and Silver conceptualized these in more or less purely social
terms, it would be appropriate to include the ecological conditions of (re)production here, much in
the second contradiction or Fraserian sense (see section 4.1.2).322 Other observes concur with this
general  idea  (Wallerstein,  Collins,  Mann,  Derluguian,  &  Calhoun,  2013,  pp.  184–186).  The
“greening”  of  capitalism  is  thus  identified  as  a  central  21st-century  challenge  within  the  SCA
framework, and as the previous rounds of internalization were key to the periodical revitalization of
322 See the critique of Arrighi’s relative failure to incorporate ecological questions in section 11.5. 
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systemic accumulation, this greening would need to function as an “engine of growth” as discussed
in  section 4.4.  This  would  likely  involve  the political  imposition  of  selective  devalorization  of
unsustainable capital assets in the course of an applied “green” creative destruction strategy.
In this sense, the search for nation-state “leaders” in “green” development is also a search
for  allies  in  hegemonic  struggles.323 As  “green”  leadership  develops  at  the  national  level,  a
pro-“green” constituency in the international political arena can be fostered, which could function
as the political base of a Green Economy coalition. Ideally, this would take “green” politics beyond
the present stage, at which it largely deals with common goods which are in everybody’s immediate
self-interest to exploit, and provide it with a particular, economically interested lobby. 
From this, we can derive the following three conditions for the development of a “green”
SCA, each of which is characterized by an interleaving of territorial and capitalist logics of power:
1. The  systemic  internalization of  (socio-ecological)  reproduction  costs,  e.g.  through  an
effective international framework pushed through and enforced by...
2. ...a rising  hegemon, stronger than the U.S. state, willing and able to broker and/or impose
“green” global governance standards and “green” creative destruction processes
3. A  wave  of  green-tech  development to  reignite  systemic  accumulation  via  material
(re)production at an expanded scale.
Since the dubious prospects in this last regard have already been covered in previous chapters, the
following sections will discuss the first two conditions in turn. Concerning the third, however, it
bears reiterating that each historical SCA in Arrighi’s  conception began with the MC phase,  in
which surplus capital was invested into an expansion of material production and trade. Mechanisms
of accumulation by dispossession, in Arrighi’s  (2008, pp. 222–234) conception, primarily played
out in the second (CM’) phase of each cycle. This perspective further reinforces the argument that
“win-win-win”  solutions  through  technological  advances  are  essential  to  warrant  systemic
accumulation by expanded reproduction rather than dispossession in a nascent “green” capitalism.  
11.4 International competition and cost internalization 
Thesis  11.4:  The  Green  Economy  downplays  the  contradictory  implications  of  its  vision  of  a
competitive race to the top in sustainability and offers no way out of the present stalemate in global
environmental politics, which weakens its chances of implementation at the international level. A
“green” global hegemony both willing and able to impose (and set an example of) systematic cost
internalization and “green” creative destruction is not a plausible proposal.
323 Although still rooted in the types of class conflict that dominate domestic politics, hegemonic struggles in 
international politics primarily take place among formally horizontally arranged national entities (see R. W. Cox, 
1983 for a discussion of Gramscian hegemony in international relations).
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The competitive logic of the  Green Economy  concept  –  emphasizing “free” trade,  international
competition and advantages for early movers who can develop a technological edge – poses deep
political problems, particularly with a view to international climate diplomacy. As argued at the
outset, one of the apparent motivations behind the GE is to overcome the stalemate in international
climate politics, in which narrow understandings of national economic interests prevent substantial
agreements.  But  in  the  GE’s  competition  case,  the  “green”  agenda is  only  a  proxy for  actors’
economic gains (the actors being nation-states instead of individual businesses in this case) and thus
remains contingent on economic considerations,  which are obviously subject to – often rapid –
change. No unambiguous “green” hegemonic leaders have therefore emerged so far (section 11.4.1).
This  dilemma extends beyond the market-oriented GE approach,  however,  and is  applicable to
“green” capitalism more generally: An international hegemony built on systemic internalization of
reproduction costs remains implausible (section 11.4.2).
11.4.1 Pollution havens versus Porter hypothesis
Two opposing notions are floating around in the literature on the trade—environment nexus, both of
which are taken up in the GE reports: The pollution haven hypothesis, which holds that if allowed to
move freely, industry will relocate to those sites with the lowest regulatory standards, punishing
states with high environmental standards through capital flight and reducing their competitiveness
(cf. Copeland, 2009), and the Porter hypothesis, which claims that high environmental standards –
if not too drastically out of step with regulations in other countries – can foster domestic technolo-
gical innovation and thus constitute a competitive advantage (cf. Porter & van der Linde, 1995).324
The  Green Economy literature, keen as it is on highlighting the positive, emphasizes the
opportunities  for  those  who  innovate  early  on  to  reap  the  economic  benefits  of  international
agreements for climate change mitigation and other ecological regulations later, in line with – and
often with explicit reference to – the Porter hypothesis  (UNEP, 2011, pp. 234, 551, 564; World
Bank, 2012, pp. 91, 98). Interestingly, the OECD (2011b, pp. 97–100) takes a more sober stance,
arguing with reference to  the pollution haven effect  that  this  “arithmetic  of competitiveness …
324 Porter and van der Linde did claim that the ability for rapid innovation, fostered by proper, market-oriented 
environmental regulation, was an asset in the struggle for global competitiveness. But their advice was to 
“[d]evelop regulations in sync with other countries or slightly ahead of them” (Porter & van der Linde, 1995, p. 
124), acknowledging that the stimulating effect could easily be outweighed if the costs imposed were too high (and 
thus admitting that the pollution haven effect kicks in relatively quickly – which also implies that even in their 
understanding very stringent regulation does impose net costs after all). Their arguments involve a few more 
oddities, such as the admonition that environmental groups should shift money from “unproductive” litigation to 
funding for technological research. Similarly, their claim that the Dutch flower industry’s unmitigated success in 
ecological modernization was evidenced by the fact that “growers from other countries actually fly flowers there to 
be processed, sold and reexported” (ibid., p. 131) reinforces the impression that the fetishization of technological 
innovation often involves a complete loss of perspective regarding overall ecological effects.
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cannot  be refuted in  its  entirety.”  (Ibid.,  p.  98)325 The World Bank also notes that “[e]mpirical
evidence  fails  to  support  the  notion  of  ‘pollution  havens’  ...  though  this  could  change  if
environmental policies, such as carbon taxes, become  much stricter.”  (World Bank, 2012, p. 83,
emphasis added) This implies that the possibility of significant capital flight from countries with
high carbon prices is not ruled out. In other words, so far there can be no reliable tests to refute the
pollution  haven  effect  in  conditions  approximating  a  Green  Economy  scenario,  let  alone  more
radical green-capitalist transformation scenarios.
Conversely,  the problem with the competitive advantage idea and the hope that it  could
facilitate international agreements is obvious: The role of market leader – to the degree that it can be
associated with national economies at all, rather than transnational firms – is restricted to a few
national economies at best. For everybody else, their relative disadvantage constitutes a major dis-
incentive to enter into stringent international agreements at all. The temptation to stick to a fossil-
based development model instead of trying to outflank present technological leaders is strong. For
“developing” countries with large stakes in extractive industries, this temptation tends to be over-
whelming, although OPEC countries have made tentative steps towards reducing their dependence
on primary export goods (OECD, 2018e, p. 18). (The same rift between “leaders” and “laggards” is
detectable  on a  national  scale,  as  with the  wide range of  state-level  climate  policy  ambition –
correlated with GHG emissions levels – in the U.S.326) Hatfield-Dodds et al.  (2017, pp. 412–413)
propose  a  “No Losers”  scenario  in  which  the  economic  benefits  from resource  efficiency  and
climate policy measures are redistributed to protect extraction-dependent countries from negative
net impacts. This would eat up 40% of rich countries’ gains from these measures: Still a win-win
outcome if a global catastrophe is averted (the scenario itself,  however, projects shady environ-
mental outcomes; see section 5.1.3), but also a game-theoretical obstacle to an effective agreement.
The constant tension between the need for “leaders” to protect intellectual property rights
(IPRs)  in  order  to  capture  the  rent  accruing  from  “green”  innovation  and  the  need,  from  an
ecological  perspective,  for  the  widest  possible  diffusion  of  such  technologies,  as  discussed  in
325 The remedies discussed by the OECD – exemptions for at-risk industries, tariffs, compensation and grandfathering 
rules – tend to interfere either with environmental goals or with “free” trade and competition, but it is argued that 
output-based subsidies may avoid all of these problems. This implies, of course, that governments have to pay 
dearly – in a very direct and literal sense – for any regulation that may impede domestic firms’ competitiveness.
326 The U.S. regional and state-level carbon trading schemes, for example, are mostly located in states that are already 
positioned at the lower end of the very wide range of per-capita carbon emission: While the “high-tech” centers 
Massachusetts and California produced energy-related CO2 emissions of around 9-10 tons per capita in 2015, the 
traditional oil state of Texas clocked in at more than 23 tons. Louisiana, big in shale gas and offshore oil extraction, 
came close to 50 tons, whereas North Dakota – rich in particularly dirty lignite coal – was found responsible for an 
impressive 75 tons per capita (EIA, 2018). This uneven geography – and geopolitics – is characteristic of Green 
Economy efforts more generally: It is the relatively densely populated coastal states with significant stakes in 
“clean-tech” development that are willing and able to reduce their emissions even further. Meanwhile, the rural 
“heartlands” remain dominated by fossil capital and its forays into the exploitation of “unconventional” fossil 
energy sources, with correspondingly much higher emissions trajectories.
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section  5.2.2,  adds  another  layer  of  contradiction  that  renders  the  competitive  paradigm
problematic. The economic benefit of “green” innovation for national economies, of course, does
not  directly  coincide  with  the  global  ecological  benefit  from the  same innovation.  The  former
inheres  in  the  maximization  of  export  revenues,  and  these  are  easily  undermined  by  foreign
competition that leads to greater technology diffusion at lower costs. Restrictive IPRs are thus an
important tool in the competitive struggle, but one that tends to impose ecological costs.
Competitiveness  clearly  only  functions  as  a  “greening”  dynamic  to  the  extent  that  the
elusive alignment between economic and environmental interests can be accomplished. Instead, in
the energy sector, competitiveness concerns tend to be strongly connected to an  energy security
frame in which, as outlined in sections 2.2 and 9.3, renewable energy becomes an additional option
to enhance overall energy supply. As countries seek their comparative advantage in international
competition, the most ironic developments occur with respect to “green” transformation: In Russia,
for example, energy strategies over the past two decades have emphasized the potential role of
domestic renewable energy development as a means of freeing up even greater amounts of fossil
reserves for export, which is understood to be the most economically efficient solution; renewable
energy lobbyists have emphasized the same arguments towards governments in oil-rich Arabian
countries  (N.  Koch, 2018,  p.  532;  N. Koch & Tynkkynen,  2018). In this  case,  “green” energy
development arguably does serve the national competitiveness agenda, but in ways that obviously
do not decrease aggregate fossil fuel use: the Economy of Additionality again.
Even where “green leadership” becomes effective, it tends to be fickle. Historical evidence
shows that if and when competitors catch up, political elites in erstwhile market leader countries can
quickly lose interest in the role of environmental champion. A salient case in point is the wavering
of the German government in terms of its active industrial policy for renewable energy production
as well as of its commitment to relatively ambitious national environmental targets, ever since the
country’s photovoltaics industry collapsed in the face of Chinese competition. At this conjuncture,
the influence of the “gray” energy sector and more powerful export-oriented industries – the car
industry above all – on national policy increasingly prevailed (Boewe & Schulten, 2013; Dehmer,
2016; Frehse et al., 2017; Sander, 2016; tagesschau, 2018). The UK government similarly phased
out much of its support for renewables in the mid-2010s, which led renewable energy investment in
the country to plummet  (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2018, p. 11). National incentive
structures may also change with opportunities in “gray” sectors: Canada, which was credited with
“leadership” in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol in the 1990s (cf. Doelle, 2018), was the first state to
withdraw from the Protocol in 2011 (among those states which, unlike the U.S., had not just signed
but actually  ratified the treaty), to much domestic and international criticism. In the intervening
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years,  exports  from Canada’s burgeoning tar  sands industry had taken off and contributed to  a
substantial  rise  in  carbon emissions;  the  Conservative  government  was apparently  unwilling  to
interfere with its projected continuing growth, which outstripped all prospects in “green” industries
(“Canada pulls out of Kyoto protocol,” 2011; Carrington & Vaughan, 2011). In a rhetorical change
of  course,  the  new Liberal  government  then  contributed  constructively  to  international  climate
diplomacy once more as the Paris Agreement was negotiated, but its domestic policies remain of of
sync  with  the  conveniently  non-binding  agreement  (Doelle,  2018).  Such  “leadership”  may
contribute to the cultural hegemony of  Green Economy solutions327, but it hardly paves the way
towards truly robust international agreements. 
The competitiveness debate further glosses over the constitutive unevenness of the global
economy. If the OECD  (2017b, p. 11) claims that countries specializing in services will enjoy a
head start as economic activity and employment drift away from “dirty” industries and tertiarization
intensifies during the transition to a  Green Economy, the constellation resembles the “leadership”
case: Service-based economies still function on the basis of massive industrial throughput, even if
part of it is outsourced to other locations (cf. section 5.1.2). The concept of a “value chain” involves
a top and a bottom; the idea that every location could equally “move up the value chain” is absurd.
Instead of an evenly proceeding “greening,” the transition may simply reinforce the global division
of  labor  that  has  developed over  the  past  decades,  with “dirty”  industries  further  clustering  in
economically disadvantaged locations, where governments’ last hope for attracting capital is lax
regulation and/or weak enforcement – and maximum levels of extraction. The dirtiest business is
not even all too flexible spatially: The greatest cost externalizations arguably take place in the zones
of raw material extraction (Kalt, 2019), which also happen to be at the bottom of the value chain.
The debate over the migration of firms and industries completely ignores the particular externali-
zations that are concentrated in these zones, below the radar of most economics departments.
UNEP acknowledges that “most environmental goods and services are currently focused in
industrial  sectors  where  many  developing  countries,  especially  low  income  countries,  lack
comparative advantages.” (UNEP, 2009, p. 14) It then concludes that “care should be taken to avoid
or  reduce  any  negative  environmental,  social,  and  economic  impacts  and  to  ensure  global
development gains, as well as ways to address potential losses” (ibid.), but it is unclear how the
“strengthening [of] domestic institutions and regulations” proposed for this purpose is supposed to
counteract the deep global asymmetries at the root of the problem. Likewise, the World Bank tries
to downplay the contradictory interests produced by the uneven geography of global capitalism by
327 Prime minister Trudeau’s (2015) statement on the Paris deal emphasizes carbon pricing and technological 
innovation as solutions, while also including more Green New Deal-type arguments like public transit investments 
and “green” job creation.
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arguing that “developing” countries rich in natural capital have a long-term interest in preserving
these capital stocks and will thus avoid turning into pollution havens  (World Bank, 2012, p. 98).
This is not only imprecise in that it equates the depletion of resources with pollution, it also ignores
that countries at the bottom of the global economic food chain tend to have the least capacity to
defend their long-term interests against short-term pressures. 
The  displacement  of  global  ecological  problems  to  competing  nation-states  is  therefore
inherently  problematic  (cf.  Hay,  1994).  The  “trade  wars”  waged  by  the  Trump  administration
simply  render  more  transparent  an  old  truth:  that  the  liberal-institutionalist  notion  of  global
competitive trade as beneficial to all sides is fictive. Economic competition has always been fought,
to a significant extent, as a game with winners and losers, at the level of individual firms as well as
in  inter-state  negotiations  (and  between  economic  classes).  Uneven  development  obviously
reinforces the divergence of interests and specific policy priorities among states. By contrast, the
Green Economy studies, as argued before, embody the spirit of 1990s liberal institutionalism and
trade-based globalization. Historically, this spirit was quickly confronted with the reality of geopo-
litical conflict. But this grim part of the story is hardly encountered in the GE studies. The GE offers
no recipe to overcome the substantial stalemate in international environmental and climate politics,
the “crisis of crisis management” as embodied by the “Rio Institutions” (Brand & Wissen, 2018, p.
16). As the stalemate constitutes perhaps the greatest  political obstacle to the realization of the
Green Economy policy agenda, this neglect considerably weakens the prospects of such realization.
Structural  reasons  for  this  have  been  outlined  in  section  11.2.  Specific  obstacles  to  “green”
hegemonic leadership will be addressed in the following.
11.4.2 Reproduction cost internalization in a “green” SCA
The GE suggests that the 21st century could indeed be shaped by a “green” cycle as it promises to
internalize socio-ecological costs, in as efficient and capital-friendly a manner as possible. But will
this be conducive to systemic accumulation? What is the nature of these costs in relation to those
incorporated in earlier cycles? Who internalizes them and to what effect?
The Dutch internalization of protection costs, as Arrighi (1994, pp. 144–158) frankly notes,
was importantly a matter of rationalizing the exercise of (often colonial, sometimes inter-capitalist)
state violence; in an important sense, it entailed a re-externalization of the costs of colonial surplus
appropriation to local populations and rival merchants and thus enlarged the net surplus for (Dutch)
capital. Moreover, since the state was brought in as a cheap provider of protection services and took
on the internalized costs in the first place, some of the immediate costs of these services could be
directly externalized to the wider public (assuming that taxation of capital was not the state’s only
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source of funding at the time). Likewise, the internalization of production costs refers to the formal
and real subsumption of labor under capital in emergent British industrial capitalism, which greatly
enhanced  and  systematized  economic  surplus  extraction.  The  American  internalization  of
transaction costs entailed the concentration of capital in large corporations, which then developed
mass production systems that reduced the relative cost of labor. 
In each case, it is clear how these processes – the term “internalization” perhaps being a bit
unfortunate – drove the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. This expansion was uneven,
with the hegemonic center that pioneered these strategies benefiting the most. Viewed in the light of
this  sequence  of  cases,  the  urgently  necessary  internalization  of  ecological costs  appears  as  a
curious successor project. By contrast to its historical predecessors, it is, as discussed in previous
chapters,  not  an  undertaking that  directly  translates  into  expanded reproduction  opportunities  –
quite the contrary. If met with the greatest imaginable success, it could maintain the conditions of
production more or less as they were before, but at quite a net cost. 
Who would want to bear these costs? It is difficult to see how a contender for hegemonic
leadership in the 21st century could benefit from unilaterally internalizing massive ecological costs,
or forcing domestic firms to do so, at least with regard to those costs that do not primarily make
themselves felt within the same national or regional territory (as is the case with greenhouse gas
emissions). In the worst case, it would end up subsidizing the lucrative polluting industries of its
rivals and lose ground in the hegemonic race, in line with the pollution haven argument. Realizing
true hegemonic leadership, it could go ahead regardless and then attempt to broker an international
agreement that ensured a fair ecological burden sharing and more or less neutralized the conse-
quences for competitiveness. But it is in the nature of hegemonic leadership that the leader has to
make short- and medium-term economic concessions to keep a broad coalition together, causing
further costs. These may be worthwhile if it establishes the basis for further differential accumu-
lation that outweighs the losses – but what would form the basis of such accumulation? Green-tech
leadership? Based on the discussions in chapter 10, dominance in the green-tech sector appears to
be a result of successful industrial policy in combination with general comparative advantages in
high-tech  manufacturing  –  but  there  is  little  reason  to  assume  a  direct  causal  link  (in  either
direction) between such industrial success and systematic socio-ecological cost internalization. 
But  even if  the  potential  “green” leader  could realistically  hope to  dominate  the  global
economy on these grounds, this constellation would drive the price for any agreement so high as to
undermine the prospects for any successful “green” diplomacy. In order for the hegemon to benefit
from a relative monopoly in green-tech sectors – monopolies of which kind drove the MC phases of
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earlier SCAs –, it is essential that the rest of the world play along with the “green” transition, which
is increasingly unlikely if the monopoly rent demanded by the hegemon is too high. 
While for previous SCAs, the respective cost internalization necessary to drive capitalist
development forward could be translated into economic dominance for the hegemon in a relatively
straightforward manner, for a “green” SCA, the connection is tenuous at best. At the same time, it is
worth remembering that hegemony has always entailed both the moment of leadership and that of
repressive  force  which  reproduces  patterns  of  unequal  exchange.  The  latter  is  precisely  what
facilitates all manner of cost  externalizations,  and this is one of the perks that make hegemonic
efforts  worthwhile. Against  this  background,  to  posit  socio-ecological  cost  internalization as  a
plausible  modus operandi of a new hegemon means to accept a purely affirmative and comically
incomplete conception of international hegemony.
11.5 A “green” hegemon, or, The China Question
A strong case has been made throughout the political economy literature of the last few decades that
a geopolitical power shift is underway, with economic power in particular increasingly shifting to
erstwhile  “peripheral”  regions  –  most  notably  the  “emerging  economies”  represented  by  the
BRIICS states –, even if this does not imply a complete disempowerment of the old “core” states of
the  capitalist  world-economy.328 The  per-capita  income distribution  by  country  has  seen  heavy
movement since 1990, with the middle stratum of countries – the semiperiphery in world-systems
terms  –  gaining  much  weight  (Grell-Brisk,  2017).  Beyond  positional  changes  of  individual
countries, this implies important structural changes in global power dynamics. Most relevant for our
purpose,  of  course,  are  the  implications  of  this  shift  for  the  prospects  of  green-capitalist
transformation.  Can  the  tendential  de-Westernization  of  capitalism  make  a  world-historical
difference that facilitates “green” development? Is a new “green” hegemon waiting in the wings?
The literature is deeply ambivalent on the “green” implications of this power shift. Schmitz
(2015) argues that in its course, with additional impetus from the 2007-9 financial crisis, “[t]he
rising powers have become the default movers and shakers in the green transformation, in both the
negative and positive sense.” (Ibid., p. 176, emphasis in original) Ciplet et al.  (2015, pp. 41–45),
whose  diagnosis  is  similar,  even  argue  explicitly  that  U.S.  disregard  of  the  threat  to  systemic
stability posed by climate change is a relevant factor that reinforces the decline of the U.S.-led
systemic cycle of accumulation. But this does not mean that potential successors are necessarily
dressed in green; the current global reconfigurations carry more complex ecological implications
(ibid., pp. 34–41): First of all, these shifts themselves are reinforced by the fact that “developing”
328 Arrighi’s late work (2008, 2010) is essentially dedicated to tracing these shifts; further references will be provided 
in the following discussion of the implications for green-capitalist transformation.
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countries possess a greater bargaining power on climate and environmental issues, given that much
of the global stocks of what is now conceptualized as natural capital is located in their jurisdictions.
At the same time, many Southern economies remain dependent on exports – and thus large-scale
extraction  –  of  natural  resources,  which  makes  governments  reluctant  to  agree  to  drastic
environmental agreements (cf. previous section). Then again, even as “emerging” economies shift
to large-scale manufacturing, their economic success hinges on massive externalizations; for China,
the World Bank calculated that its impressive growth rate is almost reduced by half if corrected for
the  costs  of  environmental  degradation  (World  Bank,  2012,  p.  18).  The  resulting  political
implications obviously depend on the effective allocation of these costs.
When considering particular nation-states as contenders for a hegemonic succession,  the
obvious candidate is China. Having flirted with Japan for this role in the 1990s, Arrighi himself
turned to China towards the end of his life, dedicating a monograph to the possibility of a Chinese-
dominated century (Arrighi, 2008). With a territory as large as the United States, China’s population
base is four times as big, and while its rapidly growing economy is nominally still smaller, in the
purchasing power parity ranking it has already outrun the U.S.329 One may argue that China’s statist
development model has, in principle, the capacity to produce significant “anti-market” effects to
direct the “force field” of capital,  as it  has done for other purposes over the past decades.  For
Arrighi,  meanwhile,  a major puzzle consisted in an unprecedented  bifurcation of economic and
military power in the capitalist world-system, with East Asia’s economic ascent taking place in the
context  of  persistent  U.S.  military  dominance.  This,  he  argued,  opened  up  several  possible
trajectories of geopolitical accommodation or confrontation, but none really implied a continuation
of capitalist history; his most favored solution was a Chinese hegemony with certain post-capitalist
traits (Arrighi, 1994, 2008, 2010).330 
This prospect is controversial with regard to both China’s power status and its progressive or
even “green” credentials. Besides its persistent military inferiority relative to the U.S. and the lack
of a power differential comparable to previous hegemonic transitions331, the willingness and ability
329 According to the World Bank database (World Bank, n.d.), retrieved April 8, 2019.
330 Although Arrighi contrasts Smithian and Marxist takes on the historical development of market economies and 
capitalism with great nuance during the first part of Adam Smith in Beijing (2008), the definition of capitalism 
effectively applied later in the book becomes blurry. At the national level, state power and state—capital relations 
for him are the crucial factor determining whether a market economy turns capitalist (ibid., pp. 331–332). In the 
more statist Chinese model, with reference to a longer tradition of East Asian economic culture, Arrighi identifies at
least a tendency towards “peaceful ascendancy” without geopolitical aggression and a potential for greater 
economic equality in a not-really-capitalist market-based economy, without really specifying what may become of 
systemic (i.e., global) capital accumulation. His “revisionist” reading of Smith as basically anti-capitalist and state-
interventionist is also controversial (on this point, see Hobson, 2009).
331 In the American–Chinese case, the potential to match the power differential between old and new hegemon seen in 
previous hegemonic transitions is dubious. From Genoa to Holland and on to the UK and U.S., in each case a 
considerable leap in the relative power of the dominant state over the entire world-system occurred. While China 
could theoretically surpass not only America’s economic but also its military power in absolute terms at some point 
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of the Chinese state to assume the role of a hegemon has been questioned for a number of reasons
ranging from the lack of East Asian political unity to energy constraints to dollar supremacy and the
moderating influence of U.S.–Chinese interdependence (Gulick, 2011; Di Muzio, 2015, pp. 13–15;
Streeck, 2017, p. 37). Its willingness and ability to reconfigure the world-system proactively rather
than  just  defend  the  status  quo  appears  even  more  dubious  (Karatasli  &  Kumral,  2017),  and
Arrighi’s benign characterization of a potential Chinese hegemony has been categorized as “wishful
thinking.” (Robinson, 2008, p. 175) Another observer argues that while China does seek to use its
increasing power to bend the world-system towards a more multipolar and equitable state – pointing
in the direction of Arrighi’s argument –, in the grand scheme of things, China remains “heavily
invested in the capitalist world-system as it exists.” (Grell-Brisk, 2017, p. 8). When Arrighi – criti-
cized by Gulick (2011) for embodying an ecologically ignorant social determinism – concluded his
Adam Smith in Beijing with the sobering comment that China could not possibly follow the Western
development path for ecological reasons but had not yet found a workable alternative, he did not
consider such an alternative path impossible  (Arrighi, 2008, pp. 385–389).332 But this appears to
hinge on his cherished scenario of a vaguely postcapitalist Chinese hegemony. Instead, and in line
with the finding of general Chinese state “conservatism” regarding the capitalist world-economy,
we will in the following consider the possibility of a green-capitalist, Chinese-dominated SCA.
Indeed, while in the course of its economic ascent China has been increasingly plagued with
local environmental degradation problems (McKibben, 2005), and its economy became the world’s
primary emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, China’s “green” development efforts have received
much attention. The  Green Economy  reports are filled with references to Chinese success stories
whose state-interventionist tendency ironically contradicts the GE’s market-oriented approach (cf.
section 10.1.3). The World Bank cites China as a leading example for green growth strategies and
“green” industrial policy in particular (World Bank, 2012, Chapters 1, 3). Further intensifying the
irony,  the  OECD  explicitly  honored  the  12th Five-Year  Plan  (2011–2015)  as  an  example  of
comprehensive national “green growth” planning in its original GE report  (OECD, 2011b, p. 73).
More recently, the 13th plan, which involved an envisaged turn to an “ecological civilization,” was
characterized as an  “important milestone in China’s transition to a more balanced, higher-quality
and greener growth plan” by the OECD (2018c, p. 57).333 It has been acknowledged that levels of
in the future, it will be more difficult to surpass the degree of relative global economic and military power 
monopolized by the U.S. during the post-World War II “Pax Americana” era, at the height of the U.S.-led SCA – not
least because of persistent U.S. military strength.
332 While Arrighi ended his book with these musings about local environmental degradation and resulting social unrest,
it is still fair to say that he bracketed the global climate change problematique when considering the possible 
emergence of a Chinese hegemony characterized by relative peace, stability and prosperity. 
333 This plan partially rests on efforts to “move up the value chain,” i.e., tertiarization processes. While reducing the 
relative carbon intensity of a given country’s GDP, such strategies are unlikely to decrease carbon emissions (or 
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environmental taxation as a share of GDP have been raised (against the international trend) and
Chinese  environmental  policy  stringency in general  has  sharply  increased  since  2000  (DRC &
OECD, 2017, pp. 19–21). The OECD’s daughter organization IEA (2017, p. 3) notes that “China is
entering a new phase in its development,” with increased energy efficiency efforts beginning to
dampen energy demand growth. China is responsible for between thirty and fifty per cent of global
investment in wind and solar energy, overall renewable electricity and electric mobility, respectively
(Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2018; IEA, 2017). In 2017, finally, even coal investment
began to drop precipitously (IEA, 2018b; investment resumed in 2018, however: Carrington, 2018).
Against this background, one may not be surprised to hear that China is on track to meet its
climate-related commitments in  the Paris  Agreement.  Notably,  however,  these goals  are  largely
related to carbon intensity – emissions per unit of economic output – rather than absolute emissions
levels  (Climate Action Tracker, 2018; Li, 2016). For absolute emissions, a peak is promised by
2030, and with a much-noted flattening of the production-based emissions curve in the mid-2010s
(cf. OECD, n.d.), this may appear realistic. It should be noted that this stabilization has taken place
in  conjunction  with  ongoing,  impressive  GDP growth,  signaling  a  significant  improvement  of
carbon intensity within a relatively short time span. At least three reservations are in order, however.
First,  as  a  national  contribution,  China’s  Paris  commitments  are  considered  “highly
insufficient” to meet the Agreement’s goal of keeping global warming below 2° C (Climate Action
Tracker,  2018).334 Second, in  an  economy powered  largely  by  relatively  inefficient  coal  power
plants, initial carbon intensity gains are fairly easy to achieve, and these can temporarily halt overall
increases  in  carbon emissions.  These  short-term advances  do not  mean that  ongoing economic
growth  and  infrastructural  expansion  can  be  sustained  while  gradually  reducing  emissions,
particularly if domestic consumption accelerates. This appears to be the case; more detailed OECD
data  suggests  that  demand-based  emissions  have  continued  to  rise  (OECD,  n.d.).335 Third,  the
stabilization of production-based emissions happened during a brief period of decreasing Chinese
environmental impacts more generally) in absolute terms, as industrial production tends to be either outsourced or 
carried on as a lower-value part of the national economy (cf. section 5.1.2).
334 Such assessments of course depend on political judgments of what constitutes a “fair” contribution of each country. 
The Climate Action Tracker website acknowledges this and, with a complex methodology, seeks a balanced 
assessment under consideration of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility.” (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2019a) The EU’s commitment, in this ranking, is merely “insufficient,” while the United States receives 
the worst grade, “critically insufficient.” China’s rating falls in between the two.
335 According to the OECD database, production-based CO2 emissions (meaning all emissions taking place within 
China, regardless of the place of final consumption of the goods produced) saw a small but steady decrease from 
2013 through 2016, from 9.19 to 9.06 Gt. Demand-based emissions (those embodied in Chinese consumption, 
whether domestic or imported) rose from 7.78 to 7.98 Gt from 2013–2015 (no data available for 2016; retrieved 
April 10, 2019). In 2012–3, when production-based emissions last hiked from 8.81 to 9.19 Gt, demand-based 
emissions saw an even stronger relative and absolute surge from 7.32 to 7.78 Gt. What these figures express is that 
the difference between emissions physically taking place within China and those ultimately “consumed” in China, 
in other words, the net export of emissions embodied in consumer goods, has been shrinking. But see also note 336.
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export volumes, paralleling a mid-decade period of decreasing trade and stagnant emissions at the
global level. As this trend was reversed in 2017, emissions growth resumed, both in China and
globally.336 For 2018, Chinese CO2 emissions growth was estimated at almost 5%, and globally
speaking, “Chinese banks led the underwriting of coal investments.”  (Carrington, 2018) This is
related to a wavering course of government: In 2018, while the state held on to its plan to introduce
a nation-wide emissions trading system in the following year, solar power subsidies were reduced
and a moratorium on new coal power plants was lifted (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). 
Moreover, looking beyond climate change to domestic environmental problems, data show
little variation in terms of population exposure to air pollution through micro-particles and lead; the
macroeconomic costs of these two categories alone as computed by the OECD continue to amount
to almost 10% of Chinese GDP – which itself has continued to grow markedly (OECD, n.d.). While
the  OECD, together  with a  Chinese  policy  think tank,  speaks  of  “absolute  decoupling” in  this
context (as SO2 and NOx emissions appear to have peaked), it also acknowledges that “continued
high levels of exposure have … significant impacts on human health and high social costs.” (DRC
& OECD, 2017, pp. 17, 18)
China’s domestic track record, thus, while demonstrating green-technological progress, is
not one of consistent “leadership.” Its climate policy centers on efficiency gains and technological
advances  rather  than  systematic  cost  internalization.  Much  as  in  the  “old”  Western  centers  of
accumulation,  “greening” is pursued to the limited extent that it  entails  medium-term economic
gains. If China’s GHG-related policies are motivated more by local air pollution and energy security
– given increasing dependence on oil and even coal imports – than climate change concerns  (Li,
2016; cf. Peng & Sun, 2015), this may create synergies, but it also points to the possibility of re-
externalizations  through  spatial  shifts  in  pollution  and  exploitation  of  further  fossil  reserves.
Likewise, the Chinese state’s strategy with regard to the Clean Development Mechanism has been to
prioritize technology transfer in pursuit of economic development, if necessary at the expense of
“green” benefits  (Economy, 2007). Meanwhile, Chinese elites have been willing to “internalize”
certain socio-ecological costs in the sense of bringing them within their national borders and re-
externalizing them to ecosystems and local populations, through the scaling-up of industries whose
very profitability is linked to the local sacrifice zones they leave behind: As one observer of the
toxic tailing ponds of Inner Mongolia’s rare earths processing zone argued, “China’s dominance of
the rare earth market is less about geology and far more about the country’s willingness to take an
environmental hit that other nations shy away from.” (Maughan, 2015, n.p.)
336 “Exports of goods and services” declined globally (US$23.88 tn to $20.88 tn) and in China ($2.46 tn to $2.2 tn) 
from 2014–2016, followed by a rebound in 2017 to $23.06 and $2.42 tn, respectively (World Bank, 2019b). 
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Beyond domestic economic development, however, the decisive question is whether China
is willing to exercise such “leadership” in the international realm to move towards a green-capitalist
framework. At the Copenhagen summit in 2009, the “interaction between a rising and a declining
hegemon”  took  the  form of  a  U.S.–Chinese  collaboration  that  hijacked  the  process  towards  a
binding  agreement  on  emissions  reductions  (Ciplet  et  al.,  2015,  p.  65).  If  the  mutual
accommodation between these two powers, identified by Arrighi (2008, Chapter 10) as one among
several competing responses among American elites, thus serves to derail the international climate
policy process,  the  road to  a  “green” hegemonic transition remains  blocked.  Given the  mutual
economic dependence of both countries on China’s rapid industrialization and mass production –
with U.S. reliance on cheap goods and cheap credit from China, and Chinese dependence on the
U.S.  as  an  export  market  and  reluctant  deliverer  of  foreign  currency  –,  this  stalemate  is  not
surprising (cf. Gulick, 2011; see also Becker, 2013, pp. 40, 48–49).
Pace Arrighi, to the extent that a Chinese bid for global hegemony has materialized, it does
not revolve around the systematic internalization of ecological and social costs of reproduction. The
Chinese  state’s  Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  for  example,  which  provides  strategic  funding  for
economically  relevant  infrastructures  abroad,  may be seen as  a hegemonic project  – but  it  has
received criticism from the GE institutions for its emphasis on carbon-heavy projects (OECD et al.,
2018, p. 5).337 While Chinese state activities in other policy realms such as development and trade
display traits of hegemonic behavior (see also Grell-Brisk, 2017), China’s conduct in climate policy
negotiations, insistent on national autonomy and non-binding targets, is arguably inward-oriented
and, in this sense, non-hegemonic. This is fully consistent with the theoretical perspective offered in
the  previous  section.  Although  observers  have  noted  a  constructive  turn  in  Chinese  climate
diplomacy from Copenhagen to Paris  (Li, 2016) and China has even been hailed for exemplary
leadership when contrasted with U.S. diplomacy under Trump  (see Worland, 2017), the Chinese
state does not appear to be willing – or able – to exercise comprehensive “green” global leadership
in a Gramscian—Arrighian sense, by abstracting from the short-term “national interest” in order to
push the world-system in a particular direction in the medium run. 
337 Such criticism itself may or may not be strategically motivated, but this does not invalidate the factual claim. 
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11.6 Excursion: A “green” Kondratieff and other techno-futures
Arrighi’s is certainly not the only long-term theorization of capitalist development.338 There is an
extensive literature on so-called Kondratieff cycles of economic development that each span about
half a century. At first glance, this concept may appear equally pertinent to the question of “green”
capitalism. So, before summarizing the prospects of a “green” SCA, a brief excursion on long-wave
theory may be useful, both to address other contenders for a tech-driven revitalization of systemic
accumulation and to explain why I prefer to work with Arrighi’s even longer SCAs instead.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this work to fully unpack theories of long waves. But the
general mainstream idea of Kondratieff cycles (alternatively, K-waves or long waves), namely that
(capitalist)  economic  development  historically  occurs  in  the  shape  of  technology-driven  waves
lasting about fifty years from trough to trough, is obviously relevant to technology-centered Green
Economy  models  with a roughly forty-year  time horizon (2011/12–2050).  In the following,  the
prospects of a “green” K-wave will be briefly considered along with the utility of the K-wave con-
cept as an analytical tool to approach the question of “green” capitalism. This excursion also sheds
some light on the relationship between “green” capitalism and other technological macro-trends.
While  Kondratieff  himself  argued  that  “the  long  waves  arise  out  of  causes  which  are
inherent in the essence of the capitalistic economy” (1935, p. 115) and saw the particular timing of
diffusion of technological innovations as a mere consequence of the logic of such cycles, with later
Marxist  interpretations  largely  following  this  causal  hierarchy  (Mandel,  1981;  Mason,  2015,
Chapter  2),  a  reversed  causality  was  soon  after  suggested  by  Schumpeter  (cf.  Rosenberg  &
Frischtak, 1983). With other economists picking up on the Schumpeterian interpretation – according
to which the clustering of innovations drove long-term economic cycles – after interest in long
waves had been revived in the crisis-riddled  1970s, one summary of the literature concluded that “a
core  model  centered  on  technological  innovation  is  emerging.”  (Thompson,  1990,  p.  203;  cf.
Wilenius  & Casti,  2015) Many remained skeptical of the existence and relevance of such long
waves  (Mansfield,  1983;  Rosenberg  &  Frischtak,  1983),  and  technological  explanations  in
particular beg the question as to how path-breaking innovation could recur with such temporal
regularity – with common explanations, such as the replacement cycle for fixed capital (Tinbergen,
1981), appearing rather coarse. 
338 For an overview of “cycles research” from a W-SA perspective, see Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995). Regulation 
approaches which link each particular capitalist regime of accumulation to a corresponding mode of regulation 
likewise highlight political-economic dynamics, but due to their methodological nationalism, they are of less help 
when considering global developments and tend to underestimate the obstacles to the emergence of a green-
capitalist regime. 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 321
11.6.1 The Fifth Kondratieff: ICTs and biotechnology
Still, long-wave theory lived to see the emergence of a fifth Kondratieff cycle supposedly centered
on information and communications technology (ICT) as well as biotechnology, although observers
disagree on its historical beginnings, with estimates – where specified – ranging between 1970 and
the late 1990s (Mason, 2015, p. 48; Wilenius & Casti, 2015, p. 339; Wonglimpiyarat, 2011, p. 68).
ICTs continue to reshape both societies and economies; indeed, currently, a digitalized smart
economy (Vormann & Lammert,  2019) in  which “intelligent” systems are changing production,
circulation and consumption patterns is fast becoming a reality, arguably to a much greater degree
than the Green.339 But not all of this is good news for capitalism. Srnicek (2017, p. 91) interprets the
rise of what he terms the  platform economy as a sign of systemic weakness rather than strength:
“[T]he lean platform economy ultimately appears as an outlet for surplus capital in an era of ultra-
low interest  rates and dire investment opportunities rather than the vanguard destined to revive
capitalism.” Other critics have noted that the effect of ICTs more generally on actual growth and
productivity rates has been nowhere near that of previous cycles shaped by steam engines, railroads,
electricity  or  the  automobile  (Gordon,  2012;  cf.  section  10.2.2).340 Current  economic  research
highlights a number of problems for capital to capture the benefits of ICT development, as well as a
slowdown  in  ICT  productivity  growth  itself  (cf.  discussions  of  the  general  slowdown  of
productivity  growth  in  Goldin,  Koutroumpis,  Lafond,  Rochowicz,  & Winkler,  2018).  For  Paul
Mason (2015), neoliberal wage depression strategies got in the way of fifth-wave development, but
perhaps more decisively, the network technologies themselves do not lend themselves to expanded
macroeconomic surplus-value production. In his view, this blockage may well signal the end of the
historical wave pattern and, thus, of capitalist development. One crucial problem here, echoed by
Rifkin  (2014), is that the informatization of production implies the infinite reproducibility of an
increasing number of relevant goods at  zero or low cost.  “Analog dollars are  becoming digital
pennies,” as even “second machine age” enthusiasts Brynjolfsson and McAfee concede  (2014, p.
110). The other problem is that many of the most spectacular successes in the IT sector are based on
redistribution  via  rents,  not  additional  surplus  production  (cf.  section  5.1.2).  While  Mason and
Rifkin  arguably  overstate  the  digitalization-driven  dematerialization  of  production  across  the
339 The concept of a smart economy speaks to central aspects common to overlapping notions and buzzwords like 
digital capitalism, platform capitalism, the internet of things, the gig economy or sharing economy, as well as to 
many green-tech developments relevant to the Green Economy: All of these promise greater efficiency across 
everyday economic activity through “smart” digital and network solutions. (Some of these terms have been used by 
critics more than enthusiasts, e.g. “platform capitalism” (Srnicek, 2017) or the “gig economy” (H. J. Parkinson, 
2017). They nevertheless refer to phenomena that are hailed by proponents for their “smartness” and efficiency.)
340 Gordon bases his argument on three successive “industrial revolutions” rather than five Kondratieff cycles, but the 
two approaches are largely commensurable. In terms of both timing and cited key technologies, the first two 
“revolutions” in Gordon’s scheme correspond relatively precisely to two Kondratieffs each. The ICT revolution, for
Gordon, already begins in the 1960s, but he dates the ultimate turning point to 1972.
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economy – see section 5.1.2 again – and thus its destructive impact on capitalist relations, the smart
economy remains deeply ambivalent from a systemic accumulation perspective.
Biotechnology, given its discursive proximity to “green” debates,  equally deserves some
attention at this point. Biotech and the “life sciences” have been suggested to align nature with
capital in novel ways. Melinda Cooper (2008) links this “vitalist” ideology to the parallel historical
emergence of neoliberalism, arguing that both share a hope in the self-generative capacities of life
in order to overcome “natural” – even including thermodynamic – limits and sustain accumulation
through “biological  autopoiesis.”  (Ibid.,  p.  31) She emphasizes  the speculative and aspirational
character of this construction: For her, the life sciences complex embodies a new, expectation-based
regime of accumulation promoting biological life’s “transmutation into speculative surplus value.”
(Ibid., p. 148; emphasis added) Investment in this area is not oriented towards profitable production
but counts purely on future patent revenues.341 The speculative turn is born from, and reinforces, the
broader neoliberal tendency towards financialization and speculative accumulation, which arguably
is not conducive to longer-term stability as promised for the GE, nor to the reignition of systemic
accumulation. Finally, Cooper points to new externalizations: “[N]ew life science conglomerates
have not overcome waste, depletion, or any other of the catastrophic limits to life on earth, but they
have simply divested themselves of the costs.” (Ibid., p. 24) In a similar vein, Deckard  (2016, p.
169) concludes that “[b]iotechnology has functioned primarily as a mode of wealth redistribution
and economic restructuring of the world’s food and fuels system” in favor of global capital – a
short-term rather than a systemic fix to underwrite future accumulation. 
Meanwhile,  as  far  as  medicine  –  perhaps  the  biggest  field  of  biotechnological  capital
accumulation – is concerned, the regularly invoked “biotech revolution” has been termed a “myth,”
with critics arguing that the field really has been “following a well-established pattern of slow and
incremental technology diffusion” and the marked rise in publications in genomics has led to very
few drug innovations: “[A]s one moves along the innovation path … evidence for a biotechnology
revolution rapidly diminishes.” (Nightingale & Martin, 2004, p. 564) More recently, a slowdown in
research productivity in the health and pharmaceuticals sectors has been noted (Goldin et al., 2018,
pp.  22–26).  For  biotechnological  advances  in  agricultural  production,  similarly  sobering
conclusions have been drawn (see discussion in section 6.2). Again, we encounter a yawning gulf
between  techno-scientific  potentiality  and  marketed  reality.  The  once  much-hailed  “biotech
revolution” is thus not only questionable in its “green” credentials (much of it not even having to do
with sustainability issues in the first place, and much of the remainder resting on re-externalization
341 Importantly, in the name of securing such revenues, it also always needs to “depotentialize the future possibilities of
life” (ibid., p. 25), for example by sterilizing seeds, such that the need for capitalist control over particular 
deployments of life conflicts with the extolled autopoietic potential of this life.
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mechanisms), but also as a future growth engine. To the extent that life sciences have developed as
a “leading” sector, a large share of the moderate gains may already have been reaped in the pre-
crisis decades of neoliberal ascent.342 Fittingly, literature database searches for “biotech revolution”
produce plenty of visionary book titles from the 1980s and 1990s, and mostly silence for the post-
2008 years.
11.6.2 The Sixth Kondratieff: Nanotechnology and sustainability?
Over the past decade, even as the jury is still out concerning the fate and proper identification of the
fifth wave, a sixth has been variously hailed (Marinova, 2009; Silva & Di Serio, 2016; Wilenius &
Casti,  2015; Wonglimpiyarat,  2011). Sustainable and “green” technology plays a central  role in
these arguments, along with bio- and nanotechnology. Even the argument for nanotechnology is cast
partly  in  terms  of  environmental  benefits  (Wonglimpiyarat,  2011).  While  I  cannot  claim  any
expertise on nanotechnology, its characterization as a potential general-purpose technology that can
reverberate throughout the economy, with many productive applications (productive in the sense of
actually producing value and, thus, surplus value) may be valid. Nevertheless, the question remains
how this particular high-tech trajectory would affect labor productivity and, thus, capital’s overall
capacity  for  surplus-value  extraction  –  and whether  the  much-touted  ecological  benefits  really
materialize. Critical voices note various environmental and health risks associated with nanotechno-
logy applications, including nano-scale air and water pollution, as well as the prospect of a “nano
divide” reinforcing global social  inequalities  (cf.  Marinova,  2009, pp. 1170–1171; Miller, 2008;
Shapira  &  Youtie,  2015).  Shapira  and  Youtie,  who  are  far  from  dismissing  nanotechnology
altogether,  emphasize  that  early  optimistic  predictions  regarding  the  commercial  potential  of
nanotechnology  applications  need  to  be  revised  downwards,  and  “green”  nanotechnologies  in
particular,  such as organic photovoltaics,  are  lagging behind once-envisioned commercialization
trajectories. They point to the need for life-cycle analysis to determine the environmental costs and
benefits of nanotechnology applications relative to conventional alternatives.
The substantive problem with the particular idea of a “green” Kondratieff cycle is that which
recurs throughout this work: It is unclear how the need to rectify capitalism’s socio-environmentally
destructive  tendencies  can  be  molded  into  a  viable  macroeconomic strategy,  even  as
countermeasures  may  yield  quite  a  few  viable  (niche)  business models.  “Green”  sixth  wave
proposals only offer voluntaristic claims; their  economic case remains obscure.343 This is particu-
342 Accepting Cooper’s (2008) claim that investment in life sciences mostly rests on purely speculative longer-term 
returns from intellectual property, of course the possibility that spectacular gains in this sector are still forthcoming 
cannot be ruled out.
343 Silva and Di Serio’s attempt “to establish sustainability as the sixth wave of innovation” (2016, p. 133) is based 
entirely on a simplistic supply-and-demand logic; in their argument, long waves generally arise from social needs, 
and since “[a] society that has high levels of social inequality; transportation difficulties; pollution; poverty; water, 
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 324
larly vexing given that the techno-structure built up across historical cycles of innovation has been
largely cumulative: While steam power may have become all but irrelevant and railroads have lost
much of their relative economic importance, central technologies and infrastructures of previous
waves – steel, electricity, automobiles, petrochemicals – remain important pillars of the present-day
economy and still absorb and valorize considerable amounts of capital. A sustainability-based wave
would need to break with this cumulative logic, taking Schumpeterian creative destruction to an
entirely new level. Whether or not global capital can prove resilient to such shocks is uncertain; so
far, “innovation” has been largely channeled into an Economy of Additionality. 
The general analytical weakness of the long-wave approach, meanwhile, is that it offers no
coherent  theory  of  the  emergence  of  such  waves  in  a  capitalist  context.  The  fetishization  of
technology itself, or of almost agent-less “innovation,” as the driver of capitalist development is a
dead end. In Arrighi’s words, in their agnostic stance towards modes of production, Kondratieff
cycles  (along  with  price-based  “secular”  cycles)  “are  certainly  not  reliable  indicators  of  the
contractions and expansions of  whatever is  specifically capitalist in the modern world system.”
(Arrighi,  1994,  p.  7,  emphasis  added) As  argued  throughout  this  work,  capital’s  technological
selectivity  functions  according to  the  criteria  of  labor  productivity  and profit.  Even more  than
previous technological developments, a “green-tech revolution” is only conceivable as a result of a
concerted political effort that bends the basic logic of capital,  forcing it to submit to ecological
priorities (at least to the primacy of resource productivity). On both these counts, Arrighi’s dialectic
of capitalist and territorial logics of power is much more fruitful.
11.7 “Green” capitalism: A world-systems appraisal
Thesis 11.7: The necessary conditions for a 21st-century “green” systemic cycle of accumulation
remain elusive: The emergence of a wave of green-tech innovation with enough force to reignite
systemic accumulation is as dubious as that of a “green” global hegemon; China appears neither
able nor willing to assume this role. Capital is facing planetary limits: Systemic accumulation has
only proceeded over the past decades at the expense of aggravating present and future ecological
crises, and alternative “engines of growth” capable of resolving these are not in sight. 
Considering the three criteria spelled out in section 11.3, the balance sheet does not look promising
for a “green” systemic cycle of accumulation. In fact, concerning the first criterion – the rise of a
power and food shortages; and violence, among others, certainly needs innovation” (ibid.), a sixth wave of 
innovation to address these ailments must be forthcoming. Similarly, Wilenius and Casti (2015) posit a need and 
desire for more “intelligent” and sustainable technologies as the driving force behind the sixth wave: “As always, 
human intention is what will lead the way.” (Ibid., p. 340) Such arguments not only abstract from political-
economic power relations in assuming a straightforward link between human need or rational insight and 
macroeconomic outcomes. In performing this abstraction, they also lose sight even of the more superficial market 
dynamics that produce such outcomes.
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new hegemon willing to assume “green” leadership –, even the first half is problematic, given that
nation-state power over the world-system appears to have have peaked already in this “full” world.
Gulick (2011) concludes that there is no potential (nation-state) successor to the U.S. that would be
large and powerful enough to lead a new global capitalist regime. Even China eventually remains
“stuck in world capitalism’s closing geo-historical window,” as one of his subheadings reads (ibid.,
p. 25). This particularly involves an ecological dilemma: The Chinese state depends on ongoing
high growth rates to avoid social unrest, but this growth spells ecological disaster. Any hopes that it
could lead a green-capitalist  transition which,  through decisive action in the near future,  averts
dangerous  climate  change  appears  to  be  wishful  thinking,  Arrighi’s  idealization  of  Chinese
hegemony notwithstanding. If Brand and Wissen (2018, p. 18) argue that geopolitical conflicts are
increasingly played out through international environmental policy bodies, it should be noted that
current geopolitical power shifts do not fundamentally transform these conflict dynamics towards
an ecological resolution. If it  were otherwise,  it  is not clear what a hegemon could gain in the
medium term through exercising leadership towards a “greening” of the system. Finally, even if the
political will existed, the availability of sufficiently “green” technology to enable ongoing systemic
accumulation remains more than dubious.
In the hegemonic transitions between historical SCAs, overaccumulated capital tended to
flow from the jurisdiction of the declining to that of the rising hegemon, which Arrighi already
noted was not so much the case this time around with the U.S. and East Asia (Arrighi, 1994, 2010).
Presently, Western surplus capital may continue to flow into real estate and financial speculation,
some of it even into productive outlets in East Asia in line with the general historical pattern – but
hardly with a specific focus on green-tech development as the technological foundation of a new
SCA. This is partly a question of inadequate political frameworks which neglect opportunities to
steer investment patterns, but I would argue that it also testifies to a realistic assessment of medium-
term accumulation opportunities – which in turn prevents the construction of more environmentally
adequate regulatory frameworks. Accumulation by expanded reproduction in the Chinese model, as
everywhere else, is still tied to increasing levels of environmental consumption.
If no nation-state can muster the strength to steer the world-system at all, this reintroduces
the question of a functioning multipolar world order:  Is  there hope of a multilateral  (capitalist)
solution this side of a world state? Moore, building on Arrighi but arguing that their respective
periodizations  only bear  a  “family  resemblance,”  identifies  the  neoliberal  era,  beginning in  the
1970s, as a fifth long-century cycle (Moore, 2015, pp. 119–120).344 This begs the question of this
344 This, of course, contradicts Arrighi’s argument that the neoliberal era simply marks the closing phase of the U.S.-
led cycle, with the usual tendency towards financialization and a brief revitalization of systemic accumulation.
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cycle’s territorial power center. While Moore later, again invoking Arrighi, acknowledges the role of
political—territorial  power (and violence)  in  driving the historical  succession of  what  he terms
“world-ecological regimes” (ibid., pp. 158–165), he does not focus on such geopolitical questions.
If  there  is  a  global  power  regime behind the  neoliberal  era  of  capitalist  history,  it  is  arguably
something along the lines of Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2003), a largely deterritorialized regime of
global capital. Now, one may find that (within this constellation at least) collective or decentralized
leadership towards the systemic internalization of ecological cost appears more politically feasible
than  unilateral  moves  in  this  direction.  But  it  is  precisely  this  outcome  that  three  decades  of
international diplomacy since the 1992 Rio summit have failed to achieve in practice. 
The Empire approach to global governance has been an ecological failure. If we understand
the essence of Empire as the rule of capital, it is not surprising that while this institutional network
may  temporarily  facilitate  systemic  accumulation  –  preferably  by  dispossession  –,  it  is
fundamentally  unable  to  exercise  leadership  that  could  manage shocks  of  the  order  of  climate
change,  constrained  by  its  lack  of  centralized  political-territorial  power  within  a  competitive
framework  and  the  resulting  endemic  short-termism.  In  the  presence  of  the  overdetermining
influence of global capital, effective and halfway equitable solutions appear flatly impossible. In its
absence, however this might be effected, global asymmetries and collective action problems would
not simply disappear, but depending on the preceding concrete historical path out of capitalism, the
prospects for consensus might be somewhat brighter.
If previous hegemonic transitions entailed periods of “chaos” in the world-system (Arrighi
& Silver,  2001),  the  prospect  of  runaway climate  change – even if  its  full  effects  are  not  yet
imminent, not even on a  longue durée timescale – threatens to explode the temporality of such
hegemonic  cycles  altogether.  If  a  benign  perspective  may  conclude  that  Empire  is  merely  the
diagnosis, clouded by the lack of historical distance, of a recurring phase of transitional chaos, it
may be alternatively considered the sign of a more permanent structural dysfunctionality of the
world-system. Besides dire prospects of an authoritarian resolution (as spelled out in the concluding
chapter), this may also offer an opening for progressive change. But the latter would have to take
place in the context of an escalating ecological crisis.   
All  of this supports the W-SA diagnosis of a “terminal” crisis  of a world-system that is
bumping  up  against  planetary  limits  in  more  than  one  sense.  We  here  encounter  the  close
interweaving  of  political-economic  and  structural-economic  constraints.  Within  the  interstate
system that in its effective reach now spans almost the entire inhabitable globe, a greater single
power  center  than  the  United  States  in  the  mid-twentieth  century  is  hardly  conceivable.  The
exhaustion of “commodity frontiers” in Moore’s sense, of nature as both tap and sink, adds a crucial
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ecological  dimension.  These  two “full  world”  dilemmas  are  interlinked in  Arrighi’s  impossible
requirement that the next systemic cycle of accumulation internalize the costs of reproduction – a
contradiction in  terms if  we accept  Moore’s dictum that  capitalism structurally  depends on the
appropriation of  Cheap Nature,  in other words,  on systematic cost externalizations.  One of the
central components of the latest reorganization of global capitalism under the neoliberal regime, in
Moore’s phrase, has been the “radical externalization of biophysical costs” (Moore, 2015, p. 162),
in which various mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession unlocked additional Cheap Natures
while accelerating the degradation of global ecosystems and reinforcing social inequality.345 Capital
indeed appears of “paying its own way” – in the sense of a full internalization of socio-ecological
costs as abstractly promised – while still warranting systemic accumulation opportunities. 
On  this  basis,  capital  has  so  far  weathered  the  social,  ecological  and  economic  crises
reinforced by the  neoliberal  regime.  Even as  growth rates  have  declined  in  Northern capitalist
“core” countries in the wake of the protracted crisis of the 1970s, returns on capital have remained
stable  or  even increased,  just  as  is  the  case  in  the  rest  of  the world  (cf.  data  in  Jordà,  Knoll,
Kuvshinov, Schularick, & Taylor, 2017; Chou, Izyumov, & Vahaly, 2016).346 The OECD database
(OECD, n.d.) records stable growth rates for the global economy even in the post-crisis 2010s, even
noting a slight uptick compared to the overall growth trajectory since 1990. Non-OECD countries
here compensate  for the lower growth rates in the OECD area.347 For capital,  the interim state
captured by the concept of Empire appears to be functional for the time being.
On the face of it,  there is still  territory to be conquered by capital: Further reservoirs of
workers in the South, whole regions underserved in infrastructural terms, billions of aspiring future
consumers.  As  the  developments  in  so-called  “emerging  economies”  underline,  some  of  this
potential is currently being tapped, keeping the global growth machine running. But as has become
equally  clear  throughout  this  analysis,  this  process  is  reinforcing  the  pressures  on  global
ecosystems, on sinks and resources. And the dynamics of accumulation have, historically, always
produced vastly uneven geographies. This tendency shows no signs of abatement. Even as capital
345 In more classically Marxist terms, the “counteracting influences” to a long-term fall in the rate of profit (Marx, 
1981, Chapter 14) – including strategies to increase both absolute and relative surplus value as well as control over 
workers, and to cheapen resource inputs – have prevailed, but at the expense of future development space. The 
appropriation of Cheap Nature plays an important role in this.
346 Chou et al., who examine countries across the world but work with the more restricted time period 1995–2007 
(notably cutting off right before the financial crisis hit), attribute about 20% of the remarkable increase in returns on
capital during that period to a “squeeze” in the labor share of the overall economic product (Chou et al., 2016, pp. 
1149, 1159). Most of the rest is attributed to a rise in “capital productivity,” which category arguably masks massive
ecological cost externalizations.
347 The figures provided translate into a global aggregate growth rate of 3.37% annually from 2010–2016 (compared to
3.3% for 1990–2016). Per-capita growth stands at 2.04% p.a. for the longer period and 2.24% for the 2010s 
(author’s calculations). For the OECD area, the 2010s growth rate slightly declined in absolute terms (2.04% as 
opposed to 2.19% for the entire post-1990 period) and remained stable in per-capita terms, at slightly below 1.5%.
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extends  its  reach  to  the  last  square  mile  of  every  continent  in  a  process  that  some  have
conceptualized  as  planetary  urbanization, signaling  the  disintegration  of  what  used  to  be
“hinterlands” (Brenner,  2013;  Brenner  & Schmid,  2014),  it  cannot  possibly  develop all  of  this
territory evenly. A political ecology perspective illustrates how capital’s structural dependence on
“sacrifice zones” – dumping grounds not so much for surplus capital, as in the happy vision of a
successive build-up of global prosperity, but for waste effluents, the debris of extraction and surplus
populations,  often  joined  in  the  same  locations  –  continues  to  grow.  The  disease-afflicted
populations of such zones are largely sidelined as potential wage workers or consumers. Because of
these necessarily very unequal forms of world market integration, capitalist expansion faces barriers
long  before  the  entire  globe  is  “integrated”  in  the  illusionary,  symmetrical  sense  promoted  by
“development” advocates, including the GE institutions.
In other words, the system has been moving in the opposite direction relative to what Arrighi
considered elemental to its longer-term survival, and this is precisely what allowed it to prosper
during  the  belle  époque of  the  last  few decades  –  and  what  reinforces  the  longer-term crisis
tendencies.  This  strategy may be sustainable  for  a  few decades  to  come,  but  it  is  clearly  self-
undermining in the longer run. The further it is pushed, the lower the chances for a relatively low-
externalization regime of “green” capitalism become. As Patel and Moore (2018, p. 88) summarize:
“Today, those [commodity] frontiers are smaller than ever before, and the volume of capital looking
for investment is greater than ever before … this time there’s no meaningful promise of creative
destruction  –  only  destruction.”  This  gradual  destruction  may  nevertheless  remain  a  capitalist
enterprise for the time being (see section 12.2). But towards the time horizon envisioned here, the
end of the 21st century, the social and ecological contradictions thus reinforced are likely to take
their toll. From this angle, not only a “green” SCA but  any  notion of another “long century” of
revived accumulation in a business-as-usual setting appears an unlikely proposition. In the long run,
capital will prove unable to pay even for the purely functional maintenance of the conditions for its
continually expanding reproduction.
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12. Conclusion and outlook
“[W]aiting for lightning to strike,” Jasper Bernes (2019, n.p.) wrote with regard to the remote but
not quite logically refutable possibility of a green-tech breakthrough to reconcile capitalism with the
global climate, “is not a politics.” As this work has demonstrated, the Green Economy, much like
other visions of “green” capitalism, involves a lot of such waiting for a technological revolution that
is  physically,  historically  and  economically  more  than  unlikely.  Any  green-capitalist  project
ultimately is a gamble on technological solutions, which must be implemented under aggravating
circumstances – such as the capitalist law of value and the resulting imperative of competitiveness –
in  order  to  achieve  the  generalized  absolute  decoupling  of  economic  growth  from  resource
consumption and ecological degradation. All things  considered,  the case for “green” capitalism
boils down to the argument that the possibility of this green-tech miracle cannot be falsified in
theory, even if thermodynamics comes quite close. The argument’s glaring lack of plausibility, how-
ever, can be demonstrated, and this thesis has done so from various angles – structural-economic
and political-economic more than physical. A strategy that depends on the vague possibility of a
miracle in order to safeguard biospheric stability may or may not be aligned with capital’s medium-
term priorities (see section 12.2), but it seems a very imprudent wager for most of humanity. 
The above deserves to be highlighted here as it speaks to the motivation that drove this
work, as explained in the introduction. But let us now turn towards a more systematic summary.
Four  lead  questions  were  posed  at  the  outset. The first  subsection  here  will  offer  condensed
responses  to  the  first  three  of  these  questions  concerning  the  Green  Economy’s systemic
accumulation potential (question 1) and its propensity for cost externalizations (question 2) as well
as the conceptual framework developed here (question 3).  The remainder  of this  chapter is  the
“outlook”  part,  extending  the  fourth  and  final  question  about  the  limits  to  the  “greening”  of
capitalism a little further. Here, I will weave together the insights gathered throughout this disserta-
tion into some reflections on the future prospects for capitalism, including both the possibility of an
authoritarian turn and the implications for resistance movements. For a visualization of the various
conceptual and argumentative strands in this dissertation, see Appendix 3.
12.1 Form over substance: The “actually emerging” GE
Summarized  in  the  briefest  form possible,  the  Green Economy’s  attempt  to  reconcile  capital’s
expansionary force with ecological constraints not only places impossible pressure on hypothetical
technological miracles but also relies heavily on myriad cost re-externalizations, while its potential
to at least attenuate socio-ecological crises is undermined by its very political-economic tameness. 
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With regard to climate change, but also to biodiversity,  the race is  not only against the
“gray”  economy but  simultaneously  against  time.  Even assuming that  infinite  accumulation  on
green-tech foundations was possible in principle, the GE’s factually incremental approach – if often
“transformational,” sometimes even “revolutionary” in rhetoric – would be much too timid to solve
the climate problem in time. A strategy of non-conflictual, incremental transformation is applied to
a situation in which an ecologically overstrained planet is host to – and product of – an immense
“force field” of accumulated capital in search of further valorization. A smooth transition for capital
is  ultimately  prioritized  over  an  effective  transformation  of  economic  infrastructure,  or  market-
oriented form over ecological substance. 
All of this reflects the historical context from which the GE approach emerged around 2010,
namely the battered but hitherto unbroken hegemony of neoliberalism. With political pressure to
resolve socio-ecological  crises still  relatively well  containable,  GE institutions’ response to this
evolving historical context took the form of minimal adaptation – too minimal, arguably, to solve
even the problem as it presents itself to capital as such  (chapter 8). To return to the notion of a
double crisis raised in the introduction, the GE may only attenuate capital’s  crisis of (ecological)
reproduction somewhat while perhaps exerting a palliative effect on the  crisis of legitimacy. This
yields a negative answer to the first lead question: The  Green Economy clearly does not appear
capable of enabling “green” systemic accumulation in the 21st century. Given that this is only partly
due to political choices that are, in principle, corrigible, and partly due to the inevitable structural
paradox of an ever-intensifying “force field” of capital within a finite material environment (see
chapter  4),  as  reflected  in  the  progressive  exhaustion  of  Cheap  Natures  (chapter  6),  this  also
suggests limits to the “greening” of capitalism in general, as enquired in the final question.
In order to be able to approach the second and fourth research questions about the GE’s
adherence to its normative promises and the overall prospects for “green” capitalism, respectively,
this dissertation first assembled a conceptual framework – as demanded by the third question. I
outlined economic, ecological and social criteria for such a formation in section 4.5, followed by an
array of theoretically conceivable “green” systemic accumulation strategies (GSASs) in section 4.6.
“Green”  capitalism,  accordingly,  would  have  to  warrant  infinite  systemic  capital  accumulation
while respecting global ecological boundaries and avoiding local sacrifice zones, as well as limiting
social cost externalizations and living up to its promises of social inclusiveness. The GSASs include
absolute decoupling through technological advances, new Landnahmen of economic territory that
outweigh sustainability constraints  in other sectors, a “downsizing” process of “green” creative
destruction and the appropriation of all manner of  Cheap Nature. These theory-deduced strategic
options are contrasted with three previously empirically inferred macro-strategies  of the GE: The
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ontology of natural capital, the gospel of eco-efficiency and the hidden strategy of problem shifting
through re-externalizations (section 2.6). My investigations have produced a number of findings
regarding both sets of strategies, potential and actual, many of which have already been summarized
in greater detail in chapter 9 and all of which point towards vastly uneven patterns of application.
Concerning the observable macro-strategies, the gospel has already received some attention
in  this  conclusion.  While  it  is  understandably  attractive  due  to  its  perceived  “win-win-win”
potential, the religious metaphor is all too apt here: Effectively, the GE relies too heavily on the
realization of an elusive – even fantastic – green-tech revolution, much like any imaginable green-
capitalist strategy is bound to do. It tends to prioritize incremental efficiency over more far-reaching
consistency developments, and green-tech development and diffusion are impaired, under capitalist
circumstances, by capital’s technological selectivity and the protection of intellectual property rights
(chapter 5). The other two macro-strategies directly collide with each other: The ontology of natural
capital’s internalization agenda tends to be compromised by ongoing re-externalizations. To a large
extent, this is the logical outcome of the  ontology’s capitalist-managerial approach to nature, in
which problem-shifting methods may appear as appropriate managerial decisions in competitive
settings. A consistent institutionalization of planetary management to reduce such problem shifting
at  the global  level,  meanwhile,  is  eschewed as  it  is  understood to undermine global  capitalism
politically and economically (chapter 11). 
Otherwise, the ontology of natural capital comes to be understood in this thesis as a rather
paradoxical approach to the management of capital’s conditions of production by capitalist means,
seeking to maintain ecosystem services in the interest of – and working through – the very same
accumulation  processes  that  have  historically  threatened  their  integrity,  whereas  capitalism has
historically depended on these conditions to be provided cheaply and reliably from “outside” (cf.
discussions in chapter 4). The natural capital approach promises to support systemic accumulation
by  rationalizing  the  escalating  costs  of  environmental  compliance  –  a  negative  systemic
accumulation strategy that combines moderate  “green” creative destruction  measures and  Cheap
Nature  strategies. Against this theoretical background, it is not surprising that so far it has been
largely ineffective macro-ecologically (sections 2.1 and 3.2) – and dominated by the urge to protect
short-term accumulation opportunities. Finally, the re-externalizations macro-strategy (chapter 7), it
bears repeating, is an expectable outcome of market dynamics and power asymmetries in the global
economy. It  not only interferes with effective  natural capital  management but also violates the
broader normative promises of the  Green Economy  as outlined in section 4.5, which with much
fanfare suggest an end to capital’s historical externalization of social and ecological costs.
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Among the available accumulation strategies proposed here, the Green Economy officially
prioritizes GSAS number one, decoupling through technological innovation, in line with the gospel.
In fact, Landnahmen (GSAS 2) and attempts to appropriate relatively Cheap Nature by way of cost
externalizations (GSAS 4, as documented throughout this work) also continue to play important
roles in securing accumulation opportunities, although both can only be considered “green” in an
extremely limited sense. Extensive Landnahmen are largely elusive: Most green-tech development
simply seeks to replace “gray” alternatives in existing markets in line with GSAS 1 rather than to
unlock entirely new markets. Structural imperatives instead point towards intensive Landnahmen in
the form of further privatization and marketization in sectors such as health and education, but also
in “green” sectors such as water and waste management (cf. section 10.1.2). Both GSAS 2 and 4
mostly  involve  accumulation  by  dispossession rather  than  by  expanded reproduction;  this  may
alleviate global-level ecological pressures and resource depletion, but it certainly raises the social
and  more  local  environmental  costs  of  capitalist  development. The  remaining  strategic  option,
“green” creative destruction (GSAS 3), is only envisioned to the limited degree that it facilitates the
rise of “green” sectors and technologies in the course of a relatively smooth systemic accumulation
process (and implemented  to an even lesser degree), while the systematic “downsizing” of global
capital  stocks is  carefully  avoided (see also section 9.1).  This  tentativeness  also hampers  more
transformative consistency approaches to green-technological change.
While attempting to postpone the day of reckoning and to shift costs to a presumably better-
equipped future, green-capitalist strategies continue to rely on all manner of cost re-externalizations
in the here and now: environmental, social, geographical and temporal (chapter 7). This thesis has
sought to trace these patterns of re-externalizations, in response to the second lead question, as well
as  to  assess  the  macro-scale  consequences  of  both tightening ecological  constraints  and green-
capitalist coping mechanisms for global capitalism. The GSAS typology highlights this propensity
for re-externalizations – and, hence, social conflict – within the overall possibility space of “green”
capitalism. Only the first of these four strategies (absolute decoupling) may  potentially  produce
unequivocal “win-win-win” outcomes. In reality, most nascent “green” technologies involve plenty
of re-externalizations if deployed at scale (see bloc III). Further, at least the dispossession-based
part of the Landnahmen strategy (2) is involved in a complex dialectic that signals entanglement in
political-economic struggle at every move – every seizure and every cession of territory will be
contested by capital interests, affected communities and/or voter constituencies. The “downsizing”
strategy of “green” creative destruction (3) is anathema to capitalists as a class, assuming that it
will be perceived as a fundamental threat to the institution of private property even by those whose
property is not directly affected. Even strategies short of expropriation (e.g. pricing policies that
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favor  “green”  alternatives)  threaten  to  lower  economy-wide  average  profit  rates.  Finally,
appropriations of Cheap Nature are frequently met with resistance, and they tend to be understood
as a betrayal of “green” capitalism’s normative aspirations. 
Given  this  combination  of  strategies,  the  evaluation  of  the  Green  Economy’s  merits
according to the three-dimensional functional and normative criteria is not too surprising either: The
economic  dimension,  systemic accumulation,  is  consistently  prioritized  over  the  ecological  and
social dimensions, both of which are heavily compromised. Despite all rhetoric to this effect, no
plausible win-win-win scenario that balances all three is offered. Not only is the envisioned smooth
growth  trajectory  incompatible  with  swift  and  dramatic  action  on  climate  change,  but  broader
criteria of “greenness” such as the avoidance of local sacrifice zones,  high-risk technologies or
structural  exclusion  of  social  groups  appear  impossible  to  meet  thusly.  Questions  of  social
reproduction are ignored in their entirety, and no foundations for a  mode of regulation to mediate
social antagonisms are discernible (cf. section 9.2).
In theory as in practice, much of the  Green Economy focuses on the global South, where
natural capital is now being “managed” in so many projects (section 7.4). Neo-colonial effects here
follow  from  the  downplaying,  or  even  reversal,  of  ecological  debt  on  the  part  of  Northern-
dominated  organizations.  The  Green  Economy  tends  to  recognize  the  greater  responsibility  of,
roughly speaking, the OECD world in principle, but throughout the institutional policy reports, the
ecological  constraints  resulting  to  a  large  extent  from  the  history  of  unfettered  industrial
development in the global North are framed, in the tradition of much Northern environmentalism, in
terms of a global “we” who “are all in the same boat,” or even as a matter of backwardness and
overpopulation  in  the  global  South,  which  consequently  needs  to  be  educated  in  supposedly
successful  Northern  strategies  of  ecological  modernization  (see  section  7.4.1).  The  discursive
shifting of responsibility finds its counterpart in material practices that mainly set to work on the
promised saving of the planet in particular locales rather than others, and these are usually locales
with little responsibility  for destruction,  and where few of the material  benefits  from historical
ecological overshoot have trickled down. The fact that the bulk of the GE reports is concerned with
“greening” Southern development is not only explicable with reference to the valid argument that
the potential for relatively painless “greening” is greatest in areas expecting massive infrastructural
growth. It is also an expression of global power asymmetries that lead to “green” policies being
primarily  targeted to  areas  that  offer  less  political-economic resistance and have few means  to
prevent the economic benefits of such measures from flowing back out to economic power centers. 
Despite geopolitical power shifts that relatively strengthen erstwhile periphery zones, the
GE thus reproduces in principle the uneven geographies of “gray” capitalism, with “green grabs”
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for conservation or biofuel production purposes emerging as new mechanisms that already affect
relatively  vulnerable  Southern  populations  (bloc  III).  Even the  narrowest  definition  of  “green”
capitalism requires global ecological stability, which the GE appears incapable of safeguarding in
the first place. But even if this requirement were met it would leave plenty of room for ongoing
unequal exchange and a stratified global division of labor. In combination, these findings answer the
second lead question concerning the GE’s fulfillment of normative criteria negatively.
During the 2010s, we consequently witnessed the “actually emerging”  Green Economy in
the shape of what  I  proposed to  call  an  Economy of  Additionality,  which develops  alongside a
“gray” economy which also continues to expand rather than being displaced (section 9.3). But when
will the EoA reach its limits? For 2050, UNEP (2011, p. 518) projects that the world will grow
richer in either case – just more so on a “green” trajectory. All of UNEP’s scenarios, however, may
signal a deferral of the real  costs to the post-2050 period, when the mounting immediate costs of
ecological (including climatic) degradation will intersect with the need for intensified, costly miti-
gation efforts. The modest environmental gains projected by UNEP for the 2050 Green Economy,
meanwhile,  may be interpreted as the optimal result considered achievable  without endangering
profitability until that point. The GE thus appears as a medium-term balancing act between obvi-
ously conflicting targets more than a long-term sustainability approach capable of reconciling these.
12.2 The prospects of capitalism, “green” and otherwise
Thesis 12.2: The end may not yet be nigh for global capitalism, but it is unclear whether the likely
trajectory of “muddling through” could last through another “long century.”
While  some aspects  of  the  critique  outlined  in  the  previous  section  are  specific  to  the  Green
Economy as a neoliberal manifestation of green-capitalist thought and practice, the broader discus-
sion of accumulation strategies and constraints suggests that “green” capitalism is generally unable
to resolve the fundamental contradictions between capital and ecology as laid out in chapter 4.
From a world-systems and world-ecology perspective, it is evident that the capitalist world-
economy is bumping up against planetary limits in several respects. Ecologically, planetary bound-
aries  are approaching fast, and some have been crossed (cf. section 2.1). Economically, “cheap”
resources are increasingly hard to come by (chapter 6). Politically, a more powerful hegemon to
steer the interstate system towards sustainability is hardly conceivable, and the centralization of
political power in a “green” world state would undermine capital’s agility (see chapter 11). Greater
amounts of capital than ever before are seeking valorization opportunities, and to warrant these, the
system  has  arguably  moved  away from  the  internalization  of  reproduction  costs  identified  by
Arrighi as the central challenge for a 21st-century systemic cycle of accumulation (see also the more
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extensive  world-systems  summary  in  section  11.7).  The  second  contradiction  of  capitalism  –
capital’s undermining of its conditions of (re)production – is increasingly making itself felt, and
most “greening” measures serve to rationalize the net costs associated with tightening ecological
constraints rather than to boost systemic accumulation positively (section 4.4). No scalable “green”
accumulation regime is in sight, and ambitious cost internalization at a global scale may well push
down the average rate of profit below zero. The conditions for “green” systemic accumulation as
outlined in section 4.5.1 thus remain elusive. Another SCA with reinvigorated systemic accumula-
tion – “green” or not quite so348 – to brave another century appears to be a rather remote possibility.
This completes my answer to the final lead question about  green-capitalist  potential in general.
While this also bodes ill for capitalist futures per se, it does not quite settle capitalism’s fate yet.
If  “greening”  cannot  sustain  capitalism  economically,  what  could?  The  prospects  for  a
revitalization  of  systemic  accumulation  through  trends  other  than  “greening,”  as  discussed  in
section 11.6, are modest:  The variously hailed biotech and nanotech “revolutions” have not yet
materialized  at  a  scale  sufficient  to  carry  the  entire  global  economy towards  a  new period  of
expansion, despite decades of research and substantial advances in these fields. While these sectors
at least suggest a certain accumulation potential, the “digital turn” is ambivalent from a systemic
accumulation perspective – much of the value generated here (but certainly not all) results from
inter-capitalist redistribution rather than original creation (cf. section 5.1.2). But in each of these
cases, of course, an isolated perspective is fruitless. Each of these “revolutions” would have to take
place under conditions of tightening resource budgets and mounting ecological crises – and/or  in
conjunction with a more systematic “greening” of capitalism. But, as demonstrated throughout, bio-
and  nanotechnology  as  well  as  digitization  processes  are  all  deeply  problematic  from  an
environmental perspective. While each promises “smart” solutions that involve certain ecological
benefits, each also brings with it new forms of environmental consumption and risk intensification.
Their attempted marriage with a  Green Economy  approach would entail new contradictions and
trade-offs  between  economic,  environmental  and  social  objectives.  Despite  all  talk  about  the
“immaterial” economy, value creation remains tied to growing material output.
Various readings of the implications of the present constellation for the future of capitalism
are  possible.  Capitalist  dynamics,  involving  both  structural-economic  and  political-economic
constraints, effectively pose an obstacle to a green-technological transformation more than they are
348 Two variants of the question of whether capital could fully “pay its own way” while still warranting systemic 
accumulation opportunities are conceivable: The first relates to full cost internalization in line with the “no 
externalizations” maxim, which is inherently contested – but also appears frankly illusionary. The second variant, 
considered in the following, restricts the question to the functional maintenance of capital’s conditions of 
(re)production. While the deliberations in this thesis allow for an appraisal, a full quantitative assessment of this 
question, in either variant, is not just beyond the scope of this work but arguably inherently impossible. 
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its  driver.  But,  as  one  interpretation  may  hold,  there  is  also  a  contradiction  between these
dimensions, with structural-economic requirements for the survival of capitalism rendered out of
reach by political-economic resistance.  Tragically,  from a macro-capitalist  perspective,  a  Green
Economy  scenario  may  still  be  preferable  to  the  accelerated  doomsday  trajectory  of  “gray”
capitalism  –  but  “progressive”  factions  of  the  transnational  capitalist  class,  including  the  GE
institutions,  have  been  unable  to  effect  a  passive  revolution  in  the  shape  of  thoroughgoing
ecological modernization against the resistance of the “gray” factions  (as detailed in chapter 8). 
In this reading, concerns about medium-term accumulation opportunities for the majority of
this class have so far trumped the longer-term general class interest. “Green” capitalists here appear
as the real, helplessly outnumbered defenders of the status quo, and capitalism – as in so many
prophesies old and new – appears destined to fall over its very own contradictions. In this respect, a
political economy perspective serves as an important corrective that points to the limits of a pure
systemic  accumulation  perspective:  Capitalists  are  always  interested  in  particular  accumulation
opportunities first, and in systemic accumulation second. This is not only to do with the reality of
differential accumulation (as profit rates do not simply level out) but, at least as importantly, with
sunk investments that may place these capitalists in opposition to the majority of their peers. At
certain  junctures,  political  developments  may  be  shaped  by  these  particular  interests  more
immediately than by any theoretical “general” class interest.
In light of the skepticism about the effectiveness of green-capitalist solutions outlined in this
dissertation it is subject to interpretation, of course, whether or not the “general” capitalist class
interest is really better served by a  passive revolution  that slows down accumulation in order to
sustain capitalist relations for a while longer – rather than by one last round of pillage-and-burn.
The “tragedy of political  economy” perspective outlined above obviously insinuates that green-
capitalist strategies are actually effective, or could be. But it is unclear that sufficient social and
physical  terrain  for  further  systemic  accumulation  can  be warranted  in  the longer  run,  with or
without “green” transformation efforts. The logic of compound growth implies that the stakes are
becoming ever  higher,  and each successive accumulation regime must provide for  ever greater
accumulation opportunities – in absolute terms – in an even fuller world, while reservoirs of Cheap
Nature are dwindling. Actual full cost internalization may render systemic accumulation impossible
in the short-to-medium-term: the rational core of the otherwise irrational gray-capitalist argument
for continuing to dance while the music is still playing. This alternative reading implies the outcome
envisioned as inevitable by the eco-Marxist catastrophists: Capitalism is hell-bent to drive straight
over the cliff and take the entire biosphere with it. Today’s reinvigorated right-wing movements
might appear as the flagbearers of such a maneuver. 
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Both of these readings suggest a tragic conclusion for capital itself, with only the former –
for a cheerful reader – allowing for the theoretical possibility of improving the fortunes of “green”
capitalism  through  more  attuned  political  strategies,  and/or  of  “saving  humanity”  through
strengthened  reform efforts.  A third  reading  identifies  a  middle  course  between  the  short-term
disaster, from a capitalist standpoint, of radical “greening” and the longer-term disaster of its non-
occurrence:  A balancing  act  may  be  required  for  capital,  a  compromise  in  which  partial  cost
internalizations designed to  handle the various reproduction crises as efficiently  as possible  are
accompanied by new re-externalizations, a muddling-through to max out the remaining potential for
capital  accumulation – and to stretch it  out across time.  Nascent green-capitalist  tendencies,  as
summarized above, arguably happen to point exactly in this direction. The analysis in section 10.1
further suggests that a more state-interventionist approach – involving the development of a more
fleshed-out green-capitalist  mode of regulation  and more active industrial policy, which of course
already  presupposes  a  shift  in  the  political-economic  balance  of  forces  –  could  improve  the
prospects of green-capitalist survival. Section 10.2 makes it clear, however, that these strategies are
ultimately bound to reproduce the dynamics of capitalist ecological crises, and “green” capitalism
necessarily takes the shape of an Economy of Additionality.
Thus, global capitalism is not necessarily set to collapse under its own weight within a few
decades as  Wallerstein has never  tired of  predicting  (most  recently in  Wallerstein,  2013).349 As
suggested in section 11.7, the accumulation process has remained remarkably vital until this point,
and there is still some room for further expansion – but always at the expense of aggravating the
crises thus deferred. Even with gradually increasing costs of reproduction, capitalism may continue
to “muddle through” for some time to come, in a gloomy inversion of happy  Green Economy
scenarios – with the adverse impact of declining growth rates on profit rates attenuated by mounting
cost externalizations. This slow decline could be intermittently economically brightened by new
growth sectors such as nanotechnology. None of this,  however,  is  likely to provide the sort  of
economic  momentum and  political  stabilization  captured  in  the  notion  of  a  systemic  cycle  of
accumulation, and accordingly, this process may not last through a “long century.” 
In fact, the past decade,  with no structural renewal taking place in the wake of a major
global  crisis,  may be the  first  taste  of  such a  non-stage  of  capitalist  history.  In  its  dire  social
implications,  this  prospect  parallels  Wolfgang  Streeck’s  diagnosis  of  a  “lasting  interregnum”
leading into a “post-social society”  (Streeck, 2017, p. 13, emphasis in original), although Streeck
classifies this as a post-capitalist period already. Indeed, whereas progressive attempts to transform
349 To his credit, Wallerstein does not envision a quasi-automatic breakdown. His verdict is also based on an optimistic 
appraisal of the capabilities of progressive social movements to overwhelm the system through their demands, 
including their refusal to accept further cost externalizations.
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and overcome capitalism step by step, part by part, locality by locality, have proven exceedingly
difficult in the face of the sheer “force field” of global capital that appears able to reclaim any lost
territory rather effortlessly, a  negative  process of gradual, geographically uneven disintegration in
the face of encroaching economic and ecological constraints may be a real historical possibility.
Following waves of capital devalorization, accumulation may again proceed at more local scales,
such that some form of the “downsizing” scenario may yet play out – without necessarily protecting
the  global  biosphere.  In  such a  scenario,  it  may indeed be  difficult  to  identify an unequivocal
threshold beyond which global capitalism no longer is. 
Either  way,  if  systemic  accumulation  depends  on  dispossession  rather  than  expanded
reproduction to an ever greater degree, this only reinforces the validity of a classical historical-
materialist tenet: Social struggles will decide over the fate of this morbid constellation in the longer
run. Capital has been busy fortifying its rule by economic and extra-economic means – it is not by
coincidence that “securitization” has long become a buzzword (see the following section) – but the
“surplus populations” swollen by decades of vastly uneven development have not become quiet
(Clover, 2016). It is a long way to go until the year 2100. 
12.3 The specter and reality of authoritarianism
Thesis  12.3:  Green-capitalist  development  today  already  carries  authoritarian  implications  for
certain populations.  When liberal  strategies  (predictably)  fail,  eco-authoritarianism is  likely  to
become generalized.
What happens if liberal-capitalist strategies for a sustainable global economy do not work out? If
the main priority of current green-capitalist strategies is the perpetuation of capitalist relations, they
may segue almost seamlessly into authoritarian crisis management. If the “co-operative interplay of
technocratic  interventionism,  sovereignty  and  ecological  modernisation”  fails,  as  Mick  Smith
(2009, p. 112) argued, “the bottom line of sovereignty is ... always the state of exception,” the latter
concept  now being  most  prominently  associated  with  Nazi  political  theorist  Carl  Schmitt.  The
“muddling through” scenario, after all, depends on an intensified externalization of the mounting
socio-environmental costs of accumulation, which should in turn intensify social unrest – while
state capacity to mollify such resistance through material concessions is likely to decrease further. 
The most drastic possibility, once these conflicts come to a head, is that of a generalized
eco-fascism, a regime which uses ecological constraints as a justification for a deeply stratified, top-
down regulation of social and individual activity, whether pertaining to consumption, mobility or
political participation. This is not without historical precedent: Polanyi (1965) interpreted the rise of
fascism in the 1920s and 1930s as a response to the excesses of liberal capitalism, which led many
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to renounce the ideal of freedom in the name of order and security (see also Lazzarato, 2012, pp.
108–109).  Societal  relations  with  nature  have  always  mattered  in  such  developments:  For
Horkheimer  and  Adorno  (1969),  the  human  domination  of  nature  and  relations  of  domination
among humans were inextricably linked – and both part  and parcel of Enlightenment ideology,
making fascism the logical successor to liberalism. There is little to suggest that these tendencies
are overcome in the Green Economy approach with its instrumental ontology of natural capital. So
what  if  an  era  of  relatively  politically  unfettered  capital  accumulation  is  producing  ecological
contradictions that cannot be resolved within the expansive system from which they originated? 
From a different angle, it has been noted that democratization and carbonization have histor-
ically developed in close interaction,  such that enforced  decarbonization may end in “predatory
militarism”  or  “totalitarian  retrenchment.”  (Di  Muzio,  2015,  p.  169) In  this  view,  even  more
tragically, it is not so much relations of domination that spawn crises (which in turn reinforce these
relations),  but  the historical  path of  relative  emancipation  from such domination  that  underlies
ecological crisis, by displacing social conflicts into the realm of nature—society relations.350 Neither
perspective bodes  well  for the future of  democracy under ecological  constraints.  Consequently,
many critics  of  “green”  capitalism likewise anticipate  an  authoritarian  turn of  ecological  crisis
management (Ciplet et al., 2015, Chapters 9–10; Kenis & Lievens, 2015, pp. 101–102; Passadakis
& Mueller, 2008). As one observer succinctly put it, “[t]he worst thing about climate change won’t
be its physical impacts; it will be what it makes us do to each other.” (Hance, 2017, n.p.)
This  is  certainly  not  just  empty  speculation.  A  “growing  climate  of  environmental
authoritarianism” has been noted, even within the broader environmental movement (Stirling, 2015,
p.  56).  The  “external”  threat  of  ecological  catastrophe  has  already  led  prominent  voices  of
environmentalism to advocate authoritarian solutions. Perhaps most notably, James Lovelock (2010,
n.p.), known for the Gaia hypothesis in Earth Systems Science, mused that “[i]t may be necessary to
put  democracy  on  hold  for  a  while”  to  address  climate  change;  instead,  “[w]e  need  a  more
authoritative world … You’ve got  to have a few people with authority who you trust  who are
running it.” (For further examples see Machin, 2013, pp. 69–72; White, 2010) Here, remarkably, it
is still assumed that authoritarian interventions could mitigate environmental problems rather than
simply manage the painful adaptation process once mitigation attempts have failed. The recent rise
of  an  anti-environmentalist  Right  (see  section  8.4.1),  meanwhile,  suggests  that  in  yet  another
scenario (perhaps resonating most with Wainwright and Mann’s  (2018) Climate Behemoth case),
neither a liberal nor an authoritarian mitigation period may take place, and an emergent eco-fascism
350 In Exner et al.’s (2008, p. 145) account, the relative democratization (and spike in resource consumption) associated
with the Fordist class compromise signaled such a displacement, from class war to a human war “on nature.”
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may  only  deserve  its  prefix  in  the  sense  of  having  to  deal  with  the  mounting  symptoms  of
ecological crisis somehow, as one aspect of a broader fascist crisis management. In the summer of
2019, this prospect became much more palpable when a White nationalist justified his killing of 22
people in El Paso, Texas – he explicitly targeted “Mexicans” – partly with concerns over shrinking
environmental space, which he wanted to secure for White Americans (Goldstein, 2019).
But  dystopian  visions  of  future  eco-authoritarianism  may  obfuscate  the  more  mundane
realities of deeply stratified societies’ encounter with ecological threats and constraints. Without
accompanying redistributive policies, the quintessentially liberal policy approaches of full resource
and pollution pricing (if seriously implemented) may lead to a form of “market authoritarianism”
that implies the social exclusion of a growing part of the population in many places. An intensified
neoliberalism which, as projected in section 10.1.2, involves the further commodification of basic
social services in the name of “green” accumulation may reinforce such tendencies.
Finally, for many communities – often in the global South –, the embryonic “greening” of
capitalism  already  has  authoritarian  implications.  Those  deprived  of  their  land  through  “green
grabbing,” as detailed in sections 3.2.4 and 7.4, are likely to agree. More dramatically, growing
ecological threats – and unfolding crises that hit the global poor first – provoke not only “greening”
measures laden with re-externalizations but also more immediately authoritarian responses: Chatur-
vedi and Doyle (2015) even speak of “climate terror” to express both the securitization of Northern
climate change discourse (in which climate change is treated much like a terrorist threat and directly
linked to specters of epidemics and mass migration) and the resulting exposure of (mostly Southern)
populations to all  sorts of “counter-terrorist” activities  (see also Baldwin, Methmann, & Rothe,
2014, on the securitization of climate-induced migration discourses). The increasing militarization
of border regimes in both the U.S. and Europe certainly attests to this. The drastically authoritarian
emergency response strategies to “natural” disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. (Klein,
2008, Chapter 20; Cooper, 2008, pp. 92–95) provide another glimpse of what a climate-crisis-ridden
society may look like.351 Critics expect a reinforcement of such uneven development even with the
realization of contemporary proposals for a technology-centered and spatially exclusive Green New
Deal, which would feed on ongoing forms of extractivism outside “green” fortresses (Ajl, 2019). (It
should be remembered, of course, that authoritarianism has been a reality for large parts of the
global population regardless of global ecological constraints or “green” policy schemes.)
351 As Christian Parenti (2017, n.p.) notes with regard to these disaster response patterns in the U.S., “after almost fifty 
years of federally subsidized law-and-order, most cities and counties have a surplus of repressive capacity, yet 
almost nothing in the way of disaster-oriented civil defense.”
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12.4 Strategic implications
These  prospects  confront  progressive  movements  with difficult  strategic  questions.  In  everyday
political  conflicts,  movements  for  environmental,  climate  and  social  justice  frequently  find
themselves caught between the Charybdis of fossil  capitalism and the Scylla of green-capitalist
antidotes. Which to target first? Will present-day green-capitalist tendencies eventually lead one –
small – step forward and soften the blow through partial mitigation, suggesting a case for a tempo-
rary political alignment? Or will their technological fetishism rather lead backwards, precluding any
possibility of averting catastrophe and working towards equitable societies with (physically and
socially) resilient infrastructures and undermine any effective struggle against “gray” capital? 
In this complex constellation, with time running out, the immediate strategic implications
for progressive movements of this analysis of “green” capitalism are difficult to decypher. Review-
ing Wainwright/Mann, Moore/Patel and Malm, Alyssa Battistoni noted that “[i]t is worrying that
thinkers so astute about the dynamics of capitalism and nature appear stymied by how we can
escape them.” (Battistoni, 2018, n.p.) But a tectonic shift has since taken place in the public debate
over the climate crisis in particular (cf. section 8.4.3). I will thus attempt to draw a few – admittedly
broad – conclusions that may contribute to movement strategies in this rapidly evolving situation.
The newly won discursive hegemony of the progressive camp on ecological questions must
now be  translated  into  political  practice.  Given  the  complex  situation,  I  would  suggest  that  a
combination of counter-hegemonic and anti-hegemonic tactics (see section 8.5) is needed.
• Be clear about the nature of capitalism.  The imperatives of systemic accumulation,  and the
potential strategies for sustaining it, are important to understand when devising demands – and
to avoid political dead ends (particularly those involving fetishization of “green” technology or
market-based pseudo-solutions). The systemic scale, however, is a dangerous terrain for move-
ment activity: “The system” as such is intangible, hardly any positive and practical political
prescriptions can be derived from understanding its workings – and the overwhelming power of
the “force field” invites despair. Movements must begin their work at more manageable scales.
• …and about  the  antagonistic  social  relations  involved.  “Win-win-win”  outcomes are  not  in
store. Neither capitalist hegemonic project really pursues these, and there is no reason for move-
ments to accept the skewed green-capitalist “people, planet, profit” formula. “We’re all in the
same boat” rhetoric is patently unhelpful. Conflicting interests must be named, priorities set.
• Be specific. Some of the recent discursive changes indeed seem quite ambiguous politically. The
heightened sense of urgency reflected in the widespread discussion of an “emergency”352 may
352 British newspaper The Guardian announced in May 2019 that it had changed its internal style guide so as to reflect 
escalating ecological crises, with, for example, “climate emergency, crisis or breakdown” to replace “climate 
change.” (Carrington, 2019b) Other media outlets were inspired to consider similar changes (Milman, 2019).
THE PROSPECTS OF “GREEN” CAPITALISM – DISSERTATION (LASSE THIELE) 342
prompt popular mobilization towards a progressive resolution as much as it may culminate in
the declaration of some form of a reactionary Schmittian state of exception. If contained, it may
simply redress the lack of momentum behind Green Economy-style solutions. The Center-Left is
flirting with a Green New Deal, which, as shown here, is not only a fuzzy concept but also just
as dependent on green-tech miracles as the GE. After the shock exerted by a more existential
debate on ecological  crises,  it  will  be particularly  important  for  movements  to  struggle  for
concrete improvements and avert problem-shifting “solutions,” while remaining wary of grand
narratives mainly intended for containment. A Green New Deal, in this view, is nothing to fight
for but something that political elites may be pressured into offering as a compromise. This
would be an intermediate success in need of both attention to detail and further radicalization.
• But don’t get lost in technical detail. The current tectonic shift in the climate debate has much to
do  with  the  circumstance  that  technocratic  droning,  for  once,  has  been  submerged  by
expressions of more existential hopes and fears – which, in this rare case, represent a more
“realist” approach to the topic. The dominant bloc can only hope to return the debate to the safe
level of technical details and cost-benefit analyses, where experts shine and the broader public
inevitably tunes out. While dealing with the nuts and bolts of implementation is unavoidable,
such loss of momentum should be avoided. Cost-benefit analyses are capital’s home turf (cf.
section 7.2.2); the real game must be played on higher grounds if social movements are to win.
• Become autonomous. The struggle for the practical emancipation from capital and its globalized
infrastructures of production and consumption is essential in order to develop resilience against
inevitable capitalist  crises and to build bridges into post-capitalist  futures.  This involves the
community level, which is where (anti-hegemonic) localist movements can shine, but it also
reaches all the way up to the level of high politics: International trade agreements designed to
consolidate the power and reach of global capital are (counter-hegemonic) focal points of at
least the same importance as climate treaties. An important test for any political reform, from a
movement perspective, is whether or not it increases (the potential for) such autonomy.
• Be anti-fascist. The process of emancipation importantly involves the creation of truly inclusive
and  equitable  democratic  structures:  intersectional  politics  in  action.  Once  the  impacts  of
ecological  crises  intensify,  these  structures  will  be  the  best  defenses against  authoritarian
tendencies. A just society dealing with adaptation to 2.5 °C warming looks like a much better
place to live than a deeply stratified society faced with 2 °C, even if the climatic difference
between the two is  significant.  In  fact,  the struggle is  already in full  swing:  In the current
political constellation, what happens to those trying to cross the Mediterranean is at least as
important for climate justice as a European coal phase-out.
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ILLUSTRATIONS 10 AND 11: PLANETARY MANAGEMENT, ALTERNATIVES AND OUTLOOK
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Appendix 4: Abstracts (English and German)
Abstract
This thesis seeks to understand the repercussions of increasing ecological constraints and of the 
imperative of “greening” for the future of global capitalism. It engages in depth with the Green 
Economy (or green growth) approach developed by major international institutions (OECD, World 
Bank and UNEP) and focuses on the centrality, conditions, feasibility and by-effects of systemic 
accumulation in a green-capitalist economy. To theorize these, a conceptual framework is developed
that distinguishes between political-economic and structural-economic constraints and comprises a 
set of functional and normative criteria for “green” capitalism (economic, ecological and social), 
potentially available “green” systemic accumulation strategies and empirically observable green-
capitalist macro-strategies. This framework draws on a wide range of critical theory, including 
Marxian economics, regulation theory, world-systems analysis, Jason W. Moore’s world-ecology 
approach and further writings in political ecology.
It is found that a combination of political-economic and structural-economic constraints renders the 
market-oriented Green Economy approach largely ineffectual with respect to its declared intentions. 
Its non-confrontational politics are too passive even to realize a minimal “passive revolution” in the 
Gramscian sense. Instead, the “actually emerging” Green Economy assumes the form of an 
Economy of Additionality that leaves the fossil-fueled infrastructure of global capitalism in place 
and develops little transformative power. Prevalent “green” strategies partially internalize socio-
ecological costs only to re-externalize these to vulnerable populations and ecosystems, in violation 
of the Green Economy’s normative standards and “win-win-win” promise. 
Generally, most “greening” measures do not contribute positively to systemic accumulation but 
merely attempt, by rationalizing the maintenance of capital’s conditions of (re)production, to reduce
the drag on accumulation exerted by ecological degradation and resource depletion. Against this 
background, the pressure for a “green-tech revolution” to resolve the fundamental capital—ecology 
contradiction is enormous, but the unprecedented absolute decoupling of systemic accumulation 
from environmental consumption remains physically and politically extremely unlikely, and “green”
capitalism’s dependence on its realization is a very risky wager. These structural constraints equally 
apply to more politically balanced alternative green-capitalist projects such as neo-Keynesian 
proposals for a Green New Deal, suggesting systemic limits to the “greening” of capitalism. The 
hypothetical full internalization of socio-ecological costs, while not precisely quantifiable, might 
well render further systemic accumulation impossible by pushing down profit rates. Global 
capitalism is approaching planetary limits, the potential for the appropriation of “cheap nature” is 
increasingly exhausted – and “win-win-win” scenarios for nature, society and capital are not on the 
horizon. 
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation versucht die Folgen sich zuspitzender ökologischer Einschränkungen und des 
Imperativs der Nachhaltigkeit für die Zukunft des globalen Kapitalismus nachzuvollziehen. Sie 
beschäftigt sich eingehend mit den „Green Economy“- (bzw. „green growth”-)Modellen wichtiger 
internationaler Institutionen (OECD, Weltbank und UNEP) und konzentriert sich auf die Zentralität,
Bedingungen, Machbarkeit und und Nebeneffekte systemischer Akkumulation in einer grün-
kapitalistischen Ökonomie. Um diese theoretisch zu umreißen, wird ein konzeptuelles Gerüst 
entwickelt, das zwischen polit-ökonomischen und strukturell-ökonomischen Beschränkungen 
unterscheidet sowie einen Satz funktionaler und normativer Kriterien für einen „grünen“ 
Kapitalismus (ökonomisch, ökologisch und sozial), potentiell verfügbare „grüne“ systemische 
Akkumulationsstrategien und empirisch feststellbare grün-kapitalistische Makro-Strategien umfasst.
Dieser theoretische Rahmen schöpft aus einer breiten Spanne an kritischer Theorie, darunter 
marxistische Wirtschaftstheorie, regulationstheoretische Ansätze, Weltsystemtheorie, Jason W. 
Moores world ecology-Ansatz und weitere Schriften in Politischer Ökologie.
Im Ergebnis sorgt eine Verbindung aus polit-ökonomischen und strukturell-ökonomischen 
Beschränkungen dafür, dass der „Green Economy“-Ansatz im Hinblick auf seine erklärten 
Zielsetzungen größtenteils wirkungslos bleibt. Seine nichtkonfrontativen politischen Strategien sind
zu passiv, um auch nur eine minimale „passive Revolution“ in Gramscis Sinne zu erwirken. 
Stattdessen entwickelt sich die tatsächlich entstehende Green Economy als eine Ökonomie der 
Zusätzlichkeit (Economy of Additionality), die die fossil betriebene Infrastruktur des globalen 
Kapitalismus unangetastet lässt und wenig transformative Kraft entfacht. Vorherrschende „grüne“ 
Strategien internalisieren sozial-ökologische Kosten partiell, nur um diese dann auf anfällige 
Bevölkerungsgruppen und Ökosysteme abzuwälzen (Re-Externalization), im Widerspruch zu den 
normativen Standards und den „Win-win-win“-Versprechen der „Green Economy“. 
Grundsätzlich tragen die meisten „grünen“ Maßnahmen nicht positiv zu systemischer 
Kapitalakkumulation bei, sondern versuchen lediglich, durch die rationalisierte Erhaltung der 
Grundlagen kapitalistischer (Re-)Produktion die negativen Auswirkungen ökologischer 
Beeinträchtigungen und schwindender Ressourcen auf den Akkumulationsprozess zu vermindern. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund besteht enormer Druck, durch eine „grüne technologische Revolution“ den 
fundamentalen Kapital/Ökologie-Widerspruch aufzulösen, doch die historisch beispiellose absolute 
Entkopplung systemischer Akkumulation von Umweltbeanspruchung bleibt physisch und politisch 
extrem unwahrscheinlich, und die Abhängigkeit des „grünen“ Kapitalismus von ihrer Realisierung 
bedeutet eine äußerst riskante Wette. Diese strukturellen Beschränkungen gelten ebenso für 
politisch ausgewogenere grün-kapitalistische Alternativprojekte wie die neo-keynesianischen 
Vorschläge für einen Green New Deal, was systemische Grenzen für eine „Ergrünung“ des 
Kapitalismus andeutet. Die vollständige Internalisierung sozio-ökologischer Kosten, wenngleich 
nicht genau quantifizierbar, könnte weitere systemische Akkumulation durch das Herabdrücken der 
Profitraten unmöglich machen. Der globale Kapitalismus nähert sich planetaren Grenzen, 
Potenziale für die Aneignung „billiger Natur“ (Cheap Nature) sind zunehmend ausgereizt – und 
“win win win”-Lösungen für Natur, Gesellschaft und Kapital sind nicht in Aussicht.
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